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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1390, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1390 2009-11-24 04:26 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1390/01 3280426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240426Z NOV 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2783
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9521
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0918
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001390 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage November 21-23 on developments in cross-Strait relations; 
on AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt's visit to Taipei; and on several 
Taiwan fishing boats, which were detained by the Burmese navy on 
November 19. 
 
2. Editorials and commentaries in Taiwan's papers continued to 
discuss U.S. President Barack Obama's China visit and changes in 
U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.  An editorial in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" and an op-ed in the KMT-leaning "China Times" urged 
the public to pay attention to the warning signals sent out by 
Obama's China visit.  An op-ed in the pro-unification "United Daily 
News," however, called for new thinking and interpretation of the 
Obama-Hu joint statement.  Several op-ed pieces linked AIT Chairman 
Burghardt's Taiwan visit to the Obama-Hu meeting and said Taiwan 
needs "strategic reassurance" from the United States.  An editorial 
in the China-focused "Want Daily" discussed the United States' 
future role in Asia, and an editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" discussed the "Chinese lesson" Obama 
has learned during his visit.  End summary. 
 
A) "Attach Great Importance to the Warning Signals Sent out by 
Obama's China Trip" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 680,000] 
editorialized (11/21): 
 
"... Despite all these, the fact that [U.S. President Barack] Obama 
has allowed China to dictate nearly the entire agenda regarding the 
cross-Strait issue was a big warning sign for Taiwan.  In addition 
to touching lightly on the well being of the Taiwan people, in his 
joint statement with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Obama stated his 
respect for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  This was 
originally the wording consistently used by the Beijing government, 
but it will certainly limit Taiwan's room for maneuver and violated 
the fifth item of the 'Six Assurances' made by President Ronald 
Reagan in 1982: namely, the United States does not agree to alter 
its position about the sovereignty about Taiwan.  Likewise, Obama's 
[assertion] in the joint statement regarding 'looking forward to 
efforts by both sides to increase dialogue and interactions in 
economic, political, and other fields was also inconsistent with the 
third item in the 'Six Assurances': namely, the United States would 
not mediate between Taiwan and China.  Without a doubt, the Ma 
Ying-jeou administration should be held entirely responsible for all 
these [developments]. ... 
 
"AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt is coming to Taipei Sunday to brief 
our country on the details concerning Obama's China trip.  Given 
that the Ma administration claimed that there is no difference 
between the developments in the Obama-Hu meeting and 'the 
information it acquired prior [to the meeting], it seems quite 
natural that it will not proactively request that Washington clarify 
the many doubts [that the people have] about the trip, as 
anticipated by those who are concerned about Taiwan-U.S. relations. 
When the Taiwan people observe the changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations 
in the wake of Obama's China trip, the arms sales, such as the F-16 
fighter jet deal, will be a major point of interest, which is also 
one of the solid indicators that can be used to examine the real 
reason for Burghardt's visit. ..." 
 
B) "New Thinking There Should Be in Interpreting the Obama-Hu Joint 
Statement" 
 
Chao Chun-shan, Chairman of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Studies 
and a professor at Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of China 
Studies, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 
540,000] (11/21): 
 
"... Judging from the above-mentioned strategic and tactical 
perspectives, we believe that the signals President Obama wants to 
convey via the Obama-Hu joint statement were merely a reflection of 
a series of tactical adjustments the new U.S. administration has 
made in terms of its cross-Strait policy in the face of the changes 
inside and outside [the United States]. ... Due to the changes in 
the [global and domestic] landscapes, we will not over-interpret 
some of the wording in the Obama-Hu joint statement. ...  Also, we 
believe [the fact] that Taiwan's security was not mentioned in the 
joint statement is a logical effect resulting from the alleviated 
situation across the Taiwan Strait. ...  We believe that the United 
States will faithfully implement its commitment made under the 
'Taiwan Relations Act' to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan, because 
it is conducive to peace and stability in the region and therefore 
meets the U.S. national interests. 
 
