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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC 1226
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/CDR JTF-BRAVO
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TEGUCIGALPA 001090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/LP MAYRA AHERN and WHA/CEN CHRIS ASHE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID MASS MARR KJUS HO
SUBJECT:  Merida 2.0 in Honduras 
 
REFS: A. TEGUCIGALPA 356 
      ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 353 
      ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 176 
      ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 50 
      ¶E. 08 TEGUCIGALPA 1080 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  001.2 OF 010 
 
 
¶1.  The following is Mission Honduras' input for the revised Merida 
Initiative strategy. 
 
------------------------------------ 
¶I. Security Environment - Assessment 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  Citizen security has become an increasing problem for Honduras 
over the past decade, and before the coup of June 28, 2009 was the 
leading topic of public concern in the country.  Accurate crime 
statistics are difficult to come by because crime is generally 
underreported and the Honduran National Police (HNP), though 
improving, lacks the resources and training to collect and maintain 
reliable crime statistics.  What is known is that from 2004 to 2008, 
rates for violent crime increased dramatically, and remain at high 
levels in 2009.  At 56.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, Honduras 
now has one of the highest murder rates in the world.  Kidnapping 
has become another increasing threat - the rate of kidnappings has 
more than doubled from 2007 to 2009, and is likely to top 100 
kidnappings in 2009.  These and other crimes, including sexual 
assault and exploitation, and extortion, have led to a public outcry 
regarding security. 
 
¶3.  A general sense of lawlessness has emerged, evidenced in high 
rates of domestic violence and violence against women, as well as 
increased violence associated with youth in sports fan clubs known 
as "barras bravas," which are becoming feeder organizations into the 
transnational criminal gangs. Trafficking in narcotics, persons and 
illicit goods, while not as directly visible, comprises the base of 
criminal activity which leads to the more public crimes. With a weak 
education system, a general lack of job opportunities, high levels 
of corruption, alienation and deteriorating values, thousands of 
at-risk youths see joining gangs as their only alternative.   Narco 
traffickers and transnational gangs are at the base of all these 
criminal activities, as reflected in the prevalence of street crime 
in the areas of the two main urban centers, the Atlantic coast, and 
the border with Guatemala, where gang activity and trafficking are 
predominantly carried out.  However, as the criminal networks 
continue to grow, crime spreads with them, and once peaceful towns 
in the middle of the country are now experiencing their own crime 
waves.  Poorer neighborhoods and communities are hardest hit, as 
their residents feel impotent against the threat of gangs, and the 
youths in these communities turn to gangs and trafficking for a 
sense of belonging, security, and income.  The remote region of La 
Mosquitia, while so far exempt from the worst of the violent street 
crime, is falling in the grips of international trafficking 
organizations, who present virtually the only source of income for 
communities largely cut off from the central government's services. 
 
 
¶4.  The Honduran law enforcement community, while making strides 
toward becoming a more effective force before the June 28 coup, 
remains inadequate to counter these crime trends alone.  Key 
challenges to law enforcement's ability to address the crime threat 
are lack of resources, lack of training and education, corruption, 
geography, and politicization resulting from the 2009 political 
crisis.  In the case of interdiction, the Armed Forces (HOAF) lack 
the funds to procure the aircraft, boats and fuel needed to 
intercept traffickers who operate in remote areas.  Honduras lacks 
any primary radar system to detect traffickers.  The HNP lacks the 
budget to pay high enough salary and other benefits to prevent 
corruption in its ranks, obtain, maintain and fuel the vehicles it 
needs to patrol its border areas and urban neighborhoods, or 
construct and maintain prisons to safely and humanely house the 
burgeoning prison population.  The Public Ministry lacks the funds 
to hire sufficient numbers of prosecutors to investigate and 
prosecute the cases presented to it by the police.  In many cases, 
especially with police, prosecutors and judges, better training and 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  002.2 OF 010 
 
 
education in management, information-sharing and investigative 
skills would increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and lead 
to more efficient use of scarce resources. 
 
