VZCZCXRO3680
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0243/01 3021527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291527Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6676
INFO RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0062
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0138
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0347
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0013
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0105
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1763

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000243 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF OSCE:  A SLIPPERY SLOPE 
 
USOSCE 00000243  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  Following an October 21-25 visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
some of the participating nine OSCE Chiefs of Missions shared notes 
and perspectives. Although the consensus was that we must take steps 
to ensure "normality" during the Kazakh chairmanship of the OSCE in 
2010, the group suspected that Kazakhstan may actually have a 
well-developed plan to avoid issues they dislike, especially in the 
third dimension, and run the organization the way they want, 
focusing on their values and selective views on first and second 
dimension security issues. The USG will need to be very vigilant, 
consult closely with the EU-which appears to be developing fissures 
on OSCE policy, and ensure close collaboration and sharing of 
information between EUR and SCA, including their constituent posts. 
 
 
Impact of a Summit on OSCE Work 
------------------------------- 
¶2.  If there is a formal OSCE Summit in 2010, the OSCE rules of 
procedure preclude any other major meetings during that year, 
including the HDIM, the Economic Forum, the Annual Security Review 
Conference, and the Ministerial Council. In other words, much of the 
major work of the OSCE will be set aside during a Summit year since 
Summits are usually held to approve major new OSCE directions and 
require three weeks of Prepcom meetings to review implementation of 
previous commitments.  (We do not think this is the type of Summit 
that the GoK has in mind.) 
 
¶3.  In a lunch hosted by the Greek CiO October 27 for the head of 
ODIHR and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (who both spoke 
in that day's Corfu Process meeting), the Kazakh ambassador 
confirmed our suspicions.  Following an informal discussion of ways 
to improve the HDIM, including the suggestion that the Kazakh CiO 
invite NGOs to participate in a follow-on Corfu Process meeting in 
Vienna next year to get their ideas and input on how to improve the 
HDIM, he stated bluntly:  "Since there will be a Summit, there will 
be no HDIM next year." This is the first that Kazakhstan has openly 
stated this fact. 
 
¶4.  The following day, the Kazakh ambassador told CDA Fuller that he 
had meant this comment as a joke, but no one at the lunch, or 
subsequently, has read it that way. The German ambassador was so 
furious that he said he intended to openly work against the Summit 
idea. The French ambassador was alarmed and said he was going to 
immediately report this to Paris; by the NATO Caucus meeting the 
next day, however, he had clearly received instructions to support a 
Summit. 
 
¶5.  With guidance from EUR, USOSCE has never given any positive 
indication about the Summit idea, due to lack of substance.  We now 
have an additional reason why this would be a bad idea under the 
Kazakh chairmanship. We should, if anything, try to steer discussion 
towards a high-level conference, perhaps on Afghanistan or Central 
Asian security concerns.  Of course, any Summit or high-level 
conference will likely invite participation by regional 
organizations, such as the CSTO and the CIS. 
 
FOCUS ON TOLERANCE 
------------------- 
¶6.  Kazakhstan's emphasis on this topic will enable them to showcase 
an area in which they have done well in the third dimension. 
Unfortunately, it will divert attention from the more critical areas 
of fundamental freedoms and basic human rights where they are doing 
so poorly. If the key CiO focus in the third dimension remains 
tolerance and there is no HDIM, there will be little space for NGO 
criticism of Kazakhstan, or any other country, on other issues.  We 
need to be careful not to play into a possible trap on this issue. 
 
Silencing the OSCE field Mission 
-------------------------------- 
¶7.  During the October 21-25 visit of nine OSCE Chiefs of Mission to 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE mission director in Astana 
advised that a gentleman's agreement was made between the SYG and 
the GOK that the mission will do no spot reporting during the Kazakh 
chairmanship. This was the price paid in July for Kazakhstan to keep 
the Mission open--in the face of an expressed threat by the GOK to 
close it. None of the nine COMs had been aware of this arrangement. 
The Finnish former CiO agreed that the participating States will 
have to speak out against such an arrangement next year. 
 
