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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1697, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 26, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1697 2009-10-26 07:51 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO9727
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1697/01 2990751
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260751Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6032
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9315
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0437
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6827
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6893
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1415
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5206
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4159
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7369
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1658
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2967
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2046
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2653
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001697 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 26, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun, All TVs 
Rapid Spread of New Flu; U.S. Declares Swine Flu Emergency, and ROK 
Reports 3,000 Infections a Day 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
At Least 136 Dead in Worst Bomb Attack in Baghdad 
in More Than Two Years 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
N. Korean Defectors Fail to Assimilate Into ROK Society 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
President Lee: "N. Korea's Intentions Remain Unclear. The North has 
Shown Few Signs of Making a Decision 
to Give up Nuclear Ambitions" 
 
 
Segye Ilbo 
War of Nerves between U.S. and N. Korea; U.S., 
North Hold Talks in New York, and U.S. Treasury Blacklists 
N. Korean Bank for Arms Deals 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
 
President Lee Myung-bak, in an Oct. 25 luncheon at the ASEAN+3 
Summit in Thailand, said that North Korea's intentions remain 
unclear and that the North has shown few signs of making a decision 
to give up its nuclear ambitions. (All) 
 
Lee Dong-kwan, Senior Presidential Secretary for Public Relations, 
said on Oct. 24 that, "There will be neither behind-the-scenes 
negotiations nor s-e-c-r-e-t agreement with the North" about an 
inter-Korean summit." (All) 
 
According to Stars and Stripes, Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during his recent visit to Seoul 
that the U.S. is considering deploying part of USFK to the Middle 
East in coming years. (Dong-a) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Ri Gun, Deputy North Korean Negotiator to the Six-Party Talks, met 
in New York on Oct. 24 with Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the 
Six-Party Talks. (All) 
 
On Oct. 23, the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted a North Korean 
bank as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction for its 
involvement in exporting ballistic missiles to Iran. (Dong-a, Segye, 
Seoul) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
The Oct. 24 meeting in New York between Ri Gun, Deputy North Korean 
Negotiator to the Six-Party Talks, and Sung Kim, U.S. Special Envoy 
for the Six-Party Talks, received wide press coverage today. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo described this meeting as a prelude to 
full-fledged bilateral talks between the two countries.  JoongAng 
observed: "One of the scenarios being discussed for bilateral 
 
SEOUL 00001697  002 OF 006 
 
 
U.S.-North Korea talks is that Special Representative for North 
Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth ... would meet in Pyongyang or a third 
country with North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju. 
Should Bosworth go to Pyongyang, he may meet with North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il to deliver a personal letter from President 
Obama." 
 
In an editorial, JoongAng argued: "It appears that North Korea's 
(recent actions) are aimed at easing international sanctions which 
have intensified and disrupting cooperation between the ROK, the 
U.S. and Japan.  Following the North's second nuclear test, the 
three countries implemented a two-track approach of 'pressure and 
dialogue' to resolve the nuclear issue.  This approach should be 
maintained until the North takes irreversible steps toward 
denuclearization. ...  The North's current flurry of peace overtures 
should not in any way lead to a hasty lifting of sanctions against 
the country." 
 
President Lee Myung-bak was widely quoted as saying in an Oct. 25 
luncheon at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Thailand: "North Korea's 
intentions remain unclear.  The North has shown few signs of making 
a decision to give up its nuclear ambitions." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
CONCERNS OVER U.S. BEEF 
(Seoul Shinmun, October 26, 2009, page 30) 
 
By Lee Jun-han, Political Science Professor of the University of 
Incheon 
 
During a national policy coordination meeting held at the Central 
Government Complex, the new ROK prime minister threw out a question, 
"Why isn't imported U.S. beef used in the cafeteria of the 
government office?  During the National Assembly's audit that 
ensued, clues (why the U.S. beef is not used in the government 
office) were revealed.  Until now, imported U.S. beef including 
intestines has been inspected only with the naked eye without 
undergoing tissue inspection.  This U.S. beef has been served to 
auxiliary police who have no choice or power (to refuse the U.S. 
beef.)  More surprisingly, a considerable amount of U.S. beef has 
been consumed in the Taereung National Village where Korean national 
players exercise with the goal of enhancing Korea's standing in 
international sports. 
 