¶5.  Collaboration and coordination between police and prosecutors is 
poor, which greatly diminishes their effectiveness.  While 
conviction rates for cases prosecuted are high (over 80 percent), 
prosecution rates hover in the 20-30 percent range annually for most 
categories of crime.  This lack of collaboration is also due in 
large part to mistrust between offices and ministries as a result of 
endemic corruption.  Corruption and fear also undermine efforts to 
engage the general public in law enforcement - victims are reluctant 
to report crimes to authorities they do not trust, and citizens who 
perceive that crimes can be committed with impunity are more likely 
to disregard the law and sometimes resort to vigilante "justice." 
The handicaps to progress caused by corruption are likely to be 
exacerbated by the political crisis following the June coup, as 
members of the law enforcement sector may be perceived as biased 
toward one side of the political divide.  A lack of governance and 
infrastructure in La Mosquitia and along the Atlantic Coast provide 
traffickers with a broad, unguarded territory in which to operate. 
The residents currently receive more material support from the 
traffickers than from the government. 
 
¶6.  As a result of the coup d'etat of June 2009, all INL security 
cooperation with the host government has been suspended.  However, 
the issue of citizen security will remain high on the agenda of the 
political class.  All leading presidential candidates have presented 
similar national security plans in their campaign platforms, and one 
has even named his would-be Security Minister, who has expressed his 
strong support for the Merida Initiative.  To that end, if 
cooperation on security efforts, under the Merida Initiative, is 
resumed, it is likely to be robust, and continued progress toward a 
more effective law enforcement sector, with continued assistance 
from the donor community, can be expected in the coming years. 
Crime rates will likely continue to rise in the near term even as 
new programs are implemented, but then should drop if the law 
enforcement initiatives continue to be implemented as planned. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
II. Merida to Date - Post/Host Nation Impressions 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  The coup d'etat of June 28, 2009 has disrupted the robust 
collaboration between the GOH and the USG on security and law 
enforcement issues.  Before the coup, the Zelaya Administration had 
made the Merida Initiative one of its highest policy priorities, and 
the entire Mission enjoyed strong cooperation from GOH leadership 
for security programs under the auspices of Merida.  Because of the 
coup, the USG has severely limited contact with the de facto 
authorities, and therefore, Merida-funded and Merida-related 
programs have been mostly suspended and terminated.  Once the 
constitutional order has been restored, all programs funded under 
Merida, as well as all other INL programs will be resumed, though 
some other USG security programs, in particular foreign military 
assistance programs, cannot be restored for FY2010. 
 
¶8.  By late 2008, the Zelaya Administration had made public security 
one of its top priorities, and Honduras was the first Central 
American country to sign a Merida Initiative Letter of Agreement 
with the United States.  President Zelaya and the Ambassador chaired 
the bilateral Merida Coordination Task Force (Refs A and D), and 
Zelaya empowered his Security Minister with tasking the entire GOH 
to produce and coordinate a national Merida security strategy. 
Phases one and two were completed by late spring 2009 before the 
June 28 coup disrupted collaborative security efforts.  Training and 
collaboration on joint (bilateral and interagency) interdiction 
operations had begun to pay off: in the first half of 2009, more 
successful maritime and air seizures of cocaine had taken place, and 
more cocaine had been seized than in all of 2008.  No specific 
written agreement exists between the U.S. and Honduras to establish 
a mechanism for exchanging adequate resources in connection with 
investigations and proceedings relating to narcotics, terrorism, 
terrorist financing, and other crime investigations.  However, 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  003.2 OF 010 
 
 
Honduras has cooperated, when requested, with appropriate law 
enforcement agencies of the U.S. Government and other governments 
investigating financial crimes. 
 
¶9.  In accordance with a prisons reform plan developed and augmented 
as a result of INL-sponsored corrections reform programs, the GOH 
constructed a modern, medium-security facility in Juticalpa in 2008, 
funded with a combination of government and domestic NGO funds, and 
had allocated an additional USD one million toward the construction 
of a high-security administrative segregation annex to the main 
prison at Tamara (as of October 2009, cell construction in the annex 
was complete).  The Ministry of Security's expanded plan called for 
increased capacity for nonviolent offenders in low security 
facilities to accommodate new rehabilitation and job training 
programs. 
 
