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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 TOKYO 002344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/09/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Countries concerned have different motives regarding concept of 
East Asian Community [Asahi] 
 
(2) Gov't to play it by ear in talks with U.S. over Futenma 
relocation [Mainichi] 
 
(3) Controversial remarks on Futenma, Hatoyama wavering between U.S. 
and SDP, desperate to prevent the comments from creating stir [Tokyo 
Shimbun] 
 
(4) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear programs; Six-Party Talks are 
indispensable [Tokyo Shimbun] 
 
(5) Editorial: Disclosure of information on ASDF transport duty in 
Iraq; make SDF activities more transparent [Asahi] 
 
(6) "Seiron" column: How to ensure the "deepening" of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance [Sankei] 
 
(7) "Seiron" column: "Self-contradiction" in Hatoyama's yuai 
diplomacy [Sankei] 
 
(8) Will honeymoon-like relationship between Rengo and DPJ continue? 
[Asahi] 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Countries concerned have different motives regarding concept of 
East Asian Community 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpts) 
October 8, 2009 
 
The concept of an East Asian Community - proposed by the Hatoyama 
administration - will be placed high on the agenda for the upcoming 
summit meeting on Oct. 10 between Japan, China, and South Korea. But 
the details of the concept have yet to be revealed, so the countries 
concerned, such as the U.S., China, South Korea, and ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) nations, remain unable to 
determine how to respond to it. 
 
Japan has yet to consider framework, aim 
 
In a speech at the UN General Assembly on Sept. 24, Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama declared that Japan will make utmost efforts to 
become a "bridge" for the world. As part of these efforts, he 
advocated building an East Asian Community. This concept is based on 
his political philosophy, "fraternity" (yuai). 
 
Hatoyama has long cherished the idea of an East Asian community. In 
the introduction of his book titled "A new constitution draft," 
published in 2005, he noted: "I would like to propose that Japan 
formulate a plan for a European Union (EU)-style East Asian 
community and play the leading role in promoting it." Australian 
politician Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who made efforts to establish 
the European Community, initially proposed the spirit of fraternity. 
Hatoyama seems to be linking "fraternity" to "community." 
 
Then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stressed in 2002 that "we 
should aim to build a community in which we walk together and move 
 
TOKYO 00002344  002 OF 014 
 
 
forward together." Successive cabinets also made efforts, through 
meetings of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) and 
East Asian summit meetings, to push ahead with cooperation in 
economic, disasters and other areas, with an eye toward an East 
Asian Community. Hatoyama's position of placing priority on Asia is 
more prominent than his predecessors', but the framework and aim of 
the idea have yet to be discussed within the government. 
 
Moreover, Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada have different 
images in mind for the community. On the question of whether the 
U.S. should be included in the envisioned community, Hatoyama said: 
"I have no intention of excluding the U.S.," while Okada commented: 
"The current scheme does not include the U.S." 
 
Hatoyama cites "currency" as an area in which cooperation is 
possible in East Asia, but Okada takes a negative view, remarking: 
"Introducing a common currency will restrict sovereignty to a 
considerable extent. There are socialist countries and also 
democratic countries [in the region]. It is inconceivable for all 
the countries to share a single currency. " 
 
China has sense of alarm; South Korea has feeling of familiarity; 
ASEAN waiting to ascertain intention 
 
"I support the idea of forming an East Asian community under the 
lead of ASEAN," Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in a press 
conference held after a meeting of ASEAN plus three in Laos in 
November 2004. He aimed to give ASEAN countries, over which China 
finds it easy to exert influence, the leadership role in talks on 
the community concept. When the Koizumi administration proposed an 
East Asian community, China was alarmed that Japan and the U.S. 
might have begun to move to exclude China's influence from the 
region. That is because the Koizumi initiative proposed not only 
economic integration but also security cooperation with the U.S. and 
Australia. For China, which is controlled by the Communist Party, 
the idea of integrating Asia would mean forming a free trade zone. 
China is not considering integration in the political and security 
areas. 
 
Meanwhile, South Korea has shown a feeling of familiarity with the 
concept of community. The late former President Kim Dae Jung 
strongly advocated the concept of an East Asian community, and the 
nation also proposed setting up a study group on the concept at the 
summit meeting of ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea in 2000. 
President Lee Myung-Bak has put forward a new concept that would 
include Central Asia and Oceania in the envisioned community. 
 
