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RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGR RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT
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DE RUEHDG #1235/01 2942010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 212010Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3607
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 8932
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 SANTO DOMINGO 001235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DS/CR/OCI 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
CARACAS FOR ELLIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC DR
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - SANTO DOMINGO 
 
REF: A) State 057623 
     B) Santo Domingo 000527 
 C) 08 Santo Domingo 001580 
 D) Santo Domingo 001030 
 E) State 097431 
 F) Santo Domingo 001177 
 G) Santo Domingo 001062 
 H) Santo Domingo 000062 
 I) Santo Domingo 001024 
 J) Santo Domingo 000140 
 K) Santo Domingo 000155 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Santo Domingo submits its semi-annual fraud report for the 
period March 2009 - August 2009 following format in ref A. 
 
 
---------------------- 
¶A.  COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Country conditions generally remain as reported in 
previous Fraud Summaries, refs B and C.  The Dominican Republic 
ranks as a middle income country, but 43% of its 9 million people 
live in poverty.  Economic conditions world-wide, particularly in 
the US, continue to have a negative impact on the Dominican economy. 
 The official unemployment rate hovers around 15% with reliable 
sources estimating rural unemployment as high as 40%.  The World 
Bank estimates that remittances, an important part of the Dominican 
economy, have declined by 6.9% this year.  Emigration remains one of 
the few means of class mobility available to a large segment of the 
country's population.  These economic factors, combined with crime 
and insecurity, prompt many Dominicans to leave their country for 
the U.S. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) There are approximately 1.2 million Dominicans living in 
the United States and an estimated 100,000 U.S. citizens, mostly 
dual nationals, live in the Dominican Republic.  Dominicans 
generally know someone living legally or illegally in the US. 
American culture is often emulated and the dream of finding success 
in America is deeply rooted.  There is a huge incentive to engage in 
visa fraud or even attempt the 70-mile crossing to Puerto Rico 
clandestinely in a yola (small boat). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The level of fraud at post is extremely high and post's 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) currently ranks first world-wide in 
number of confirmed fraud cases.  Corruption is widespread and 
innate respect for rules is rare.  Mala fide visa applicants support 
a nationwide industry of visa touts and document forgers. 
Approximately 2,500 deportees were returned from the US in 2009 to 
the end of this reporting period.  Hundreds more Dominicans were 
sent back after having reached Puerto Rico by yola.  Although 
improvements in U.S. documents, visa processing, biometric 
collection and record systems make fraudulent travel to the U.S. 
more difficult, large numbers of Dominicans continue trying to beat 
the system. 
 
 
------------- 
¶B.  NIV FRAUD 
------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Fraud is omnipresent and takes many forms.  NIV officers 
do not depend on applicant documents and are encouraged to use 
simple 214b refusals when appropriate.  The NIV visa refusal rate 
for the period covered by this report was approximately 36%.  In 
these 6 months, 2,745 NIV cases were referred to the Fraud 
Prevention Unit (FPU) representing approximately 4.5% of total NIV 
applications.  Even though the number of NV cases referred to FPU 
increased, the percentag of NIV cases referred decreased slightly 
becaus the NIV unit processed more cases during this repoting 
period.  FPU confirmed fraud in 213 NIV cass, close to 8% of those 
referred. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) FU continues to routinely pre-screen applications fr 
visa categories C1/D, H2B, I, J, and P1 as wel as B1/B2 received as 
groups.  While FPU confirms fraud in less than 10% of these cases, 
it provides useful notes to officers conducting interviews.  FPU has 
developed travel histories for various groups which help officers 
distinguish between legitimate and mala fide travelers.  The number 
of fraudulent groups submitting applications is low and post 
believes this is largely due to the deterrent effect of FPU 
pre-screening.  Visa classes for which FPU revealed significant 
numbers of confirmed fraud cases are discussed individually below. 
 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  002 OF 009 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Almost 90% of post's NIV applications are for B1 and/or 
B/2 visas and these are the majority of FPU's NIV caseload.  There 
were 70 cases of confirmed fraud in B1 and/or B2 applications during 
this six-month period.  FPU receives most cases as groups including: 
little league, sports, and even dominos teams; training, convention 
and other business related travel; religious based organizations; 
and civic groups.  FPU maintains records, including come-back 
statistics, for most of these groups, and informs group organizers 
of the long-term repercussions on the group's future applications 
that will ensue should individuals overstay.  We believe that by 
employing these procedures, pre-screening and monitoring groups for 
overstays, we have reduced the amount of fraud attempted. 
Nevertheless fraudulent cases varying from little league teams with 
mala fide travelers added to the rosters to fraudulent document 
packages prepared and sold by the actual head of the Dominican 
Chaplains Association were uncovered by FPU this reporting period. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) During this reporting period, post processed more J1 visas 
than any other category except B1 and/or B2.  While there are few 
cases of confirmed fraud related to J1 applications, the category 
continues to be of concern.  After our 2008 analysis revealed 24% of 
J1 travelers were overstays and an overstay rate for those with 
previous J1 travel of 38%, NIV officers increased their scrutiny of 
J1 applicants.  As a result post's refusal rate rose to 63% during 
2009, not unreasonable given the demographics of the applicants and 
documented overstay rates.  The number of J1 applications declined 
to under 2,000 and some organizers may have been frustrated with 
high refusal rates.  Post has yet to complete its 2009 validation 
study of J1 travelers. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) FPU confirmed fraud in over 10% of the P1 cases referred 
for investigation.  Most P1 applications involve either musical 
groups which regularly tour the eastern U.S. or Major League 
Baseball (MLB) players.  FPU pre-screening of all musical groups and 
the well-known consequences of including additional members solely 
for visas purposes help discourage this type of fraud.  Still some 
legitimate musicians inevitably overstay in the U.S.  Other fraud 
encountered during the reporting period included a well-known 
performer who previously toured in the U.S. using a B1/B2 visa as 
well as multiple performers included on the same petition (to save 
application fees) even though they would perform separately at 
distinct venues in the U.S. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Previous fraud summaries (ref B and C) have reported on 
P1 visa fraud by Dominican baseball players which remains a concern 
for FPU.  Local media report a declining trend but still estimate 
that approximately 25% of Dominican MLB players are involved in 
age/identity fraud.  Post has worked closely with MLB to improve 
procedures related to the signing and subsequent visa application of 
Dominican players.  These procedures, some of which will be newly 
implemented in the coming season, include: MLB (rather than 
individual teams) managing investigations; pre-screening of all 
investigations by MLB New York before submission with visa 
applications; improved training and compensation for local MLB 
investigators; and early registration with MLB of all players 
participating in local academies.  Two MLB teams opened new 
academies during the reporting period and at least one more has 
begun construction.  Due to difficult conditions in Venezuela, 
several MLB teams have moved or are planning to move Venezuelan 
players to academies in the Dominican Republic.  Post is concerned 
by the possibility for fraud in this group and, in consultation with 
MLB, is considering how to best process MLB related applications 
from Venezuelan nationals. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) FPU pre-screens most H2B cases using PIMS and other 
references to provide case notes related to history or associations 
of companies and recruiters, viability and operations of U.S. firms, 
previous rates of return and other information.  Fraud was confirmed 
in over 38% of H2B cases referred to FPU.  Even when these 
investigations do not lead to confirmed fraud, the background 
information provided assists officers when interviewing applicants. 
Santo Domingo's refusal rate for H2B applications remains high at 
approximately 85%. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) FPU supplied investigative material to the U.S. Attorney 
for the Western District of Missouri supporting a RICO racketeering 
indictment of persons and companies abusing Dominican (and other 
nationality) workers and violating laws and regulations governing 
the H2B program.  Dominicans anxious to get to the U.S. by any means 
are willing to pay recruiters high fees even when prospects for 
legitimate work are questionable.  Post regularly inquires about 
fees during H2B interviews, but applicants rarely admit to paying 
prohibited fees.  On various occasions during this reporting period, 
companies in the U.S. halted applications being submitted by local 
agents without authorization. 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  003 OF 009 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Post continues using CA/FPP (H&L) and PAS funds in 
support of our "Maco" media campaign which discourages H2B visa 
applicants from becoming involved with professional visa touts.  The 
campaign is built around slang use of the word "maco" which can mean 
both a toad and a fraud.  The campaign has included radio spots, 
posters distributed to local "colmados" (corner store, 7-11 
equivalents), beer bottle holders, large posters on the consular 
section walls and various press events.  This year a Mambo (popular 
music) theme was developed which will shortly hit the radio waves. 
The target audience is low income with particular focus in the Cibao 
region; a demographic particularly susceptible to unscrupulous H2B 
recruiters and regularly associated with visa fraud. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) There was one significant case involving F1 visa fraud 
during this reporting period.  NIV received a large group of 
applicants claiming plans to study English at a Florida school and 
referred them to FPU.  FPU found that they all came through a local 
H2B recruiter and were associated with an H2B company/recruiter in 
the U.S.  Further investigation revealed 52 related (fraudulent) F1 
applications in Santo Domingo.  CA/FPP also linked the U.S. 
recruiter with 198 similar applications in Ukraine and Nepal. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Post conducts an annual validation of referrals. In 
CY2008 over 98% of 1,163 referred applicants were verified as having 
returned.  The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) accounted for close 
to one quarter of all referrals and the great majority of overstays 
came from FCS.  No other section or agency at post had more than 2 
referrals who overstayed.  Post tracks information regarding those 
who have not returned and also informs persons/offices making the 
referral. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Post's recent validation study for children age 16 and 
under is detailed in ref D.  The study found that almost 99% of the 
visa holders in this category returned to the Dominican Republic 
after appropriate travel.  There were only 9 confirmed overstays in 
the sample; eight of them were female with one male adjusting status 
for residency in the U.S.  None of the overstays had traveled 
related to a specific event, such as little league tournaments. 
 
