Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09SEOUL1705, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 27, 2009

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SEOUL1705.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1705 2009-10-27 07:38 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO0892
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1705/01 3000738
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270738Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6046
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9321
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0443
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6833
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6899
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1421
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5214
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4165
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7375
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1664
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2973
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2052
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2659
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 27, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
New Flu Swept Schools; 80 Percent of Recent Infections Occurred in 
Children 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
ROKG Considers Sending 300-strong Elite Unit, 
including Special Warfare Command Personnel, to Afghanistan 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, 
Seoul Shinmun, All TVs 
New Flu Spreads Like Wildfire; Five Die in One Day 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROKG Considers Sending Police or Military Forces 
to Afghanistan 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the National Assembly yesterday 
that the ROKG is considering sending at least 130 civilian 
professionals to help rebuild Afghanistan and also some police or 
military forces to protect them. (All) 
 
An ROKG source, in a related development, said that a decision on 
whether to send police troops or soldiers will be made before 
President Barack Obama's Nov. 18 visit to Seoul and that sending a 
300-strong elite unit, including personnel from the Special Warfare 
Command, is a viable option. (JoongAng) 
 
The ROKG yesterday offered North Korea 10,000 tons of corn in 
humanitarian aid. This relatively small amount of aid, if accepted 
by the North, will be the first government-level food aid since the 
Lee Myung-bak Administration took office early last year. (All) 
 
Regarding the Oct. 22 remark by Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that (the U.S.) is considering deploying 
part of USFK to Iraq or Afghanistan, the Defense Ministry said 
yesterday that the two countries have not discussed any troop 
redeployment. (Dong-a) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-Aid for Afghanistan 
--------------------- 
All ROK media covered Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan's remarks 
during yesterday's National Assembly session, in which he said that 
Seoul is considering sending at least 130 civilian professionals to 
help rebuild Afghanistan and also some police or military forces to 
protect them.  Foreign Minister Yu was widely quoted: "The ROKG 
plans to boost the medical, vocational and police training programs 
of the Provincial Reconstruction Team.  Currently, Korean civilians 
are under the protection of the U.S. military.  If the PRT is 
expanded, however, we'll need to protect our workers on our own." 
 
In a related development, right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo quoted an 
ROKG source as saying that a decision on whether to send police 
troops or soldiers will be made before President Barack Obama's Nov. 
18 visit to Seoul and that sending a 300-strong elite unit, 
including personnel from the Special Warfare Command, is a viable 
option.  Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun commented that even though 
Foreign Minister Yu said that no consideration will be given to 
combat troop deployment, this ROKG move can be seen as setting the 
stage for troop redeployment to the war-torn country. 
 
Possible Deployment of Some USFK Troops to Middle East 
 
SEOUL 00001705  002 OF 006 
 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo noted the Oct. 22 remark by Adm. Michael 
Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff - that (the U.S.) 
is considering deploying part of USFK to Iraq or Afghanistan - and 
cited the ROK Defense Ministry as asserting yesterday that the two 
countries have not discussed any troop redeployment.  The newspaper 
wrote in the headline: "ROK Out of Sync with U.S.? Or Prelude to 
USFK's Relocation?" 
 
In an editorial, Dong-a also argued: "If the U.S. increases its 
troop presence in Afghanistan, it will inevitably affect U.S. troops 
stationed overseas.  ... In order to prevent USFK troops from being 
deployed to Afghanistan, creating a security vacuum on the Korean 
Peninsula, the ROK should actively help establish peace in 
Afghanistan.  During the Vietnam War, we sent our troops to Vietnam 
to avoid a USFK reduction. ...  In particular, providing assistance 
(by dispatching) police and military troops (to Afghanistan), as the 
U.S. would like us to do, is absolutely essential to achieve a 
prompt stabilization of the region." 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "It would be difficult 
to blindly oppose (any plan by) the U.S. to send its troops in the 
ROK (to other areas of the world.)  What matters is that we should 
come up with appropriate measures in the event of a dispatch of some 
USFK troops, because the move will likely weaken the ROK and U.S. 
combined forces' deterrence against North Korea.  In particular, in 
a situation where tensions are mounting on the Korean Peninsula due 
to the North's nuclear development, we should thoroughly prepare 
ourselves against the worst-case scenario." 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo carried a commentary headed "Let's Demand 
the U.S. and China Set Deadline for Resolving North Korea's Nuclear 
Issue."  It argued: "The year 2012, by which North Korea aims to 
build a 'strong and prosperous country,' should be the deadline for 
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.  If it is crystal clear 
that the ROK cannot live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, how about 
making it plain to the U.S. and China that unless the nuclear issue 
is resolved by 2012, the ROK cannot help but consider a third 
option, which includes developing nuclear weapons of its own?" 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
-------------------- 
 
