VZCZCXYZ1406
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3755 2791335
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061314Z OCT 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 103755 
 
SIPDIS 
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE 
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH 
KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
Reasons:  1.4 (B), (D), (H). 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 
¶2. 
 
¶2. (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Department requests Embassy 
Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "North 
Korea,s Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the 
French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of 
Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.  Info 
addressees also may provide to host government officials 
as appropriate.  In delivering paper, posts should 
indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of 
our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be 
held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, 
November 9-13, 2009.  NOTE:  Additional IE papers will be 
provided via septels.  END NOTE. 
 
¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: 
 
(SECRET REL MTCR) 
 
North Korea's Missile Program 
 
Introduction 
 
North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic 
missile development efforts.  We expect both the new 
Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and 
the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as 
demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the 
Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle 
(SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a 
failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the 
pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. 
North Korea's deployed forces include hundreds of Scud 
and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009. 
 
North Korea remains one of the world's leading suppliers 
of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to 
provide assistance to both Iran's and Syria's ballistic 
missile programs.  North Korea, since the 1980s, has 
supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, 
missile components, and missile-related technology. 
These sales have included complete Category I missile 
systems, as well as production technology and expertise. 
North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic 
missiles and continues to market its systems to countries 
in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile 
marketing activities worldwide.  North Korea this year 
probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation 
with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement 
with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile 
technology. 
 
North Korea has developed most of the necessary 
capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its 
ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues 
to make progress in its missile development efforts, it 
remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of 
missile-related raw materials and components.  While most 
of these materials are for direct application to its 
missile program, North Korea may procure some items in 
support of its missile customers. 
 
Program History 
 
North Korea's ballistic missile program started in the 
early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 
300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt.  This Scud 
B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s 
Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 
systems.  In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted 
Egypt's efforts to domestically produce Scuds.  Building 
on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- 
range Scud C in the mid-1980s.  These Scuds have been 
exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed 
in North Korea.  Given its 20  years experience working 
with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and 
produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of 
delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 
km.  North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the 
No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is 
deployed as part of North Korea's missile forces.  The No 
Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which 
could strike all of South Korea and Japan. 
 
Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North 
Korea's TD-1 and TD-2 systems.  In 1998, North Korea 
tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No 
Dong first stage and Scud second stage.  Although 
launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North 
Korea had successfully developed many of the essential 
technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM 
development.  The DPRK has also developed the follow-on 
system for the TD-1, the TD-2.  Although a more advanced 
design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and 
No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong 
engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No 
Dong-based second stage.  In a two stage configuration, 
the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a 
substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg. In a 
three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 
2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 
15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and 
Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.  The 
first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of 
Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific.  This 
demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew 
only about 40 seconds. 
 
Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile 
IRBM --called the Musudan by the United States.  The 
Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of 
up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload.   The Musudan is 
derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in 
North Korea's liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 
had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic 
propellants -- unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and 
nitrogen tetroxide (N204) -- than those used in Scud-type 
missiles.  Development of the Musudan with this more 
advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to 
build even longer-range missiles -- or shorter range 
missiles with greater payload capacity -- than would be 
possible using Scud-type technology. 
 
As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has 
started to develop its own solid-propellant missile 
systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid 
propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM. This new missile 
-- called the Toksa by the United States -- has a range 
of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg.  This is a 
disturbing development since North Korea can apply its 
experience in producing this missile to other, longer- 
range, solid propellant missile designs.  Solid 
propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many 
countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and 
shorter launch times, making them more survivable than 
liquid propellant missiles. 
 
North Korea,s advances -- in both its liquid and solid 
propellant programs -- have come despite a self-imposed 
missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea's 
ability to verify new designs or modifications to its 
missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.  North 
Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No 
Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. 
 
Program Activities 
 
On April 5, 2009, North Korea -- despite UN Security 
Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of 
all activities related to its ballistic missile program -- 
conducted the second launch of the TD-2.  Although the 
April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in 
orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first 
TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is 
making progress in developing technology that can 
directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. 
Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 
of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 
1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile 
activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No 
Dong MRBMs on July 4th. 
 
The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North 
Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range 
missile systems and that long range missile development 
probably remains a priority.  North Korea's next goal may 
be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of 
threatening targets around the world, without requiring 
the lengthy -- and potentially vulnerable -- launch 
preparation time required by the TD-2. 
 
Technology Supplier 
 
The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related 
technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking 
to re-engage with former customers in the region.  North 
Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its 
missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and 
Africa.  North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic 
missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer 
any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers 
interested in complete systems, and can design missiles 
to meet specific customer needs.  For customers with 
established missile programs or otherwise lacking 
interest in complete systems, North Korea provides 
missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground 
support equipment and launchers, and production 
technology.  North Korea can also broker precision 
machine tools and other missile-related raw materials 
from third-parties for customers through its extensive 
procurement network. 
 
Iran 
 
Iran is one of North Korea's key missile customers. 
Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B 
and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production 
technology.  The Scud and other missile technology acquired 
from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, 
which is based on North Korea's No Dong. 
 
North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, 
called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.  This technology 
would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology 
than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic 
missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian 
missile and SLV designs. 
 
North Korea also provided assistance to Iran's SLV 
program.  On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the 
Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of 
which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong).  Pyongyang's 
assistance to Iran's SLV program suggests that North 
Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development 
of long-range ballistic missiles. 
 
Syria 
 
Syria is another of North Korea's key missile customers. 
North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C 
missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 
km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the "Scud 
D."  The missiles came initially in either partially or 
completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in 
North Korea.  Syria has since achieved a domestic 
production capability, probably with extensive assistance 
from Pyongyang.  North Korea has also provided a range of 
other missile-related services to Syria, including 
production technology, ground support equipment, raw 
material, components, technical assistance, and know-how. 
 
North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria's 
development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for 
its Scud ballistic missiles. 
 
Yemen 
 
In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud 
missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North 
Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be 
retransferred to any third party.  North Korea probably 
resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009. 
 
Burma 
 
The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, 
probably was associated with North Korea's primary arms 
export entity -- suggesting that the cargo was most 
likely weapons-related.  The ship returned to North Korea 
prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely 
Burma.  The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic 
missiles or conventional weapons.  A November 2008 visit 
by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic 
missile production facility suggests that the two sides 
probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, 
and that the cargo may have been related to these 
discussions. 
 
Foreign Assistance 
 
North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, 
front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic 
Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and 
materials needed to support both its own and its 
customers' missile programs.  Members of this network 
often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, 
or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they 
utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South 
Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of 
controlled items. 
 
Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile 
program includes material North Korea finds too costly or 
too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile 
component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for 
re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile 
tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty 
steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision 
gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and 
liquid-propellant precursors. 
 
Although important for its own program, North Korea also 
uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials 
for its missile export customers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
North Korea will continue to develop missiles with 
increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. 
In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to 
seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers 
-- most commonly China-based, given their proximity and 
access to technology that would be beneficial to North 
Korea,s missile program.  In light of its past missile 
technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for 
any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or 
technology associated with missile systems other 
countries -- including MTCR Partners -- have retired. 
 
International pressure against North Korea and its 
customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s 
missile sales.  However, despite such pressure, North 
Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients 
and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, 
their production technology, and missile maintenance and 
support services to all interested customers. 
 
 
END TEXT OF PAPER. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR 
issues for ISN/MTR.   A word version of this document 
will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON