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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 001687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 23, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Policy Adrift on Foreign Language High Schools 
 
 
JoongAng Ilbo, All TVs 
Two Koreas S-e-c-r-e-t-l-y Met in Singapore to Discuss Possible 
Summit 
 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
81-Year-Old ROK POW Detained in China for Two Consecutive Months 
after Fleeing N. Korea 
 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
U.S. to Mobilize Full Range of Military Capabilities in Event of 
Emergency on Korean Peninsula 
 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Three Sons of Hyosung Group Chairman Probed over Purchasing Overseas 
Real Estate 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates adopted a 16-point joint statement following the 41st Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul yesterday. The statement 
confirmed a continuing U.S. commitment to defend the ROK against 
North Korea's military threats. (All) 
 
Secretary Gates made no direct request for aid to Afghanistan, only 
saying in a joint press conference: "We obviously welcome any 
contribution that any countries around the world are prepared to 
make, but that decision - what and how much to contribute - is 
entirely up to the ROK." (All) 
 
According to a key ROKG official, a high-profile, nongovernmental 
ROK figure met in Singapore last week with Kim Yang-gon, Director of 
the United Front Department at North Korea's Workers' Party, 
apparently to discuss a possible summit between the two Koreas. 
(All) 
 
The ROKG is considering resuming imports of sand from North Korea, 
which have been suspended since April, when the North test-fired a 
long-range rocket. (Chosun, Hankyoreh, Segye) This move is likely to 
create a stir, given that there has been suspicion that payments for 
sand shipments may have been pocketed by military authorities in the 
North. (Chosun) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
- ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
All media covered yesterday's annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative 
Meeting, in which the U.S. pledged to mobilize globally available 
U.S. forces and military capabilities to augment the ROK's defense 
in case of crisis.  According to media reports, the U.S. also made 
it clear that it will provide "extended deterrence," using the full 
range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, 
conventional strike and missile defense capabilities, in order to 
deal with North Korea's military threats. 
 
Most media observed that this development carries great significance 
 
SEOUL 00001687  002 OF 007 
 
 
since it has expanded U.S. reinforcements from American territory 
and Japan-centered forces to U.S forces across the world in the 
event of an emergency on the Korea Peninsula. 
 
On the Afghanistan front, all media reported that Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates made no direct request for aid to Afghanistan, quoting 
him as only saying in a joint press conference: "We obviously 
welcome any contribution that any countries around the world are 
prepared to make, but that decision - what and how much to 
contribute- is entirely up to the ROK." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized: "The greatest threat to 
peace on the Korean Peninsula is North Korea's nuclear program. 
There is a high possibility that the North Korean nuclear issue may 
be settled in the following two ways: accepting a nuclear-armed 
North Korea or making a fundamental change to the current armistice 
on the Korean Peninsula in return for the North's abandonment of 
nuclear weapons.  Should the North's nuclear possession become an 
established fact, we wonder if the U.S.'s stated 'extended 
deterrence' alone could satisfy the ROK's political, military, 
economic and psychological security (needs)." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo argued in an editorial: "The defense 
agreement with the U.S. is based on a solid bilateral alliance.  If 
the alliance weakens, the agreement cannot ensure a feeling of 
safety.  This is why we are worried about disbanding the ROK-U.S. 
Combined Forces Command (CFC) and transferring wartime operational 
control in 2012.  Few multinational forces have won in war without a 
unifying command.  Joint operation under the leadership of the U.S. 
military helped prevent North Korea from taking the ROK." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo observed: "The ROKG is reportedly considering 
sending a 300-strong force to Afghanistan to protect the civilian 
Provincial Reconstruction Team there. ... In order to protect the 
civilian team, however, combat troops, who are stronger than the 
units of military medics or engineers, are needed.  Police officers 
are not appropriate.  Talking about sending mercenaries will also 
only invite uncontrollable controversy.  Rather than vaguely citing 
the ROK-U.S. alliance as a reason for troop deployment, the ROKG 
should first come up with alternatives which can win public 
approval." 
 