Living in the U.S. as a researcher, I go to grocery stores on 
weekends, where I often look at nicely packaged beef only with a 
watering mouth without buying it.  When I was studying in the U.S. 
before, I couldn't afford to buy beef.  But now I don't feel like 
(buying it), knowing that U.S. beef may cause health problems.  The 
U.S. beef imported to the ROK comes from cows more than 30 months 
old.  In contrast, beef distributed in the U.S. is mostly meat from 
cattle under 20 months of age and is considered safe.  I say to 
myself hypnotically that U.S. beef is safe, but I can't dispel my 
concerns easily. 
 
My anxiety further intensified after I read a terrifying article 
about U.S. beef.  According to the New York Times, a 22- year old 
young American woman suffered from diarrhea and spasms after eating 
a hamburger.  She fell into a coma for 9 weeks.  Her mother had 
purchased ground beef and made a hamburger.  But it turned out that 
the beef was contaminated with E coli.  The woman became paraplegic 
due to nerve damage.  I suddenly felt my legs numb upon recalling 
that I had had a hamburger at a (McDonalds) fast-food chain a few 
days ago. 
 
I cannot but suspect that good-quality beef isn't always used for 
hamburgers.  Allegedly, ground beef sometimes includes intestines or 
other parts, or even bones.  Also, other kinds of meat in addition 
to beef, and beef from other countries may be mixed into the ground 
beef. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001697  003 OF 006 
 
 
This October alone, at least three recalls of beef products were 
announced in the U.S.  Not only ground beef but also other kinds of 
products were subject to the recalls.  The recalls were issued 
because beef products may have been contaminated with E. coli or 
Specified Risk Materials (SRM) were not removed.  The problem is 
that one of the U.S. firms that issued a recall in October exports 
beef to the ROK.  One way or another, U.S. beef is fueling consumer 
anxiety both inside and outside the U.S. 
 
In the ROK, U.S. imports increased until October in 2008, but after 
that, they began decreasing as the global economic crisis hurt the 
ROK economy and drove up the exchange rate.  Weak consumer 
confidence in U.S. beef was also at play.  A U.S. beef importer, who 
sued MBC's "PD Diary," an investigative television newsmagazine, and 
an actress (for allegedly misleading the public into a boycott of 
U.S. beef products and damaging sales), argues that he incurred a 
loss of more than 400 billion won due to candlelight protests.  In 
this situation, it is evident that the U.S. livestock industry has 
failed to achieve its target profits and market expansion in the 
ROK. 
 
On October 10, Japan banned all U.S. beef imports from a U.S. 
meatpacker, saying that bovine spinal columns, which are banned 
under a bilateral agreement, were found in beef shipments from the 
plant.  The Hatoyama Administration strongly said that it did not 
plan to renegotiate to ease the import terms as the U.S. demanded. 
In Taiwan, there is no report, either, that the nation's import 
terms for U.S. beef have been eased as much as those of the ROK.  In 
the middle of the candlelight protests, ROKG officials said that 
they would take action after watching the results of U.S. beef trade 
negotiations of Japan or Taiwan.  But what are they doing now? 
Isn't this the time for the Prime Minister to find a solution at a 
fundamental level, rather than at the level of a cafeteria?  Doesn't 
he have to find a solution in which Korean consumers enjoy "cheap 
and quality" U.S. beef with confidence, thereby reducing the loss of 
ROK and U.S. industries and patching up divisions in public 
opinion? 
 
 
A CHANCE TO BRING TRANSPARENCY TO INTER-KOREAN DEALINGS 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 26, 2009, page 35) 
 
Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Lee Dong-kwan on Saturday said, "As we have 
already stated, we will not pursue a summit with any hidden 
political agenda."  Briefing reporters on rumors of a possible 
inter-Korean summit, Lee said any such meeting must be in line with 
the genuine interests of the public and help in the resolution of 
the nuclear impasse.  "I stress again it is our government's 
unchanging stance that we will not hold an inter-Korean summit that 
will simply end in a meeting of the leaders," Lee said.  He added 
Seoul has no fantasies about such a meeting and pledged the 
government would be clear and open about any arrangements when the 
time comes. 
 
Many have grown skeptical about the value of a summit after the 
first two were held without even touching on the main issue of the 
North Korean nuclear program.  As a result, President Lee Myung-bak 
pledged during his election campaign to be transparent about the 
agenda and arrangement process. 
 
