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Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA453, 2009 IAEA/GC: GENERAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA453 2009-10-02 14:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0453/01 2751431
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021431Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0147
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0911
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000453 
 
STATE FOR IO/GS, ISN, 
ISN/MNSA - WONG, DAVIS, COCKERHAM, RUDOLPH 
-  ISN/NESS - STRATFORD, BURKART 
-  ISN/RA - DANIEL, NEPHEW, GROMOLL 
DOE FOR S-1, S-2 
-  NE - MCGINNIS, CLAPPER, HERCZEG, HAN 
-  NA 20 - BAKER, WITTROCK 
-  NA 24 - LERSTEN, GOOREVICH, BRUNS 
NRC FOR OIP - MDOANE, JSCHWARZMAN 
ROME FOR USMISSION TO FAO 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY IR KN SY LY IN
SUBJECT: 2009 IAEA/GC: GENERAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) Director General ElBaradei opened the IAEA General Conference 
on September 14 with a valedictory address looking back on his 
12-year tenure.  He observed that the IAEA has made considerable 
progress in many areas, from improving access to energy, food and 
water for people in need, to helping to enhance the safety and 
security of nuclear materials and facilities.  ElBaradei cautioned 
however, that "so many of the issues I raised back then are still 
with us today" - nuclear verification in the DPRK, the lack of 
significant progress in nuclear disarmament and the perennial 
problems of inadequate Agency funding and legal authority for IAEA 
safeguards.  He once again urged Iran to work more closely with the 
IAEA and sign the Additional Protocol.  Then, following his formal 
appointment as the next IAEA Director General at the opening of the 
GC, DG-designate Yukiya Amano also took the floor to deliver general 
remarks on the challenges ahead for the Agency.  Amano cited 
increasing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, the 
rise in demand for energy coupled with concerns about greenhouse gas 
emissions, food security, human health and water availability.  He 
also noted that the Agency must use its resources, both financial 
and human, responsibly.  The U.S., on behalf of the North America 
Group, and other regional groups delivered statements thanking 
ElBaradei for his service and welcoming Amano. 
 
2. (U) The General Debate in the GC Plenary spanned four days, 
including national statements from 110 member states and 
inter-governmental organizations.  The UN Secretary General's 
message, delivered by High Representative for Disarmament Affairs 
Duarte, thanked the DG for his service and extended full support for 
newly appointed DG Amano.  The SYG highlighted the September 24 UN 
Security Council nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation summit. 
His message called for universal adherence to the Additional 
Protocol; for all NNWS to bring into force safeguards agreements in 
advance of the 2010 NPT Revcon and for states to cooperate fully 
with the IAEA.  The SYG also reaffirmed international support for 
resuming Six-party talks on the DPRK. Speaking third in the General 
Debate, Secretary of Energy Chu delivered the U.S. statement and a 
Presidential message in support of the IAEA.  A number of countries 
offered their thanks to outgoing DG El-Baradei and support to 
incoming DG Amano.  Several states highlighted non-proliferation 
challenges in Iran, Syria and the DPRK.  Arab states focused heavily 
on Middle East safeguards, citing double standards as regards Israel 
for creating an imbalance in the region. [NOTE: National statements 
are posted at www.iaea.org. END NOTE] END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
DG's Introductory Remarks 
------------------------- 
 
3. (U)  The DG focused his statement on comparing the state of the 
Agency in 1997 when he assumed the position of Director General, and 
the present day.  He noted considerable progress in many areas, from 
improving access to energy, food and water for people in need, to 
helping to enhance the safety and security of nuclear materials and 
facilities, but noted many issues remained the same:  verification 
in the DPRK, the lack of any significant progress in nuclear 
disarmament and inadequate Agency funding and legal authority.  By 
contrast to 1997, he noted that the expected expansion of nuclear 
power will create more demands on the Agency. The DG noted the 
growth in the size of the Technical Cooperation Program from a 
modest 80 million USD in 1998 to disbursement of 96 million USD in 
2008.  He called for a dramatic increase in TC funding and 
emphasized the importance of the IAEA Program of Action for Cancer 
Therapy (PACT). 
 
4.  (U)  The DG noted that Agency safeguards had progressed from 
verification of declared nuclear material at declared facilities to 
assessing information on a State's nuclear program and, most 
importantly, verifying the absence of undeclared activities. He 
noted that the IAEA was implementing "integrated safeguards" in more 
than 40 countries, and was making increasing use of advanced 
technology.  Nonetheless, he emphasized that in order to detect 
possible clandestine nuclear material and activities, the IAEA 
needed to have greater legal authority (including implementation of 
comprehensive safeguards and APs), technology and resources.  He 
also noted the need for legal authority and expertise for IAEA to 
pursue alleged weaponization activities.  He regretted the fallout 
from the Iraq war and recalled the Agency's assessment of Iran not 
having revived its nuclear weapons program and its unheeded request 
for more verification work prior to the war as a "valuable 
investment in peace."  The DG added that it gave him no consolation 
that the Agency's findings were subsequently vindicated. 
 
