VZCZCXRO2014
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0224/01 2891347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161347Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6636
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0129

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000224 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, 
NILSSON, FRIEDT 
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) 
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: JOINT FSC-PC 14 OCTOBER: ISAF DEPUTY COMMANDER 
URGES "EXPEDITIONARY POLICE" CAPABILITIES 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Dutton appealed 
to the joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation 
and the Permanent Council (FSC-PC) for developing 
"expeditionary police" capabilities that would parallel those 
of the military for building capacity in Afghanistan.  Dutton 
also emphasized sustained "political will" as the primary 
factor for mission success.  There appeared to be unanimity 
in the FSC-PC for further OSCE engagement in Afghanistan, 
especially for border security, rule of law and other 
governance issues. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Meanwhile, the plenary adopted the Best Practice 
Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts 
(FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2).  In Working Group "B," Russia suggested 
the group move forward with its proposal for Naval CSBMs 
under the pretense that "no comments" from delegations 
implied consent.  The U.S. made clear its concerns.  We 
expect Russia will continue to press on this issue as well as 
their proposal to amend VD99.  No draft documents were moved 
to plenary from Working Group "A."  End Summary. 
 
Deputy ISAF Commander 
 
¶3. (SBU) The 41st Joint FSC-PC, held on October 14, ) 
unusual in that it was the second Joint session in a month ) 
featured Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Jim Dutton's frank 
appraisal of the shortfalls to achieving a success in 
Afghanistan.  He introduced his brief with the blunt 
assessment, "The single likely cause for strategic failure in 
Afghanistan would be the loss of political will to see this 
through."  Following his rapid review of achievements (e.g., 
successful Pakistani engagement and cooperation on the 
border, Afghan National Army budgeting, credible plan for 
developing the Aghan National Police, evolution of the 
political and democratic process), he warned that the 
positive masked the reenergized insurgency, public 
perceptions of decline, press skepticism, lowered 
expectations, and calls among some for an early "exit."  He 
noted insurgents also read the press and use it to 
rationalize a strategy of "waiting out." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Dutton underscored ISAF's military achievements were 
not the best measure for success in Afghanistan, but were 
only one component of a strategy to gain the initiative, 
consolidate gains, and make the gains sustainable as the best 
path towards an exit strategy.  He explained the goal was not 
about defeating the insurgency, but neutralizing its ability 
to threaten the stability of the Government of Afghanistan or 
the security of its people.  He underscored the need for 
sufficient resources to develop the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), which he characterized as wasteful, deficient in 
leadership, and corrupt with a high proportion of drug 
addicts.  He argued for creating an expeditionary capability 
for national police forces that could be deployed to 
Afghanistan to train and mentor the ANP in the same way that 
the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is designed to do. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dutton also advocated for a different strategic 
approach to strengthen the counter-insurgency operational 
culture, the security partnership away from its preoccupation 
with force-protection, responsive and accountable governance 
(key to comprehensive security), and organizational changes 
focused on "unity of effort."  He noted Afghanistan needed to 
connect subnational to national governing institutions, to 
improve PRT coordination, to focus on rule of law issues, and 
to improve the resources-to-task ratios.  Dutton argued the 
Taliban was weak and defeatable by the Afghanis with our 
help, but he advised no insurgency is defeated without some 
level of political reconciliation. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Sweden (Nesser), speaking for the EU and the 
several candidate, Stabilization and Association countries 
among others, inventoried EU member states' commitments to 
Afghanistan including in the areas of civilian 
reconstruction, governance and rule of law, policing, as well 
as border management and customs administration.  Sweden 
further suggested OSCE consider cooperating with Afghanistan 
to enhance border security, counter-terrorism, to combat 
radicalization, trafficking in drugs and persons and promote 
respect for human rights and regional cooperation.  Sweden 
noted these would contribute to not only Central Asia but the 
whole OSCE area and beyond. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000224  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The U.S. (Fuller), Canada (Gregory), Russia (Azimov) 
each made statements supporting OSCE's niche, value-added 
capabilities.  Russia called for a greater role for it in 
NATO discussions with ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, and 
more discussion in the NATO-Russia Council especially on 
addressing counter-narcotics strategies, including 
coordination between NATO and the CSTO.  Turkey (Buluc) 
supported OSCE engagement to assist Afghanistan in border and 
police and counter-narcotics training. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Dutton responded to various points, thanking Russia 
for its contribution to opening up the air corridor for 
supplies, noting that the counter-narcotics component in 
Afghanistan was important but not as serious as focusing on 
Pakistan and Iran components, encouraging OSCE members states 
to consider developing an expeditionary police capability to 
help build ANP capacity, and underscoring that the 
minimization of civilian casualties was ISAF's top priority, 
though statistically the collateral damage was extremely low. 
 