Considering the nature of inter-Korean relations, it could be 
difficult to reveal the entire process of arranging a summit. 
During its historic contact with Beijing, the White House kept the 
process s-e-c-r-e-t even from its own diplomats.  The transparency 
the public wants to see is not about revealing every little detail 
of the process but means that they want the leaders of the two 
countries to be honest about matters like the nuclear issue.  North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-il has said denuclearization on the Korean 
Peninsula was his father's "last wish."  But there is no point 
trying to make such rhetoric look like some sort of major progress 
in the nuclear dismantlement process. 
 
The North Korean nuclear problem is at the root of inter-Korean 
relations.  The ROK is the only country that is directly threatened 
 
SEOUL 00001697  004 OF 006 
 
 
by North Korea's nuclear weapons.  The reason the North insists on 
keeping its nuclear weapons is that it is afraid of being defeated 
and absorbed by the ROK. 
 
Some people here fear that North Korea and the U.S. may leave the 
ROK out of any nuclear negotiations and are desperately hoping for 
an inter-Korean summit.  These fears are probably at the bottom of 
the rumors about a possible summit.  They are based on the erroneous 
belief that nuclear discussions should be conducted between North 
Korea and the U.S., while the ROK should work to create an amicable 
atmosphere for such discussions by promising economic aid to and 
holding a summit with North Korea. 
 
But even if the U.S. and North Korea do hold nuclear talks, key 
issues including turning the armistice into a peace treaty must 
involve the ROK.  As long as Seoul and Washington maintain a close 
alliance, the North would not even be able to consider leaving the 
ROK out.  North Korea knows this, and that is why it is hoping for 
an inter-Korean summit. 
 
This is an opportunity to bring greater transparency to inter-Korean 
negotiations, which have been flawed for the last 20 years, and to 
set a framework for regular talks between the two Koreas and the 
U.S.  The next inter-Korean summit must be a decisive step in that 
direction. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FIRST U.S. - N. KOREA CONTACT SINCE THE LAUNCH OF THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD LEAD TO THE NORTH'S RETURN TO SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 23, 2009, page 46) 
 
Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks and Ri Gun, Deputy 
North Korean Negotiator to the Six-Party Talks had a meeting in New 
York on October 24.  This is the first U.S.-North Korea contact 
since the Obama Administration took office.  The meeting was held 
while the two countries are still engaging in confrontation 
following North Korea's second nuclear test and missile launches and 
the UN Security Council's resolution condemning these acts.  The 
unofficial working-level contact came even though the U.S. has been 
demanding as preconditions for U.S.-North Korea talks that North 
Korea demonstrate its willingness to achieve denuclearization and 
promise to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.  It is likely that the two 
officials discussed several issues including North Korea's return to 
the Six-Party Talks, its willingness to pursue denuclearization, 
U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks and a U.S.-envisioned comprehensive 
approach for resolving the nuclear issue.  Ri Gun will also 
participate in talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, which will 
be held in New York on October 30.  Attention is turning to whether 
the first one-on-one U.S.-North Korea contact will lead to the 
North's return to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
Recently, North Korea has mounted charm offensives at the U.S., the 
ROK and Japan.  In a series of conciliatory moves, the North invited 
Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth to 
visit Pyongyang, hinted at the possibility that it may rejoin the 
Six-Party Talks during a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and 
proposed inter-Korean talks.  However, it remains unclear whether 
Pyongyang is really willing to give up its nuclear weapons program. 
ROK President Lee Myung-bak said on October 25 that the North has 
shown few signs of making a decision to give up its nuclear 
ambitions while Pyongyang insists that it intends to pursue 
denuclearization through nuclear disarmament talks with the U.S. 
Therefore, we can only question as to North Korea's true intentions 
behind the peace gestures.  It appears that North Korea's (recent 
actions) are aimed at easing international sanctions which have 
intensified and disrupting cooperation between the ROK, the U.S. and 
Japan. 
 
