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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1651, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 20, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1651 2009-10-20 07:54 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO4338
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1651/01 2930754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200754Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5956
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9291
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0410
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6796
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6864
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1390
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5176
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4133
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7345
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1631
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2943
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2022
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2629
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 001651 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; October 20, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
U.S. Pentagon: "ROK has Obligation 
to Provide Aid to Afghanistan" 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Foreign Executives Finding Place in Korea; 
Wide-Ranging Experience Offering Companies Here Competitive Edge 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
One in Four Top-Ranked Students on College Entrance Exams Attends 
Special-Purpose 
High Schools or Autonomous Private High Schools 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Six Neighborhoods in Southern Seoul Selected as Sites for Second 
Batch of Low-Cost Public Apartments 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Analysis of ROK-EU FTA Documents Discloses "Loose" Quarantine Rules 
on European Beef Imports 
 
Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
Additional 39,000 Low-Cost Public Apartments 
to be Built by 2013 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
U.S. Pentagon Spokesman Geoff Morrell, in an Oct. 18 interview on a 
plane en route to Hawaii, the first stop of Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates' Asia trip, said that all countries, including the ROK, Japan 
and the U.S., that hope for the peace, prosperity and economic 
growth of the world, have an obligation to provide aid to 
Afghanistan. (Chosun, JoongAng, Segye) 
 
On Oct. 18, the White House clarified an earlier remark by a senior 
defense official that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had invited 
President Lee Myung-bak to visit Pyongyang, stating that there was a 
misunderstanding in Washington regarding the possibility of an 
inter-Korean summit. (JoongAng, Dong-a, Hankook, Hankyoreh, Segye, 
Seoul, all TVs) 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, in an Oct. 19 speech in Seoul, said 
that Seoul is ready to meet North Korea at any time to discuss the 
nuclear issue. (Hankook) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-Afghanistan 
------------ 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo and Segye Ilbo and right-of-center JoongAng 
Ilbo gave front-and inside-page play to Oct. 18 press remarks by 
Pentagon Spokesman Geoff Morrell, in which he said that all 
countries, including the ROK, Japan and the U.S., have an obligation 
to provide aid to Afghanistan.  He was further quoted: "Afghanistan 
needs large-scale economic aid now.  Any country that finds it 
difficult to give military support is asked to give financial aid." 
 
 
The newspapers also quoted another senior Pentagon official as 
saying: "Although Korea has provided medical support, it would be 
better for the country to make contributions to other sectors as 
well.  The quicker Korea decides and the bigger its support, the 
better." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo, in particular, noted the Pentagon 
 
SEOUL 00001651  002 OF 005 
 
 
spokesman's use of the word, "obligation," and interpreted it as an 
indirect U.S. request for prompt aid from Seoul.  Chosun went on to 
observe that even though Washington is hoping for economic aid from 
the ROK in consideration of the country's political situation, it 
cannot be ruled out that the U.S. may make a "difficult request" for 
military troops at some point in the future, given that the U.S. is 
sinking deeper into the mire of the Afghan war.  A key ROKG official 
was quoted as saying:  "Even if we send troops to Afghanistan, it 
would be to guard ROK civilians working in the war-torn country and 
not for combat purposes." 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo quoted Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan as 
saying in an Oct. 19 speech in Seoul: "We are ready to meet North 
Korea at any time to discuss the nuclear issue."  He was further 
quoted as reaffirming Seoul's two-track approach of upholding 
international sanctions against North Korea while being open to 
dialogue with the North. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
 SEOUL IS NOT READY TO TAKE OVER FULL TROOP CONTROL 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 20, 2009, page 39) 
 
In a briefing about the annual Security Consultative Meeting to take 
place on Thursday in Seoul, a high-ranking U.S. Defense Department 
official reiterated that a final decision about the transfer of full 
control of Korean troops to Seoul in 2012 would be made based on the 
circumstances at that time, but, at present, the plan was 
progressing "on schedule."  A spokesman for the Korean Defense 
Ministry on Monday confirmed this.  That means at 10 a.m. on April 
17, 2012, the responsibility to command Korean troops in case of war 
will be handed over from the Combined Forces Command to the Korean 
military and the CFC will be dismantled. 
 
Korea and the United States agreed to the transfer in 2007.  They 
are now at about the halfway point.  But just how smoothly are the 
preparations going?  The Roh Moo-hyun Administration announced the 
transfer of wartime control as if it was a second Independence 
Movement for Korea.  But the situation on the Korean Peninsula is 
too complicated to be simplified through the lens of populism. 
 
The ROK is under direct threat from North Korea, which is armed to 
the teeth with missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  North 
Korea conducted a second nuclear test this year and held 25 test 
launches of missiles, including ones that can be transformed into 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.  2012, when the ROK will gain 
full military command, is also the year North Korea has vowed to 
complete its preparations to become a "military power." 
 
