VZCZCXRO5999
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHSM #0662/01 2941238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211238Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4809
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0868
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3204
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2539
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0346

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000662 
 
STATE FOR CA/FPP 
PASS to KCC Williamsburg 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT CVIS KFRD ASEC CPAS SW
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - STOCKHOLM 
 
REF: STOCKHOLM 0224 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000662  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  As Sweden hosts the Presidency of the European Union 
from June through December 2009, one of the top priorities at the EU 
and national level remains refugees.  Embassy Stockholm continues to 
deal with Sweden's large population of third country nationals, many 
with insufficient identification documents and weak ties to Sweden. 
In addition, the ESTA program has highlighted several Swedish 
travelers with possible ineligibilities. FPU Stockholm has had 
several notable fraud cases and is working on developing fraud 
intelligence products useful for the Nordic Baltic region. End 
Summary. 
 
Country Conditions 
----- 
 
¶2. Sweden has long been considered a low-fraud post, but FPU 
Stockholm questions whether these categorizations are helpful, if 
not outright misleading.  Sweden is a Visa Waiver Program country, 
so most business and tourist travelers utilize their Swedish 
passport to travel to the United States.  When Swedish passport 
holders do apply for B1/B2 visas, they are usually looking for 
extended visits or have been required to do so by the new Electronic 
System for Travel Advisory (ESTA).  Sweden is also home to a diverse 
population of Third Country Nationals, including one of the largest 
concentrations of Iraqis and Iranians in Europe.  Because of 
Sweden's relatively liberal refugee and asylum policies, many these 
refugees receive Swedish citizenship relatively quickly.  The result 
is steady stream of difficult cases in all three units of the 
consular section and a very busy FPU. 
 
¶3. FPU notes that Sweden's economic recovery drags behind much of 
the rest of Western Europe with unemployment projected to stand at 
11 percent for the next 12 months.  While the Swedish state's 
generous unemployment benefits guard against abuse of the Visa 
Waiver program, many younger Swedes are looking to travel to the 
U.S. for lack of economic opportunities in Sweden.  More 
importantly, newer immigrants to Sweden will have an increasingly 
difficult time entering the Swedish labor market and may seek 
opportunities in the U.S. 
 
¶4. In the last year, the Swedish Migration Board has become less 
willing to grant permanent residence to many asylum seekers, 
particularly Iraqis.  Not surprisingly, the number Iraqi asylum 
seekers have dropped considerably.  Somalis are now the leading 
asylum seeking population in Sweden with a steadily increasing rise 
in Afghanistan refugees.  As part of its EU Presidency, Sweden is 
pushing for the EU to share the financial and social burden of 
hosting asylum seekers will dedicate a significant portion of its EU 
Presidency to establishing EU-wide asylum/refugee policies. 
 
NIV Fraud 
----- 
 
¶5.  Most of the FPU's time is focused on NIV applicants.  During the 
reporting period, Stockholm adjudicated over 16,582 NIV cases with a 
refusal rate of 18.82 percent (including 221g refusals). 
Stockholm's applicant pool represented 126 different countries. 
Over 21 percent of our NIV applicants apply with non-Swedish 
passports.  The refusal rate for Swedish citizens was 13.80 during 
the reporting period.  The FPU provides three basic services: 
pre-checking foreign passports and select applicant categories; 
consular interview assistance; and referral investigations.  During 
the reporting period, the FPU pre-checked approximately 900 third 
country NIV applicants.  Approximately 100 cases were referred to 
the FPU during or after the interview process, resulting in 26 
confirmed cases of NIV fraud and 11 outstanding requests for 
additional documentation from suspect applicants.  Not reflected in 
these statistics is the number of fraudulent activities discovered 
during pre-interview checks which lead to 214(b) refusals. 
 
¶6.  Impact of ESTA.  With the implementation of the ESTA for Visa 
Waiver Country travelers, Post has seen an increase in Swedish 
citizens with legal issues applying for B1/B2 visas often because of 
prior criminal or immigration violations.  In most of these cases, 
visas are eventually issued after receiving appropriate DHS 
waivers. 
 