 
------------ 
¶C.  IV FRAUD 
------------ 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Post's most prevalent type of fraud remains IV fraud in 
family-based categories, particularly marriage.  Approximately 8% of 
IV cases, in which the officer could not easily issue or refuse, 
were referred to FPU.  From March through September 2009, FPU 
recorded 889 cases of confirmed IV fraud representing 52% of IV 
cases processed by FPU.  CCD statistics for the reporting period 
show over one-third of all fraud confirmed cases worldwide were from 
Santo Domingo. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Most IV fraud results from petitioners who create sham 
relationships for immigration purposes in return for payment or to 
assist relatives/friends to reach the U.S.  Cases referred to FPU 
are often resolved on the same day by FPU investigators conducting 
dual interviews with petitioners and beneficiaries.  Many 
petitioners admit to fraud both verbally and in signed statements 
during FPU interviews.  An estimated 10-20% of FPU referred cases 
remain doubtful after FPU interviews and are sent for field 
investigations.  FPU has practically eliminated the backlog of IV 
field investigations despite an increasing workload. 
 
 
------------ 
¶D.  DV FRAUD 
------------ 
 
¶19.  (U) Dominicans are not eligible for the Diversity Visa Lottery. 
 Post occasionally processes DV visas for non-Dominican applicants. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
¶E.  ACS AND US PASSPORT FRAUD 
----------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) The amount of fraud related to citizenship is difficult to 
measure.  Applicants whose cases are not clearly approvable often 
abandon or withdraw the application when asked to produce additional 
evidence in support of their claim.  ACS continues working to close 
previously abandoned cases whenever possible.  Similarly PIERS 
enables post to thwart imposters claiming to have lost/stolen 
passports and soliciting new documentation.  Other questionable 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  004 OF 009 
 
 
cases are resolved through DNA testing.  Even though these types of 
cases may involve fraud, they are not necessarily referred to FPU. 
 
 
¶21.  (SBU) During the reporting period, ACS referred approximately 
30 citizenship-related cases.  FPU confirmed fraud in six of them. 
FPU assisted local law enforcement authorities in another 35 
citizenship cases, 20 of which were fraudulent (see para 42).  Post 
continues to encounter cases of Dominicans who have lived and been 
documented in the U.S. after assuming the identity of a citizen, 
most often from Puerto Rico.  ACS and ARSO-I encourage U.S. 
authorities to pursue these cases, particularly when the imposter 
has petitioned for others based on a fraudulent status.  FPU 
regularly assists Passport Agencies and domestic USCIS offices to 
investigate cases involving Dominicans applying for services in the 
US.  In a typical case FPU identified Dominicans who had entered the 
U.S. illegally and sought status by claiming to be Cubans.  A more 
common scenario is for Dominicans to obtain Puerto Rican birth 
certificates and attempt to document themselves as citizens using 
the false identity.  The FBI recently exposed a ring which had 
stolen the identities of 12,000 school children and employees in 
Puerto Rico and sold them in document packages to illegal 
immigrants. 
 