Over the past 60 years, the reason why the CFC was kept alive was to 
allow the U.S. military to use its cutting-edge technology to sense 
any unusual developments in North Korea and to lead both American 
and ROK troops in defending this country together in the event of an 
emergency.  It takes a lot of money to buy equipment and train 
soldiers for the ROK military to take on the crucial responsibility 
of detecting ominous signs from North Korea, assess its nuclear and 
missile facilities and predict the movements of long-range artillery 
and 100,000-strong Special Forces. 
 
Seoul said in 2007 it would spend W151 trillion (US$1=W1,171) to 
upgrade military surveillance capabilities and modernize equipment. 
But the latest National Assembly audit reveals that the military 
lowered the minimum required time for fighter pilot training to 131 
hours a year to save fuel, bringing flight hours very close to North 
Korea's annual average.  And some mechanized divisions were found to 
have filled almost half of their arsenal with trucks instead of 
tanks.  The Defense Ministry asked for a 7.9 percent increase in 
next year's budget allocation but was granted only a 3.8 percent 
increase.  The only solution is to boost the defense budget while 
cutting back on welfare spending or boosting taxes.  But the ROK is 
 
SEOUL 00001651  003 OF 005 
 
 
not in a situation to make such changes. 
 
The U.S. had planned to realign its troop presence in the ROK and 
bolster its naval and air force capabilities, so when the Roh 
Administration cited the need for the ROK to regain wartime military 
control of its troops, Washington was more than willing to oblige. 
This is the political backdrop against which the transfer was 
decided.  In other words, lower priority may have been placed on the 
ROK's security.  Seoul and Washington must begin honest, 
comprehensive negotiations about security and base the timing of the 
transfer on the results of those talks. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT PYONGYANG'S PROPOSAL FOR INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT; 
WHY DID WHITE HOUSE GIVE EXPLANATION ON SUNDAY? 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 20, 2009, Page 2) 
 
By Washington Correspondent Kim Jung-wook and Reporter Namgoong 
Wook 
 
News Analysis 
 
A high-ranking White House official contacted the ROK's Washington 
correspondent corps on the afternoon of October 18, local time.  It 
was highly unusual, especially considering it was Sunday.  During 
the phone conversation, the official said, "there was a 
misunderstanding" regarding a remark by a senior defense official 
that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had invited ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak to visit Pyongyang.  He seemed to be strongly determined 
to calm controversy over Kim's proposal. 
 
 "What Washington wanted to say was that the North has made some 
peacemaking gestures," the U.S. official said. "In that context, the 
Pentagon official disclosed the fact that a North Korean delegation 
talked about President Lee's possible visit to Pyongyang when the 
delegation met with President Lee during their trip to the ROK in 
August to mourn the death of former President Kim Dae-jung. However, 
there was no specific invitation to President Lee."  Furthermore, he 
said, "The clarification was final and the Department of Defense 
will not have a separate briefing to explain the situation" and made 
it clear that the explanation had consensus within the USG.  A Blue 
House official said, "It can be interpreted that their explanation 
is in the same line with what we said."  This consequently has 
wrapped up the five-day confusion between the ROK and the U.S. over 
North Korean leader Kim's proposal. 
 
This controversy originated from a closed-door briefing, which was 
held between U.S. senior defense officials and some of their 
accompanying reporters on October 15 (Korean time), prior to Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates' visits to the ROK and Japan.  At the end of 
the briefing, one defense official said, "Suddenly we reached a 
charm phase with North Korea, with Kim Jong-il inviting President 
Lee Myung-bak from the ROK to visit Pyongyang."  The U.S. Department 
of Defense requested an embargo on its media coverage until the late 
afternoon of October 18, when (Secretary Gates) started his tour. 
After being notified of the statement by the ROK Embassy in 
Washington, the Blue House, mindful of the sensitivity of the 
remark, gave a background explanation to accredited Blue House 
reporters on October 16.  A high-ranking Blue House official said, 
"The Pentagon official made the statement during a briefing. 
However, North Korea simply expressed its willingness, in principle, 
to improve inter-Korean ties, and it is difficult to say that a 
formal invitation has been extended from the North.  In the USG's 
communication process, there appears to be a misunderstanding about 
what Seoul said to the U.S. in order to share information." 
 
The USG, however, did not provide an explanation until the embargo 
was lifted.  In addition, the Pentagon's briefing set for October 17 
 
SEOUL 00001651  004 OF 005 
 
 
was canceled.  When the ROK media began to give wide coverage to the 
senior Pentagon official's remark on October 18, the White House, 
not the Pentagon, came forward to settle the situation. 
 