ASEAN countries are looking at the concept with mixed feelings. A 
Foreign Ministry official of Thailand, the chair of ASEAN, grumbled: 
"Although Mr. Hatoyama has said he places priority to Asia, he has 
yet to meet the prime minister of the ASEAN chair country." 
 
As pointed out by Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Faculty of 
Political Science of Chulalongkorn University, ASEAN countries take 
the view that Japan has overly depended on the U.S. and that its 
role in the region is always vague. While welcoming the Hatoyama 
concept, they are taking a wait-and-see attitude to ascertain the 
real intention and specifics of the concept. 
 
U.S. shifts attention to Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
Hatoyama's proposed concept of an East Asian Community was initially 
 
TOKYO 00002344  003 OF 014 
 
 
received negatively in the U.S. An article by Hatoyama that was 
carried in the New York Times (online) took up this concept in the 
context of criticizing the U.S.-led world economic structure and 
calling for economic and security systems centered on Asia. Given 
this, some Americans felt the concept was unrealistic and as 
symbolized the Hatoyama administration's stance of distancing itself 
from the U.S. 
 
The timing [for the release of Hatoyama's community concept] was 
also bad. The administration of President Barack Obama has placed 
importance on relations with Asia, as shown by Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton's visit to Japan as the first destination of her 
overseas trip in her new post. Declaring in Thailand in July: "By 
taking action, we will demonstrate that the U.S. has returned," 
Clinton signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a pact 
that Washington was reluctant to sign under the previous Bush 
administration. The U.S. also launched a strategy dialogue with 
China and India for their senior officials to regularly hold talks. 
 
The community concept emerged at a time when the U.S. began to pay 
attention to Asia. Since Prime Minister Hatoyama did not take it up 
when he met with President Obama in September, the sense of alarm 
has been assuaged for now. The focus of discussion has now shifted 
to bilateral issues, such as the realignment of U.S. forces in 
Japan, including whether to halt the Maritime Self-Defense Force's 
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and whether to revise the 
agreed relocation plan of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station. 
 
(2) Gov't to play it by ear in talks with U.S. over Futenma 
relocation 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 9, 2009 
 
Two days ago, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama implied that he would 
accept the currently planned relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' 
Futenma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, to a coastal 
area of Camp Schwab in the island prefecture's northern coastal city 
of Nago. Yesterday, Hatoyama was asked what he meant. "I'd like to 
explore a 'landing point' among various options," he replied. 
Hatoyama made it clear that his government would take a flexible 
stance in the run-up to full-fledged negotiations with the United 
States over the Futenma relocation issue. Meanwhile, the Social 
Democratic Party, one of the DPJ's two coalition partners, urged the 
foreign and defense ministers to move Futenma airfield out of 
Okinawa or Japan. His Futenma remarks had repercussions yesterday. 
 
"While giving consideration to the feelings of Okinawa's people, we 
will arrive at an answer through negotiations with the United 
States," he told reporters in his office yesterday, by way of 
explaining the remarks he made on Oct. 7. "I didn't mean I would 
accept an agreement that was reached under my predecessor's 
administration." He added, "We're looking into various 
possibilities." He also stressed, "I have no doubt that an 
intergovernmental agreement carries weight." 
 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell will come to Japan on 
Oct. 11, and Parliamentary Defense Secretary Akihisa Nagashima will 
visit the United States next week. On Oct. 20, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Gates is scheduled to arrive in Japan. On Nov. 12, U.S. 
President Obama will make his first visit to Japan. Ahead of his 
 
TOKYO 00002344  004 OF 014 
 
 
visit, Japan and the United States will hold consultations on 
bilateral issues, including the Futenma issue. 
 
In the run-up to this summer's election for the House of 
Representatives, Hatoyama insisted on the DPJ's advocacy of 
relocating the heliport functions of Futenma airfield outside 
Okinawa Prefecture. This was specified in the DPJ's "Okinawa Vision" 
paper released in 2008. However, the DPJ's manifesto did not 
directly touch on the Futenma issue. State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Koichi Takemasa, meeting the press yesterday, stressed, "The 
manifesto is our party's policy course and is the newest one." 
However, Hatoyama is now, in fact, fettered by his comments during 
the election campaign. 
 