"Finally, in terms of the [call for] political dialogue across the 
Taiwan Strait, an issue that has drawn the most attention lately, we 
believe that the relevant wording in the joint statement did not 
violate the United States' long-standing call for both sides to 
resolve their differences using peaceful means. ..." 
 
 
C) "[AIT Chairman] Raymond Burghardt Arrives in Taiwan to Explain 
the Obama-Hu Meeting:  the United States Only Offers a [Justifiable] 
Explanation?  [Taiwan] Wants Strategic Reassurance" 
 
Professor Edward Chen from Tamkang University's Graduate Institute 
of American Studies opined in the pro-unification "United Daily 
News" [circulation: 400,000] (11/23): 
 
"AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt has arrived in Taipei and will offer 
an explanation for the Obama-Hu meeting.  Since both the U.S. 
Congress and the U.S. media believe that Obama made too many 
concessions to Hu Jintao, Burghardt, in addition to providing 
'strategic reassurance' to Taipei this time, should also provide 
support for the policy and [various] projects on which Washington 
and Taipei have been working together. ...  Since Washington has 
guaranteed more than more once [prior to the Obama-Hu meeting] that 
it would not disappoint Taiwan and has agreed to make it up to 
Taiwan afterwards, Burghardt should not just be offering an 
explanation this time but should provide 'strategic reassurance' to 
Taiwan.  What really matters is that strategic reassurance cannot 
just be lip service but must be accompanied by [real] support for 
the policy and [various] projects on which Washington and Taipei 
have been working together.  These should include strengthening 
U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation projects, concrete measures to 
support Taiwan's participation in international organizations or 
international establishments, as well as Washington's approval to 
sign a U.S.-Taiwan extradition agreement, visa-waiver [program] 
agreement, trade and investment framework agreement, and a free 
trade agreement in the future." 
 
D) "Attach Great Importance to the Cross-Strait Crisis Caused by the 
United States' Pro-China [Attitude]" 
 
Former DPP Legislator Julian Kuo opined in the KMT-leaning "China 
Times" [circulation: 120,000] (11/23): 
 
"... For the first time in the joint statement, there appears [the 
wording of] 'respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and neither side supports any attempts by any force to 
undermine this principle,' and only the three [U.S.-China] 
communiqus, not the 'Taiwan Relations Act,' were mentioned.  Based 
on this fact, China will certainly expand its interpretation by 
saying that 'the United States respects China's sovereignty and is 
opposed to Taiwan independence.'  ([Former U.S. President Bill] 
Clinton only mentioned that [Washington] does 'not support Taiwan 
independence' and never said 'being opposed to Taiwan 
independence.')  Or further, Beijing will demand that Washington 
respect China's 'Anti-Secession Law.'  ([Former President George W.] 
Bush was opposed to the 'Anti-Secession Law.')  If the United States 
does not express its views otherwise, it will be akin to 
[Washington] acknowledging that Taiwan is China's domestic issue, 
and the United States will thus lose its role of providing strategic 
balance in the Taiwan Strait. 
 
"The joint statement also commended the outcome of the visit to the 
United States by the vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military 
Commission, in October this year, stating that [Washington and 
Beijing] will take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable 
military-to-military relations in the future.'  What matters is that 
the major appeal made by the Chinese official during his U.S. trip 
was that 'U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are the hurdle for Sino-U.S. 
relations.'  Washington's acceptance of such a statement implied 
that there might be changes to its arms sales to Taiwan. ...  What's 
most important is that the United States has attached importance to 
the fact of China's rise, saying that it welcomes a strong, 
prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world 
affairs,' and it also defined U.S.-China relations as a 'partnership 
that will address common challenges in the 21st century.'  In order 
to seek China's cooperation, Washington not only has denied the 
'China threat theory,' but it no longer highlights the importance of 
human rights. 
 
