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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 002442 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/22/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration 
shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear 
agreement (Yomiuri) 
 
(2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep 
price to pay for ambiguity (Okinawa Times) 
 
(3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S. 
alliance at risk (Nikkei) 
 
(4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in 
1980 (Asahi) 
 
(5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage 
to revise campaign pledges (Asahi) 
 
(6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Sankei) 
 
 
(7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration 
shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear 
agreement 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 22, 2009 
 
Tokyo -- Washington Bureau reporter Satoshi Ogawa 
 
The visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Japan, where 
the main issue was how to handle the relocation of the U.S. Marines' 
Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, ended in discord, with Gates 
strongly pressing Japan to reach a decision before President Barack 
Obama's visit to Japan on Nov. 12-13, and Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama and other Japanese officials not offering a definite 
response. At a news conference held after his meetings, Gates made 
repeated demands of the Hatoyama administration in an unusually 
strong tone, which is rare in diplomacy. Tension in the Japan-U.S. 
alliance has heightened ahead of the U.S. President's visit to 
Japan. 
 
A senior Japanese government official was visibly shocked after 
watching Gates's news conference on Oct. 21. He said: "I'm surprised 
he made such blunt statements. It appears that without any 
consideration for diplomacy he simply explained the heated exchanges 
that took place during the meetings." 
 
Gates said: "Without (the construction of) the replacement facility 
(in Nago City), there can be no relocation (of U.S. Marines in 
Okinawa) to Guam. There will also be no troop reductions or return 
of land in Okinawa." This amounted to "open intimidation" (in the 
words of a government source): if the Hatoyama administration does 
not make any progress on Futenma relocation, the transfer of 8,000 
Marines from Okinawa to Guam, a main feature of the U.S. Forces 
Japan (USFJ) realignment plans, and other measures to reduce the 
burden imposed by military bases will not be implemented. Gates's 
tough stance reflects the fact that the Obama administration has 
 
TOKYO 00002442  002 OF 012 
 
 
judged its soft approach to the Hatoyama administration a "failure." 
One participant on the U.S. side in the meetings observed, "We have 
been too soft so far," admitting the shift to a hard-line approach 
toward Japan. 
 
The tough stance is not limited to the Futenma issue. At his 
meetings and during the news conference, Gates demanded an increase 
in financial contributions to expand the Afghan armed forces and 
police as part of Afghan aid measures. He also made it a point to 
mention the secret agreement on bringing nuclear arms into Japan and 
cautioned that "this should not have a negative impact on the 
bilateral relationship." 
 
According to a senior Ministry of Defense official, this time Gates 
declined a salute from a guard of honor, something normally 
performed by the Self-Defense Forces for welcoming state guests and 
other VIPs. Observers interpreted this as sign tough negotiations 
lay ahead in Tokyo. 
 
The lack of consensus on the Japanese side was also pronounced. In 
response to Gates's demand to implement the USFJ realignment plans 
at an early date, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said, "We don't 
plan to spend too much time." Meanwhile, Hatoyama said, "We need a 
bit more time to give the issues careful consideration and to come 
up with an answer." The Prime Minister reiterated to reporters on 
the evening of Oct. 21 his policy to consider the government's 
response after the Nago mayoral election next January. 
 
In a speech delivered to the Yomiuri International Economic Society 
meeting on Oct. 21, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada revealed that 
Gates had said in the meeting with him on Oct. 20 that "discussions 
have been going on for 13 years (since the Japan-US. agreement on 
the return of Futenma) and the arguments have been exhausted," and 
that he had responded, "As an opposition party we argued against the 
Japan-U.S. agreement during that period." 
 
The fact that a coordination process had taken place among Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, Okada, and Kitazawa ahead of 
Gates's visit also gave the impression that the government was not 
prepared with a diplomatic position before the Okada-Gates talks on 
Oct. 20. 
 
(2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep 
price to pay for ambiguity 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 5) (Full) 
October 22, 2009 
 
The U.S. government is taking advantage of the Okinawa Prefectural 
Government's acceptance of the relocation of the U.S. forces' 
Futenma Air Station to corner the Hatoyama administration. 
 