The U.S. government's basic position is that it will not consent to 
any changes to the current Futenma relocation plan. Therefore, the 
Hatoyama government is exploring tactics to get the U.S. 
government's understanding while positioning the Futenma issue in 
the overall picture of Japan-U.S. bilateral relations, including the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean 
and Japan's assistance to Afghanistan. Washington may see Hatoyama 
as adhering to a policy of relocating the Futenma facility outside 
Okinawa Prefecture without offering a specific solution. If that is 
the case, intergovernmental negotiations may hit a snag from the 
start. Hatoyama is believed to have judged that he had to send a 
message to the United States through his remarks of two days ago. 
 
The Hatoyama government, however, has yet to determine its policy 
course on the question of relocating Futenma airfield within Okinawa 
Prefecture or moving it out of the prefecture. Meanwhile, government 
offices are required to resubmit their budget requests for next 
fiscal year no later than Oct. 15. The focus is on whether the 
Defense Ministry will earmark estimates in its budget request for 
the Futenma relocation. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, 
when he met the press yesterday, was asked if the government would 
put off its decision on this matter. "That's also conceivable," 
Hirano said, implying the possibility of forgoing a decision on Oct. 
¶15. 
 
(3) Controversial remarks on Futenma, Hatoyama wavering between U.S. 
and SDP, desperate to prevent the comments from creating stir 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
October 9, 2009 
 
Tetsuya Furuya 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was preoccupied yesterday with 
explanations of his controversial remarks on Oct. 7 concerning 
relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (Ginowan 
City in Okinawa Prefecture) that were taken as suggesting his 
readiness to accept a contentious Japan-U.S. agreement reached 
during the previous government led by the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP). In his explanations, Hatoyama appears to have become 
distressed, being caught between the U.S. government, which has 
sought the relocation of the base to a place elsewhere in Okinawa as 
agreed, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), one of his party's 
coalition partners, which has called for relocating the facility out 
of Okinawa. 
 
Hatoyama said to the press corps yesterday evening regarding his 
comments on Oct. 7, "I did not mean that I would completely accept 
 
TOKYO 00002344  005 OF 014 
 
 
the agreement reached between the former Japanese and U.S. 
governments." He also said, "It is true that the accord the former 
government concluded carries weight because it was an agreement 
between the two countries." 
 
The previous government agreed on a plan to relocate Futenma Air 
Station to the coastal area of Camp Schwab, a U.S. military base. 
Hatoyama's comments did not mean that he would accept the bilateral 
agreement as is and left open the possibility he would accept a 
slight revision of the current plan by moving the airfield further 
out to sea or by relocating the base outside the prefecture. 
 
When his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was an opposition party, 
Hatoyama took a position of aiming at moving the base outside the 
prefecture. Since taking office, he has asserted that he has no 
intention of changing his view on the base. Against the backdrop of 
Hatoyama's altering his position is the U.S.'s strong stance. 
Japan-U.S. talks between diplomats and defense officials at the 
director general level were held in Washington this week. A senior 
Defense Ministry official who had received a report [on the talks] 
said to those around him, "(The U.S. side is) tough. [They are] very 
tough." 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Japan on Nov. 12. The 
Japanese government has predicted that aid to Afghanistan will be a 
major agenda item at the summit meeting between Hatoyama and Obama. 
There is a possibility that Obama will ask Hatoyama about the true 
intention of his controversial remarks. 
 
Meanwhile, with regard to a coalition agreement reached by the DPJ, 
the SDP, and the People's New Party (PNP), in which the DPJ pledged 
to "move in the direction of reexamining" the realignment of U.S. 
military bases in Japan, Hatoyama stressed on the 8th, "Naturally I 
cannot ignore it." For the SDP, however, the direction of the 
reexamining" means relocating the base out of Okinawa. 
 
In reaction to Hatoyama's controversial remarks, the SDP, many of 
whose legislators hail from Okinawa, yesterday requested Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano cancel the current plan. SDP 
Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno and other officials called on 
Hirano at the Prime Minister's Official Residence [Kantei]. If 
Hatoyama seeks a conclusion that will play down the significance of 
the coalition agreement, it will drive a wedge between coalition 
partners. 
 
(4) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear programs; Six-Party Talks are 
indispensable 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
October 7, 2009 
 
Pyongyang has suggested the possibility of conditionally returning 
to the Six-Party Talks on the nuclear issue. The other five 
countries should continue making efforts to bring North Korea to the 
table with the aim of making it abandon its nuclear program. 
 