- N. Korea 
---------- 
Citing a key ROKG official, all ROK media reported that there was a 
s-e-c-r-e-t contact in Singapore last week between a high-profile, 
nongovernmental ROK figure and Kim Yang-gon, Director of the United 
Front Department at North Korea's Workers' Party, apparently to 
discuss a possible summit between the two Koreas. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo, in particular, quoted a key ruling camp 
official as saying: "North Korea has long requested a meeting with a 
person who can speak on behalf of President Lee Myung-bak, and it is 
true that such a meeting was recently on the verge of happening. 
Since news of the meeting was made public, however, it will be 
difficult to hold meetings of senior officials from both Koreas for 
some time." 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
 
JITTERS OVER DEFENSE ACCORD WITH U.S. 
(Dong-a Ilbo, October 23, 2009, page 39) 
 
The United States yesterday reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to 
extended deterrence by using the full range of its military 
capabilities, including a nuclear umbrella, if North Korea attempts 
a nuclear attack on the ROK.  In times of emergency, Washington will 
flexibly increase and relocate its forces across the world to the 
Korean Peninsula.  U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Korean 
counterpart Kim Tae-young adopted a 16-point joint communiqu on 
North Korea's nuclear program at the Security Consultative Meeting 
yesterday, which was based on talks of the two countries joint 
 
SEOUL 00001687  003 OF 007 
 
 
chiefs of staff Wednesday.  The joint statement can pressure North 
Korea to abandon nuclear weapons. 
 
Secretary Gates reaffirmed Washington's extended deterrence to 
Seoul, saying a nuclear attack on the ROK will be considered one on 
U.S. soil.  He clarified specific means like intercontinental 
ballistic and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic 
bombers.  Gen. Walter Sharp, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, 
said June 26 in a lecture at the Korea Military Academy that the 
extended deterrence includes missile defense. The concept of 
extended deterrence was specified in the "Future Vision of the 
Korea-U.S. Alliance" at the June bilateral summit after being 
included first in the Security Consultative Meeting's joint 
communiqu in 2006.  The joint agreement is also meaningful since it 
includes the expansion of U.S. forces to include U.S. forces across 
the world as well as forces from American territory and 
Japan-centered forces in case of emergency on the Korea Peninsula. 
 
The decision, however, failed to dispel insecurity since the plans 
to disband the Combined Forces Command and transfer wartime 
operational control back to Seoul in 2012 remain unchanged.  The two 
defense ministers will check progress on a regular basis, leaving a 
silver lining of hope.  Gates promised that Washington will keep 
providing complementary forces until Seoul can defend itself on its 
own.  Fortunately, the U.S. will maintain its 28,000-strong forces 
in Korea and extend their stay here to three years. 
 
The defense agreement with the U.S. is based on a solid bilateral 
alliance.  If the alliance weakens, the agreement cannot ensure a 
feeling of safety.  This is why we are worried about disbanding the 
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and transferring wartime 
operational control in 2012.  Few multinational forces have won in 
war without a unifying command.  Joint operation under the 
leadership of the U.S. military helped prevent North Korea from 
taking the ROK. 
 
As Secretary Gates indirectly requested, cooperation in war zones 
such as Afghanistan could be a good opportunity to strengthen 
alliances.  The ROK needs to create a good environment for U.S. 
forces in Korea, such as assisting in the relocation of the main 
U.S. base to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.  Now is the time to show 
great interest in the comprehensive strategic alliance with national 
and global security in mind, something that was agreed on at the 
bilateral summit in June. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT REQUIRES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, October 23, 2009, page 31) 
 
Defense Minister Kim Tae-young and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates convened yesterday in Seoul for the 41st Republic of 
Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and issued a joint 
communiqu, the core of which dealt with the U.S.'s dedication to 
providing a firm security umbrella for the Korean Peninsula, and the 
ROK's contribution to global security.  Broadly speaking, in return 
for the U.S. assistance in decreasing the ROK's security concerns 
resulting from North Korea's strengthened nuclear and missile 
forces, the ROK decided to agree to expand its contribution in 
Afghanistan if the situation arises where the U.S. finds itself in a 
difficult position. 
 
The statement shows that the two countries are in agreement on 
promoting close cooperation in handling wide-ranging global security 
challenges, including peacekeeping, stabilization, reconstruction 
support, humanitarian aid and disaster relief.  Nowhere was the word 
"Afghanistan" used.  During his press conference, Gates said the 
U.S. has not made any concrete requests to the ROKG for support in 
Afghanistan, and that the timeline and extent of ROK support is 
entirely up to the ROKG.  This was merely his statement; however, it 
is a widely known s-e-c-r-e-t that the U.S. is strongly hoping for 
ROK cooperation in a number of areas, including troop deployment.  A 
 
SEOUL 00001687  004 OF 007 
 
 
speech Gates gave to the men and women of the ROK-U.S. Combined 
Forces Command provided evidence of this sentiment, when he said 
that military contributions to global security are also in the ROK's 
core interest. 
 
The ball is now our government's court.  Since our government has 
already promised to construct a new hospital at Bagram Air Base, and 
to increase personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and 
provide economic support, it is a matter of great interest as to 
whether our government will expand aid to include military support. 
Military support including combat troops, however, is something we 
can never accept, in consideration of the facts that the Afghanistan 
War, as a war which began out of U.S. revenge for the 9.11 terrorist 
attacks, lacks appropriate justification, that the U.S. is also 
currently undecided about whether to boost its troop presence, and 
that the ROKG has already pulled out medical and engineering units 
amidst public shock following the mass-kidnapping of a missionary 
service group in the summer of 2007. 
 
