VZCZCXRO8735
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2245/01 2861558
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131558Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 6901
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3792
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USCINCEUR FMFO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS TU KWBG IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELIS MULL RESPONSE TO TURKISH "HUMILIATIONS" 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (S) Summary.  Turkey's decision to cancel Israel's 
participation in the joint Turkey-U.S.-Italy-NATO-Israel 
Anatolian Eagle air exercise  received heavy media coverage 
here October 11-13.  Although the IDF adhered to agreed 
language on the international portion of the exercise being 
postponed and not cancelled, the Turkish decision to exclude 
Israel was the source of wide-ranging commentary.  Some 
sources suggested that Israel should not put up with Turkey's 
"humiliating" treatment of Israel, while others, including 
Defense Minister Barak and Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon, 
made public statements stressing the ongoing strategic 
importance to Turkey to Israel.  Sources in the Israeli NSC 
and IDF have told us that while discussions of how to handle 
the deteriorating relationship with Turkey are ongoing, no 
decisions have been made thus far either to retaliate or to 
make gestures toward Ankara.  Our IDF source stressed that 
the Turkish military appeared to have been embarrassed by 
Prime Minister Erdogan's decision, but they believe that the 
Turkish General Staff no longer has the power or the will to 
challenge Erdogan.  Israelis are carefully following the 
development of Turkey's strategic cooperation with Syria and 
are also wary of Turkey's attitude toward Iran.  All of our 
contacts, and most media reports, have stressed Israeli 
appreciation for the U.S. decision to pull out of Anatolian 
Eagle, noting that this was an important signal to Erdogan. 
We doubt that in the present environment the GOI will be 
inclined to make concessions to Turkey's desire to play a 
larger humanitarian role in Gaza.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) GOI contacts have been in touch with us since October 
3 regarding Turkey's decision to exclude Israel from the 
Anatolian Eagle joint exercise, but the issue stayed out of 
the Israeli media until the end of the Succot holidays 
October 11.  It then became a matter of competing headlines, 
with some media, especially the conservative, 
English-language Jerusalem Post taking the lead in suggesting 
ways that Israel could retaliate, while  other media have 
stressed the view that Israel continues to have a huge 
investment in maintaining a strategic relationship with 
Turkey, Erdogan's anti-Israeli posturing notwithstanding. 
Among the retaliatory measures mentioned are cancelling the 
sale of Israeli drone technology to Turkey and refusing to 
respond to Turkey's annual requests for Israeli help in 
blocking the Armenian Genocide bill in the Congress.  The 
liberal Ha'aretz newspaper reported October 12 that MFA 
Director General Gal had convened a special MFA working group 
to review Israeli policy toward Turkey, but in contrast to 
the usual leaks about sensitive discussions here, MFA 
contacts declined to reveal the content of these discussions, 
one indication of the seriousness with which the MFA is 
handling the Turkey discussions. 
 
¶3.  (S) IDF Deputy J-5 Brigadier General Yossi Heimann told 
PolCouns October 12 that the MOD and IDF remain eager to 
preserve the strategic relationship that they have developed 
with the Turkish military over the past 15 years, but Heimann 
admitted that Israel is also sensitive to repeated insults 
and slights by Prime Minister Erdogan and is deeply worried 
about Erdogan's inclinations to develop Turkey's relations 
with Syria and Iran.  Heimann assessed that the Turkish 
General Staff no longer has the power or the inclination to 
challenge unpalatable decisions by Turkey's civilian 
political leadership, adding that to some extent, Israel's 
image in Turkey is associated with the Turkish military, 
making the Israeli-Turkish strategic relationship an easy 
target for Erdogan.  Heimann stressed that the Turkish J-3 
had been embarrassed and apologetic when they initially 
informed the Israeli defense attach in Ankara of the 
decision to bar Israel from participating in Anatolian Eagle. 
 "We also have our pride," Heimann said, noting that there is 
discussion of cancelling the drone project, but he stressed 
that no decision has been made.  The idea of transferring 
advanced military technology to Turkey is now coming under 
increased scrutiny due to Israeli uncertainty about the 
direction of Turkish policy toward Israel's enemies.  Heimann 
said the entire IDF General Staff and the MOD leadership were 
greatly appreciative of the U.S. decision to cancel 
participation in Anatolian Eagle as well as to urge Italy and 
NATO to follow suit.  Heimann noted that Erdogan may have 
misunderstood tensions between the Obama Administration and 
the Netanyahu Government as an indication of reduced U.S. 
support for Israel.  It was therefore vitally important to 
Israel that the U.S. send the signal that it sent regarding 
Anatolian Eagle. 
 