In his meeting with visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Il indicated that the North is ready to hold 
multilateral talks after observing the results of U.S.-DPRK talks, 
adding that the Six-Party Talks are included in the multilateral 
talks. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002344  006 OF 014 
 
 
Since its nuclear test in May, North Korea has insisted that the 
Six-Party Talks are useless, saying, "They are gone forever," and 
"They only discuss sanctions." The North has also continued missile 
tests. It can be said that the North has slightly softened its 
stance. 
 
The Obama administration has told the North that it would hold 
bilateral talks within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The two 
countries are likely to hold bilateral talks shortly. 
 
Kim Jong Il's statement reflects his shrewd calculation that if he 
can discuss the nuclear issue, a guarantee for his regime's 
preservation, and other matters only with the U.S., with luck he can 
ignore the existence of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. must not play 
into his hands. 
 
The North's shift to dialogue is largely ascribable to the 
effectiveness of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Heavy 
restrictions on trade in materials connected with nuclear and 
missile development and a freeze on Pyongyang's assets overseas have 
dealt a serious blow to the North Korean economy. 
 
China's position is delicate. This time around, China and North 
Korea have inked agreements in eight areas including economic and 
technological cooperation and tourism. Wen, who holds the No. 3 post 
in China, visited North Korea to make a personal appeal to Kim Jong 
Il to return to the Six-Party Talks. He needed to offer a quid pro 
quo in the form of economic aid. 
 
China's promise to extend aid might end up weakening the 
effectiveness of the sanctions. 
 
It is undeniable that over the last 15 years the U.S. and China have 
always tried to resolve problems arising from North Korea's repeated 
nuclear tests and missile launches. If this pattern takes hold, the 
Six-Party Talks might turn into a forum for simply rubber-stamping 
decisions of the U.S. and China. 
 
North Korea's nuclear ambitions pose a threat to such countries as 
South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The five countries, including those 
three, are in accord on providing alternative energy aid and 
improving infrastructure [in the North] if the country proceeds to 
abandon its nuclear program. The Six-Party Talks are indispensable. 
 
Joining the Six-Party Talks is also a shortcut for North Korea to 
obtain what it needs to reconstruct its economy. 
 
Japan-China-South Korea summit talks will take place in Beijing on 
Oct. 10. Close cooperation is necessary to learn the outcome of the 
China-DPRK talks and to bring North Korea back to the negotiating 
table. 
 
(5) Editorial: Disclosure of information on ASDF transport duty in 
Iraq; make SDF activities more transparent 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
October 7, 2009 
 
The Defense Ministry has disclosed data detailing the Air 
Self-Defense Force's airlift support activities in Iraq. The 
ministry revealed the data in response to the plaintiff's demand for 
information disclosure in a lawsuit calling for a halt to the 
 
TOKYO 00002344  007 OF 014 
 
 
dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. During the Liberal Democratic Party's 
government, information about this matter was kept under wraps 
despite repeated similar requests. This development probably can be 
taken as one advantage brought about by the change of government. 
 
The ASDF deployed three transport planes to Kuwait from which for 
four years and nine months, until December of last year, they flew 
missions to Iraq. The ASDF initially assisted the activities of 
Ground Self-Defense Force troops in southern Iraq. After the troops 
were withdrawn from Iraq, however, the ASDF flights were extended to 
Bagdad and the northern part of Iraq. The aircraft were also used to 
transport members of the United Nations and the multinational 
forces. 
 
The disclosed data details the contents of airlift activities on a 
weekly basis. It records the amount of transported goods and numbers 
of persons, the nationalities, units, and ranks of transported 
military personnel, and even the types and numbers of accompanying 
small arms. 
 
When the LDP was in power, the government emphasized that the 
dispatched planes were engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance. But the opposition camp suspected that the ASDF 
transport mission might be intended mainly to carry U.S. troops. The 
opposition camp also suspected that the ASDF's activities could 
constitute support for [the multinational forces'] combat 
activities. The government, however, only presented the total 
numbers of goods and personnel transported and refused to disclose 
the details of ASDF activities, reasoning that [disclosing 
information] might undermine security. 
 
According to the data disclosed this time, nearly 70% of the people 
transported by the planes were American military personnel. Many of 
them were carrying small arms or pistols. It might be necessary to 
verify whether or not the weapons or munitions were transported in 
violation of the Iraq Special Measures Law. 
 