¶10.  The political crisis following the coup has set back GOH and 
donor nation efforts to tackle Honduras' security problems. Despite 
the de facto regime claims to the contrary, independent watchdog 
groups report violent crime has risen sharply, and the flow of 
illegal narcotics through Honduras has continued unabated since the 
coup.   Ironically, this deterioration in the absence of continued 
reform illustrates the value of the Merida Initiative and the 
opportunity to make gains on security in Honduras. 
 
¶11.  The current suite of Merida programs is capable of addressing 
citizen security concerns by approaching the issue from both the 
"hard" side of security sector capacity-building as well as the 
"soft" side of guiding civil society toward a preventive culture 
able to promote community security needs (Ref E).  Disruption of 
implementation due to the political crisis has meant results in this 
area are still unavailable.  Furthermore, the political crisis and 
polarization of society in Honduras have weakened civil society's 
confidence in the public sector.  Once the constitutional and 
democratic order has been restored, an even greater effort will be 
needed to promote reconciliation, redefine the role of security 
forces, and rebuild public confidence in civic authorities.  An 
engaged civil society will be vital for the success of the other 
programs.  When implementation resumes, USAID also will execute 
several Merida Initiative projects including a Regional Gang 
Prevention Alliance that will expand Honduras-specific activities, 
including long-term integrated prevention, media awareness, job 
placement, and small quick impact grants. Post additionally plans to 
implement complementary activities including a municipal 
strengthening activity, vocational education activity, community-led 
infrastructure projects, and a rule of law activity, once funding 
becomes available. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
III. SWOT Summary 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶12.  Part III is a summary of A) Strengths, B) Weaknesses, C) 
Opportunities, and D) Threats that shape Post's Merida strategy and 
clarify the variables that will likely influence its success. 
 
13.--A. Strengths: The HNP information and analysis center (CEINCO) 
is regarded as the best in Central America, according to their 
regional colleagues.  While CEINCO is not the best-equipped 
information and analysis center in the region, it has demonstrated 
an ability to provide useful information to the field, especially in 
counternarcotics.  CEINCO success is attributable in large part to 
its director, who has received extensive training at the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador, which 
he has applied to his unit.  Under Merida, CEINCO has proposed 
expanding into other organized crimes, and would be an integral part 
of increased anti-gang efforts, asset laundering and INL's planned 
model community police precinct in the San Pedro Sula neighborhood 
of Chamelecon.  CEINCO will receive vital analysis equipment and 
training through Merida to support its expanding role. 
 
¶14.  (A cont'd) The GOH has shown a willingness to support joint 
interagency, multilateral information-sharing and operational 
coordination to interdict air and maritime narcotics shipments, 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  004.2 OF 010 
 
 
which has been reflected in the increasing volume of drug seizures 
in the first half of 2009.  The DEA's vetted unit, supported with 
INL funding, has played a vital role as a tactical response team 
(TRT) for interdictions, in cooperation with the HOAF, JIATF-South, 
and JTF-Bravo. 
 
¶15.  (A cont'd) GOH ministries and institutions have also 
demonstrated their readiness to cooperate with multifaceted partners 
through long-established working relationships with municipalities, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector and civil 
society.  For example, GOH institutions such as the Honduran Social 
Investment Fund (FHIS) and the Ministry of Government and Justice 
have collaborated with USAID on citizen participation and governance 
programs to strengthen municipal services, transparency, citizen 
participation in decision-making, and job creation.  Additionally 
the Honduran Ministry of Education has developed partnerships with 
local and international education NGOs, private training 
institutions, and other donors to help youth in Honduras acquire 
basic education and vocational training directly linked to job 
opportunities. These relationships have laid the foundation for 
close cooperation and integrated implementation of Merida Initiative 
activities. 
 
¶16.  (A cont'd) The GOH enacted its first money laundering 
legislation (Decree 202-97) in 1997.  Congress passed legislation in 
early 2008 that brings the GOH closer to international legal 
standards for control of illicit financing, including money 
laundering and terrorist funding.    Amendments to the money 
laundering law gives the UIF oversight for collecting all suspicious 
transactions reports from banks and expands the scope of entities 
required to report suspicious transactions. 
 