Governor Hirokazu Nakaima should admit that he has been co-opted 
into such a scheme. 
 
The governor's oft-repeated phrase that "relocation out of the 
prefecture is the best option" sounds like a meaningless cliche. If 
he maintains an ambiguous attitude at this critical stage in the 
fate of the base issue, his words might be used in an unintended 
way. Recent developments concerning the Futenma issue have 
substantiated this contention. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002442  003 OF 012 
 
 
Shortly before U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's visit to 
Japan, a senior Department of Defense official stated that moving 
the planned Futenma replacement facility in Henoko, Nago City, 
farther offshore by 50 meters would be acceptable. The official 
said: "If the governor wants to move the facility, that is an issue 
between the Japanese government and the governor. If a proposal is 
made, we will consider it." 
 
The timing of this shift in the policy of the U.S. government, which 
had insisted the replacement facility could not be moved even 1 
millimeter, can be interpreted as a mere maneuver for the purpose of 
finding a meeting point. 
 
Secretary Gates also conveyed to the Japanese government the U.S.'s 
readiness to accept moving the replacement facility farther 
offshore. This is a major concession on the part of the U.S. 
government, which had pushed for construction of the facility in the 
coastal area of Camp Schwab. 
 
Because the governor said this would be a "good thing," he has 
finally come out with a clear stance. It would appear that the 
governor and the U.S. government are working hand-in-hand to check 
the Hatoyama administration's moves toward reexamining the agreement 
on returning Futenma, including the possibility of relocating it out 
of Okinawa or out of Japan. 
 
We wonder if the governor is aware of the popular will. An opinion 
poll conducted by Okinawa Times and Asahi Shimbun in May disclosed 
that 68 percent of Okinawans oppose and only 18 percent favor 
Futenma's relocation within the prefecture. There is a chasm between 
the Nakaima administration and the popular will. 
 
This debate is distorted. 
 
Allowing foreign troops to use Japan's national territory is an 
issue that touches on sovereignty. Normally, the host country 
provides the facilities and training grounds to meet the 
requirements of the troops whose deployment it recognizes as 
necessary. Why is the U.S. defense secretary making the 
determination that relocation to the coastal area of Camp Schwab is 
the only option and telling Japan that plans to relocate the Marines 
to Guam will be scrapped without Futenma relocation, as if he were 
serving an ultimatum? 
 
This also sounds like intimidation. 
 
His statement resembles a warning to a new administration aiming at 
an "equal relationship." 
 
The Futenma base is a U.S. Marine facility. The government needs to 
explain to the people whether the Marines are indispensable for 
Japan's defense and security. Furthermore, unless it clarifies why 
the Marines cannot function if they are not based in Okinawa, debate 
is untenable. 
 
The present situation where senior U.S. officials' statements appear 
to decide Japan's policy is too unprincipled. Okinawa has been 
tossed into just such a situation. 
 
The governor should express Okinawa's indignation in a 
straightforward manner. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002442  004 OF 012 
 
 
The option of relocation out of Okinawa is often nixed because 
nowhere else will accept a new military base. This is an utterly 
unreasonable notion. Are other prefectures saying that it is all 
right for Okinawa to host the base when they themselves refuse to do 
so? 
 
If the Japan-U.S. security alliance is indeed important, the 
concomitant burden should be borne in mind. Japan is often 
criticized for enjoying a "free ride" in security, but the reality 
is that the free ride is made on the back of Okinawa. 
 
Now is the time for Governor Nakaima to question with vehemence the 
postwar security policy of concentrating military bases in Okinawa. 
 
(3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S. 
alliance at risk 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 22, 2009 
 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates might be wondering why he 
flew across the Pacific. While in Japan, he met with Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and Defense Minister 
Toshimi Kitazawa. But none of them talked about what he wanted to 
hear - specific support measures to replace the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's ongoing refueling mission and words of 
commitment to the Japan-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. 
 
Imagine if the U.S. remained noncommittal even though the Japanese 
defense minister visited the U.S. immediately after a new government 
had been launched there and wanted to reconfirm an accord concluded 
between Japan and the previous U.S. administration. The defense 
minister must be wondering why he visited the U.S. 
 