The Nagoya High Court ruled in April of last year that the ASDF's 
activities in Iraq are in violation of Article 9 of the Constitution 
because they might be involved in the multinational forces' combat 
activities. 
 
Consideration naturally should be give to the safety of ASDF troops 
in Iraq. But it is improper to keep information on SDF troops' 
activities, particularly those of troops overseas, hidden from the 
public on the pretext of the troops' safety. 
 
Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said: "The government should 
refrain from touching on secrets regarding national defense, but we 
decided to disclose the data because we found in talks with other 
countries' governments that doing so would have no adverse effect. 
We should share information with the people as much as possible." 
This is a reasonable statement, but the actual situation until now 
was quite different from what Kitazawa suggested. 
 
The nontransparent policy management during the LDP administration, 
as represented by secret nuclear agreements between Japan and the 
U.S., resulted in strong public distrust of politics. We welcome the 
new administration's stance of prioritizing transparency in 
diplomatic and security areas. 
 
The Diet should initially play the role of checking civilian control 
 
TOKYO 00002344  008 OF 014 
 
 
over the SDF. But this principle was not working properly under the 
1955 political situation, because only limited information was 
provided to the Diet for the reason that such information is linked 
to military top secrets. 
 
We hope that the new government will quickly improve the current 
situation. The government should provide the Diet with necessary 
information in a positive manner and establish a system to enable 
politicians to scrutinize [SDF activities]. 
 
(6) "Seiron" column: How to ensure the "deepening" of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) 
October 7, 2009 
 
Jun Sakurada, associate professor at Toyo Gakuen University 
 
Key to trustworthiness of the "cornerstone" 
 
The new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, reportedly "confirmed the 
importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance" with U.S. President Barack H. 
Obama during his recent visit to the United States. However, the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has so far sent out numerous 
messages that could be interpreted as a lack of enthusiasm about 
"deepening" the bilateral alliance relationship, at least up until 
the recent change of administration. 
 
For instance, according to a Bloomberg News report on September 11, 
House of Representatives member Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi (then senior vice 
minister of defense in the DPJ's "Next Cabinet") termed the missile 
defense system deployed under the Liberal Democratic Party cabinet 
as "useless" and indicated that the Hatoyama cabinet should consider 
cutting the budget for missile defense from FY2010. 
 
Concerns about the Japan-U.S. relationship have been solely due to 
the article written by Prime Minister Hatoyama that appeared in The 
New York Times. 
 
In light of events even before that, the Hatoyama cabinet's rhetoric 
on the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone [of its foreign 
policy] will not be able to win the United States' trust. Advocacy 
of the "deepening" of the bilateral alliance not backed by concrete 
policy measures may, on the contrary, accelerate the "hollowing out" 
of the alliance. 
 
Start with discussions about emergencies 
 
To be sure, the Hatoyama cabinet is giving consideration to 
cooperating on the prevention of global warming and nuclear 
proliferation as a specific policy for "deepening" the alliance with 
the U.S. However, even though the prevention of global warming and 
nuclear proliferation is important in the context of Japan's future 
foreign policy and working on these issues is indeed a worthy cause, 
discussions on this do not necessarily have to be with the U.S. 
alone. The discussions that Japan needs to have with the U.S. as an 
ally should be about policy issues that it can only talk about with 
the U.S. 
 
Essentially, the discussion should be about "emergencies." The 
reason the Japan-U.S. relationship constitutes an alliance is based 
on the understanding that Japan and the U.S. will jointly deal with 
 
TOKYO 00002344  009 OF 014 
 
 
issues relating to "emergencies" in Japan and in areas close to 
Japan. However, due to the various constraints on its security 
policy, including those arising from the provisions of the 
Constitution on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense 
and other matters, Japan has been unable to fulfill its obligations 
under the Japan-U.S. alliance as an equal partner. As long as Japan 
does not deal with such constraints, it cannot possibly be an "equal 
ally to the U.S." in the real sense. 
 
Therefore, precisely because of its awareness of the inequality 
under the bilateral alliance, Japan needs to continue to make 
conscious efforts to make up for such inequality. 
 
The refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and the handling of U.S. 
Forces Japan realignment are linked to such efforts. In that sense, 
the prevention of global warming and nuclear proliferation is not a 
decisive factor for promoting the "deepening" of the alliance. 
 