¶17.  (A cont'd) The GOH had taken its own initiative to develop 
improved community outreach and community policing techniques to 
make its neighborhood police precincts more responsive to community 
needs.  The GOH implemented over 13,000 community security 
roundtables at local precincts, and has dedicated funds to the 
construction of improved, community-focused police precincts in some 
of its most crime-ridden urban neighborhoods.  INL and USAID plan to 
support and build on these efforts in the neighborhood of Chamelecon 
and elsewhere to develop community gang prevention programs and a 
model anti-gang community policing precinct.  A proposed INL 
Community Policing Adviser would provide daily, in-the-trenches 
training and then communicate the precinct's best practices to the 
HNP leadership for both replication throughout the force and into 
police academy training. The GOH instituted important police 
management reform through the 2008 Organic Police Law, which 
restructured the police under a single Director General, established 
an Internal Affairs Unit that reports directly to the Minister of 
Security in order to address accusations of police corruption and 
abuse, and requires drug testing of all police every six months. 
The Ministry of Security also established a department policy to 
polygraph all police, and the first to undergo polygraph was the 
Minister of Security himself.  INL is supporting these efforts by 
assisting in the vetting of the IA units and providing funds for an 
expanded HNP polygraph unit to carry out the policy.   Finally, the 
Zelaya Administration did provide increased resources to the 
Ministry of Security including doubling the size of the HNP to 
13,000 members. 
 
¶18.  (A cont'd) In January 2009, the process for the selection of 
the Supreme Court was the most transparent in in its history.  The 
new court may provide a base from which to build a more effective 
and reliable judiciary.  However, the Court's role in the June 28 
coup and the subsequent political crisis has cast into doubt whether 
it can play a constructive role in reforms.  Even if the Court 
expresses a willingness to support eventual anti-corruption and 
capacity-building efforts, we will first have to find ways to work 
through its role in the coup and how that may affect public 
perceptions of bias. 
 
¶19.  (A cont'd) As a result of the newly-established Bilateral 
Merida Coordination Task Force, co-chaired by the Ambassador and the 
Minister of Security, the GOH drafted the first two phases of a 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  005.2 OF 010 
 
 
four-phase national Merida security plan.  Phases one and two 
established an overall needs determination, described programs 
intended to address those needs, and determined which agencies and 
other partners were implementers of the programs.  The following 
phases were to be developed by those implementing bodies to lay out 
specific goals and objectives of each program, as well as resource 
needs to accomplish them.  This plan is the first of its kind for 
GOH integrated planning, and reflected the importance the GOH placed 
on the Merida Initiative as a catalyst for an integrated, 
interagency, multilateral approach to the threat of transnational 
crime and trafficking.  Its further development has been disrupted 
by the coup. 
 
¶20. -- B. Weaknesses: The host nation deficiencies in addressing 
citizen security needs are wide and deep, but are not necessarily 
insurmountable with prolonged effort to reform institutions, train 
personnel, educate the public on their role in security, and build 
capacity in the security sector.  Weaknesses can be categorized as 
lack of resources, corruption, mismanagement/lack of interagency 
coordination, and lack of training and education.  These 
deficiencies in law enforcement agencies are exacerbated by the 
cultural, economic and political environment. 
 
¶21.  (B cont'd) The primary challenge facing the GOH in 
accomplishing the goals of the Merida Initiative is an overall lack 
of resources.  In the case of interdiction, the Armed Forces (HOAF) 
lack the funds to procure the aircraft, boats and fuel needed to 
intercept traffickers, especially in the remote Atlantic coastal 
region of La Mosquitia.  Furthermore, Honduras lacks any primary 
radar system to detect traffickers.  The HNP lacks the budget to 
obtain, maintain and fuel the vehicles it needs to patrol its border 
areas and urban neighborhoods, or construct and maintain prisons to 
safely and humanely house the burgeoning prison population.  The 
Public Ministry lacks the funds to hire sufficient numbers of 
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute the cases presented to it 
by the police.  And all law enforcement agencies lack the resources 
to train their personnel or provide salaries at a living wage, 
thereby increasing the potential influence of corruption. 
 