"The United States has made such concessions to show its weakness -- 
from respecting China's sovereignty, looking into its arms sales to 
Taiwan, expressing expectations for peace talks across the Taiwan 
Strait, and welcoming China's rise to avoiding mentioning democracy 
and human rights; all these have indicated the decline of the U.S. 
hegemony and the rise of U.S. realism.  Judging from a long-term 
historical perspective, Obama's China visit may just be an initial 
reaction by the United States toward China's rise, and it is certain 
that in the future Washington will do more things tilting toward 
China that will disappoint its allies and bitterly upset Taiwan.  In 
this vein, the major 'regression' in Taiwan-U.S. relations' is 
nothing but one of the [series of] effects from the United States 
coping with China's rise. ..." 
 
E) "How Is the United States to Lead and Direct Asia?" 
 
The China-focused "Want Daily" [circulation: 10,000] editorialized 
(11/22): 
 
"... A bigger political problem for Obama in the future is that in 
his 'Asian policy' speech in Tokyo, he declared that the United 
States is interested in developing relations with Asian nations and 
will continue to maintain a leading position in the Asia-Pacific 
area.  The question is how is the United States going to lead Asia 
while the strength of China is coming close to that of the United 
States today?  The United States must adopt a low [profile] and be 
flexible in taking advantage of smart power to make major 
contributions in Asia, so that it can play a leading role in the 
area. ... 
 
"In reality, when it comes to dealing with the global financial 
crisis and the challenges of traditional and non-traditional 
security issues, the importance of U.S.-China relations prevails 
over that of U.S.-Japan relations.  But in terms of the East Asia 
strategy and regional security in Northeast Asia, U.S.-Japan 
relations outweigh that of U.S.-China relations.  By maneuvering 
these two sets of relations appropriately, the United States should 
be able to contribute to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region. ..." 
 
F) "An In-depth Analysis of the Sino-U.S. Joint Statement" 
 
Professor Tsai Wei from Chinese Cultural University's Sun Yat-sen's 
Institute for Globalization Studies opined in the China-focused 
"Want Daily" [circulation: 10,000] (11/21): 
 
"... Finally, we should pay attention to the fact that the 
China-U.S. joint statement possibly indicated that along with the 
growth of mainland China's economic and political strength, the 
United States will do more to confirm, understand, act in concert 
with, and even acknowledge Beijing's position.  Even though 
Washington will not and has no intention to betray Taiwan, Taiwan's 
role and importance will, over time, be more marginalized.  This is 
a developing process from a quantitative change to a qualitative 
change, and it will not shift its direction as Taiwan's willpower 
hopes it will.  Taiwan's situation will only be all the more 
difficult." 
 
G) "Obama's Chinese Lesson" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (11/21): 
 
"US President Barack Obama's visit to China was most notable for his 
hosts' refusal to play his game. Nothing could have been more 
symbolically ludicrous and deflating for Obama and the dignity of 
the office of US president than speaking before a bunch of 
hand-picked university students taking part in a 'town hall' address 
in Shanghai. ... What this trip has done is give Obama something 
very personal that might challenge the stance of those under him 
that the Chinese government should, in effect, be afforded 
diplomatic unaccountability. With direct experience of the ill will 
and hubris of Chinese politicians and media appointees, together 
with predictably limited progress on regional, environmental and 
human rights issues, Obama will not take home anything like the awe 
for Chinese might and history that Mao Zedong inculcated in former 
US president Richard Nixon when they met in Beijing. 
 
"The part of the US establishment that allows North Korean autocrats 
to be named as such and Chinese autocrats to be feted and empowered, 
therefore, may find that Beijing's refusal to find common ground 
with the West on basic levels of diplomatic courtesy will impress 
itself on the US president. Taiwan can only gain from this, though 
the effects are likely to be subtle and gradual, and certainly not 
enough to justify a reduction in vigilance.  It has been said 
before, but it needs to be said again and again: Beijing's communist 
government regards open displays of goodwill from the West 
patronizingly at best, but more often with suspicion and open 
contempt. In Obama's case, however, Beijing has adopted an 
astonishingly cavalier approach at a symbolic level with the one 
world leader whose friendship it could have employed for the 
betterment of all.  Even by the complex and inscrutable standards of 
much statecraft, Beijing has presented Obama and the American people 
with a regrettable message: Give us face when making deals -- but 
leave your principles at home." 
 