¶7.  Comprehensive investigation techniques helped FPU Stockholm 
crack a number of cases.  As one example, a single male wanted to 
spend 6 months traveling the US after a recent 3 month VWP visit. 
After questioning by the FI, the applicant confessed that he was 
actually planning to resume his work as an auto mechanic.  A blog 
betrayed a disc jockey who told the consular officer that he never 
worked in the US even though his blog highlighted his work in 
several major US cities.  An aspiring yoga "student" had her plans 
to continue working illegally as a model and yoga teacher revealed, 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000662  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
in a twist, by her roommate's blog.  Finally, one failed applicant 
to a Texas community college gave an interview to a local Swedish 
tabloid in which she claimed that she was refused for being "too 
beautiful for a visa" and suspected of being a sex-worker during her 
previous stay in Texas.  The FPU was not, in fact, concerned with 
her looks so much as her provocative internet advertisements for 
"sexy modeling," which were purged from the internet shortly after 
her visa interview. 
 
¶8.  Iranian B1/B2 applicants.  Post conducted a validation study of 
B1/B2 Iranian applications in Sweden and compared the profiles of 
successful travelers with overstays and refused applicants. 
(REFTEL) Given Sweden's large Iranian expat and visitor application 
pool, the study confirmed that Post's general approach is effective 
at avoiding overstays.  In follow on discussions with FPP, FPU used 
recent studies from Frankfurt and Ankara to urge other FPUs to 
collect a more uniform set of data points to assist in comparing and 
evaluating future studies.  Post's NIV Chief, Claire Smolik, also 
attended the September FPP conference on Iranian travelers and is 
working with FPU to implement best practices. 
 
¶9.  Russian B1/B2 applicants.  Stockholm is working with several 
other regional FPUs to finalize a collaborative study of Russian 
B1/B2 applicants.  Although initial indications are that 
Nordic-Baltic posts make good decisions on issuing to Russian 
applicants, there are clearly local differences in the social and 
economic conditions for expat Russians that warrant closer 
attention.  FPU Stockholm hopes to conduct future region-wide 
validation studies to continue to foster cooperation. 
 
¶10.  FPU Stockholm is increasingly concerned with NIV E Visa 
applications and is reviewing our standard operating procedures for 
handling this case.  In May, an NIV Clerk who handles this portfolio 
met with FPU London to discuss best practices.  One ongoing case 
involves a restaurant possibly being used as a front for illegal 
business activities. 
 
IV Fraud 
----- 
 
¶11. The IV Unit provides FPU Stockholm with ample opportunity to 
hone our fraudulent documentation analysis techniques.  The IV unit 
has seen a rise in fraudulent IV and K visa cases among a growing 
number of applications from petitioners and beneficiaries coming 
from refugee populations from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea, and 
Ethiopia.  Thirteen IV cases were formally referred to the FPU 
during the reporting period, two of which remain unresolved.  The 
FPU also inspects various identification documents, mostly from 
Iraqi or African applicants, on average 1-3 cases per week. 
 
¶12. Inter-Embassy cooperation is vital.  Because of the large Iraqi 
asylum community in Sweden, Post continues to find a heightened 
number of questionable Iraqi passports and other supporting 
documents. Post works closely with Embassies Amman and Baghdad in 
addressing these issues.  Several African posts have similarly been 
helpful in confirming document fraud in Sweden's growing African TCN 
community. 
 
¶13. Relationship fraud presents the most difficult evidentiary 
challenge.  Time-intensive and detailed interviews, including 
telephone interviews with the petitioner in the U.S., can lead to 
positive results.  In one case, the FI noted the absence of wedding 
bands in a photo taken the day after a wedding ceremony.  Further 
interviews of both the applicant and his petitioner (by telephone) 
resulted in a series of conflicting statements.  More than convinced 
that a marriage broker arranged the entire trip, Post returned the 
petition with a recommendation for revocation.  In another case, the 
fiance applicant could not identify the store where his Amcit 
petitioner worked, but managed to recall the address.  This was a 
remarkable lapse because the petitioner works at an American chain 
convenience store called Seven-Eleven that is also ubiquitous in 
Sweden. 
 