¶22.  (B cont'd) While the USG and other donors can assist the GOH to 
build and procure facilities and equipment, recurring costs such as 
salaries, fuel and maintenance will remain problematic, requiring 
innovative solutions on all sides.  Donors must focus on programs 
that minimize recurring costs - training in procedures and 
maintenance will reduce waste, and expensive equipment should be 
avoided in favor of low-tech options wherever possible.  The GOH for 
its part must implement more efficient and effective procedures for 
managing the resources it has. 
 
¶23.  (B cont'd) Corruption remains another key challenge for the 
HNP, prosecutors and judiciary, though the GOH took some important 
steps toward combating corruption in 2008 and early 2009.  The 
Police Organic Law created an Internal Affairs Division that answers 
directly to the Minister of Security and, once vetted, staffed and 
trained, should be a major force against police corruption. 
Corruption in the judiciary has made successful prosecution of 
narcotraffickers especially difficult, though the selection of a 
new, more independent Supreme Court in January 2009 may provide an 
opportunity to reform the entire sector. 
 
¶24.  (B cont'd) Due to a combination of corruption, poor management 
and cultural mistrust, the various law enforcement agencies do not 
coordinate efforts well.  Prosecutors do not trust the police to 
carry out effective investigations of crime, citing cases where 
police have warned suspects or divulged information to them. 
Likewise individual prosecutors demonstrate territoriality between 
offices of the Public Ministry over criminal cases, resulting in an 
overall prosecution rate of 20%.  While there is a shortage of 
prosecutors, and prosecutors lack necessary resources, the rate of 
prosecutions per prosecutor is also low, reflecting poor management 
of caseloads.  The DHS/ICE vetted unit has encountered resistance 
from key prosecutors to receiving assistance in investigating crimes 
because they fear losing total control over the cases.  However, 
where prosecutors have built a relationship of trust and cooperation 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  006.2 OF 010 
 
 
with police units through interagency training or other 
collaboration, productivity has demonstrably increased.  Prosecutors 
who cooperate with the DEA and ICE vetted units have increased their 
volume of prosecutions significantly. 
 
¶25. (B cont'd) Lack of training and education hinder effective law 
enforcement work in Honduras.  Police enter their academy with a 
sixth grade education at best, and then are taught by instructors 
pulled largely out of the ranks.  Instructors rarely have 
demonstrable expertise in the subjects they teach, nor do they have 
any knowledge of pedagogical principles.  Prosecutors and judges 
likewise demonstrate a lack of understanding for basic principles 
such as chain of custody or evidentiary procedure.  The Public 
Ministry seeks to create its own internal affairs unit, but lacks 
the resources or donor support to train and vet it adequately.  Both 
prosecutors and judges sometimes lack the most basic skills.  For 
example, in many cases when large amounts of illicit cash has been 
seized, judges will demand to see the actual bills seized as proof 
in a trial, or prosecutors will hold on to the cash for effect. 
 
¶26.  (B cont'd) These deficiencies are exacerbated by an environment 
characterized by weak governance and rule of law, in which law 
enforcement must operate.  Communities plagued with violent crime 
are not willing to file criminal accusation out of fear, mistrust 
for the authorities or a sense of powerlessness.  Anti-gang efforts 
are hampered by a lack of education, employment opportunities or 
community support for at-risk youth.  Remote communities in 
trafficking zones lack alternative economic resources and do not 
understand the consequences of the drug trade on their communities 
or others. 
 
¶27.  (B cont'd) And finally, the political crisis following the June 
28, 2009 coup has added a new challenge to be surmounted.  Police 
have been politicized, defending the de facto regime against those 
who have taken to the streets to oppose the coup.  Classes in the 
police training centers have been suspended for both officers and 
cadets, who have been assigned to perform security tasks related to 
the political crisis.  The Attorney General has initiated a series 
of politically-motivated prosecutions against President Zelaya and 
his cabinet members, undermining the Public Ministry's credibility 
as an agent for equal justice.  If before the June 28 coup criminal 
activity and lack of personal security was one of the most important 
threats for the Honduran population, conditions since the coup have 
only exacerbated the situation. Gangs and other criminal groups are 
taking advantage of the current political crisis to extend their 
illicit activities, and youth are learning the arts of violent 
confrontation and criminal opportunism rather than dialogue and 
consensus. 
 