H) "U.S. Must Clarify Stance on Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (11/23): 
 
"...The absence of the TRA from the Joint Statement was particularly 
unfortunate since the latter was the first such broadly stated 
expression of commitment on numerous issues between the U.S. and the 
PRC for over two decades and because the joint statement contained 
 
an unprecedented agreement to Beijing's insistence on respect from 
Washington for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity within 
the context of 'building and deepening bilateral strategic trust' 
and as 'the core of the three U.S.-China communiqus which guide 
U.S.-China relations.'  It is likely that American Institute for 
Taiwan Board Chairman Raymond Burghardt, who arrived yesterday to 
brief President Ma Ying-jeou and his Kuomintang administration and, 
hopefully, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, that the 
issue of 'sovereignty and territorial integrity' does not refer to 
Taiwan.  Since the Joint Statement does not explicitly include a 
recognition by Washington that 'Taiwan is part of the People's 
Republic of China' (as it did regarding Tibet), Burghardt might 
argue that the U.S. is agreeing only to 'respect' of a general 
principle and the U.S. has only 'acknowledged' but never 
'recognized' Beijing's claim that Taiwan is 'part of China' or 'part 
of the PRC' under the latter's 'one China principle. 
 
"Nevertheless, we cannot help but be concerned that Beijing will 
take advantage of this seemingly new expression of Washington's 
"respect" to bolster its international propaganda that 'Taiwan is a 
part of China' and downplay the TRA, especially since this 
affirmation was preceded by a paragraph in which Beijing defined its 
meaning by emphasizing that 'the Taiwan issue concerns China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.'  However, the Obama 
administration should keep in mind that the language of the Joint 
Statement skirts very close to contradicting the 'Six Assurances' 
commitments made to Taiwan in July 1982 by the late U.S. president 
Ronald Reagan, including his promise that Washington would not play 
a mediation role between the PRC and Taiwan or alter its position 
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. Moreover, the Joint Statement 
also showed that Washington is pleased to see the improvement in 
cross-strait relations and the resumption of dialogue between Taipei 
and Beijing after the restoration of KMT rule last year under Ma. 
 
"Nevertheless, Washington should pay attention to an increasing 
number of indications that this 'improvement' is more apparent than 
substantive and more fleeting than lasting and not overlook growing 
dissent within Taiwan over the pace, scope and the lack of 
transparency and democratic accountability in Ma's cross-strait 
policy.  The expression in the Joint Statement that the U.S. 'looks 
forward' to 'efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and 
interactions in economic, political, and other fields' creates an 
impression of endorsement for Ma's one-sided and China-centric 
cross-strait policy and the extension of 'political' or even 
'unification' talks for which there is absolutely no consensus in 
Taiwan.  This statement is particularly alarming since it seems to 
encourage Beijing's current intensification of pressure on the Ma 
administration to enter into 'political talks,' as illustrated by 
the calls by several heavyweight PRC scholar-officials for political 
negotiation during a conference held earlier this month in Taipei. 
 
 
"Obama could have provided more balance and upheld democratic 
principles if he had reiterated the content of the statement by his 
predecessor Democratic president Bill Clinton on Feb. 24, 2000 that 
'the issues between Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully 
and with the assent of the people of Taiwan' during his post-summit 
press statement.  We urge Burghardt to reaffirm to both the Ma 
administration and the Taiwan people that U.S. policy toward Taiwan 
has not and will not change even though Washington is deepening its 
'strategic partnership' with Beijing and that the Taiwan Relations 
Act remains the foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.  The AIT 
chairman should also clarify that the U.S. has no intention to push 
Taipei into 'political negotiations' with Beijing and should confirm 
that the Obama administration respects Taiwan's democratic system in 
terms of how its cross-strait policy is forged, including the 
democratic principle that the resolution of issues between the PRC 
and Taiwan must have the 'assent' of the 23 million Taiwan people." 
 
 
STANTON