Most importantly, the Japan-U.S. alliance is also a guarantee for 
Japan that the U.S. will not become an "enemy" again. The mistake 
that Japan made in the war against the U.S. more than 60 years ago 
was not the fact that it "went to war" - as most pacifists would 
claim - but that it "fought against a country that it should not 
have made an enemy of." 
 
For this reason, Professor Yonosuke Nagai (a political scientist) 
harshly criticized the pacifists of the past who cried out anti-war 
and anti-American slogans at the height of the Vietnam War, 
conveniently reassured by the tacit assumption that "the U.S. would 
never abandon Japan." 
 
How to make continuous efforts 
 
However, now that the Hatoyama cabinet has been launched, if the 
attitude of aiming to "deepen" the Japan-U.S. alliance without 
making any substantial efforts, based on the almost unconscious 
assumption that the Japan-U.S. alliance will never break down - 
similar to the pacifists in the past - is perceived prominently as 
the "will of the Japanese government," it will cause tremendous 
damage to the future of Japan's. 
 
On the other hand, the attitude of ridiculing the advocacy of a 
substantial "deepening" of the bilateral alliance as "subservience 
to the U.S." by both political leftists and rightists is also an 
extension of what might be called the irresponsibility of pacifists 
in the past. 
 
The report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, 
based on discussions in the government under the previous Aso 
cabinet, has recommended allowing the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense, the relaxation of the three principles on 
arms exports, possessing the capability to strike at enemy bases, 
and a review of the five principles on participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. Like other policy issues, the Hatoyama 
cabinet will probably shelve these recommendations. 
 
However, if the Hatoyama cabinet implements even one or two of the 
recommendations, this will be a solid step toward ensuring 
"equality" in the Japan-U.S. alliance and promoting the "deepening" 
of this alliance. This author hopes that Prime Minister Hatoyama 
will do so, but will he be able to "change tack" in order to 
accomplish this? 
 
TOKYO 00002344  010 OF 014 
 
 
 
(7) "Seiron" column: "Self-contradiction" in Hatoyama's yuai 
diplomacy 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) 
October 9, 2009 
 
Atsuyuki Sassa, first director of Cabinet Security Affairs Office 
 
Incoherent policies due to the Social Democratic Party line 
 
Hatoyama's "yuai [fraternal] diplomacy" has begun with his security 
and foreign policies, the very foundation of national policy, left 
undefined. These were kicked off with hasty visits to the U.S. by 
the idealist Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, suspected of being 
anti-U.S., and the dogmatic Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. This 
author is certainly not the only one worried that Japan-U.S. 
relations may deteriorate. 
 
The Hatoyama cabinet is the oddest in the history of Japan's 
constitutional government. While the voters gave the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) 308 seats in the House of Representatives, and 
the administration enjoyed a support rating of 75 percent at its 
inauguration, over 70 percent of the voters feel "insecure" about 
the government they elected. The reason is the ambiguity of the 
DPJ's security and foreign policies. The DPJ's bible, its manifesto 
for the recent election, says nothing specific about how to defend 
Japan against missiles launched by North Korea. 
 
Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa has made prominent statements on the 
supremacy of the United Nations. The DPJ has also concluded a 
coalition agreement with the SDP, which takes an entirely different 
direction in security issues, and appointed its leader, Mizuho 
Fukushima, to the cabinet, resulting in total incoherence in its 
security and foreign policies. 
 
From the perspective of a two-party system, taking the SDP into the 
administration as a coalition partner was a serious mistake. In 
light of the pathetic situation of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) after its crushing defeat in the election, the people have no 
choice but to hope the DPJ will toe a pragmatic line in security and 
foreign affairs. It is obvious to everyone that Japan cannot respond 
to threats from the unpredictable North Korea with "yuai" and "child 
allowances." The DPJ has serious responsibilities. Formulating 
security and foreign policies acceptable to the people is an urgent 
task for the party. 
 
Impossible without security treaty revision 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama has patted himself on the back and claimed 
he was "able to build a Yukio-Barack relationship of trust," on the 
model of the "Ron-Yasu" relationship between former Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone and President Ronald Reagan, and that "there was a 
warm atmosphere" during his first visit to the United States. 
However, if I may say so, I would opine that this was the result of 
the deferring of all controversial issues by Japan hands such as 
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in their attempt to 
showcase friendship, in order to hold in place the American 
"protectorate" of Japan that had shown signs of defecting. It must 
be remembered that the Japan-U.S. security treaty is not a mere 
treaty of friendship and goodwill but a military alliance. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002344  011 OF 014 
 
 
When Prime Minister Hatoyama announced his goal of seeking a "close 
and equal Japan-U.S. relationship," I was hopeful, because the DPJ 
had achieved a bloodless revolution through legal means--truly a 
"Heisei Restoration," which both the LDP and leftist forces had 
failed to accomplish. Bold political and administrative reforms to 
correct the deeply entrenched problems of many, many years have 
already started. Therefore, I had hoped that the U.S. "protectorate" 
would be rehabilitated to become a sovereign country with equal 
status as the U.S. in security and foreign policies. 
 
