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Viewing cable 09USNATO444, AFGHAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE: I SUPPORT MCCHRYSTAL'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USNATO444 2009-10-08 16:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USNATO
VZCZCXRO5902
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHNO #0444/01 2811607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081607Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 1261
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3471
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0690
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0676
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0471
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1000
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0093
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1062
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000444 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS MCAP MARR PREL NATO PINS PTER AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE: I SUPPORT MCCHRYSTAL'S 
WAY AHEAD 
 
REF: SG(2009)0846 
 
USNATO 00000444  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) On October 6, NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen 
distributed to Allies a letter he received from Afghan 
Minister of Defense General Wardak (ref).  In the letter, 
Wardak expressed his "wholehearted support for the findings 
of General McChrystal's assessment of the situation in 
Afghanistan and his recommended way ahead."  He went on to 
argue that the new strategy should be "fully resourced." 
Describing the situation in Afghanistan as being at a 
"critical juncture," Wardak warned that failure in 
Afghanistan could result in the country becoming a terrorist 
base or a failed state, as well as a source for regional and 
global instability."  He stressed, however, that he believed 
that the war was still "winnable." 
 
2. (SBU) Wardak also praised McChrystal for taking a new 
approach in his dealings with the Afghan government, 
commenting that "We Afghans now really think we are a part of 
the same team." 
 
3. (SBU) The full text of Wardak's letter follows: 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
1 October 2009 
 
The Honorable Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
Secretary-General 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
Dear Secretary-General, 
 
My purpose in writing is to express wholehearted support for 
the findings of General McChrystal's assessment of the 
situation in Afghanistan and his recommended way ahead.  I 
base my support not only as the Minister of Defense, but as a 
professional soldier with over 31 years experience as both an 
insurgent and counter-insurgent leader.  As his assessment 
makes clear, we are at a critical point in our endeavor.  We 
have arrived here by virtue of decisions made in the past 
that underestimated the enemy, failed to identify the true 
source of the threat, did not create a fully resourced 
civil-military counterinsurgency campaign plan, that failed 
to deliver good governance and development for the people, 
and that under-resourced the campaign.  However, victory is 
still within our grasp, provided that we recommit ourselves 
based on lessons learned.  As GEN McChrystal states in his 
assessment success is achievable but additional resources and 
significant changes in strategy are required. 
 
The stakes are high in Afghanistan.  Failure could result in 
the country becoming a terrorist base or a failed state, as 
well as a source of regional and global instability. 
Therefore, as General McChrystal also emphasized, our efforts 
require a firm political will and substantial patience on the 
part of the Afghan people, the Afghan government, and the 
countries providing support.  Any wavering of our resolve or 
suggestion of an exit strategy or deadline for withdrawal 
would be, as Secretary Gates said, a "strategic mistake" and 
have catastrophic consequences for us all. 
 
Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are inextricably 
linked.  Counter-terrorism alone leads to an open ended 
campaign, one that never ends.  It will not lead to strategic 
victory.  In fact, many argue that the campaign we have 
conducted these last eight years was heavily-tilted toward 
counter-terrorism rather than a full civil-military 
counter-insurgency effort.  Adopting a counter-terrorism 
strategy would be dealing with the symptoms rather than the 
disease.  Defeating such enemies requires a global strategic 
response and continued strong leadership by all parties 
 
USNATO 00000444  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
involved.  The response must also address the array of linked 
sources and conflicts that sustain their movement, while 
addressing local grievances.  The key to success is winning 
the struggle for the support of the people by protecting them 
from the enemy and increasing their welfare through good 
governance and economic development.  We must regain the 
initiative from the enemy, and gain the people's trust that 
we are committed to seeing the mission through to its end. 
To quote Sir Winston Churchill, "Success is not final and 
failure is not fatal.  It is the courage to continue that 
counts."  Patience, a long war strategy, and the allocation 
of sufficient resources can make all the difference.  The 
Taliban lacks strong leadership, popular support, and an 
ideology that Afghans can embrace.  Yet the threat is growing 
due to its external support and the weakness of our joint 
efforts.  Proper application of General McChrystal's strategy 
will counter this threat, and ensure our joint victory. 
 
We must ensure that security operations are integrated with 
civilian - and principally Afghan-led - efforts to improve 
governance and development.  The government's support and 
legitimacy will increase only if we can assure the security 
of the people and provide them with the basic necessities of 
life.  Therefore the new strategy should be fully resourced. 
By doing so we will shorten the duration of the campaign. 
 
I firmly believe that General McChrystal's assessment has all 
of the elements that we have longed for since 2002, 
including: accelerating the growth and fielding of the ANA 
and ANP: further growth of the ANSF to 400,000 personnel; 
more effective partnering arrangements between ISAF and ANSF; 
increasing economic aid and making Afghan ministries the 
vehicle for delivering development assistance; renewing 
reconciliation efforts; continuing progress with respect to 
civilian casualties, collateral damage, house searches and 
detention; intensifying international efforts to deprive the 
enemy of its external support; and overhauling the 
counter-narcotics efforts.  To implement these elements, NATO 
can play a decisive and significant role for which Your 
Excellency's support is requested. 
 
Success for Afghans is to be able to defend Afghan territory 
on our own, with the US and NATO playing strong supporting 
roles as part of an enduring strategic partnership with our 
country.  An Afghan solution is far more cost-effective, 
politically less complex, and will save the lives of our 
friends and allies.  We therefore will accelerate the growth 
of the Afghan National Security Forces.  But as General 
McChrystal acknowledged in his assessment, until the ANSF has 
sufficient capability coalition forces must "bridge the gap" 
to prevent any deterioration in the situation and to ensure 
HOLD can be achieved in order to allow BUILD. 
 
The approach General McChrystal as the NATO ISAF Commander 
has already taken is unprecedented.  We Afghans now really 
think we are part of the same team.  There is more 
integration in our planning processes, more sharing of 
intelligence and enhanced operational cohesiveness.  And the 
way he has described partnership will further improve our 
effectiveness and prepare us for the day we can fully take 
over the responsibility for our security. 
 
We are at a critical juncture in our history. For Afghans it 
is a question of our national survival.  We will therefore 
recommit ourselves and spare no effort or sacrifice to 
achieve our goal.  We have come so far together and paid so 
much in blood and treasure, but the final destination is now 
clearly visible.  Failure is not an option, so I ask for your 
full support of General McChrystal's assessment and let us 
continue our struggle with more courage, determination and 
resources. I truly believe, as General McChrystal does, that 
this war is winnable. 
 
USNATO 00000444  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
/s/ 
 
General Abdul Rahim Wardak 
Minister of National Defense 
 
END TEXT 
HEFFERN