Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1380, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CHINA VISIT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09AITTAIPEI1380.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1380 2009-11-19 09:48 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1380/01 3230948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190948Z NOV 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2758
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9515
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0914
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CHINA VISIT 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage November 19 on U.S. President Barack Obama's China visit 
and Taiwan's reactions to the joint statement inked by Obama and his 
Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao on November 17; on developments in 
cross-Strait relations; and on the year-end city mayors' and county 
magistrates' elections around the island. 
 
2. Several editorials and op-ed pieces in Taiwan's papers continued 
to discuss the Obama-Hu joint statement and the reasons why the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was not mentioned in the statement.  An 
analysis in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" said the Obama-Hu 
joint statement was harmful to Taiwan, because Beijing can use it to 
put pressure on Washington in the future in terms of U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan and cross-Strait relations.  A column in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" said the joint statement 
indicated that future U.S.-China relations will move toward the 
direction of "more cooperation and less confrontation."  A separate 
"United Daily News" column said the fact that the TRA was not 
mentioned in the U.S.-China joint statement can be viewed as a 
warning signal for Taiwan.  An editorial in the KMT-leaning "China 
Times" interpreted the signals behind the Obama-Hu joint statement 
and said the statement will definitely become the guideline for 
U.S.-China relations during Obama's term of office.  The article 
also urged Taiwan to express its disagreement with the statement to 
the United States when Washington sends its envoy to Taiwan next 
week.  A separate "China Times" column said the joint statement 
showed that Obama has finally acknowledged China's influence in the 
international community.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taiwan News," however, said Obama "basically did 
not depart substantively from existing U.S. policy on the Taiwan and 
Tibet issues despite intense pressure from the PRC."  End summary. 
 
A) "Obama-Hu [Joint] Statement Harmful to Taiwan; Is the Ma 
Administration Wide Awake Yet?" 
 
Washington correspondent Nadia Tsao wrote in a news analysis in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 680,000] (11/19): 
 
"If the Ma Ying-jeou administration still believes that [current] 
U.S.-Taiwan relations are better than those during the [former Chen 
Shui] Bian administration, the U.S.-China joint statement made 
public on November 17 should deal a blow and wake Taiwan's leader 
up.  This is because the statement clearly indicated that in [U.S. 
President Barack] Obama's head, he never thought of Taiwan's core 
interests at all.  Should things go on according to the logic of the 
joint statement, any further developments of cross-Strait relations 
will be like the 'one China' as Beijing defines it. ... 
 
"On top of the United States' reiteration that it respects China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, what has kept [us] on our 
toes by the November 17 joint statement is the fact that the Taiwan 
issue will be dealt with under the premise that Washington and 
Beijing establish and deepen their strategic mutual trust.  In other 
words, if the Obama administration wants to carry out the 'strategic 
reassurance' policy proposed by Deputy Secretary of State James 
Steinberg to ensure that China's rise will not pose any threats to 
other countries, Beijing, in return, can also request that 
Washington carry through the one China policy as part of the 
strategic reassurance.  Therefore, it requires [our] close attention 
as to how Beijing will use this joint statement to put pressure [on 
Washington] in terms of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or further 
political talks across the Taiwan Strait. 
 
"There is no lack of mid- or high-level officials in the Obama 
administration who understand and sympathize with Taiwan; however, 
judging from Obama's trip this time, he is a U.S. leader who has no 
[specific] ideology and has almost no understanding of, or feeling 
for the historical background of what has been happening in the 
Taiwan Strait.  It will be a challenge for Taiwan to try to make 
Obama understand the situation Taiwan is in and its core interests, 
and, obviously, the Ma administration has fallen short in this 
respect. ..." 
 
B) "Obama-Hu Meeting Seen in the Eyes of Beijing" 
 
The "United Notes" column in the pro-unification "United Daily News" 
[circulation: 400,000] wrote (11/19): 
 
"... For Obama's visit to China this time, Beijing has attached 
great importance to how he would define their bilateral relations, 
and 'to establish strategic partnership' became a commitment that 
Beijing badly craves.  Obama, however, did not disappoint Beijing; 
the "China-U.S. joint statement' clearly indicated that the United 
States and China have decided to continue their strategic and 
cooperative partnership and to deepen strategic mutual trust.  Even 
though the two sides may disagree [on some issues,] [what is 
important is to] respect and accommodate each other's core interests 
and major concerns.  This statement indicated that U.S.-China 
relations will move toward the direction of 'more cooperation and 
 
less confrontation' in the future. ... 
 
"... In addition, Beijing realizes that, due to the counter attack 
by the Republican Party, Obama is now facing strong political 
pressure, so he needs to score points by cooperating with East Asia, 
and China is a major target for Obama.  As a result, under the 
strategic framework of China-U.S. cooperation and the situation that 
cross-Strait relations have been improving, the 'rock' -- Taiwan 
issue -- that originally stood in the road of China-U.S. relations 
has been moved to the side and is no longer the stumbling block 
hindering Beijing-Washington ties. ..." 
 