A new administration will naturally bring about changes in policy, 
but international promises and policies are different matters. For 
instance, the previous Bush administration took over the accord its 
predecessor Clinton administration concluded with Japan in 1996 on 
the return of U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. If the U.S. 
had overturned the accord, Tokyo would have become distrustful of 
Washington's foreign policy. 
 
In countries in which regimes changes occur frequently, it is 
customary to place emphasis on the continuity of foreign policy. 
Japan is now in the stage of trial and error. 
 
It was revealed through Defense Secretary Gates's visit to Japan 
that there is friction between Japan and the U.S. over security 
issues. The friction must be quickly resolved so that it is only a 
temporary phenomenon. If the two countries remain unable to take 
care of their pending issues, President Barack Obama's planned visit 
to Japan in November might end in failure even if the two countries 
try to gloss over the failure with words, as they did in the case of 
Gates's Japan visit. 
 
If the discord over security issues lasts for a long time, 
Japan-U.S. ties will inevitably weaken. 
 
The Obama administration might begin to regard China as a more 
trustworthy partner than its ally, Japan. In negotiations on issues 
related to North Korea, as well, China might become more influential 
 
TOKYO 00002442  005 OF 012 
 
 
and Japan might eventually feel even more frustrated. Also in 
negotiations on pending issues between Japan and China, including 
the development of gas fields, if Japan loses the support of the 
U.S., its position will become weaker. 
 
If the Hatoyama administration feels that it was able to display "an 
equal Japan-U.S. relationship," this should be considered dangerous 
self-contentment. 
 
In discussing the Futenma issue with Gates, Okada pointed out the 
current difficult political situation in Japan and sought his 
understanding about the government's stance. This remark, made by a 
senior ruling party official after its recent landslide victory in 
the general election, could be interpreted as an excuse for a lack 
of coordination and leadership capability. 
 
The Hatoyama administration has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. 
alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security 
policies. If this is not simply diplomatic language, the 
administration should make the decision to continue the refueling 
mission and take action to implement the relocation plan for the 
Futenma facility as soon as possible; otherwise, the Japan-U.S. 
alliance may turn into a mere name and may not properly function in 
an emergency situation. 
 
The prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister 
are lacking in a sense of crisis. This could result in exposing the 
Japan-U.S. alliance to risk. 
 
(4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in 
1980 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
October 22, 2009 
 
Masahiro Tsuruoka 
 
In the spring of 1980, shortly before his sudden death, Prime 
Minister Masayoshi Ohira considered disclosing to the public port 
calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons and 
dissolving a secret nuclear pact between Japan and the United 
States. This was revealed in Asahi Shimbun interviews with Hajime 
Morita, a former House of Representatives member, and Lower House 
lawmaker Koichi Kato. Morita was serving as secretary to Prime 
Minister Ohira and Kato as deputy chief cabinet secret at the time. 
 
In 1963, Foreign Minister Ohira held talks with U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan Edwin Reischauer and confirmed the pact's interpretation that 
Tokyo was to allow port calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying 
nuclear weapons. This was revealed through testimonies and documents 
in the United States. The Asahi Shimbun interviews have made clear 
that Ohira was concerned about the fact that the pact was still kept 
under cover (in 1980) when he was serving as prime minister and that 
he considered dissolving the agreement. 
 
According to Morita, about two months before his death, Prime 
Minister Ohira called into his office Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Masayoshi Ito, Kato, and himself. There, Ohira asked for their 
opinions, saying, "Don't you think it's about time to let the people 
know about port calls by vessels carrying nuclear weapons?" Kato 
also remembers this scene. "I don't think that would be appropriate 
at this point," Ito replied. Morita followed suit, saying, "That's 
 
TOKYO 00002442  006 OF 012 
 
 
not possible." Kato echoed Morita's opinion. 
 
According to Morita, Ohira then said, "I know it's difficult. That's 
why I am asking for your opinions," and he did not bring up the 
issue again before he died. Ohira did not seem surprised at the U.S. 
view immediately after his meeting with Ambassador Reischauer. But 
he gradually began to think seriously about the gap between the 
government's official position and reality, and developed a desire 
to unveil the secret pact. On several occasions Morita heard Ohira 
mumbling "introduction, introduction" (referring to the introduction 
of nuclear weapons) in the car on the road. 
 