¶28. --C. Opportunities: While many of the GOH plans and efforts to 
combat the crime threat have been disrupted by the coup and 
subsequent political crisis, restoration of the constitutional order 
may provide the opportunity to resume previous initiatives. 
Furthermore, some of the civic action mobilized by the movements 
both for and against the coup can be harnessed to build greater 
openness to reforms and to develop a more active role by the public 
in their own community's affairs.  Just as parents of public school 
students have taken action to demand their children's education not 
be politicized, we can reach out to these same nascent civic leaders 
to demand an end to criminal activity in their neighborhoods.  It is 
in periods following upheaval that societies are most receptive to 
reform efforts. 
 
29  (C cont'd) Other opportunities for U.S. assistance to improve 
the GOH ability to combat the threat of crime include (Ref C): 
---1. Vetted Units: 
------a. The HNP's newly-created Internal Affairs Division requires 
vetting and extensive training to become an effective force against 
police corruption. 
------b. Model community police precincts likewise will require 
extensive vetting, training and equipment to take back neighborhoods 
controlled by gangs and increase public participation in their own 
security. 
------c. CEINCO, the HNP information analysis unit will play a vital 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  007.2 OF 010 
 
 
support role and requires further equipment, software and training; 
sub-units such as the FBI-supported TAG unit will be needed for 
regional information sharing and analysis. 
------d. Interagency anti-kidnap and anti-gang units are needed, but 
will require extensive vetting, training and equipment. 
------e. Additional Tactical Response Teams (TRT) need to be vetted 
and equipped for more efficient, effective interdiction operations. 
------f. U.S. law enforcement agencies' vetted units operating in 
Honduras should be expanded and provided additional training in 
order to confront increasing transnational crimes and criminal 
organizations. 
------g. An existing Honduran task force comprised of police and 
prosecutors dedicated to investigating and prosecuting crimes 
against foreigners needs funding for equipment and training. 
 
--- 2. Border Security:  The HNP Frontier Police are responsible for 
interdiction efforts along the land borders and at airports. 
Frontier Police currently lack facilities at remote, but 
heavily-trafficked border crossing posts, and lack the means to 
border areas away from the formal crossings.  Converted containers 
to use as combined office/dormitory space, motorcycles, inspection 
equipment and a K-9 inspection team will build capacity to reduce 
trafficking of people and illicit goods across Honduran borders. 
Field training will also improve and strengthen their interdiction 
capabilities. 
 
--- 3. Military Base Construction:  The Honduran military does not 
have a significant forward presence in heavy drug trafficking areas. 
 Since the military plays a vital role in the interdiction of a 
majority of illicit trafficking, building bases to augment the 
military presence in La Mosquita (Ref B) and the Bay Islands is 
paramount to gaining territorial sovereignty and control of the 
region.  The bases create a permanent GOH presence in remote areas 
where virtually none exists now, and provide vital refueling 
stations to extend the ability of both the HOAF and the joint, 
multilateral force to carry out their role in interdictions. 
 
--- 4. Seized Asset Program: Training police, prosecutors and judges 
on the existing legal framework, handling and use of evidence and 
information-sharing can produce a self-sustaining program that will 
diminish the top law enforcement challenge in Honduras if 
successful.  Building success in this area in combination with 
development of vetted inter-agency vetted units will be the most 
effective tools to improving the justice sector overall. 
 
--- 5. Prison Reform: The GOH has a long-term strategy for reforming 
their prisons system to reduce violence and gang influence in its 
prisons and to effectively manage offenders in a secure and humane 
environment. The GOH has dedicated funds to constructing 
high-security administrative segregation facilities for its most 
dangerous prisoners, low-security facilities which will be used to 
develop rehabilitative prisons industries/vocational training 
programs, and a formal classification system will be implemented to 
ensure prisoners are placed in an appropriate level of supervision 
to protect prisoners, staff and the public.  A correctional training 
program will be developed through the Merida Initiative to 
complement the National Police Academy Penitentiary curriculum, 
which will instruct correctional procedures, processes and 
practices.  Assistance is required in training, equipment and 
infrastructure in order for the prisons system to implement the GOH 
strategy. 
 