Vienna Doc 99 "Contacts" BPG Adopted 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following the Security Dialogue (Agenda Item 2), the 
plenary agreed to the Draft Decision on the Best Practice 
Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts 
(FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2).  Under AOB, the Greek Chair (Bakoyannis) 
announced that it requested Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to 
present to a special session of the Permanent Council the 
report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mision 
on the Conflict in Georgia at a mutually agreeable date. 
Also under AOB, the CPC Director (Salber) reported on the 
OSCE presentation to the 1540 Review Meeting in New York. 
Sweden marked the tenth anniversary of ESDP. 
 
Naval CSBMs 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) recommended moving its Proposal 
for a Draft Decision on CSBMs in the Naval Area 
(FSC.DEL/120/08/Rev.2) to Working Group "A" for discussion 
since it had received no comments from delegations on it. 
"This implied consent," Ulyanov said (Note:  knowing full 
well that over half of FSC pS had expressed concern about 
Russia's proposal in the past year.  End note.).  Russia also 
requested that its AIAM proposal to amend VD99 
(FSC.AIAM/2/09) be placed on the agenda of Working Group "A." 
 
¶11. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) drew upon standing generic 
guidance refuting the need for naval CSBMs (98 STATE 156529). 
 Russia attempted to underscore the U.S. was missing the 
point in that Russia was seeking to address only the issue of 
Chapter 1 of its proposal, "Exchange of Military 
Information."  The U.S. noted in addition to the problematic 
language in Chapter 1 (i.e., "zone of application"), the 
information Russia was requesting was readily available 
through open sources, and thus added no value.  The U.S. 
reiterated that absent a highly unusual situation in which a 
clear national interest would be served, it remained U.S. 
policy not to enter into discussions regarding naval CSBMs 
that would impinge on operations in international waters. 
Russia retorted that such arguments would apply equally to 
land forces and perhaps we did not need the Vienna Document 
(Comment: at this point several delegations rolled their 
eyes!  End comment.)  Russia said the U.S. position was not 
an acceptable reason to not discuss the issue of Naval CSBMs 
in that the Russian proposal if for a specific area and would 
not impinge on U.S. moving ships through the Mediterranean. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Chair (UK) moved off the agenda item when no 
delegation requested the floor following the last Russian 
intervention.  The Chair did announce that it would move the 
Russian AIAM proposal to the following week's agenda for 
Working Group "A." 
 
Working Group "A" 
 
¶13. (SBU) There were no current implementation issues raised. 
 Under Item 2, VD99, the Chair kept the draft decision on the 
Agenda and Modalities of the 20th AIAM (FSC.DD/9/09) on the 
agenda for the following session "to give all delegations an 
opportunity to obtain guidance from capitals."  Turkey's 
revised proposal for a draft decision on possible FSC action 
towards improving the application of VD 99 compliance and 
verification measures (now digital cameras only) was 
 
USOSCE 00000224  003 OF 003 
 
 
acknowledged with Belarus and Sweden expressing support for 
the draft.  It remains on the agenda for the next WGA. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Under Agenda Item 3, Sweden, a co-sponsor along 
with Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK, introduced 
the revised Food For Thought paper on an update of FSC 
Decision 15/02 on expert advice on implementation of Section 
V of the OSCE Document on SA/LW (FSC.DEL/151/09/Rev.1).  The 
U.S. (Ellis) said with the revisions it could now support the 
draft.  The chair will keep the document on the agenda for 
the next WGA. 
 
¶15. (SBU) There were no interventions under Agenda Item 4 
(SCA).  Under Item 5 (Code of Conduct), the CPC reported it 
was organizing with Austria a November 5 regional workshop in 
Sarajevo on Security Sector Reform and civilian oversight of 
the Armed Services for South East Europe.  Under Item 6 
(other CSBMs), the Czech Republic reported below threshold 
and demonstration of major equipment airbase visit under the 
VD99. 
 
¶16. (U) The next WGA is scheduled for October 21, following 
WGB and the FSC plenary. 
Fuller