Many years after retiring as ambassador to Japan, Reischauer 
testified in 1981 that Ohira in their meeting in 1963 had confirmed 
the U.S. view that port calls were not equivalent to the 
introduction (of nuclear weapons). But the Japanese government has 
consistently denied this fact. 
 
Shortly after assuming office, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada 
ordered the ministry to investigate four secret agreements, 
including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons, and to produce 
a report by the end of November. A third-party panel to be set up 
will also interview persons familiar with the matter. 
 
After entering the Finance Ministry, Morita married the eldest 
daughter of Ohira, a former Finance Ministry official. In 1962, 
Morita became a secretary to Foreign Minister Ohira. In 1972, Morita 
again served as secretary to Ohira, who became foreign minister for 
a second time. 
 
Seinan Jogakuin University Professor Hideki Kan, who found copies of 
official U.S. telegrams on the Ohira-Reischauer talks about 10 years 
ago, said: "It is significant that there was a politician who 
agonized over deceiving the people about the existence of a secret 
(nuclear) pact and considered disclosing the pact to the public." 
 
(5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage 
to revise campaign pledges 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) 
October 22, 2009 
 
Gerald Curtis, professor at Columbia University 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the administration 
just over a month ago, but its achievements during this short period 
are impressive. First of all, the government has changed its 
policymaking systems drastically, and not just in the sense that the 
methods of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) era have been changed. 
The system of an administration comprising the senior bureaucrats 
appointed by the Emperor and the majority party in the Diet was 
established during the Taisho period, and this has remained 
basically unchanged even under the new postwar constitution. The 
historical significance of the Hatoyama administration's 
revolutionary change of this system of governance is tremendous. 
 
The new system under which the cabinet makes policies and the party 
passes these policies in the Diet prevents the zoku giin (Diet 
members lobbying for special interests) from coming into play and 
clarifies accountability for policymaking. The phenomenon of cabinet 
ministers talking to the people in their own words, and not reading 
from scripts prepared by the bureaucrats, is a symbol of the major 
 
TOKYO 00002442  007 OF 012 
 
 
changes brought about by the Hatoyama administration. 
 
I have long had doubts about the myth that the bureaucrats are to 
blame (for Japan's problems). There is nothing wrong with the 
bureaucracy itself. The issue is whether the politicians controlling 
the administration are able to fully utilize their governing 
abilities, and not leave things in the hands of the bureaucrats, and 
are able to make the capable bureaucrats or bureaucrats who have a 
sense of mission to make contributions to the country to work 
closely with the cabinet. 
 
In any case, the people have high hopes for and give strong support 
to the Hatoyama administration's efforts so far. The United States 
and other countries are closely watching developments from now on. 
 
However, the Hatoyama administration also faces serious problems. 
The first problem is how to maintain the unity of the cabinet, since 
the DPJ has formed a coalition with small parties because it does 
not control a majority in the House of Councillors. 
 
The notion during the LDP era that each minister is the boss in his 
ministry is incompatible with the DPJ administration's thinking. If 
Mr. Hatoyama allows the leader of junior coalition partner People's 
New Party to openly declare that the prime minister cannot possibly 
fire him and behave like he is an equal of the prime minister, this 
will undermine not only the prime minister's authority, but also the 
unity of the cabinet. 
 
Another issue is whether the administration is able to display 
courage in revising the policies included in the DPJ's campaign 
manifesto if warranted. Campaign pledges are just campaign pledges. 
A responsible political leader should not be obsessed with policies 
just because they are campaign pledges, regardless of whether 
funding is available. 
 
With tax revenues plunging, the issuance of more deficit-funding 
bonds will be required if all the policies in the manifesto are to 
be implemented. Child allowances, toll-free expressways, and so 
forth are not one-time policies. Since they will probably continue 
for many years, spending for these policies will increase every 
year. If government debts increase any further, the credibility of 
the Hatoyama administration will be jeopardized. 
 