Following the North's second nuclear test, the three countries 
implemented a two-track approach of 'pressure and dialogue' to 
 
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resolve the nuclear issue.  This approach should be maintained until 
the North takes irreversible steps toward denuclearization. 
Depending on the situation, equilibrium may shift between pressure 
and dialogue.  The North's current flurry of peace overtures should 
not in any way lead to a hasty lifting of sanctions against the 
country.  Former U.S. President George W. Bush lifted sanctions on 
the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) bank due to North Korea's relentless 
demands and made progress on the Six-Party Talks.  However, this 
only resulted in North Korea carrying out a second nuclear test. 
Now, North Korea is openly claiming itself as a nuclear state and 
scheming to make it an established fact.  This should not be 
allowed.  Ultimately, we should persuade the North to abandon its 
nuclear weapons.  This is not an easy goal, given the North Korean 
leadership's unwavering commitment to nuclear development.  After 
all, the North Korean nuclear issue can be resolved only when the 
entire international community, including all Six Party Talks member 
countries, makes consistent and enduring efforts (to stop the North 
from nuclear development.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
BOSWORTH VISITS PYONGYANG WITH OBAMA'S LETTER? KIM JONG-IL VISITS 
CHINA? 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 26, 2009, Pages 4-5) 
 
By Reporter Ye Young-joon 
 
After North Korea's charm offensive, how will things pan out? 
 
Contact made between Ri Gun and Sung Kim on October 24 
 
Following a s-e-c-r-e-t inter-Korean meeting, the first contact 
between North Korean and U.S. officials since the launch of the 
Obama Administration was made in New York on October 24.  Deputy 
North Korean Negotiator to the Six-Party Talks Ri Gun, who is 
visiting the U.S., and U.S. Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks 
Sung Kim had a meeting for about an hour at the U.S. mission to the 
UN.  Ri, who arrived in the U.S. to attend the Northeast Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue set for October 26 in San Diego, is expected to 
meet with Kim a few more times during his stay until the end of this 
month. 
 
The meeting between the two officials can be seen as a prelude to 
full-fledged bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea.  An 
(ROKG) official well-versed in the North Korean nuclear issue 
predicted, "Since the U.S. has already decided to have direct 
dialogue with North Korea, the U.S., during the Ri-Kim meeting, is 
expected to check Pyongyang's position and determine the venue and 
timing for bilateral talks with the North.  The date (for the talks) 
is likely to be after mid-November."  One of the scenarios being 
discussed for bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks is that Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth, who has 
already been invited by the North, would meet in Pyongyang or a 
third country with North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang 
Sok-ju.  Should Bosworth go to Pyongyang, he may meet with North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-il to deliver a personal letter from 
President Obama.  Under another scenario, North Korea would return 
to the Six-Party Talks, depending on the outcome of U.S.-North Korea 
dialogue.  The first contact between the U.S. and North Korea was 
made possible because North Korea's charm offensive squared with the 
U.S.'s "two-track" approach of dialogue and sanctions (toward the 
North.)  In early October when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited 
Pyongyang, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had sent him a message 
that "We hope to improve relations with the ROK and Japan."  The 
recent inter-Korean s-e-c-r-e-t contact in Singapore should also be 
seen in this context.  North Korea-Japan negotiations are also 
expected to resume now that the new Japanese government has taken 
office.    The efforts to create a favorable atmosphere for talks 
before the dialogue with the U.S. is consistent with North Korea's 
negotiating style. 
 
It is also possible that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il will visit 
 
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China.  A diplomatic source said, "We believe that during his visit 
to the North, Premier Wen invited Kim."  There is also speculation 
that, when Kim Yang-gon, head of the Unification Front Department of 
North Korea's Workers' Party, appeared in Beijing last week, one of 
his missions was to discuss North Korean leader Kim's visit to 
China.  Kim Yang-gon, who is in charge of relations with China's 
Communist Party, has coordinated summit diplomacy between North 
Korea and China, which was restored in the 2000s.  An (ROK) 
government official noted, "It appears that North Korea's charm 
offensive is also aimed at undermining cooperation among the five 
parties and taking 'the teeth out of the sanctions.'"  To this end, 
North Korea should first win over China.  Strengthening relations 
with China would also be advantageous for North Korea at the 
bargaining table.  When it comes to inter-Korean dialogue, a 
prevalent view is that since the s-e-c-r-e-t meeting has now been 
made public, it may be difficult, for the time being, to restore the 
momentum (for dialogue).  Observers say, however, that the reason 
why the ROKG has not disclosed its lines of contact with the North 
is that it wants to keep the lines open and deal with future 
developments in a flexible manner. 
 
 
STEPHENS