¶4.  (S) Israeli NSC senior adviser Eitan Naeh, an expert on 
Turkey and the Caucasus, provided PolCouns with a strategic 
overview of Israeli-Turkish relations October 7.  Naeh, who 
served as DCM in the Israeli Embassy in Ankara in the late 
1990s and was later Ambassador to Azerbaijan, said he has 
concluded that even at the height of Israeli-Turkish 
cooperation, Israel had overly high expectations of Turkey's 
potential contributions to the regional stability.  Naeh 
suggested that Israel's ties to Turkey have gradually 
deteriorated as the Turkish secular elite has gradually ceded 
power to the Islamist Ak Party.  Naeh said he considers 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu to be as much of an opponent of 
the relationship with Israel as PM Erdogan, though he 
described Davutoglu as less emotional than Erdogan and more 
cautious in his rhetoric. 
 
¶5.  (S) Naeh also indicated that the GOI is engaged in a 
review of the long-term implications of the shift in Turkey's 
regional policies.  He said they see the new Turkish 
strategic relationship with Syria as the mirror image of 
strategic relations with Israel in the 1990s, and are very 
concerned about GOT comments critical of the idea of imposing 
harsher sanctions on Iran.  Naeh expressed skepticism about 
Turkish claims to the U.S. that they send tough messages to 
the Iranians in private.  He agreed that Turkish public 
opinion wants good relations with all of Turkey's neighbors, 
with the apparent exception of Israel, thus reinforcing 
Erdogan and Davutoglu's regional policy inclinations. 
 
¶6.  (C) Yediot Aharonot columnist Alex Fishman, Israel's 
leading defense and national security correspondent, lamented 
to us October 13 that Israel had failed to see the signs of a 
deteriorating relationship with Turkey for a number of years, 
and thus missed possible opportunities to adjust Israeli 
policies.  Fishman said the Israeli Air Force stopped flying 
joint exercises in Turkish air space in 2002, both because 
the U.S. offered better exercise opportunities but also 
because of Turkish political sensitivities since the Second 
Intifada.  Fishman said he had covered Turkey's deployment of 
armored units to the Syrian border in 2006 in a successful 
effort to pressure Damascus to expel PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan.  Fishman and Naeh separately both noted that for 
years after this, Israeli commentators discussed the "Turkish 
option" for dealing with Syria, but now Turkish border guards 
are conducting joint exercises with their Syrian 
counterparts.  Fishman noted that Defense Minister Barak 
continues to be a firm advocate of trying to preserve at 
least the semblance of a strategic relationship with Turkey. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment.  Following Operation Cast Lead and Erdogan's 
rhetorical attack on Shimon Peres at the Davos conference, 
the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv repeatedly mentioned to us 
the ongoing cooperation afforded by the Israeli MOD to the 
Turkish Red Crescent Society's humanitarian assistance 
programs in Gaza.  Turkish diplomats also noted signs of 
restored Israeli popular confidence in Turkey as a friendly 
country, pointing to record-breaking levels of Israeli 
tourism to Turkey last summer.  The Israeli media October 13 
has reported a statements by Davutoglu and other senior 
officials playing down the tensions with Israel and 
suggesting that relations remain on track.  PM Erdogan, 
however, continues to make headlines with his attacks on 
Israel's Gaza policy as well as his suggestion to Turkish 
university students that they learn from the Jews how to make 
money from scientific research.  In the current environment, 
it strikes us as doubtful that the GOI will be interested in 
offering gestures to the Turks in order to improve the 
fraying bilateral relationship. 
 
 
CUNNINGHAM