 
------------------ 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD 
------------------ 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Adoptions are not a significant part of post's workload. 
Issues related to adoption may arise in occasional NIV, IV and/or 
ACS cases.  As is true in general, susceptibility of officials to 
corruption along with procedural weaknesses also leaves open the 
possibility for adoption-related fraud. 
 
 
---------------------- 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING 
---------------------- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Post has found DNA testing to be a very useful tool in IV 
and CRBA cases when other evidence is not sufficient to support a 
relationship claim.  Dominican law allows for children to be 
declared late, sometimes many years after their birth, based solely 
on a declarant's statement.  Thus it is easy to obtain legitimate 
documents in support of fraudulent cases.  It is common practice for 
Dominicans to take in children as "hijos de crianza", documenting 
them (falsely) as biological children and never going through a 
formal adoption.  In other cases, Dominicans who emigrate to the 
U.S., legally or otherwise, may have little contact with their 
children and have difficulty establishing the relationship.  In 
these and similar situations, post requests a DNA exam. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) New DNA collection requirements detailed in ref E will 
decrease vulnerability to fraud.  They will also significantly 
impact post's workflow.  Informal statistics indicate that 
approximately 400 cases per month are referred for DNA analysis. 
Approximately 10% of those returned fail to establish a biological 
relationship.  Most often cases with no biological relationship are 
abandoned without informing post, making it difficult to gather 
statistics.  Post regularly orients new IV and ACS officers in the 
use of DNA testing and is reviewing DNA referral procedures while 
planning implementation of on-site collection. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (U) Post has DHS/ICE, DHS/CBP, and DHS/CIS representation which 
handle these matters. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶26.  (SBU) The U.S. Coast Guard regularly intercepts go-fast, 
traditional "yola" and other boats attempting to cross the 70-mile 
Mona Straight and enter Puerto Rico undetected.   Its biometric 
program identifies captains/organizers with repeated detentions and 
allows for successful prosecutions in Puerto Rico.  While the 
majority of passengers are Dominicans, Third Country Nationals (TCN) 
have also been detected, including Haitians, Chinese, Cubans and 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  005 OF 009 
 
 
Colombians.  Unauthorized private flights also smuggle drugs and/or 
humans to Puerto Rico and even the continental U.S.  Dominican 
authorities recognize the need to monitor officials and procedures 
at Santiago, Punta Cana, Puerto Plata and smaller airports. 
 
¶27.  (SBU) The Dominican Republic serves as a transit route for 
persons seeking illegal entry to the U.S.  Several recent cases 
involved Iranians arriving from Caracas, obtaining fraudulent 
documents (generally Israeli and European Union passports) and 
attempting travel to Canada and to other Caribbean islands.  During 
the reporting period nationals from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Cuba, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania have been detained using fraudulent 
documents. Local authorities are supported in their ongoing 
investigations by our ARSO-I as well as other agencies at post.  The 
porous border with Haiti has always been a local concern and Haiti's 
recent elimination of visa requirements for almost all nationalities 
holds implications for the Dominican Republic as well (ref F). 
 
¶28.  (SBU) An Interpol source reportedly identified the Dominican 
Republic as a fugitive haven.  In the past six months at least 15 
fugitives, including Italian mafia chiefs, have been apprehended 
here.  The number of Colombians living illegally in the Dominican 
Republic while engaging in narco trafficking is receiving increased 
coverage in local media.  One noteworthy case involved a Colombian 
with seven false identities, supported by a national IDs or 
"cedulas," who was previously deported from the U.S. after serving 
time for trafficking in narcotics.  Investigation of the Colombian 
began after a traffic accident, and intensified when the public 
prosecutor consulted with FPU.  (We confirmed his record in the U.S. 
and three of his false identities.) 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Post has an Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO-I) 
assigned criminal investigative workload related to consular 
activities.  Post also benefits from a vetted officer from the 
National Police (PN) Anti-Fraud Unit delegated full-time to the 
ARSO-I.  During much of the reporting period the ARSO-I was detailed 
out to cover RSO staffing gaps and there was a two month gap before 
the ARSO-I's replacement arrived at post. 
 