It is worth actively considering whether contributing non-military 
support is in accordance with our international prestige and 
economic power.  In particular, there is a need to focus support on 
the reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, a country 
which has been impoverished due to war.  However, because the 
current political situation in Afghanistan is so murky and the U.S. 
has also been unable to present a blueprint for resolving the 
situation in Afghanistan, a careful posture is critical.  A quick 
response would not be a competent response. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
ARE SEOUL AND WASHINGTON BEING COMPLETELY FRANK? 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 23, 2009, page 39) 
 
The ROK and U.S. defense chiefs held their annual Security 
Consultative Meeting on Thursday in Seoul and stipulated in a joint 
statement specific steps to provide the ROK with "extended 
deterrence" against the North Korean nuclear threat.  It was the 
first time specific measures were put on paper.  The U.S. will 
provide the ROK with a nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and 
missile capabilities.  In addition, Gates said the U.S. will deploy 
any American troops that can be mobilized from around the world in 
the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. 
 
According to a bilateral defense treaty, the mobilization of 
additional American troops was to come from soldiers based in the 
U.S. mainland and Japan.  But Washington has now pledged to expand 
that to American troops stationed around the world.  At a time when 
concerns are increasing over a potential shortage of U.S. troops 
after the transfer of full control of Korean troops to Seoul, the 
agreement demonstrates Washington's resolve to uphold its pledge to 
defend the ROK.  The joint communiqu avoids any mention of the 
ROK's support for military operations in Afghanistan, leaving it up 
to Seoul to decide. 
 
None of the 16 clauses of the joint statement leave any room to 
doubt Washington's commitment to the ROK's defense.  But even with 
the signing of such a powerful agreement, a feeling of unease 
lingers. 
 
The greatest threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula is North 
Korea's nuclear program.  There is a high possibility that the North 
Korean nuclear issue may be settled in the following two ways: 
accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea or making a fundamental change 
to the current armistice on the Korean Peninsula in return for the 
North's abandonment of nuclear weapons.  Should the North's nuclear 
possession become an established fact, we wonder if the U.S.'s 
stated 'extended deterrence' alone could satisfy the ROK's 
political, military, economic and psychological security (needs). 
If the armistice is turned into a proper peace treaty, the ROK will 
face the greatest upheaval in national security in its history 
because it would probably mean an end to the U.S. Forces Korea. 
 
SEOUL 00001687  005 OF 007 
 
 
 
It is in these circumstances that the allies once again stipulated 
that the transfer of full troop control will take place as planned 
on April 17, 2012.  Gates even referred to this as a "historic 
change."  If the North Korean nuclear threat did not exist, this 
would be fine.  The two countries said they would time their 
military preparations to the period of the handover.  But as the 
situation stands, a strategic decision is needed requiring 
political, diplomatic, economic and psychological factors to be 
considered, in addition to military and technical ones. 
 
If North Korea makes the strategic decision to scrap its nuclear 
program, it will inevitably demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from the Korean Peninsula.  It knows that this is the ROK's greatest 
weakness.  And at that point, Washington will have to balance 
whether it has more to gain from North Korea giving up its nukes or 
from revising its alliance with the ROK. 
 
Washington's decision is difficult to predict.  The most important 
factor when the time comes will be whether Seoul and Washington were 
able to hold frank discussions about the future of their alliance 10 
or 20 years down the road.  This should serve as the framework not 
only for peace on the Korean peninsula, but for peace in Northeast 
Asia involving the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
 
ROKG JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN TO GUARD 
CIVILIANS THERE IS Unconvincing 
(Hankook Ilbo, October 23, 2009, Page39) 
 
The ROKG is reportedly considering sending a 300-strong force to 
Afghanistan to protect the civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) there.  Debate on the troop dispatch, which was heated ahead 
of the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on October 22, 
now appears to have ended in a conclusion (that ROKG will consider 
sending troops.)   It appears that the ROKG intends to send troops 
(to Afghanistan) for whatever reason and then give the excuse that 
they are not for combat purposes.  However, it is doubtful whether 
this kind of justification may sound persuasive enough to convince 
people to agree to the troop dispatch.  The government's efforts 
seem to be clumsy. 
 
We should first remember that we had started to send the Dongui 
Medical Unit and the Dasan Engineering Unit to the region in 2001 
but, after the kidnapping incident in 2007, rushed to pull out the 
troops.  The two units were composed of a small number of non-combat 
troops.  However, faced with the deterioration of domestic public 
opinion and a call for troop withdrawal from the Taliban insurgents 
who held 20 Koreans hostage, the ROKG could not afford to continue 
to have troops stationed there. 
 