C) "Shouldn't the DPP Be Held Responsible [for the Current State of 
U.S.-Taiwan Relations]?" 
 
The "Black and White" column in the pro-unification "United Daily 
News" [circulation: 400,000] wrote (11/19): 
 
"... [U.S. President] Obama did not mention the 'Taiwan Relations 
Act' (TRA) in Shanghai on November 15.  Some may thought he just 
missed it, and, as expected, he verbally mentioned the TRA in his 
joint press conference with [Chinese President] Hu Jintao 
afterwards.  Unexpectedly, however, the TRA went missing again in 
the Obama-Hu joint statement.  Among the three occasions, the 
formal, written joint statement is naturally the most significant 
one, so one cannot say it is not a warning signal [for Taiwan]. 
Besides, the joint statement said the United States welcomes the 
'peaceful development' in cross-Strait relations (Beijing's official 
wording).  Such a statement can all the more be regarded as [a move 
showing] Obama has endorsed Hu's cross-Strait policy. 
 
"Given such a situation, not only has the pressure on cross-Strait 
relations increased, but also there are some doubts in terms of 
Taiwan-U.S. relations.  If Taiwan wants the United States to take on 
more commitments that surpass its capability or willingness to take 
on risks, it seems reasonable should the United States decide to 
back out or fade away. ..." 
 
D) "Carefully Interpret the Signals in the Obama-Hu Joint 
Statement" 
 
The KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 120,000] editorialized 
(11/19): 
 
"... The [U.S.-China] joint statement is perhaps the most important 
document regulating China-U.S. relations following the three 
U.S.-China communiqus.  It may be an overstatement to call it the 
fourth communiqu, but the joint statement will definitely be a 
guideline document for China-U.S. relation during Obama's term of 
office.  China and the United States have signed communiqus and 
agreements in the past, but in the part on Taiwan in the Obama-Hu 
joint statement, there are several points that are obviously 
different from all the previously signed documents. 
 
"First is about the proposal and confirmation of the core interests. 
 The statement particularly pointed out that China's and the United 
States' respect for each other's core interests is the key to ensure 
a healthy development of bilateral relations.  Here, U.S. core 
interests is not the point; what matters is that China's core 
interests are ensuring its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Even though neither side specified what this [statement] really 
refers to, Hu Jintao, nonetheless, further indicated in the press 
conference that 'on issues such as Taiwan, [the United States] 
respects China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.'  Obama, on 
the other hand, also said he respects that 'Tibet is part of China.' 
 All these have clarified that the core interests refer to the 
Taiwan and Tibet issues and that the United States must respect 
[China's interests] and thus has no right to intervene. 
 
"Second, Taiwan's security is not mentioned [in the joint 
statement].  In all its previous statements or talks about 
cross-Strait [issues], the United States has always mentioned the 
'Taiwan Relations Act' (TRA) or its commitment to Taiwan's security' 
in tandem with the three U.S.-China communiqus, but unexpectedly 
not in this formal document.  Even though perhaps Washington will 
reiterate it afterwards, the effect will not be as strong as in a 
joint statement inked by two state leaders. ...  Third, the United 
States' expectations for political talks [across the Taiwan Strait] 
have gradually assimilated with China's attitude.  When speaking of 
its hopes for cross-Strait political talks in the past, Washington 
only said that it hopes to reduce tension, but in the joint 
statement, it clearly stated that 'it looks forward to efforts by 
both sides to increase dialogue and interactions in economic, 
political, and other fields.'  This [statement] has exactly matched 
mainland China's latest policy toward Taiwan. ... 
 
"There were actually signs that can be traced as to why Obama would 
be tilting [toward China] to such an extent. ...  In addition to the 
fact that China is in possession of 600 billion U.S. dollars worth 
 
of U.S. government bonds, Washington needs to work with Beijing on 
issues ranging from climate change, the economic crisis, or even 
global security; it also needs to acknowledge China's rise and 
accept the fact that the two countries will govern the world 
together.  On the other hand, though it is no longer possible for 
the United States to be the only superpower in the globe, Washington 
is not resigned to being pushed out of the Asia Pacific region by 
China.  On the contrary, it wants to join the region more 
proactively. ...  Given all these factors interwoven together, the 
United States [agrees to] yield to China's core interests, in 
exchange for China's not objecting to the United States' continued 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region and for Beijing's active 
coordination with Washington on global issues.  This can be viewed 
as a sensible deal, with Washington feeling pleased, China feeling 
happy, and all the Asian-Pacific nations feeling relaxed.  Perhaps 
the only ones that are sacrificed are Taiwan and Tibet. 
 