Toward this end, the interpretation of the "right of collective 
self-defense" by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau requires amendment, 
Article 5 of the security treaty needs revising to make the 
bilateral alliance both defensive and offensive, and host-nation 
support, without parallel in the world, including the provision of 
military bases and the "sympathy budget," under Article 6, needs to 
be reduced. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is merely an 
appendix to the security treaty, so the revision of SOFA will not 
make the bilateral relationship equal. Militarily, Japan is indeed a 
U.S. "protectorate," so unless the security treaty itself is 
revised, the treaty and an equal Japan-U.S. relationship are two 
irreconcilable, contradictory concepts. 
 
Doing nothing about the "sympathy budget," amounting to 200 billion 
yen, that is not a treaty obligation and shouldering the financial 
burden of 600 billion yen for the relocation of U.S. marines in 
Okinawa to Guam were indeed serious omissions by the LDP. Yet Japan 
will now have to continue to accept the provision of bases in 
Okinawa and pay the "sympathy budget" as national obligations under 
the security treaty because Prime Minister Hatoyama has made a 
commitment to President Obama to retain Articles 5 and 6 as they 
are. 
 
Extreme arbitrariness impermissible 
 
The next issue is the "nuclear umbrella." The essence of the 
security treaty is the United States' nuclear deterrence. The 
Obama-(Hillary) Clinton administration, which initiated the UN 
resolution on a "world without nuclear weapons," has been in power 
for nine months. Prime Minister Hatoyama should have demanded a 
clear commitment to the "nuclear umbrella" from President Obama at 
the summit meeting. Not only did he fail to do so, he has even 
abandoned the "nuclearization card," an option for achieving an 
equal relationship, emphasized the three non-nuclear principles, and 
ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate the secret 
nuclear accord. 
 
A security treaty without nuclear weapons is meaningless. We hope 
that the Yukio-Barack relationship does not turn out to be a 
fleeting moment of camaraderie between two idealists with similar 
mindsets. 
 
Proposing the concept of East Asian Community to China during the 
U.S. visit is also a problem. This will benefit China's pursuit of 
hegemony and may expose Japan to the risk of becoming a vassal state 
of China, as well as arouse suspicions in the Western countries, 
particularly the United States. 
 
Collaboration between China, a nuclear-armed military dictatorship, 
and Japan, an economic and technological power, may give rise to 
unnecessary suspicions among the Western countries. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002344  012 OF 014 
 
 
Lastly, although Prime Minister Hatoyama is calling for cooperation 
among countries based on his grandfather's words yuai, things are 
not so simple in the global arena. The international commitment to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent was also abrupt and 
reckless. This is a commitment that will affect Japan's economic 
growth and impose an additional cost on the people. Therefore, a 
national consensus is required. Public opinion polls have shown the 
DPJ's landslide victory was mainly the result of "dislike of the 
LDP" (58 percent). Only 10 percent of respondents cited the DPJ 
manifesto as a reason for voting for the party, and merely 2 percent 
cited Prime Minister Hatoyama as the reason. The people have not 
given Prime Minister Hatoyama a mandate to act with extreme 
arbitrariness. 
 
(8) Will honeymoon-like relationship between Rengo and DPJ 
continue? 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
October 9, 2009 
 
The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), the central 
organization of trade unions, marked the 20th anniversary since its 
formation. Representatives of the three ruling parties, including 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, attended its regular conference held 
in Tokyo on Oct. 8. Rengo played up its honeymoon-like relationship 
with the new administration. It is expected to work together with 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for the Upper House election 
next year. However, it is not completely in agreement with the DPJ 
on the policy front. It is finding it difficult to maintain a proper 
distance from the administration. 
 