5.  (U)  In the case of the DPRK, the DG reminded that the Agency 
had sounded the alarm and reported the country to the Security 
Council for non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations as 
far back as 1993.  He derived important lessons learned from Iraq 
and the DPRK, including the need to let diplomacy and thorough 
verification take their course.  The DG also noted that the U.N. 
Security Council needs to develop a comprehensive compliance 
meQnism that does not rely only on sanctions and, as the 
international community move towards nuclear disarmament, he called 
for strengthening the Agency's verification mandate, noting this as 
a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament.  Turning to Iran, the DG 
called for Iran to engage substantively with the Agency to clarify 
difficult and important questions regarding the authenticity of 
information relating to alleged weaponization studies and to 
implement the Additional ProtQl.  He welcomed the U.S. offer to 
initiate a dialogue with Iran, without preconditions Qon the 
basis of mutual respect. 
 
6.  (U)  The DG asserted that it had become increasingly difficult 
to call on non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to renounce nuclear 
weapons in perpetuity and accept new measures to strengthen 
non-proliferation if nuclear-weapon states continue to modernize and 
almost glorify their nuclear arsenals.  He specifically referenced 
NATO's current Strategic Concept, which says the purpose of the 
Alliance's nuclear weapons was "to preserve peace and prevent 
coercion and any kind of war," given that "conventional forces alone 
cannot ensure credible deterrence." 
 
7.  (U)  The DG also emphasized that the proposed IAEA low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) bank and an LEU reserve in Russia would be last-resort 
assurance for countries with nuclear power programs that face a 
supply disruption for non-commercial reasons.  Such a reserve would 
give countries confidence that they can count on supplies of fuel to 
run their nuclear power plants and do not have to develop their own 
fuel cycle facilities.  Nevertheless, he said that under such 
proposals, no country would have to give up any of its rights under 
the NPT, including the right to develop its own fuel cycle. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Statement 
-------------- 
 
11. (U) The third speaker in the General Debate, Secretary of Energy 
Chu delivered the U.S. statement and a message from President Obama. 
 The Presidential message pledged that the U.S. would do its part to 
support the Agency's goals, including strengthening safeguards, and 
promoting nuclear safety, security and peaceful nuclear energy and 
applications. Secretary Chu reminded Member States of the 
President's commitment to create a world free of nuclear weapons and 
the need to strengthen the NPT. Full text of the U.S. statement is 
available at www.doe.gov and www.iaea.org. 
 
------------ 
Group Themes 
------------ 
 
12.  (U) Each regional group thanked outgoing DG ElBaradei for his 
service and pledged support for incoming DG Amano.  Africa Group 
member states highlighted the need for more Technical Cooperation 
(TC) by speaking about success stories in areas of human health, 
tsetse fly eradication, and agriculture.  The Arab League, as in 
past years, singled out Israel and its purported nuclear 
capabilities, and included allusions to the Iranian-proposed agenda 
item on preventing military attacks on nuclear facilities.  Citing 
Israel as the destabiliQg force in the Middle East, many Arab 
League members reminded that they were members of the NPT.  Sweden, 
on behalf of the EU, Albania, Bosnia, Iceland, Norway, Moldova, and 
Ukraine, highlighted the EU's commitment to all three NPT pillars, 
called on Iran to fully comply with all UN resolutions and urged the 
DPRK to return to Six-Party talks.  Individual EU members delivered 
national statements along the same lines.  The EU also welcomed the 
March 2010 Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the U.S. and called 
upon all Member States to fund nuclear security and TC more fully. 
Similarly to the African Group, members of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Group (GRULAC), highlighted the Agency's TC program citing 
success in the fields of water management, human health, and nuclear 
energy development. Many GRULAC members supported President Obama's 
call for a nuclear-weapons free world and called upon the DPRK to 
re-commit to Six-Party talks.  Within GRULAC, a few Caribbean 
members led by Haiti, focused on the plight of less developed 
countries (LDCs) and called for more technical cooperation and 
assistance. 
 
---------------------  ----- 
Nuclear Verification:  Iran 
---------------------  ----- 
 
13. (U) Iranian Vice President and Atomic Energy Agency of Iran 
(AEOI) Director Salehi delivered Iran's statement.  Salehi noted his 
personal involvement in facilitating recent inspections at Arak and 
Natanz and described Iran as a "peace-loving" nation.  He cautioned 
against threatening Iran's national security on the pretext of 
verification and at the behest of a few Western nations. Insisting 
that Iran is in compliance with its international obligations, 
Salehi also highlighted Iran's achievements in the nuclear arena. 
Later, following Israel's national statement, Iran exercised its 
"right of reply" to say that a non-NPT signatory (Israel) had made 
false allegations against Iran and calling the Zionist regime a 
threat to peace. 
 
