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P 060703Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6754
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDC
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002642 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, IO-UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IO PGOV PREL SO AU
SUBJECT: USAU: SYNOPSIS OF AMISOM CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH 
TCCS AND PARTNERS 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The November Consultative Meeting of AMISOM 
stakeholders reveals a precarious security situation and 
danger in continuing status quo support to both AMISOM and 
the TFG.  While all stakeholders agree that AMISOM must not 
fail, few donors are willing to provide sufficiently flexible 
funding or lethal assistance to both AMISOM and the TFG. 
Good news includes the addition of a Djiboutian contingent to 
AMISOM, EU resumption of funding in December, the 
establishment of a TFG radio station, and the fact that the 
TFG has paid at least some of its soldiers.  The bad news is 
that AMISOM still has not achieved its mandated end strength, 
and is still suffering from arrears in salaries, insufficient 
equipment, and a stalemate over reimbursement from the AU for 
contingent-owned equipment.  Somali Police salaries remain in 
arrears, and both the AU and donors are concerned with the 
slow pace of the TFG in reconciliation and expansion of 
governance, as well as poorly stated needs and lack of a 
security framework to govern foreign assistance and security 
sector reform.  The group revalidated AMISOM's existing 
mandate, but called for an adaptation of rules of engagement. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) As is customary, international partners were invited 
on November 2 to the culminating portion of the day's 
consultative meetings between African Union (AU) Peace and 
Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, Ministers of Defense 
from AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCC), and other 
stakeholders.  (Note: MoDs from Burundi, Djibouti, Somalia, 
and Uganda were in attendance.)  Lamamra began by giving a 
synopsis of preceding closed deliberations, saying there had 
been no major developments since the last such gathering.  He 
stated, however, that political reconciliation efforts by the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continue.  Lamamra 
admonished the TFG for its lack of cohesion and encouraged it 
to expand its governance beyond Mogadishu.  While extremist 
elements still dominate the media in Somalia, Lamamra praised 
the TFG for establishing a state radio station to counter 
insurgent misinformation. 
 
General Security Situation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Lamamra characterized the security situation as "more 
mediocre" than before, with "ping-pong" control of Mogadishu 
between TFG/AMISOM forces and the Islamic insurgent group 
al-Shabaab.  Lamamra laid some of the blame for this lack of 
capacity at the donors' door, saying that much of what had 
been pledged at the March Donors Conference in Brussels had 
yet to materialize.  Friendly forces, Lamamra said, are still 
suffering from a lack of critical military equipment.  Other 
noteworthy comments included: 
 
- Expansion of AMISOM with a formal contribution of troops 
from Djibouti; 
- TFG payment of salaries to 3,214 Somali National Armed 
Forces (SNAF); and 
- Non-payment of TFG police forces (more for a lack of 
mechanism than funding). 
 
¶4. (C) Lamamra also made the case for additional TFG forces, 
saying that the government needs 8,000 military personnel and 
a police force of 5,000 to secure Mogadishu.  He estimated 
that an additional 8,000 troops would be needed to secure the 
central and southern portions of Somalia.  Lamamra ended his 
resume of the security situation by saying Somalia is 
volatile and unpredictable, and added that the status quo is 
untenable. 
 
AMISOM Mandate and Rules of Engagement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Lamamra reported that the group had determined 
AMISOM's existing mandate to be sufficiently robust and 
flexible.  However, AMISOM's rules of engagement (ROE) needed 
to be adapted to allow friendly forces to take preemptive 
military action in certain cases.  Lamamra also articulated 
the need for improved equipment and resources to allow AMISOM 
to be proactive, striking "the snake amongst its eggs." 
(Note: Interlocutors tell us separately that a major concern 
with the ROE is AMISOM's limited ability to protect key 
installations from terrorist attacks, which is a concern both 
from a force protection standpoint and because these 
installations are key revenue earners for the TFG.) 
 
Training for TFG Forces 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Lamamra welcomed the many offers of training for TFG 
police and military forces, but entreated the TFG to provide 
a better framework to harmonize international support, 
including policies, doctrine, and a comprehensive list of 
needs.  He asked international partners to ensure that their 
training packages are standardized and adapted to Somali 
needs, and requested that the packages include essential 
equipment.  Lamamra stated that partners must also budget for 
salaries for uniformed Somali personnel, or risk losing them 
to the insurgents once deployed.  Finally, he cautioned 
partners to ensure ethnic and clan balance in the units they 
train. 
 
The Somali MoD Weighs In 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) In contrast to his predecessor Dr. Gandhi, newly 
appointed Somali Minister of Defense Abdallah Boss Ahmed was 
at times both defensive and accusatory.  Extremists, he said, 
took advantage of the complete lack of support from the 
international community to attempt to overthrow the TFG in an 
offensive that lasted from May to July 2009.  He claimed 
twice that his government had received none of the support 
pledged at the Brussels conference.  Nonetheless, Boss 
reported that the parliament had resumed its work in 
Mogadishu and has managed to develop a work plan and budget 
of 9.3 million USD, of which 3.6 million USD has already been 
raised.  The TFG is reaching out to parties outside the 
Djibouti Process and remains committed to dialogue and 
reconciliation, but insecurity remains its largest impediment. 
 