LET'S DEMAND THE U.S. AND CHINA SET A DEADLINE FOR RESOLVING NORTH 
KOREA'S NUCLEAR ISSUE 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 27, 2009, page 35) 
 
By Editorial Writer Kim Chang-ki 
 
President Lee Myung-bak on Saturday said, "There is no indication 
that North Korea has decided to abandon its nuclear weapons."  He 
was apparently explaining why behind-the-scenes talks about an 
inter-Korean summit came to naught. 
 
The (ROK) government maintains that the North Korean nuclear issue 
must be on the agenda of any inter-Korean summit.  But simply 
raising the issue alone is insufficient.  A strategy should be 
established in advance for the kind of response North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il can be expected to give.  Even if the North decides to 
abandon its nuclear weapons, however, it is uncertain if the North 
will tell the ROK president before the U.S. President. 
 
Pyongyang has long demanded a reciprocal nuclear disarmament 
agreement with Washington.  Preposterous as this may seem, the North 
has set it as the starting point for negotiations.  It will call not 
only for normal relations with the U.S., but also for a peace treaty 
in place of the armistice agreement and the withdrawal of the U.S. 
Forces in Korea.  Washington, too, will place other issues on the 
table like improved human rights in the North. The issue of Japanese 
citizens kidnapped to the North also remains unresolved. 
 
Even if Pyongyang and Washington agree to (President) Lee's "grand 
 
SEOUL 00001705  003 OF 006 
 
 
bargain" of security guarantees and economic incentives in a 
one-shot deal to get the North to abandon its nuclear ambitions, 
considerable hurdles would still need to be overcome over a long 
period until specific accords are reached and a timetable is worked 
out.  For example, America would insist upon the North's 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons before a diplomatic normalization, 
but the North would undoubtedly want to leave denuclearization till 
the very last. 
 
In the 16-year-long nuclear tug-of-war with America, the North has 
learned a few things.  For starters, it realized that it is 
effectively impossible for the U.S. and the ROK to opt for a 
military solution.  Perhaps former President Bill Clinton's surgical 
strike formula, prepared in the spring of 1994, was the first and 
last opportunity to rid the North of its will to develop a nuclear 
program in a situation with the lowest risk of touching off a total 
war. 
 
Pyongyang also seems believe that it can always avert extreme 
international pressure by returning to the negotiation table.  In a 
desperate situation, it could again agree to old formulas like 
freezing nuclear activities and international inspections.  The 
regime, paying no attention whatsoever to the plight of its people 
due to international sanctions, thinks it can hold out for a long 
time.  Instead, it is the international community, including the ROK 
and the U.S. that is worried about humanitarian concerns. 
 
Until Washington, Beijing and Seoul discourage these calculations in 
unison, it will be impossible to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue.  Some pundits believe that the North, despite its two nuclear 
tests, has yet to turn its nuclear devices into usable weapons. 
Even if that is true, it is merely a matter of time until it does. 
 
 
The year 2012, by which North Korea aims to build a 'strong and 
prosperous country,' should be the deadline for resolving the North 
Korean nuclear issue.  If it is crystal clear that the ROK cannot 
live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, how about making it plain to 
the U.S. and China that unless the nuclear issue is resolved by 
2012, the ROK cannot help but consider a third option, which 
includes developing nuclear weapons of its own? China, its biggest 
trade partner, would be able to deal the economy a fatal blow at any 
time, and the ROK depends on the U.S. for fuel for nuclear power 
generation.  There is little room for maneuver. 
 