Flexibility to make revisions if warranted is necessary, even for 
campaign pledges. Like U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama won the election under the slogan of "change." After 
taking office, President Obama has made pragmatic revisions to 
specific policies while standing firm on his basic ideals. If the 
Hatoyama administration can convince the people on this point and 
demonstrate its courage and resolve, it will probably become the 
administration that will realize the historical changes Japan 
needs. 
 
(6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
October 20, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
 
(Note) Figures are percentages. Figures in parentheses are 
percentages in the previous Sankei-FNN survey, conducted Sept. 
 
TOKYO 00002442  008 OF 012 
 
 
16-17. 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
Yes 60.9 (68.7) 
No 20.7 (15.3) 
Don't know (D/K), etc. 18.4 (16.0) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 40.6 (44.4) 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 18.9 (18.8) 
New Komeito (NK or Komeito) 3.6 (4.0) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP or Kyosanto) 2.7 (2.7) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.3 (2.4) 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 2.3 (4.1) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.5 (0.3) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.0 (0.3) 
Other political parties 0.5 (0.8) 
None 28.5 (21.6) 
D/K, etc. 1.1 (0.6) 
 
Q: Do you have high expectations for the Hatoyama government on the 
following points? 
 
The prime minister's personal character 
Yes 71.0 
No 15.6 
D/K, etc. 13.4 
 
The prime minister's leadership 
Yes 41.5 
No 28.5 
D/K, etc. 30.0 
 
Foreign, security policies 
Yes 42.1 
No 24.9 
D/K, etc. 33.0 
 
Economic policy 
Yes 36.2 
No 34.6 
D/K, etc. 29.2 
 
Cutting government waste 
Yes 72.2 
No 15.6 
D/K, etc. 12.2 
 
Relations with bureaucrats 
Yes 76.1 
No 10.4 
D/K, etc. 13.5 
 
Budget 
Yes 47.0 
No 29.9 
D/K, etc. 23.1 
 
Teamwork 
Yes 46.8 
 
TOKYO 00002442  009 OF 012 
 
 
No 29.7 
D/K, etc. 23.5 
 
Performance at 1 month 
Yes 52.7 
No 21.4 
D/K, etc. 25.9 
 
Q: What do you think about the Hatoyama government on the following 
points? 
 
Mr. Ichiro Ozawa is the right person as DPJ secretary general 
Yes 49.0 (56.7) 
No 39.0 (33.3) 
D/K, etc. 12.0 (10.0) 
 
Mr. Katsuya Okada is the right person as foreign minister 
Yes 70.1 (63.7) 
No 15.2 (18.0) 
D/K, etc. 14.7 (18.3) 
 
Mr. Akira Nagatsuma is the right person as health, labor and welfare 
minister 
Yes 66.3 (70.0) 
No 17.2 (9.3) 
D/K, etc. 16.5 (20.7) 
 
Mr. Seiji Maehara is the right person as land, infrastructure and 
transport minister 
Yes 62.5 (------) 
No 23.4 (------) 
D/K, etc. 14.1 (------) 
 
Mr. Shizuka Kamei is the right person as state minister for postal 
reform 
Yes 24.9 (41.8) 
No 53.9 (40.2) 
D/K, etc. 21.2 (18.0) 
 
 
Ms. Mizuho Fukushima is the right person as state minister for 
consumer affairs and declining birthrate 
Yes 46.8 (61.5) 
No 29.7 (24.3) 
D/K, etc. 23.5 (14.2) 
 
The DPJ's coalition with the SDP and the PNP is good 
Yes 52.7 (49.8) 
No 21.4 (37.1) 
D/K, etc. 25.9 (13.1) 
 
You feel Mr. Ozawa's influence in the cabinet lineup 
Yes 49.0 (61.3) 
No 39.0 (26.8) 
D/K, etc. 12.0 (11.9) 
 
Do you think the Diet should discuss such issues as the "child 
allowance handout" plan during its extraordinary session? 
Yes 70.1 (------) 
No 15.2 (------) 
D/K, etc. 14.7 (------) 
 
 
TOKYO 00002442  010 OF 012 
 
 
You have high expectations for the DPJ's newly elected lawmakers? 
Yes 66.3 (39.2) 
No 17.2 (43.8) 
D/K, etc. 16.5 (17.0) 
 
Q: Do you have high expectations for LDP President Sadakazu 
Tanigaki? 
 
