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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1339, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. BEEF IMPORTS TO TAIWAN, PRESIDENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1339 2009-11-10 09:30 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1339/01 3140930
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100930Z NOV 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2688
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9491
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0900
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. BEEF IMPORTS TO TAIWAN, PRESIDENT 
OBAMA'S TRIP TO ASIA 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage November 10 on rumors that the United States had halted all 
U.S. beef exports to Taiwan given the Taiwan government's tight 
control over the product; on developments in cross-Strait relations; 
and on the unidentified cash flow to Palau in 2005 and its possible 
connection with former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. 
 
2. Editorials and op-ed pieces in Taiwan's papers appeared to have 
shifted their focus to discuss cross-Strait and other local issues 
rather than U.S. beef exports to Taiwan.  Only one column in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed AIT Taipei Director William 
Stanton's recent analogy about the risk of eating U.S. beef and 
riding scooters and President Ma's analogy regarding the risk of 
eating U.S. and smoking or eating betel nuts.  The article said 
Stanton's remarks and logic exposed the chauvinistic mentality of 
U.S. officials stationed in Taiwan, while Ma's remarks revealed his 
ignorance of the fears and desires of the ordinary people in Taiwan. 
 With regard to U.S. President Barack Obama's upcoming trip to Asia, 
a column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the new term 
"strategic reassurance" coined by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
James Steinberg and U.S.-China relations.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" urged the Obama 
team to "resist the temptation of gaining 'concessions' on unrelated 
issues by nodding along as Beijing inevitably introduces policies or 
slogans that injure Taiwanese interests."  End summary. 
 
3. U.S. Beef Exports to Taiwan 
 
"Hidden Discrimination of the VIPs" 
 
Chang Ta-chuen, a well-known Taiwan fiction writer and social 
critic, wrote in his column in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 520,000] (11/10): 
 
"AIT Taipei Director William Stanton said when he delivered a speech 
at National Chengchi University on October 26 that the cases of mad 
cow disease in the United States are far lower than the death rate 
caused by scooter accidents in Taiwan.  Stanton also said candidly 
that a Korean student once asked him:  'How do you know one will not 
die from the mad cow disease by eating U.S. beef?'  [Stanton said 
he] asked a question in reply:  'How do you know you would not go 
blind when you watch a Samsung television?'  [These remarks] 
immediately triggered a wide and indignant discussion among the 
[Taiwan] public. 
 
"Such highly controversial remarks have fully exposed the 
chauvinistic mentality of the U.S. officials stationed in Taiwan. 
If such logic were tenable, the United States should then remove all 
the travel barriers it has taken the lead to design for the sake of 
protecting its homeland security -- the probability of air disasters 
caused by carrying a 300 milliliter bottle of water is far lower 
than that of getting cancer in the United States, and can the 
passengers use [such logic] to resist the requirement for security 
check at the airport? ...  If such counter-questions are untenable 
in practice, on what ground is Stanton's theory convincing to 
anyone? ... Stanton looked quite complacent after having made such 
undesirable remarks, and the local media, having rushed to bicker 
[about them] for a while, stopped looking into the matter anymore. 
Oddly enough, why doesn't Taiwan, which is known to be an 
independent sovereign state, immediately protest to the United 
States against Stanton's discriminatory and discreet remarks?  As it 
turns out, our own national leader also thought it that way. ... 
 
"... Why didn't Ma try to save those [who smoke and eat betel nuts 
in Taiwan by banning the two products] while he can?  The reason is 
quite simple, and one can understand it real quickly through 
Stanton's remarks:  Looking at these living, ordinary people from 
the eyes of the VIPs who stand up high, dress very clean, and enjoy 
good health and hygiene, all they see is probably the approval 
ratings they imagine them to be.  In other words, they are blind to 
the fear, risks and desires that most people feel in their lives." 
 
4. President Obama's Trip to Asia 
 
A) "How Come the White House Has yet to Set the Tone on 'Strategic 
Reassurance'" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 120,000] wrote (11/10): 
 
"It goes without saying that the climax of U.S. President Barack 
Obama's trip to Asia will be his visit to China.  Prior to his 
departure, the official and private think tanks in the United States 
have sent out signals about what he might talk about [with Chinese 
President Hu Jintao].  But they have failed to mention 'strategic 
reassurance.'   This is a new term coined by [U.S.] officials, but 
why did they forget to mention it when they should? ... 
OBAMA'S TRIP TO ASIA 
 
"According to [U.S. Deputy Secretary of State] James Steinberg, 
strategic reassurance is a 'bargain.' ...  He also added that [U.S.] 
arms sales to Taiwan are conducive to regional stability, and that 
it meets the interests of Washington and Beijing to have serious 
discussions on [regional stability] and [the United States] is 
interested in listening to Beijing's views [on the topic].  The 
United States will not eliminate the legitimacy of Chinese military 
modernization, but it would like to hear some powerful [reasons] 
from China so that Washington can understand better that some of 
[China's] military programs are consistent with its objective of 
peaceful development, [Steinberg said]. 
 
"Such a reply is full of loopholes.  Every country is legitimate in 
developing its national defense, and does China need the United 
States to acknowledge its military modernization?  The United States 
needs to understand clearly the programs in China's military 
development, and if it fails to do so, does it mean that they cannot 
be regarded as peaceful development?  When it comes to arms sales to 
Taiwan, Washington's one and only reply is to 'act in accordance 
with relevant laws concerning Taiwan.'  Does that leave any room for 
further discussion? ..." 
 
B) "A Quiet, But Strong Obama" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (11/10): 
 
"... Even so, the House of Representatives vote was a much-needed, 
if temporary, victory for the White House as Obama prepares to set 
out on a four-nation tour of Asia, including China and Japan. The 
Japanese leg of the trip is less problematic than it seems. The 
leftist government of Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is 
quite predictably moving back to the center of reality of Japan-US 
relations; not even a fuss over US troop deployment in Okinawa 
amounts to as much as some observers fear.  It is in China that 
Obama's mettle will be tested. North Korea's weapons program may be 
the main game, but it is quite easy to overstate what can be 
achieved on this matter on this tour; the same applies to the other 
leading issues on the table.  For Taiwanese, the primary concern 
instead is what signals, if any, Obama will send on cross-strait 
relations. There is no reason why Obama and his aides would wish to 
make an impression with Beijing on Taiwanese affairs -- other than 
to quickly acknowledge and deflect China's perennial fears of a 
hardening of cross-strait policy. One thing that President Ma 
Ying-jeou's time in office has delivered to Washington is a relative 
lull in the unification debate that gives it breathing space to do 
this, and so work cooperatively with China on practical matters. 
 
"It is therefore unrealistic to expect anything resembling Taiwan 
advocacy during Obama's trip to China; if nothing else, this would 
be most undiplomatic on a first presidential tour of the US' primary 
economic and military rival. The best Taiwan can hope for is a proxy 
discussion on human rights, though even this is likely to be 
low-key. 
For the moment, Taiwanese can settle for a sotto voce approach by 
the US on cross-strait tensions. They do not expect gratuitous 
pronouncements of limitless military support and platitudes on 
shared values. They cannot expect the US to be a cheerleader when so 
much in the Taiwanese political environment is unstable and lacking 
in consensus.  What Taiwanese do expect is a US president who will 
not weaken himself and his country -- and the region's stability -- 
by confusing diplomatic goodwill and compromise on key strategic 
points. This Chinese government remains canny, ambitious and 
ruthless; no sober observer should assume that its development as a 
world power entails reciprocal goodwill, least of all to a 
government whose power and wealth it covets but whose founding 
principles it despises. 
 
"Taiwanese are all too familiar with news of well-meaning envoys 
visiting China and leaving with a full stomach and a pat on the back 
for repeating slogans that the Chinese then use for domestic and 
international propaganda. In recent years the British and Australian 
governments have proven themselves to be particularly vulnerable to 
this. It is hoped that the Obama team, for its part, will resist the 
temptation of gaining 'concessions' on unrelated issues by nodding 
along as Beijing inevitably introduces policies or slogans that 
injure Taiwanese interests.  In Asia, as with domestic politics, the 
key for Obama is to keep his allies on side and quietly let his 
rivals know who's boss. However imperfect, that's how things get 
done." 
 
STANTON