Should the ROK therefore leave matters to China and the U.S.?  The 
U.S., if it has given up on a military solution, should be pushing 
ahead with sanctions and negotiations but lacks the decisive means, 
while China, seeking stability on the Korean Peninsula, is hobbled 
by the North Korean regime.  Those are the reasons the ROK must look 
for new ways of breaking the stalemate. 
 
 
TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH NATIONAL 
INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION 
(Dong-a Ilbo, October 27, 2009, page 35) 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the National Assembly yesterday 
that the ROKG is considering sending civilian professionals to help 
rebuild Afghanistan and some police or military forces to protect 
them.  Minister Yu said that the number of civilians to be deployed 
will be 130, adding that the ROKG is discussing ways to protect them 
on its own.  The ROKG must devise ways to guard them if it plans to 
send about a hundred civilians to Afghanistan where the Taliban 
reigns.  According to other sources, the ROKG is considering 
dispatching at least several hundred (police or military) officers. 
 
 
Expanding assistance to Afghanistan is needed to bolster the 
ROK-U.S. alliance.  Last week U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
said, "We obviously welcome any contribution that any countries 
around the world are prepared to make, but that decision - what and 
how much to contribute - is entirely up to the ROK."  This seems to 
be a roundabout way of requesting assistance from the ROK.  In order 
 
SEOUL 00001705  004 OF 006 
 
 
to shore up the ROK-U.S. alliance, we should take active steps when 
the U.S. needs help.  If we ignore an ally's difficulties, it may 
jeopardize the "Joint vision for the Alliance of the ROK and the 
U.S." that the two leaders agreed to in June. 
 
The Obama Administration has made an all-out effort to stabilize 
Afghanistan since taking office.  There are (currently) 65,000 U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan but the USG plans to send an additional 34,000 
troops. 
 
If the U.S. increases its troop presence in Afghanistan, it will 
inevitably affect U.S. troops stationed overseas.  Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen said that the 
Pentagon is discussing whether troops will be deployed from the ROK 
to Iraq and Afghanistan in coming years.  In order to prevent USFK 
troops from being deployed to Afghanistan, creating a security 
vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK should actively help 
establish peace in Afghanistan.  During the Vietnam War, we sent our 
troops to Vietnam to avoid a USFK reduction. 
 
As the world's tenth largest economy, the ROK cannot disregard 
efforts to build peace in Afghanistan.  The Afghan people have been 
living in a state of war for eight years.  For the ROK, which fought 
back against the North with the help of the UN during the Korean 
War, providing aid to Afghanistan is one of the ways to repay the 
debt it owes to the international community. 
 
In particular, providing assistance (by dispatching) police and 
military troops (to Afghanistan), as the U.S. would like us to do, 
is absolutely essential to achieve a prompt stabilization of the 
region. 
 
 
ROKG SHOULD HURRY TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF USFK 
TROOPS TO MIDDLE EAST 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 27, 2009, page 46) 
 
In a noteworthy move, the U.S. is reportedly considering dispatching 
some United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops to Afghanistan.  In 
response to a question by a USFK soldier during a visit to the ROK 
last week, Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff said that this is one of the issues the U.S. is discussing 
with the ROK.  This has sparked concerns that if some of the 28,500 
USFK ground forces are deployed to Afghanistan, it likely will 
undermine the security of the ROK.  In particular, observers say 
that this move may coincide with the transfer of wartime operational 
control to the ROK scheduled for April 2012, thus dealing a further 
blow to the U.S.-ROK joint forces' capability to deter North Korean 
provocations.  Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the National 
Assembly on October 26 that the ROK plans to deploy 130 civilian 
professionals to help rebuild Afghanistan and also some police or 
military forces to protect them. 
 
The ROK and the U.S. agreed in November 2006 to give "strategic 
flexibility" to USFK.  This means that the role of USFK is expanded 
to defend not only the Korean Peninsula but also overseas U.S. 
bases.  Therefore, the U.S. can deploy USFK troops to other areas 
anytime it wants. 
 
It would be difficult to blindly oppose (any plan by) the U.S. to 
send its troops stationed in the ROK (to other areas of the world.) 
What matters is that we should come up with appropriate measures in 
the event of a dispatch of some USFK troops, because the move likely 
will weaken the ROK and U.S. combined forces' deterrence against 
North Korea.  In particular, in a situation where tensions are 
mounting on the Korean Peninsula due to the North's nuclear 
development, we should thoroughly prepare ourselves against any 
worst-case scenario. 
 