14. (U) More than two dozen IAEA members referred to Iran in their 
General Debate statements; most were critical. The EU, UK, Germany, 
Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
Japan, Norway, Ireland, and Malta variously urged Iran to cooperate 
with the IAEA (or noted Iran's defiance), implement the AP and/or 
related transparency measures, comply with UNSCRs and change course. 
The EU affirmed that as the guarantor of international security the 
UNSC was an important partner of the IAEA. 
 
15. (U) Other national statements, including by some current or 
incoming UNSC members, were more balanced.  China said the Iran 
portfolio should be settled in an appropriate manner.  Chile and 
Mexico welcomed positive progress on the Iran work plan and urged 
Iran to intensify cooperation and clarify outstanding issues. 
Turkey shared the DG's concern that the Agency is not able to verify 
the full scope of Iran's program.  Ukraine supported constructive 
dialogue between Iran and the Agency.  Malaysia welcomed recent 
Iranian cooperation but also called for clarification of outstanding 
issues. Sudan welcomed IAEA activities in Iran and encouraged a 
peaceful conclusion.  As would be expected, Cuba came to Iran's 
defense arguing that political manipulation should have been stopped 
long ago. 
 
---------------------  ----- 
Nuclear Verification:  DPRK 
---------------------  ----- 
 
16. (U) The majority of Member States called on the DPRK to 
cooperate fully with the UN Security Council and IAEA. Singapore, 
Norway, Greece, the EU, Malta, Bulgaria, Austria, Thailand, the UK, 
Turkey, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Germany, France, Mexico, Chile, Italy, Sweden, Japan, and Korea, 
among others called on the DPRK to rejoin Six-Party Talks and all 
voiced concern over recent actions. China said it would work with 
all relevant parties to pursue denuclearization of the peninsula. 
The CTBTO representative, while deploring DPRK actions, noted that 
the two DPRK test explosions in 2006 and 2009 proved the reliability 
of the CTBTO detection system. 
 
--------------------------- 
Nuclear Verification:  Syria 
--------------------------- 
 
17.  (U) A number of Member States called upon Syria to cooperate 
more fully with the IAEA. Turkey, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Canada, Israel, Germany, Ukraine, Sweden, Belgium, and France, among 
others called upon Syria to demonstrate transparency and cooperation 
in the application of its Safeguards Agreement. Sudan, Venezuela, 
Cuba, and Malaysia called for the Syria investigation to be closed 
or at a minimum not be influenced by outside parties.  In this 
regard, some Arab Group Members highlighted the failure to achieve a 
nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and singled out 
Israel's attack on the Syrian facility as proof of the dangers faced 
by states in the Middle East. 
 
------------- 
NPT and CTBTO 
------------- 
 
18. (U) Given the upcoming NPT RevCon, many member states affirmed 
their commitment to the NPT and its role as the cornerstone of the 
global nonproliferation regime. Member States such as the Holy See 
and the Philippines also singled out the CTBTO in their statements 
reminding of its important within the international community. 
Sweden, on behalf of the EU, called on the NPT RevCon to adopt a 
concrete set of pragmatic, effective, and consensual measures for 
stepping up counter proliferation efforts. 
 
--------------- 
Assured Supply 
--------------- 
 
20.  (U)  Only a few Member States mentioned the need for assured 
supply of nuclear fuel in the event of an interruption of supply. 
Russia reported on the progress of the International Enrichment 
Center at Angarsk as a multi-national commercial arrangement and 
reaffirmed its commitment to maintain, as a contribution to the 
Agency, a safeguarded LEU reserve for the IAEA at that facility in 
Angarsk.  China used its statement to highlight the need for 
further, in-depth discussion among Member States on the recent 
proposals for assured supply.  Ultimately, China said, it would like 
to see a mechanism established. 
 
---------------- 
An End in Sight... 
---------------- 
 
21.  (U) Comment:  110 national statements spanning four days 
finally brought an end to the plenary sessions and the GC President 
could move on in the agenda.  Because of repeated lengthy statements 
and delegations' failure to observe the recommended fifteen-minute 
limit on their national statements, the GC President and Secretariat 
asked the General Committee to consider how to curb national 
statements.  The General Committee agreed that in 2010 the 13-minute 
warning light would be made visible to the entire hall (heretofore 
it has been visible only to the speaker and others on the podium). 
This measure of moral suasion will, it is to be hoped, make it 
unnecessary to contemplate shutting off microphones as a deterrent 
against long-windedness.  En Comment. 
 
DAVIES