Yes 34.1 
No 54.7 
D/K, etc. 11.2 
 
Q: Do you think the DPJ should keep its manifesto without fail? 
 
The DPJ should do so 9.0 
The DPJ should do its best to do so, but it can't be helped if it 
fails to keep some pledges in its manifesto 38.8 
The DPJ should flexibly translate its policies into action without 
being bound to its pledges 50.6 
D/K, etc. 1.6 
 
Q: Do you think the DPJ should translate the following policies into 
action? 
 
No fees for high school 
Yes 46.9 
No 44.1 
D/K, etc. 9.0 
 
Abolition of provisional gasoline tax rates 
Yes 57.1 
No 29.3 
D/K, etc. 13.6 
 
Compensation for farming households 
Yes 59.2 
No 21.7 
D/K, etc. 19.1 
 
Loan moratorium for small businesses 
Yes 54.9 
No 28.4 
D/K, etc. 16.7 
 
Relocation of the U.S. military's Futenma airfield outside Okinawa 
Prefecture 
Yes 45.1 
No 29.1 
D/K, etc. 25.8 
 
Ban on bureaucrats' replies before the Diet 
Yes 39.9 
No 35.7 
D/K, etc. 24.4 
 
25 PERCENT  cuts in Japan's greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 
levels as a midterm goal 
Yes 72.7 
No 17.5 
D/K, etc. 9.8 
 
Q: Who do you think is appropriate as prime minister among the 
 
TOKYO 00002442  011 OF 012 
 
 
following politicians? 
 
Yukio Hatoyama 28.7 
Katsuya Okada 8.2 
Naoto Kan 5.5 
Ichiro Ozawa 4.4 
Seiji Maehara 3.9 
Akira Nagatsuma 1.6 
Other ruling party lawmakers 1.7 
Yoichi Masuzoe 9.7 
Shigeru Ishiba 4.2 
Nobuteru Ishihara 2.5 
Sadakazu Tanigaki 2.2 
Taro Kono 0.8 
Yasutoshi Nishimura 0.1 
Other opposition lawmakers 3.4 
None 16.5 
D/K, etc. 6.6 
 
Q: Would you like the ruling or opposition parties to win next 
year's election for the House of Councillors? 
 
The DPJ and other new ruling parties 59.0 (58.6) 
The LDP and other new opposition parties 32.9 (32.3) 
D/K, etc. 8.1 (9.1) 
 
Q: How long do you think the Hatoyama government will continue? 
 
About several months 4.0 (1.3) 
Until around next summer's election for the House of Councillors 
16.8 (18.2) 
Until next fall 26.5 (24.1) 
Until after next fall 47.7 (51.9) 
D/K, etc. 5.0 (4.5) 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Oct. 17-18 by the 
Sankei Shimbun and Fuji News Network (FNN) over the telephone on a 
computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. For the survey, a 
total of 1,000 persons were sampled from among men and women, aged 
20 and over, across the nation. 
 
(7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 22, 2009 
 
08:42 Met Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano at the Prime Minister's 
Official Residence. 
09:10 Met U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, followed by former Prime 
Minister Mori, with Hirano present. 
10:11 Met Environment Minister Ozawa. Later attended a meeting of 
the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies. 
12:17 Met Katsura Sanshi, a professional comic storyteller, with 
Transport Minister Maehara and others present. 
14:17 Met Cabinet Intelligence Director Mitani. 
15:10 Responded to an interview with the Thai newspaper Bangkok 
Post. Later, met State Minister for Administrative Reform Council 
Sengoku, Cabinet Office Vice Minister Furukawa, and Government 
Revitalization Unit Executive Secretary Kato. 
16:22 Met Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae, Deputy Education Minister 
Shimizu, Director General for International Affairs Saneshige of the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry, and others. 
 
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17:32 Met Chinese National Peoples Representatives Congress Foreign 
Affairs Committee chief Li, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
and others. 
18:45 Met at the prime minister's official residential quarters with 
Diet Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Mitsui, the head directors of 
Lower House standing committees, and others. 
20:29 Met Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Nagatsuma and 
parliamentary secretary Yamanoi. 
21:39 Returned to his home. 
 
ROOS