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Viewing cable 09WARSAW1029, SUPPORT FOR POLAND'S ASPIRING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09WARSAW1029 2009-10-05 14:23 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Warsaw
VZCZCXYZ0638
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #1029/01 2781423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051423Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8997
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHOMB/OMB WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS WARSAW 001029 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/NESS, L-NPV, L-T, EUR/PRA AND S/EEE REBECA 
NEFF; USTR FOR ELIZABETH BALTZAN AND JARED RAGLAND; OMB FOR 
DAVID LEE; COMMERCE FOR HILLEARY SMITH AND STEVE CLAGGETT; 
DOE/NNSA FOR HEATHER LOONEY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EINV TRGY BEXP BTIO PL
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR POLAND'S ASPIRING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. WARSAW 1450 
     B. WARSAW 958 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The Polish government requests US 
assistance in launching a nuclear power program.  PM Tusk's 
goal of generating nuclear power by 2020 is optimistic. 
However, simultaneously meeting Poland's carbon emissions 
commitments and addressing its energy security concerns will 
require diversifying away from coal.  Poland's public and 
private sector leadership view nuclear as a vital piece of 
that diversification, achievable in the medium-term.  The 
U.S. has an interest in seeing the GoP succeed in meeting its 
climate change and energy security goals, but Poland lacks 
the human capital to design and implement a nuclear program. 
Polish officials have specifically asked for US assistance in 
building that human capital.  They would like to engage us 
early in the process as they begin to draft legislation and 
design regulatory infrastructure.  End Summary. 
 
Why Nuclear? 
------------ 
2.  (SBU) Poland's reliance on domestic coal for 95% of its 
electricity insulates it somewhat from dependence on Russian 
energy.  At the same time, this dependence on coal puts 
Poland at odds with EU-established emissions caps, which 
favor imported (Russian) gas or other alternatives.  Poland 
will require huge investments in its outdated power sector in 
the coming years regardless of the nuclear program; some 60% 
of Poland's power plants are 25 years old or older.  PM Tusk 
has made nuclear power, along with LNG, his primary response 
to solving Poland's energy-climate conundrum.  Poland does 
not have a substantial anti-nuclear movement.  Opposition 
party leaders including Law and Justice (PiS) energy experts 
have so far limited their criticism to the effectiveness of 
Tusk's energy policy implementation, and have generally been 
silent or even supportive of Poland's move toward nuclear. 
 
Next Steps Toward Implementation 
-------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU) Hanna Trojanowska's appointment by PM Tusk last May 
as the new Commissioner for Nuclear Power signaled an 
acceleration of efforts to launch the program.  While most 
analysts agree that the 2020 target Tusk announced last 
January is too optimistic, the GOP is aggressively advancing 
toward that goal.  Trojanowska's new office in the Ministry 
of Economy will spearhead efforts to create the required 
legislative and regulatory infrastructure, and to build the 
international partnerships Poland will need to get this off 
the ground.  Trojanowska is a technocrat who comes to the 
Ministry from Poland's largest state-owned power generator, 
Polish Energy Group (PGE), which has been tasked with 
contracting construction and ultimately operating the planned 
facilities. 
 
4. (SBU) Trojanowska hopes to have regulatory legislation 
drafted by the end of 2009.  Chair of the Parliament's 
Sub-Committee on Energy and member of the governing Civic 
Platform (PO) party, Andzrej Czerwinski, is optimistic about 
the prospects for passing that legislation in early 2010.  He 
contends that the government's "Energy Strategy Through 2030" 
was long delayed because the government was building a 
multi-party consensus to support the long-term commitment 
needed to develop nuclear power, LNG, and other alternatives 
to coal. 
 
Poland Will Need Help 
--------------------- 
5.  (SBU) Trojanowska discussed the GOP's need for 
international assistance at a recent informal meeting with 
the US delegation to the GNEP working group on fuel cycles, 
hosted in Warsaw the last week of September.  One of her 
early priorities is to secure governmental cooperation, 
particularly with the U.S., including signing a Technical 
Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  While the Poles backed away 
from an earlier request due to bureaucratic reorganizations, 
they are now nearly ready to request a TIEA.  They will also 
look to the National Nuclear Safety Administration, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Energy for 
assistance in everything from fuel cycle planning to 
structuring bids; however, their immediate priority is for 
personnel exchanges, training, and general help building the 
human capacity to develop a nuclear program.  US industry 
representatives agree that Poland will need assistance in 
developing its regulatory capacity and have expressed concern 
that without US collaboration, the Polish government may be 
steered by a third country toward a particular technology or 
industry partner. 
 
Comment: Getting Started on Nuclear Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
6.  (SBU) Poland has at various levels asked to increase 
engagement with the U.S. on energy security and climate 
change.  Earlier discussions of these issues have become 
bogged down in the details of Brussels negotiations or the 
morass of competing Russia-oriented energy projects.  In 
contrast, support for Poland's nuclear program matches up 
well with our broader commercial interests, climate/energy 
security agenda, and fuel cycle and non-proliferation 
concerns.  It also provides an opening for tangible bilateral 
cooperation on a genuine priority for PM Tusk.  An 
appropriately high-level invitation from US energy officials 
to further discuss cooperation would crystallize Poland's 
still vague request for help and directly respond to one of 
Poland's top priorities. 
TULLEY