¶30.  (SBU) The ARSO-I has coordinated with local immigration 
officials investigating Iranian and other TCNs transiting the 
Dominican Republic (see para 27), participating in interviews with 
subjects and passing relevant information to interested law 
enforcement partners.  Other ongoing ARSO-I investigations are 
related to groups organizing illegal travel using fraudulent 
documents. 
 
¶31.  (SBU) The ARSO-I is following through with other agencies in 
the U.S. on several cases involving U.S. citizenship obtained 
through fraudulent means.  In cooperation with the U.S. Marshall 
Service (USMS) and other law enforcement agencies, the ARSO-I has 
helped secure the arrest of various wanted persons as they presented 
themselves here for consular services.  The ARSO-I also played a 
critical role in the consular malfeasance case reported in ref G. 
Other allegations related to inappropriate activities by consular 
personnel have been investigated by the ARSO-I. 
 
¶32.  (SBU) In coordination with local police the ARSO-I supports an 
effort to clear visa "fixers" offering services to consular clients 
from the immediate vicinity of the consular section.  Several 
roundups by cooperating transit police (AMET), assisted by the PN 
Anti-Fraud Unit, have resulted in the temporary arrest of these visa 
touts and pushed back their operations; but this is an ongoing 
battle.  ARSO-I diligence also resulted in the arrest of a money 
changer using counterfeit currency to defraud ACS and other consular 
clients. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶K.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶33.  (U) The Junta Central Electoral (JCE) is responsible for 
issuance of "cedulas", the national identity card which is the only 
generally accepted form of photo identification in the DR.  Persons 
age 16 or older present an application form accompanied by a birth 
certificate which JCE confirms prior to cedula issuance.  Cedula 
numbers are unique and people generally know their number by memory. 
 Recognizing the possibility of persons obtaining multiple cedulas 
under different identities, the GODR has made improvements to the 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  006 OF 009 
 
 
cedula system to counter this vulnerability. 
 
¶34.  (U) The JCE cedula update began in 2008 and now has 
approximately 3.3 million records that include biometric 
information.  Roughly 45 percent of cedula holders have voluntarily 
registered their biometric information to date.  Inclusion of 
biometric information with automated cross-checking of the database 
has already proven successful with JCE reporting 2,120 cedulas 
canceled because of fraud and/or multiple issuances.  The new cedula 
and biometric JCE database represent a great improvement in GODR 
efforts to counter pervasive identity fraud, but full implementation 
remains difficult politically, and deadlines requiring registration 
under the new system have been continually extended. 
 
¶35.  (U) The birth certificate is the basic document used to obtain 
a "cedula" and subsequent passport.  When registering a birth, civil 
authorities request the hospital birth record and the father must be 
present if his name is to be included on the document.  Home births 
may be documented if supported by a statement from local officials. 
Births recorded within three months are considered timely or 
"oportuna"; declarations are accepted "tardia" at any later date. 
Annotations and/or corrections may be recorded years after the event 
and are generally based solely on the statement of a parent.  JCE 
reports that so far this year over 86,000 late births were 
registered, including those made in special registration drives. 
Adults whose births were undocumented may register when accompanied 
by statements from five persons supporting the claim.  Local offices 
issue the first birth certificate "acta" with the central office of 
the JCE responsible for all subsequent copies.  Post only accepts 
registry documents issued through the central office of the JCE 
which has more reliable issuance procedures.  The document may be in 
an abbreviated form, "extracto," or a more complete form, 
"inextensa," providing the who, where, and when of the registration 
and subsequent updates. 
 
¶36.  (U) The JCE is responsible for the civil registry system. 
Registration of events, such as birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, 
and death, occurs at local offices throughout the country with 
duplicate records sent to the central office in Santo Domingo at the 
end of every year. Records are handwritten into books organized 
chronologically with separate books for each type of event kept at 
each registry office.  Changes made to any document are annotated in 
the margins of the original entry.  Record verification requires a 
hand search of books at the central office.  Efficient searches 
require the place and date on which the registration (rather than 
the event) occurred.  More extensive searches may be done using date 
ranges, but take considerable time and effort.  Because of the way 
records are maintained, searches based on name only have been 
impractical; general queries requesting a subject's birth record or 
marital status could not be answered without a location and 
approximate date.  JCE recognized limitations in the civil 
registration system and initiated a comprehensive improvement 
project. 
 