¶8.  On October 27, the Greek CiO confirmed this agreement.    She 
said that Kazakh Secretary of State/FM Saudabayev had made it quite 
clear in June that he was not going to allow the OSCE mission to 
send negative reports while his ambassador Kairat Abdrakmanov was in 
the Chair.  Later that day, the SYG confirmed that he had indeed 
 
USOSCE 00000243  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
made the gentleman's agreement, but at the direction of the Chair. 
He said it had been the only way to preserve the OSCE Mission.  CDA 
Fuller protested that this was blackmail and that if the GoK closed 
the mission just prior to assuming the chair, the non-democratic 
message would have been quite clear and the reaction from the 
international community would have been very strong.  His response 
was that this was a Greek CiO decision.  (Comment.  USOSCE senses 
that the new Greek government is taking a firmer hand on OSCE 
matters than the previous one and changing the instructions to the 
CiO in Vienna.  Washington may want to consider having Embassy 
Athens talk with the new Greek PM/FM about the OSCE and the upcoming 
Kazakh chairmanship, among other issues.) 
 
Georgia 
------- 
¶9.  The Greek CiO advised CDA Fuller on October 27 that she had 
received unsettling news from her Georgian colleagues about the 
October 20 visit of a Kazakh high-level delegation to Tbilisi led by 
deputy FM Zhigalov. The Georgians understand the Kazakh message to 
be that they did not agree with any OSCE presence being "status 
neutral" (i.e., no impact on the recognition of South Ossetia 
Abkhazia), but wanted to ensure "equality."  She said the Georgians 
were quite worried.  Kazakh OSCE ambassador Abdrakmanov denied to 
CDA Fuller on October 29 that there was any intention of Kazakhstan 
to change the OSCE approach.  Embassy Tbilisi might want to check 
with the Georgians to get their version of the Kazakh mission and 
its possible implications. 
 
¶10.  On the positive side, the Kazakhs have apparently taken our 
suggestion that their intended Special Representative on conflicts 
Nurgaliev, who is currently the head of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, attend the next round of Geneva talks.  It will not be 
enough for him to understand the situation, but at least he will 
meet the players and make himself known. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  On the way back from the Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan trip, four of 
the COMs met to share notes and agreed that the best thing we could 
do during the Kazakh chairmanship in 2010 would be to hold the line 
and prevent any further erosion of the OSCE principles and 
procedures.  Unfortunately, the new information provided above 
suggests that the GoK may have developed a plan for ensuring that 
only the issues it wishes to address are dealt with during 2010.  In 
the last 10 years, Kazakhstan has focused extensively on developing 
regional cooperation on security and economic issues--which match 
the first and second dimensions.  Although it will continue to 
repeat its declaration of support for the OSCE acquis and the third 
dimension (including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law), 
it will skillfully steer the agenda to other issues, using the full 
force of the power that the United States and other western 
countries built into the OSCE CiO position. 
 
¶12.  Civil society representatives from the five Central Asian 
countries with whom the ambassadorial delegation met on the trip 
berated the international community for having allowed Kazakhstan to 
become chair and thereby erode the credibility of the OSCE.  They 
all insisted that the situation of human rights has deteriorated in 
the region in at least the last year.  It also appears that the 
Central Asian countries are beginning to copy one another's 
excesses.  The lack of due process in the Zhovtis case in Kazakhstan 
sent a chill throughout the region.  Kyrgyzstan's recent 
governmental reorganization which placed the MFA under the authority 
of the president goes further than the Kazakhstan Secretary of 
State's assumption of the FM minister position. Previous graduates 
from Uzbekistan from the masters program at the OSCE Academy in 
Bishkek were threatened with consequences if they ever sought a job 
in an international organization. 
 
¶13.  It is clear that we are going to be facing a far more difficult 
situation under the Kazakhstan chairmanship than simply holding the 
line. This will definitely require a concerted effort on the part of 
EUR and SCA and their respective posts to collaborate closely and 
share information to meet this challenge. 
 
FULLER