"The joint statement signified a major change in U.S.-China-Taiwan 
relations.  Though there are elements related to international 
structure [behind it], the Ma administration's national security 
team is obliged to find out how this process resulted in such an 
outcome.  First, if the United States had informed [Taiwan] in 
advance of the content [of the joint statement], the national 
security decision-making agency would be considered to have 
neglected its duty by failing to handle it prudently and responding 
to it solemnly.  If Washington did not even notify us or if Taiwan 
did not learn of it at all in advance, it would be even more 
worrisome.  It is reported that the United States will send someone 
to explain this to Taiwan next week, and Taiwan should seize this 
opportunity to express its disagreement [to the statement] and let 
Washington assure its security commitment to Taiwan via remarks made 
openly by high-ranking [U.S.] officials or concrete actions such as 
arms sales [to Taiwan], in an attempt to revise step by step the 
direction of the joint statement. ..." 
 
E) "Obama Acknowledges China's International Influence" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 120,000] wrote (11/19): 
 
"...No matter how swift and fierce China's rise is, it will be 
difficult for it to become a worthy opponent of the United States. 
Then what is it about China that the United States cares most?  The 
answer should be its 'international influence.'  The one thing that 
Washington cannot tolerate and fears most is that the influence of 
other countries surpasses that of the United States.  [To achieve 
that] requires not only powerful military force and strong economic 
power but also many other factors.  How can one influence and win 
others over if it has mighty military power but wages war 
frequently, and if it has a lot of money but is heartless and 
heavily in debt?  Yet it happens that the United States has been 
having such troubles over the past few years, and, as a result, it 
has gradually lost the respect of others and its influence in the 
international community has also declined little by little. 
 
"By contrast, China somehow has [benefited from its] peaceful rise 
over the past few years, and its modesty has won it respect.  It 
'gave away' the money it has earned from the United States and 
Europe to the Third World, with no strings attached.  It does not 
care about suffering a loss when making friends in Asia, and it 
never preached to any other countries; it develops modern weapons 
but never brags about them.  China is completely independent in 
terms of the direction of its foreign relations, and it never favors 
any country or blocs.  Also, it constantly emphasizes the United 
Nations.  All these have helped to increase China's influence in the 
international community. ...  One can say that the growing Chinese 
influence is the result of the decline of U.S. [influence.]  In 
consequence, the thing that the United States fears most has finally 
happened: it appears that China's international influence will 
likely surpass that of the United States.  Just take a look at the 
China-U.S. joint statement, which has covered almost every important 
issue in the current international community, and Washington 
requires Beijing's assistance on all these matters.  Isn't that akin 
to acknowledging China's influence in the international community 
publicly?  No wonder China welcomes it earnestly." 
 
F) "Obama's Asian Policy and Taiwan's Challenge" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (11/19): 
 
"The first Asian tour by new U.S. President and Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Barack Obama manifested the new American regional agenda 
whose importance transcends the traditional fixation in Taiwan on 
the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle.  In contrast with the 
unilateralism of his predecessor, Obama sent a message that the U.S. 
aims to launch a comprehensive re-engagement in the Pacific 
community during a major speech on his Asian policy delivered in 
Tokyo November 14. ...  Some of Obama's themes clearly reflected a 
 
continuity of U.S. interests, especially Washington's concern with 
opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism as grave 
threats to the security of both Asia and North America through 
various channels, including the six-party talks on North Korea. 
While this effort will help ensure that Washington's influence on 
these two issues will not fade, another consequence will be the 
enhancement of the PRC's weight in regional security and this is a 
development that merits close concern from Taiwan. ... 
 
"Hence, while Obama emphasized his hopes that the U.S. and the PRC 
can become 'strategic partners' in efforts to promote economic 
growth, energy security and regional stability, the Democratic 
president was willing to annoy PRC State Chairman Hu Jintao by 
stressing the universality of 'fundamental human rights' for 'all 
peoples' and by announcing the restoration of a bilateral 'human 
rights dialogue' early next year and openly 'encouraging' Hu to 
resume serious dialogue with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual 
leader and his fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate.    Obama's 
transparent intent is to secure the cooperation of the PRC in his 
global and regional strategic agenda undoubtedly enhances the CCP 
regime's strategic leverage which will undoubtedly be utilized to 
exclude Taiwan from these regional processes and push to achieve 
substantive and perhaps legal 'unification.' 
 
"Nevertheless, Obama basically did not depart substantively from 
existing U.S. policy on the Taiwan and Tibet issues despite intense 
pressure from the PRC.  Moreover, despite Obama's vague statement of 
'respect' for the 'sovereignty and territorial integrity of China,' 
the U.S. president pointedly highlighted the Taiwan Relations Act of 
1979, which commits Washington to ensure Taiwan's security and 
treats Taiwan for all legal purposes as a distinct state, along with 
the so-called 'three communiqus' as constituting the foundations of 
Washington's 'our one-China policy.'  Facing this new complex 
situation, Taiwan official and civic forces must set aside cherished 
illusions or obsessions and adopt proactive diplomatic efforts based 
on democratic values and endeavor to link with other democratic 
states to promote a 'democratic rise' to promote a free and 
prosperous East Asia." 
 
STANTON