--- 6. Gang Prevention: Given that over 60% of the Honduran 
population is 25 or under, there is a critical need for resources 
that will both create jobs and provide educational and vocational 
training for a new generation of Honduran youth. Opportunities exist 
for the GOH to work with USAID, which has the direct experience and 
relationships with Honduran and international partners (through an 
ongoing project) that can serve as the foundation for providing 
at-risk youth with more positive, productive alternatives for 
continued education and employment. Additionally, existing and 
successful partnerships with GOH institutions such as FHIS and local 
actors can be leveraged to facilitate locally-led initiatives. These 
initiatives would focus on creating jobs and opportunities for 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001090  008.2 OF 010 
 
 
people living in border areas, urban "hot spots," and other regions. 
 Activities would include prevention programs targeting at-risk 
youth, specialized work and education initiatives, community 
awareness and outreach, and training for municipal workers and local 
civil society. The GOH could couple educational and alternative 
social structures with law enforcement efforts to prevent at-risk 
youth from joining gangs. 
 
--- 7. Combating Financial- and Cyber-crime: Police, prosecutors and 
judges need training in how to combat money laundering and 
cyber-crime.  The Honduran legal framework requires modernization as 
traffickers and criminal gangs become more sophisticated in their 
techniques.   Though special investigative units created with 
assistance from ICE have yet to initiate anti-money laundering 
operations, the framework is in place and activities are expected to 
commence upon resolution of the political situation. 
 
--- 8. Public Education and Outreach: The HNP needs assistance in 
developing a more effective program to educate the public about 
their role in fighting crime, improving communication between law 
enforcement authorities and the public, building public trust in law 
enforcement institutions and engaging civil society as allies in 
efforts to reduce violence.  The HNP has already instituted 
community security roundtables, NGOs have developed community 
outreach centers that reduce gang activity and membership in 
individual neighborhoods and both the HNP and civil society have 
developed education programs on specific topics, but an overall 
strategy is lacking for integrating these efforts and binding 
together communities against crime.  Such assistance could be 
provided in the form of a limited-term advisor to the Ministry of 
Security.  Resources to implement a strategy already exist. 
 
--- 9. Economic Development of Trafficking Zones: Remote areas such 
as La Mosquitia are in need of economic alternatives to supporting 
the drug trade.  Improvements in infrastructure, a more permanent 
and engaged security presence (both HOAF and HNP), and greater 
access to basic services are necessities (Ref B). 
 
--- 10. Rule of Law:  USAID will build on GOH initiatives in 
implementing rule of law programs for juvenile justice sector 
reform.  Opportunities exist to: 1) modernize the juvenile justice 
system; 2) work with judges, public defenders and special prosecutor 
units addressing juveniles and gang-related crimes; and 3) increase 
public confidence and accountability of juvenile public sector 
institutions. 
 
--- 11. Anti-Corruption: Corruption of law enforcement as well as 
justice sector institutions is a key factor in the upsurge of 
criminal activity.  The Merida program provides a unique opportunity 
to build demand for transparency and accountability directly with 
civil society as well as through local and municipal actors.  These 
efforts would complement USAID's local governance and 
decentralization initiative, which aims to strengthen civil society 
oversight of national and local government use of public funds 
through technical support to institutions such as the National 
Congress, transparency commissions, and watchdog organizations. 
 
 
¶29.  D. Threats: The two overriding threats to implementing a more 
effective Merida strategy to address citizen security in Honduras 
are the influence of well-financed transnational criminal 
organizations and the potential for continued political instability 
stemming from the June 2009 coup.  Traffickers already wield greater 
influence over communities in the remote trafficking zones of La 
Mosquitia and the Atlantic coast than the national government, and 
because narcotics cases are tried in the judicial district where the 
arrest takes place, traffickers are able to gain control over local 
judges, prosecutors and police through bribery and threats. 
Likewise, traffickers and gang leaders use bribery and threats to 
gain control over local politicians, prisons and whole communities. 
 