¶37.  (U) Progress has been steady on the JCE project, now in its 
third year, to modernize the registry system.  New registrations 
(birth, marriage, divorce, death) are entered into a computerized, 
searchable database.  Whenever someone solicits a copy of a previous 
registration decree, that record is also entered into the system; 
including a scanned copy of the book/page where it was originally 
recorded.  At the same time JCE is systematically entering and 
scanning records from its books working from the most recent back. 
At present JCE has entered approximately 22 million registrations 
into the new registry system.  While the total number of 
registrations to be converted is not clear, a rough estimate 
suggests that the number of records contained in the database is 
approaching half of those available for living persons.  This 
represents a great improvement to the registry system.  FPU has had 
cases of record searches, which would have been impossible without 
the computerized system, yielding positive results. 
 
¶38.  (U) Dominicans may refer to their passports as biometric 
because the passport office scans an index finger with the 
application.  A second scan and one-to-one check with the first is 
made to ensure that the person picking up the passport is the 
applicant.  Although the passport office retains the fingerprint 
scan, it is not available for use with any other GODR database. 
Because passports do not contain unique biometric identifiers, 
improvements in the automated cedula system (precursor identifying 
document) described above are critical to counter passport and visa 
fraud. 
 
¶39.  (SBU) There is always a concern that genuine documents may be 
obtained by fraudulent means or through corrupt local officials. 
Although significant improvements are being implemented, there 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  007 OF 009 
 
 
remain systematic vulnerabilities.  The ease with which 
registrations can be altered or even declared years after the event 
makes the documentation process susceptible to manipulation. 
Officials who are not well paid and receive little oversight are 
vulnerable to corruption and may issue documents even in 
questionable cases. 
 
¶40.  (SBU) Progress continues on the biometric initiative sponsored 
by Embassy's Force Protection Detail (FPD-DR) which is described in 
ref H.  This project aims to establish an automated data base with 
biometric capability and integrate various local law enforcement 
systems.  It will significantly improve GODR capabilities in 
combating terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and other criminal 
activity.  FPD-DR plans to greatly expand the number of biometric 
capture stations and to provide servers enabling the integration of 
various GODR law enforcement agencies.  A fully implemented 
initiative would provide for FPD-DR to receive biometric data from 
the GODR system which, once passed through US Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), would be available to various USG watch lists and 
data bases. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶L.  COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶41.  (SBU) The FPU benefits from a high level of cooperation with 
GODR authorities.  Dominican officials continue to respond to record 
verification and other inquiries both informal and official.  The 
ARSO-I supervises a vetted officer from the National Police (PN) 
Anti-Fraud Unit who is delegated full-time to duty at the consular 
section.  The officer regularly assists in investigations and 
provides local jurisdiction in cases where detention and/or arrest 
may not have been otherwise possible.  Ref I details one of several 
cases in which the PN officer's ability to detain and arrest was 
critical to the successful prosecution of a ring supplying 
fraudulent NIV document packages.  FPU also benefits from direct 
access to records in the police database. 
 
¶42.  (SBU) GODR immigration officials regularly send suspect 
documents and/or travelers to FPU for verification.  During this six 
month period, 35 cases involving citizenship were referred; 20 were 
confirmed fraudulent involving imposters, photo substitute and 
counterfeit documents.  Fraudulent visas were confirmed in another 
12 out of 19 cases received from GODR officials.  A final case 
involved a fraudulent LPR card.  Cooperation allowing FPU to see the 
documents seized and to interview the persons detained has improved 
somewhat in these cases.  Typically such cases result in a fine and 
conditional release if they are prosecuted. 
 
¶43.  (SBU) The FPU and ARSO-I worked in cooperation with GODR 
immigration and national police on several operations against 
document rings during the reporting period.  In one operation a tip 
helped FPU identify travelers planning to use washed and reprinted 
visas (most on foils originally issued in Peru) to board a cruise 
ship from the Casa de Campo facility near La Romana.  Immigration 
officers who traveled from Santo Domingo along with FPU personnel 
and the vetted PN officer were able to arrest two of the organizers. 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶44.  (SBU) In the past six months corruption amongst GODR officials 
received increased media coverage and recent surveys show that the 
majority of Dominicans see corruption increasing.  There have long 
been charges of corruption and involvement of law enforcement 
personnel in criminal activity in the Dominican Republic.  Local 
media reported the National Police (PN) Chief's estimate that 3,000 
officers have been dismissed in the past two years.  Large scale 
police transfers are common.  In one recent incident, the entire PN 
force in Azua was transferred and 194 officers identified for 
investigation.  Extradition requests involving active and former 
members of the armed forces further highlight the problem.  Low 
salaries must compete with high pay offs, making the fight against 
corruption difficult amongst all levels and types of Dominican 
officials.  NIV and FPU actively pursue visa revocations, in 
coordination with Mission-wide efforts to combat corrupt officials 
engaged in or supporting criminal activities.  During the reporting 
period 23 visas were revoked, and more were physically cancelled. 
 