DV Fraud 
----- 
 
¶14.   Stockholm had three significant DV fraud cases.  In one case, 
FPU Asmara assisted in confirming Stockholm's suspicions that two 
documents supporting an applicant's claim of marriage were 
fraudulent.  In a second case, a DV applicant's high school records 
were proven to be fraudulent, thanks to assistance from FPU 
Kinshasa. In the third case, the Facial Recognition feature in the 
CCD indicated that a DV applicant may have used his brother's 
identity in an earlier NIV application. The applicant stalled for 
weeks on Post's request for a recent photograph of his brother.  In 
late September, the applicant's last minute effort to send in an 
undated "recent" photo of his brother (probably himself) confirmed 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000662  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
FPU's concerns. 
 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
----- 
 
¶15. Stockholm's use of a four part ACS fraud checklist has lead to 
greater use of FPU in ACS cases.  FPU reviews approximately 4-7 ACS 
cases per week based on these indicators and conducts an average of 
one ACS fraud interview per week. The checklist has been shared with 
other EUR posts.  In one case involving an otherwise routine 
passport renewal application, FPU confirmed that the applicant's 
Swedish mother had taped a more recent photograph of the child on 
the expired passport.  After careful investigation, FPU concluded 
that the altered passport was never used for travel or 
identification purposes and permitted the applicant's parents to 
present additional proof of identity.  In an ongoing case, FPU has 
confirmed a US passport holder maintaining different, if similar, 
identities. 
 
Adoption Fraud 
----- 
 
¶16.  Post has had no adoption cases in this reporting period. 
 
Use of DNA Testing 
----- 
 
¶17.  Post has utilized DNA testing for DV and some ACS cases. 
Overall, our experience has been positive.  FPU and IV are working 
to implement the new DNA testing guidelines.  In one K-1 case, DNA 
testing was required of the beneficiary.  The fiance claimed to 
have impregnated the petitioner while they resided in a Guinean 
refugee camp.  The child was born in the U.S., but the applicant was 
not listed on the birth certificate.  After the petitioner received 
the DNA test results, she refused to share them with her fiance who 
decided to withdraw his application in August. 
 
Asylum and other DHS benefit Fraud 
----- 
 
¶18.  Although post has no fraud to report, Post's increasing number 
of Iraqi translator visa applications has demanded an increasing 
amount of attention from FPU.  FPU works closely with Embassy 
Baghdad to confirm identification documents and often returns 
security badges retained by former State Department and Department 
of Defense workers.  Even with Embassy Baghdad's support, Post often 
has a difficult time verifying prior employment in Iraq or other 
claims. 
 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorist Travel 
----- 
 
¶19.  Sweden is often regarded as a transit center for Chinese and 
Eastern European trafficking rings to other European countries, but 
not to North America.  However, Swedish authorities are highly 
focused on combating sex trafficking and has made it a centerpiece 
of their EU Presidency.  Sweden is a destination country for 
asylum-seekers.  To date, FPU has detected no systematic effort to 
use Sweden as a transit to the United States.  FPU is following up 
on leads suggesting emerging routes through Central America and 
Canada.  Although limited in travel funds, FPU has made an effort to 
visit immigrant-intensive communities to better understand those 
populations.  Increased cooperation with FPUs in Oslo and Copenhagen 
can assist Stockholm in understanding the two Swedish cities 
(Gothenburg and Malmo) that are both close to and demographically 
similar to Oslo and Copenhagen. 
 