 
¶30.  (D cont'd) The current political crisis has polarized Honduran 
society.  Even after the political crisis is resolved, social 
 
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cleavages could have a destabilizing impact on the general 
population, the military and the police force. Further 
destabilization could exacerbate the presently weak education 
system, lack of jobs for at-risk populations, and already low 
citizen confidence in public institutions, including the courts and 
police, that the Merida Initiative was created to improve. 
Additionally, given that the police are entirely focused on the 
political crisis, street crime and organized crime are thriving as 
they find the perfect scenario to increase their criminal activity 
with no police intervention.  Border controls, already weak due to 
lack of resources, are now almost nonexistent.  The threat is that 
lawlessness could undermine any efforts already gained and hinder 
further progress. 
 
¶31.  (D cont'd) The global financial crisis, aggravated by the 
political crisis, has induced recessionary economic conditions, 
including tight credit, declines in investment levels, rising 
unemployment and increased poverty.  The socio-economic crisis will 
heighten social tensions and increase crime levels. 
 
----------------------------------- 
IV. Host Nation Regional Engagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶32.  Prior to the June 2009 coup, the GOH encouraged regional 
security cooperation through SICA.  However, the current political 
crisis has isolated Honduras from regional and international 
cooperative bodies.  While restoration of the constitutional order 
may lead to a return to U.S.-Honduran cooperation through the Merida 
Initiative, renewed cooperation with regional bodies is uncertain. 
 
 
¶33.  On a working level, the HNP has shown a willingness to 
participate in transnational law enforcement information-sharing and 
collaboration, especially with U.S. assistance in building the 
information infrastructure to do so.  Likewise, the HNP and HOAF 
participate in working-level information sharing and coordination on 
interdiction efforts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶V. Post Thoughts on "Merida 2.0" and the Way Forward 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶34.  The Merida Initiative is an effort that reaches beyond the 
programs explicitly funded by the Initiative.  Under the aegis of 
the Merida Initiative, Mission Honduras and the GOH before June 28 
had both taken a holistic approach to security efforts, tying in not 
only the "hard" anti-crime programs and anti-trafficking work of law 
enforcement and armed forces, but also the "soft" efforts of 
community development designed to reduce the influence and appeal of 
criminal organizations on at-risk groups and communities, as well as 
on governance in general.  Likewise, the GOH under the Zelaya 
Administration had begun a government-wide approach to Merida 
through the Bilateral Merida Task Force, which had prepared the 
first two phases of an interagency National Merida Strategy which 
incorporated security and law enforcement, but also education, 
health and community development elements.  The Mission sees Merida 
as a tool for Honduras to be able to work with regional partners in 
a more effective and efficient manner in the fight against 
international crime.  In terms of our bilateral efforts, Merida is a 
holistic concept for developing and adopting a two country, 
multi-agency security strategy. 
 
¶35.  While the June 28 coup has disrupted these efforts, they remain 
a guide to the way forward if Honduras' constitutional order and 
relations with the United States and regional neighbors are 
restored.  Restoration of programs under Merida will not happen all 
at once, however.  We will have to resume cooperation in stages, 
with counternarcotics interdiction efforts taking the lead.  A 
stepped strategy to resuming the holistic approach must be developed 
in order to rebuild from the crisis, and must address new challenges 
that have arisen as a result of the coup and its aftermath. 
Nonetheless, just as the crisis has created new challenges, it is 
likely to have created new opportunities for change and growth.  A 
 
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society emerging from a crisis is more likely to accept new 
approaches to their problems, and we must be prepared to take 
advantage of that window of opportunity to affect change where it 
was not possible in the past. 
 
¶36.  The Mission should, for example, consider the role of a 
proposed truth commission designed to bring the country back from a 
period of extreme polarization as a chance to also look at the 
endemic problems that have promoted the recent spike in violent 
crime.  New programs aimed at post-crisis reconciliation should be 
included in the overall strategy. 
 
¶37.  The Mission may also use the window of opportunity to deepen 
its commitment to expanding vocational education and to linking 
at-risk youth with meaningful jobs. The USG could also broaden the 
scope of the initiative by improving juvenile justice and reducing 
corruption at the local levels. 
 
¶38.  In the long run, the strategy already begun before the coup 
will be the basis for a revised Merida Initiative in Honduras, but 
it will be coupled with elements of conflict resolution. 
 
LLORENS