¶8. (U) Boss claimed to have 9,800 "paramilitary" forces under 
his control, suggesting that if they are properly supported 
by partners, they will be able to dominate Mogadishu.  He, 
too, mentioned needing an additional 8,000 troops to 
recapture the rest of Somalia.  (Comment: Boss is probably 
exaggerating the number of paramilitary forces under his 
influence.  While there may well be 9,800 clan and private 
sector fighters in Mogadishu, the TFG has thus far shown no 
ability to get them into the fight in any organized manner. 
It is also noteworthy that previous post-Djibouti Agreement 
end strength discussions called for 5,000 Somali military and 
10,000 Somali Police.) 
 
¶9. (C) Somalia is at a crossroads, said Boss, and urgently 
needs both political support and unfettered financial 
assistance from the international community.  He pleaded on 
behalf of AMISOM for both additional peacekeepers and 
maritime assets.  He reiterated that the international 
community urgently needs to find a solution for police 
salaries, claiming they have not been paid for 15 months, and 
stating that the arrears are undermining morale and the TFG's 
efforts to secure and stabilize Mogadishu.  Boss also asked 
the international community to increase humanitarian support 
for internally displaced Somalis. 
 
United Nations Support to AMISOM 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Craig Boyd then briefed the group on assistance 
provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM 
(UNSOA).  His staff disseminated a Consolidated Contributions 
Statement reflecting a total of 198.7 million USD pledged in 
Brussels, but only 70.2 million USD received. Boyd's salient 
comments included: 
 
- UNSOA's budget for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 
is 225 million USD; 
- The SRSG and SRCC jointly determine the priorities 
regarding expenditures from the AMISOM Trust Fund of 25 
million USD, of which 14 million USD is already committed; 
- Some donors to the AMISOM Trust Fund have put stringent 
caveats on their contributions; 
- No lethal equipment can be financed from the AMISOM Trust 
Fund, so there must be either UN or bilateral solutions; and 
- The Somalia Security Institutions Trust Fund has eight 
million USD in pledges but only 850,000 USD in actual 
contributions. 
 
The AU's Special Rep Ponders Reversing Donor Contributions 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶11. (U) Nicholas Bwakira, who formally announced his 
resignation as the Special Representative of the Chairperson 
of the Commission at the end of the meeting, reported that 
despite 25 million USD languishing in the United Nation's 
bank account in New York, troop allowances have not been paid 
since April for one TCC, and since May for the other. Bwakira 
opined that donors might reverse their contributions and pay 
the AU Commission directly instead.  In response, EU 
Ambassador to the AU Koen Vervacke stated that the EU's next 
tranche of funding would be disbursed sometime in December, 
and that it would cover salaries through April 2010. 
 
¶12. (U) The UN Special Representative for the Secretary 
General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, sought out USAU Ambassador 
Michael Battle during a break to discuss the poor funding 
mechanisms that delay needed disbursements.  Ould-Abdallah 
stated that the United States was the only country that 
managed to provide direct support to Somalia and lamented the 
fact that money gets stuck in the UN system.  He recommended 
that donors bypass the cumbersome UN, channeling funds 
instead through the PriceWaterhouseCoopers mechanism. 
 
Contingent-Owned Equipment Reimbursements Remain Problematic 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶13. (U) Ugandan Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga sounded 
the familiar refrain of reimbursements for contingent-owned 
equipment, saying that the Ugandan Parliament authorized 
Uganda's participation in AMISOM on the condition that it be 
budget neutral.  He also indicated that payment of death 
benefits remain problematic and may impact negatively on 
future troop contributions.  Burundian Minister of Defense 
Germain Niyoyankana echoed Kiyonga's criticisms.  The UNSOA 
representative recommended that when the UN next reviews the 
AMISOM mandate, it consider authorizing the use of assessed 
contributions to reimburse for contingent-owned equipment. 
Kiyonga suggested that the proposed UN solution would be a 
half-measure since presumably it would only reimburse for 
equipment retroactive to UNSCR 1863 and not the beginning of 
the AMISOM deployment. 
 
Uganda and EU Offer to Assist in Somalia SSR 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Kiyonga also offered for Uganda to play a 
coordinating role in training the Somali Security Forces 
(SSF), contingent on donor support. EUAU Ambassador Vervacke 
mentioned that the EU is studying how it might address the 
SSF training shortfall, and indicated that it might be able 
to use its 300 million euro Peace Facility to support 
AMISOM's security sector reform efforts in Somalia. 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT: While the financial situation is not as grim 
as portrayed by the Somali Minister of Defense, USAU agrees 
that there are several causes for concern.  All the 
stakeholders seem to agree that AMISOM cannot be allowed to 
fail, but only the USG appears willing to provide lethal 
support to the mission.  The EU appears to have worked 
through most of the issues associated with its recovery 
orders; it will provide the AU with 60 million euros for the 
period from August 2009 to April 2010, funding troop 
allowances, death benefits, police and civilian salaries, 
civilian vehicles, medical expenses, travel, and rent. 
UNSOA's impressive budget of 225 million USD will be 
restricted to deployment and rotation costs associated with 
troops, police, and contingent-owned equipment, as well as 
rations, fuel, and accommodations. The needs are even more 
glaring on the TFG side of the ledger, including funding 
shortfalls in training, equipping, paying, and sustaining 
SSF, as well as a lack of a needs assessment, policy 
framework, and coordinating mechanism for SSR. 
 
¶16. (C) COMMENT Continued:  Technically, a TFG coordinating 
mechanism exists.  The Joint Security Committee is codified 
Djibouti Agreement; it is comprised of sector working groups 
and has funding.  Apparently, however, several key members of 
the TFG do not want the mechanism to work, as they would 
rather see support given directly to their respective 
ministries.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
MUSHINGI