Since then, the ROKG has maintained its stance against troop 
redeployment.  We also repeatedly pointed out that it would be 
reckless to send troops other than reconstruction staff or police 
instructors.  Just because there were changes of governments in the 
ROK and the U.S. does not mean that such a position must be changed. 
 With the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating further, even in 
the U.S., which is leading the war, supporters of the troop pullout 
outnumber those opposed to the pullout. 
 
This is why the Obama Administration is hastening to withdraw troops 
from Iraq and is focusing on stabilizing the situation in 
Afghanistan.  In particular, it is vital to maintain the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the U.S. and 
NATO.  A majority of the 19 nations that contributed over 300 troops 
to the ISAF are showing signs of breaking ranks.  This might be the 
reason why the ROKG came up with a plan to increase its PRT staff to 
300 and send 300 guard troops to the region. 
 
In the joint communiqu of the SCM, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates 
 
SEOUL 00001687  006 OF 007 
 
 
stressed the expansion of the ROK's contribution to peacekeeping 
operations.  However, it is far-fetched to argue that Secretary 
Gates' emphasis on the role of the ROK military makes the troop 
dispatch inevitable.  In order to protect the civilian team, 
however, combat troops, who are stronger than the units of military 
medics or engineers, are needed.  Police officers are not 
appropriate.  Talking about sending mercenaries will also only 
invite uncontrollable controversy.  Rather than vaguely citing the 
ROK-U.S. alliance as a reason for troop deployment, the ROKG should 
first come up with alternatives that can win public approval. 
 
 
 
IT IS TOO EARLY TO REGAIN WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL FROM U.S. IN 
APRIL, 2012 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 23, 2009, page 46: Excerpts) 
 
In a joint statement following the Security Consultative Meeting 
(SCM) in Seoul yesterday, ROK and U.S. defense ministers reaffirmed 
that the ROK will take over wartime operational control of its 
military forces from the U.S. by April 17, 2012.   It seems that the 
two ministers made this commitment, mindful that an increasing 
number of ROK people are raising concerns over the transfer of 
wartime operational control or voicing opposition to the plan, 
saying it is too early.  Their agreement, however, is not enough to 
defuse controversy.  Considering the ROK military's (lack of 
progress in) modernization, the ROK's economic situation and 
security conditions on the Korean Peninsula, a transfer of wartime 
operational control to the ROK as planned is highly likely to 
undermine security on the Korean Peninsula.  At the National 
Assembly early this month, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young said that 
it would be best to maintain the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command 
but the ROK has no choice but to prepare for its disbandment because 
the two nations agreed to do so. 
 
During the National Assembly audit on the Defense Ministry, 
lawmakers pointed out many problems regarding the ROK's defense 
position.  In the joint statement, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates pledged to keep providing complementary forces until the ROK 
is capable of defending itself on its own even after the transfer of 
wartime operational control.  The U.S. specifically said it is 
committed to providing extended deterrence against the North Korean 
nuclear threat using the nuclear umbrella, and conventional strike 
and missile capabilities.  This assurance seems to have been made 
due to concerns that ROK forces will likely be weakened after the 
transfer of wartime operational control. 
 
For years until the ROK and the U.S. agreed in 2006 to disband the 
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the two countries were at odds 
over several foreign and security issues including the North Korean 
nuclear issue.  In particular, former President Roh Moo-hyun, who 
had emphasized self-defense since taking office, was too idealistic 
when he requested that the U.S.  hand over wartime operational 
control.  This request, however, conformed to the interest of the 
U.S. which embarked on restructuring its military to enhance 
mobility.  Therefore, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to the transfer of 
wartime operational control, not based on the objective evaluation 
of ROK military's mid-and long-term capabilities but because of 
temporary conflicts between the two countries and the strategic 
change in U.S. military alignment. 
 
Whatever prompted the agreement, the ROK is not in a position to 
halt the transfer process of wartime operational control right now. 
It is evident that we should make our greatest efforts to achieve 
self-defense.  However, the ROK's "Defense Reform 2020," which was 
initiated in 2005, is suffering a setback in several areas.  In 
addition, we are unlikely to find ways to resolve problems 
(regarding our defense) until April 2012.  Therefore, we have no 
other option but to continue to strengthen the combat capabilities 
of our military while at the same time seeking renegotiation with 
the U.S. over the transfer of wartime operational control to delay 
the timetable (for the transfer.) 
 
 
 
SEOUL 00001687  007 OF 007 
 
 
STEPHENS