The best-case scenario would be that USFK troops are not deployed to 
Afghanistan.  This scenario still may be realized through close 
discussions with the U.S.  Analysts believe that Minister Yu's 
official announcement to provide additional assistance to 
Afghanistan was made considering this ROK position.  Also, we should 
 
SEOUL 00001705  005 OF 006 
 
 
take measures against any inevitable deployment of USFK troops and 
prepare for a possible reduction in USFK that may result when the 
temporary deployment is prolonged.  The ROK should hurry to 
strengthen its own forces.  The ROK also should seek to deploy 
additional navy and air forces to replace USFK troops if they are 
dispatched to Afghanistan.  In addition, we should actively consider 
delaying the timetable for the transfer of wartime operational 
control to the ROK so that it does not happen at the same time as a 
dispatch of USFK troops to the Middle East. 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
ROK OUT OF SYNC WITH THE U.S.? OR PRELUDE TO USFK'S RELOCATION? 
(Dong-a Ilbo, October 27, 2009, Page 8) 
 
By Reporter Yoon Sang-ho 
 
Controversy is mounting over the statement by the Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. is considering pulling some 
USFK troops out of the ROK. 
 
After the statement by Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Adm. Michael Mullen that the U.S. is considering deploying part of 
USFK to Iraq or Afghanistan in coming years was made public, 
controversy over the true meaning of the remark is mounting inside 
and outside the military. 
 
Regarding Adm. Mullen's statement, the Ministry of National Defense 
explained on October 26, "The two countries have not discussed any 
troop redeployment."  Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu 
Myung-hwan also noted at the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Unification Committee on the same day, "The USFK's 
overseas redeployment was not specifically discussed (at any 
meetings), including the recent ROK-U.S. Security Consultative 
Meeting (SCM)." 
 
A key ROKG official implied, however, that there were discussions 
between the ROK and the U.S., saying, "Once the process of extending 
the tours of USFK servicemen to 'three-year family accompanied 
tours' is completed, it will be possible to manage USFK personnel in 
a flexible way, such as using the ROK as a stationing base from 
which USFK soldiers can be temporarily dispatched to the Middle East 
region." He added, however, "Such management will be possible only 
after 2015 or 2016, when the tour normalization policy is fully 
implemented." 
 
The ROK and U.S. military authorities appear perplexed.  Although 
both sides agreed in early 2006 to the USFK's strategic flexibility, 
under which USFK troops will be deployed to other troubled parts of 
the world with the ROKG's consent, the pullout of USFK troops is a 
sensitive issue, which could stir up controversy over a "security 
vacuum." 
 
The USFK said on October 26, "We are looking at Adm. Mullen's 
statement again and are determining whether to announce an official 
position."  The ROK defense ministry is also at a loss.  For the 
ministry, it is hard to understand why Adm. Mullen mentioned the 
possibility of pulling USFK troops out of the ROK, two days before 
the ROK and the U.S. agreed to maintain USFK presence at the current 
level (28,500 soldiers) during the 41st SCM.  An official said, "If 
the U.S. does not explain exactly why Adm. Mullen made the remark, 
it will increase suspicion and misunderstanding." 
 
Some observers believe that this controversy is attributed to the 
ROK being out of sync with the U.S.  They speculate that after both 
sides agreed at a closed-door meeting to maintain the USFK at the 
current level and to deal with its overseas deployment under the 
principle of strategic flexibility, this (plan to deploy troops off 
the peninsula) may have been revealed in the process of explaining 
(the flexible deployment plan) to U.S. servicemen. 
 
At any rate, experts expect that since the U.S. has now clarified 
 
SEOUL 00001705  006 OF 006 
 
 
that USFK is not exempt from the policy of strategic flexibility, 
which applies to all U.S. soldiers around the world, the USFK's 
redeployment to other part of the world will come sooner or later. 
A military official commented, "We expect that about 500 U.S. troops 
may be pulled out of the ROK." 
 
 
STEPHENS