The key to this controversy is whether the Pentagon official's 
remark is a far-fetched interpretation based on a misunderstanding 
or a major mistake of revealing a s-e-c-r-e-t, which was supposed to 
be kept under wraps.  At the moment, the latter is more likely, 
considering the fact that the ROKG's stance is consistent and that 
even the White House came forward to provide an explanation. 
However, when it comes to sensitive matters related to North Korea, 
both the ROKG and the USG have a tendency not to reveal facts 
easily.  Because the specifics of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's 
messages - which were delivered to Seoul by the North Korean 
condolence delegation in August and delivered to Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao during his visit to Pyongyang earlier this month - are not 
expected to be disclosed, controversy over (whether) an inter-Korean 
summit (was proposed) may likely continue. 
 
Some observers point out that the ROK and the U.S. should take this 
incident as an opportunity to reexamine their intelligence sharing 
system.  A diplomatic source in Washington said, "At this critical 
moment in negotiations with the North, it is not desirable that 
there appear to be discords between the ROK and the U.S.  Closer 
coordination in the process of sharing and disclosing intelligence 
is needed." 
 
 
U.S. RAISES NEED FOR ECONOMIC AID FROM ROK BUT MAY ASK FOR MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 20, 2009, page 3) 
 
By Reporter Yu Yong-won and Correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
With the U.S.-led Afghanistan war deteriorating, the U.S. is making 
concrete moves by requesting assistance from the ROK. 
 
It seems that the Obama Administration is hoping for economic aid 
from the ROK (rather than military support) in consideration of the 
country's (internal) political situation.  Economic aid is less 
likely to spark opposition than military support and it would be 
difficult for the ROKG to decide on military assistance quickly. 
 
U.S. Pentagon Spokesman Geoff Morrell, in an Oct. 18 interview on a 
plane, did not specify what assistance the U.S. wants from the ROK. 
However, Morrell said that a rich country such as the ROK has means 
to help develop Afghanistan.  He also added, "Any country that finds 
it difficult to give military support is asked to give financial 
aid." Previously, when asked about Japan's need to provide support 
to Afghanistan, a high-ranking Pentagon official said that it is not 
necessary that Japanese aid be only military aid.  Observers say 
that the U.S. is also taking the same position with the ROK. 
 
Analysts say that there are two reasons why the U.S. has stressed 
the need for economic aid from the ROK.  First, the U.S. understands 
that it would not be easy for the ROK to make a quick decision on 
sending troops.  The U.S. is also concerned that this issue may 
trigger anti-American sentiment. 
 
Second, some U.S. observers believe that the scale of troop 
deployment -- hundreds of forces -- that is being discussed by the 
ROKG is not of any immediate substantial benefit.  Therefore, it 
seems that the Obama Administration has judged that unless military 
support is provided right away, it would be better for the ROK to 
make swift economic contributions. 
 
However, many people in the ROK argue that it is still too early to 
say that the ROK's aid will be limited only to non-military aid.  It 
cannot be ruled out that the U.S. may make a "difficult request" for 
military troops at some point in the future, given that the U.S. is 
sinking deeper into the mire of the Afghan war. 
 
In fact, the U.S. has been unofficially sounding out the ROK on the 
issue of troop deployment since the inauguration of the Lee 
 
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Myung-bak Administration.  The ROK's foreign and security ministries 
have considered reviewing their military contributions since the 
spring.  The Defense Ministry has been reviewing an option to send 
about 500 guard forces since this April.  Guard forces will be 
selected primarily from special warfare command forces which have 
been deployed in countries such as East Timor, Iraq and Lebanon and 
which received high evaluation marks from the international 
community for their civil affairs operations. 
 
The ROKG's basic position is that, under any circumstances, it will 
not send combat troops.  A high-ranking ROKG official said that 
ROK's aid mainly involves assistance in peace-building activities 
led by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).  The official went on 
to say, "Even if we do send troops to Afghanistan, it would be to 
guard ROK civilians working in the war-torn country and not for 
combat purposes." 
 
This ROK position reflects the negative view towards troop 
deployment at home and the increasingly worsening situation in 
Afghanistan.  An ROKG source said that the ROKG will not officially 
use the expression, "troop deployment." 
 
The scale of the ROK's troop deployment, if realized, will depend on 
the scale of the PRT.  The ROKG plans to increase the number of PRT 
personnel from 30 to 85 by early next year. 
 
The ROKG views, however, that this PRT scale falls short of U.S. 
expectations and is actively considering greatly expanding the 
number of personnel. This would also lead to an increase in the 
number of guard forces to protect the PRT.  A military source said 
that, in any case, there is a high possibility that the number of 
forces to be deployed will be between 300 and 500. 
 
However, a growing number of ROK people are likely to oppose a 
military contribution because the Afghanistan situation has been 
getting worse due to Taliban's increasing presence; and controversy 
is intensifying over (plans for) additional troop deployment, even 
in the U.S. 
 
Therefore, some observers say that the ROKG will make a final 
decision on troop deployment after Afghanistan's runoff election and 
the ROK-U.S. summit which will take place during President Obama's 
visit to the ROK. 
 
 
STEPHENS