VZCZCXRO7457
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0938/01 2951759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221759Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 1502
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7403
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000938 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC XY GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA:  UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY DETAILS 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. UN Department of Political Affairs A/SYG 
Haile Menkerios briefed the Security Council on October 21 
on the planned UN commission of inquiry (COI) into the 
atrocities committed in Guinea since September 28.  He 
explained the expectations for the COI for which there was 
widespread support, cautioned about the security situation 
in Guinea, and warned of the "unprofessional" Guinean 
army.  Ambassador DiCarlo supported ECOWAS' and Burkinabe 
President Compaore's efforts, and all Council members 
except Russia supported the COI.  French Perm Rep Araud 
said he would circulate a draft Presidential Statement 
which would, inter alia, support the COI, stress the 
importance of establishing a new transitional authority, and 
welcome the statements of the AU, ECOWAS, and the 
International Contact Group. END SUMMARY. 
 
PLANS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
 
¶2. (SBU)   UN Department of Political Affairs A/SYG 
Menkerios briefed the Security Council on his October 17 
- 20 trip to West Africa, including his stops in Abuja, to 
meet with AU and ECOWAS members at the October 17 summit, 
Conakry, and Ouagadougou, to meet with Burkinabe President 
Campaore.  He said that both AU Commission Chairman Ping and 
ECOWAS President Chambas supported the COI, as did junta 
leader Dadis Camara, and the Guinean prime minister, 
opposition, and civil society members. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Menkerios expected the mandate for the COI to: 
(1) establish the facts (but not investigate events 
prior to September 28); (2) identify the crimes; (3) 
attribute responsibility; and (4) make accountability 
recommendations.  He said that if Guinea's legal system is 
deemed insufficient to prosecute alleged perpetrators, a 
hybrid system might work (potentially including ECOWAS or 
other legal bodies), but noted an international criminal 
tribunal would be both time-consuming and difficult to 
arrange. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Menkerios said the UN Secretariat would start 
drafting the Terms of Reference for the mandate 
immediately, and that a full security assessment would need 
to be conducted before the COI could commence.  He 
expressed concern regarding the level of cooperation Dadis 
would offer. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Menkerios thought the COI should consist of 3-5 
members, including at least one woman and one African, 
hopefully from West Africa.  He solicited candidates for 
the COI from the Council, as well as from the AU and 
ECOWAS.  He anticipated the COI would take less than a 
month to complete its work. 
 
RUSSIA EXPRESSES CONCERN 
 
¶6. (SBU) Russian PR Churkin expressed concern that the SYG 
would create a COI without specific Security Council 
approval.  (Note:  Churkin was not at the October 14 SYG 
lunch for Council PermReps, during which there was no 
opposition to Ban's idea to support an investigation. End 
Note.)  Menkerios, Burkina Faso PR Kafando, and French PR 
Araud responded to Churkin's concerns by citing the 
implicit agreement made during the lunch, and Kafando noted 
that the Guinean opposition "Forces Vives" had requested an 
international investigation immediately following the 
September 28 atrocities. 
 
SECURITY FOR THE COI AND WITNESSES 
 
¶7. (SBU) Menkerios said he was assured by ECOWAS that it 
would do "what is necessary" regarding security for the 
COI.  He said that if Guinea's internal security mechanisms 
were deemed insufficient, ECOWAS would consider deploying 
security and military observers, along with human rights 
commissioners and observers.  Direct (unspecified) 
intervention could be required if ECOWAS did not appear 
able to address the security concerns, Menkerios noted. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FLOATED BY FRANCE 
 
¶8. (SBU) Araud proposed a Presidential Statement (PRST) 
which would, inter alia, support the COI, stress the 
importance of establishing a new transitional authority, and 
welcome  the statements of the AU, ECOWAS, and the 
International Contact Group.  Araud said France expects to 
circulate a draft to the entire Council soon.  Most members 
supported the idea of a PRST; China did not mention the PRST, 
while Mexico wanted additional information on the COI before 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000938  002 OF 002 
 
 
offering its support.  Churkin said a PRST was premature. 
 
U.S. SUPPORTS THE ECOWAS ARMS EMBARGO AND SANCTIONS 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ambassador DiCarlo expressed strong support for 
the ECOWAS decision to impose an arms embargo on Guinea and 
to work with the AU on creating targeted sanctions against 
individuals.  DiCarlo supported Burkinabe President 
Compaore's efforts to urge Dadis and the CNDD to step aside 
and establish a transitional authority to lead Guinea 
towards credible elections.  All Council members joined her 
in welcoming Compaore's facilitation and all, except 
Churkin, expressed support for the COI. 
 
OTHER COUNCIL CONCERNS: SCR 1888 AND FUNDING 
 
¶10. (SBU) Austrian PR Mayr-Harting was joined by Croatian 
PR Vilovic and Ambassador DiCarlo in highlighting the need 
to look at the implications of SCR 1888 (on women, peace, 
and security, adopted September 30) for this COI, since 
many of the atrocities under investigation were committed 
against women.  The UK called for the COI to be funded from 
either voluntary contributions or existing resources. 
 
GUINEA'S ARMY IS A PROBLEM 
 
¶11. (SBU) In conclusion, Menkerios expressed shock at the 
"unprofessional, disunited" appearance of the Guinean army, 
which lacked any promotion criteria and even allowed 
soldiers to return home with their weapons.  Menkerios said 
that Dadis' hope to reform the military without a return to 
civilian rule would not be possible. 
Wolff