DPJ attaches importance to its relationship with Rengo for its 
organizational power: Ozawa asks for cooperation for Upper House 
election next year 
 
The new Hatoyama administration is clearly attaching importance to 
Rengo. On Sept. 17, the day after the launch of the administration, 
Hatoyama invited Chairman Takagi and others to the Prime Minister's 
Official Residence (Kantei) as the first guests. On that occasion, 
Takagi made a request, "Since we have a policy agreement, we would 
like to discuss various things properly." Even when he was visiting 
Pittsburgh, U.S.A, to attend the financial summit (G-20), Hatoyama 
contacted Takagi, who was also visiting the U.S. to attend the labor 
summit. 
 
Among cabinet members, there are many lawmakers who are backed by 
labor unions, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, 
State Minister for Administrative Reform Council Yoshito Sengoku, 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Minister Tatsuo 
Kawabata and Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Masayuki Naoshima. 
Tadayoshi Kusano, a former Rengo member, has also been picked as a 
member of the Administrative Reform Council, the showcase of the 
cabinet. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has even criticized this 
situation, with one part member saying, "Labor unions are ruling the 
cabinet." 
 
The relationship between the DPJ and Rengo cooled down briefly in 
2005, when then DPJ president Seiji Maehara advocated a policy of 
shedding the party's dependence on labor unions. However, when 
Ichiro Ozawa took office as president in April 2006, the situation 
changed completely. Having an eye on Rengo's organizational power, 
Ozawa asked Takagi to visit various parts of the country with him. 
 
TOKYO 00002344  013 OF 014 
 
 
They then traveled all over the country in the run-up to the Upper 
House election in 2007. 
 
The DPJ won a crushing victory in the Upper House election with 
Rengo offering manpower to make up for the weakness of DPJ's local 
organizations. Rengo offered full support to the DPJ for the general 
election this summer. The election of 38 candidates backed by trade 
unions contributed to the DPJ's landslide victory. 
 
Chief of the secretariat Nobuaki Koga will replace Takagi Rengo's 
regular conference on the 9th. Koga hails from the Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. (now Panasonic). He has been associating 
with Hirano, who also hails from the same trade union, for 30 years. 
The Hirano-Koga Panasonic line will replace the Ozawa-Takagi line. 
 
Ozawa, who is spearheading the DPJ in preparing for the Upper House 
election next summer, has already started taking action in an effort 
to use Rengo once again to the utmost extent. 
 
Rengo: Coordinating gaps in policies is problem 
 
Many representatives of industrial unions at the Rengo regular 
conference voiced concern about the DPJ's policy of reforming the 
public servant system or making highways toll free. 
 
Members of labor unions under Rengo even goaded the leadership with 
one saying, "Rengo is the largest support organization of the ruling 
power. We want you to stick to the stance of saying whatever we have 
to say." 
 
Looking back on the 20-year history of Rengo, Chairman Takagi noted, 
"Our organization has not necessarily made smooth progress. We are 
still half way." 
 
The power transfer is an opportunity for Rengo to go on the 
offensive, changing the trend. The lineup for that has been set with 
Deputy Prime Minister Naoto Kan, with whom Rengo has been working 
since the party was an opposition party, having been put in charge 
of employment, and Ritsuo Hosokawa, who has the full support of a 
trade union under the wing of Rengo, taking office as senior Vice 
Health, Labor and Welfare Minister. Since the launch of the new 
administration, Rengo has been strongly calling on the government to 
strengthen employment measures. As a result, preparation for 
emergency employment measures has gotten under way. 
 
However, Rengo is not necessarily in agreement with the DPJ on all 
individual policies. How should it deal with policies that are 
linked to the interests of trade unions under its wing? For 
instance, there are issues intertwined with the Japan Pension 
Organization to be launched in January next year. That is because 
Social Insurance Agency officials could lose their jobs as the new 
organization is launched. 
 
When Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Nagatsuma along with the 
senior vice ministers and the parliamentary secretaries made a 
courtesy call on Rengo, Chief of Secretariat Koga cautioned them, 
"Please make a cautious response." 
 
How will Rengo realize their policies, while keeping a proper 
distance from the ruling party without being unilaterally influenced 
by it? The campaign guidelines adopted at the regular conference 
included this description: "Rengo will hold policy talks with 
 
TOKYO 00002344  014 OF 014 
 
 
political parties if the need arises, regardless of whether it is 
the ruling camp or the opposition camp, which can be taken as 
insurance, so to speak, as well as a policy of strengthening ties 
with the DPJ. 
 
ZUMWALT