¶20.  There are false document production rings in Sweden that are 
targeting Swedish authorities and many Iraqis also utilize false 
documents in order to get to Sweden.  Some of these falsified 
documents pass through the Embassy, but more importantly, the 
Swedish identification documents are more often used in applying for 
United States visas.  A typical Iraqi refugee will pay money to be 
smuggled to Copenhagen, often via Turkey using the authentic 
passport of an Iraqi-Swedish or Iraqi-UK citizen.  The subject 
returns the false documents to the smuggler travelling with him or 
her and then enters Sweden without identification papers on a 
train. 
 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
----- 
 
¶21. Post has no pending DS criminal investigations.  Cooperation 
with the RSO and RSO staff has been good.  RSO Stockholm currently 
has individuals with experience in Iraq, which has proven to be very 
helpful in dealing with Iraqi applicants. 
 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000662  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Swedish Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
----- 
 
¶22. Sweden issues EU-compliant passports.  FPU has previously 
documented the Swedish government's relaxed attitude about identity 
requirements for refugees.  In the case of refugees who have 
obtained Swedish citizenship, FPU never relies on the Swedish 
passport as sufficient proof of identity.  In the case of refugees 
with permanent residency in Sweden, FPU notes that an "identity not 
confirmed" is used by the Swedish authorities when original birth 
documents are not presented, which are rarely subjected to serious 
scrutiny otherwise.  FPU also notes that Swedish migration 
authorities have become more rigorous in their identification 
requirement for asylum-seekers. 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
----- 
 
¶23. Sweden's privacy rules restrict the sharing of most personal 
information about Swedish citizens and residents by Swedish law 
enforcement.  Nevertheless, the Swedish authorities work very hard 
within the constraints of the Swedish legal system to be of 
assistance to FPU inquiries.  FPU has good relationships with all of 
the major migration and law enforcement authorities and regularly 
receives fraud email alerts from regional airports.  In addition, 
Mr. Sandmark has provided training on lie detection and document 
fraud to ICTS (International Consultants on Targeted Security) staff 
at Stockholm International Airport.  In the reporting period, FPU 
has had successful outreach meetings with representatives from the 
government student loan agency (CSN), which promises to develop into 
a mutually beneficial collaboration.  In our first case, FPU 
Stockholm helped CSN identify a ring of Swedes using a fraudulent 
I-20 to apply for Swedish government loans, but with no plans to 
actually apply for a student visa.  Finally, FPU Stockholm is 
engaging with representatives from Sweden's higher educational 
admissions verification team to help combat fraudulent foreign 
student applications to Swedish universities. 
 
Staffing and Training and Outreach 
----- 
 
¶24.  The FPU consists of one part-time Fraud Prevention Manager (Dan 
Mangis) and one LES Fraud Investigator (Marten Sandmark) with 
significant non-FPU duties in the NIV during certain parts of the 
year.  The current FPM arrived at Post in August 2008 and will leave 
in July 2010.  He serves as the Deputy Consul and manages the IV 
Unit.  His replacement is receiving FPU training this spring.  The 
FI also has significant responsibilities in the NIV Unit, but works 
full time in the FPU when seasonal help is available.  Post has 
trained a backup Fraud Investigator, Maria Sederholm in order to 
free additional time for fraud analysis projects, particularly 
relating to regional issues and trends. Both the present FPM and Mr. 
Sandmark have taken all of FSI's available fraud training courses. 
When practical, FPU will nominate backup Fraud Investigator Ms. 
Sederholm for fraud training. 
 
¶25. Stockholm is piloting the new Consular Case Management System 
(CCMS) and is happy to lend a small post perspective to the 
program's evolution.  Post has made several suggestions and looks 
forward to the rollout of the final product. 
 
¶26.  Reaching out to other Posts:  FI Sandmark has attended the 
Frankfurt Fraud Conference in September and participated in a panel 
discussion with other experienced fraud investigators.  Earlier in 
the year, FI Sandmark joined an innovative "chat conference" with 
other EUR LES fraud investigators in order to develop cost-efficient 
ways to collaborate with other posts.  FPU has hosted consultation 
visits from FPUs in Oslo and Copenhagen and provides and receives ad 
hoc support to posts in EUR, AF, and SCA.  FPU Stockholm initiated 
the first regional study of Russian B1/B2 applicants in the 
Nordic-Baltic region and plans to use H&L funding from FPP to 
conduct training/consultation visits with Copenhagen, Oslo and at 
least one Baltic post.  FPU Stockholm hopes to establish a more 
structure regional FPU working group to develop more regional 
studies. 
 
 
BARZUN