¶45.  (SBU) FPU receives a variety of reports from USG and GODR law 
enforcement agencies and we also review local media accounts to make 
 
SANTO DOMI 00001235  008 OF 009 
 
 
CLASS entries for persons implicated in criminal activities who do 
not currently hold visas.  Informal statistics kept during the 
reporting period recorded approximately 500 CLASS entries in a four 
month period.  In spite of FPU diligence, post remains concerned 
that applicants with undocumented/unrecorded ineligibilities may 
still slip through. 
 
¶46.  (SBU) Post had five new cases involving altered fingerprints 
during the last six months.  This trend was reported in ref J as 
well as the previous Fraud Summary.  Some of these new cases were 
unique.  Post's first NIV case involving fingerprint alterations was 
also our first female who later admitted to multiple attempts at 
illegal entry to the U.S.  In another case "C" and "Z" shaped scar 
patterns were observed, rather than the usual horizontal or vertical 
cuts.  After EFMs were unable to obtain acceptable prints from 
another applicant, FPU discovered that he had placed glue over all 
ten prints.  When the glue was removed, he was reprinted revealing 
his previous use of a false identity.  The interception in May of a 
Dominican finger slasher (denied a visa in February) who was 
apprehended in Lima, en route to Toronto using fraudulent documents, 
demonstrates the determination of some to reach the US by any means. 
 FPU and/or ARSO-I regularly alert local law enforcement contacts 
and support GODR prosecution of persons who have acquired cedulas 
and passports in fraudulent identities.  Some of these cases also 
involve altered fingerprints, not a crime in itself according to 
Dominican law. 
 
¶47.  (SBU) Post continues to be concerned by GODR diplomatic 
appointments supporting a large patronage system, whereby dozens of 
non-accredited "vice-consuls" are appointed and paid by Presidential 
decree, but act independently of the Foreign Ministry.  For years, 
the USG has pressed the GODR to bring its diplomatic and consular 
operations in the USA in line with U.S. laws and regulations, 
Department practices, and the Vienna Convention on Consular and 
Diplomatic Relations.  In June 2007, we requested via diplomatic 
note a full account of all persons working in the USA for the GODR; 
the GODR has not yet responded adequately.  This problem has grown 
significantly under President Fernandez and has been raised in 
conversations with him (see ref K).  In some cases appointees' 
status as Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) or U.S. citizens renders 
these persons ineligible for accreditation for positions that are 
widely assumed to be sinecures with no official functions.  Other 
politically appointed persons gain accreditation and then abuse 
their diplomatic privileges, often with little supervisory 
oversight.  In one recent case, FPU obtained a signed statement from 
the "spouse" of a diplomat declaring that they had no marital 
relationship but had gotten a marriage decree in order to make her 
eligible for an A2 visa. 
 
¶48. (SBU) Even though Consular support has helped local authorities 
detect and deter mala fide travelers using the Santo Domingo - San 
Juan ferry, its history of smuggling, corrupt immigration officials 
and reputation as a means of passport-free entry into the U.S. make 
it a continuing concern.  Changes in the ferry schedule combined 
with continued workload demands have forced post to reduce our 
presence during departure of the Santo Domingo - San Juan ferry. 
Boarding for Tuesday and Thursday departures now occurs during 
regular work hours and may be monitored through spot checks by FPU 
personnel.  Consular personnel continue to offer assistance/consults 
during Sunday departures.  Implementation of the WHTI travel 
document requirement for land and sea ports of entry has facilitated 
document inspection by eliminating travel using only a birth 
certificate.  However post has seen that acceptance of Enhanced 
Driver's Licenses (EDLs) makes document inspection by GODR 
officials, now confronted with EDLs from several states, more 
difficult. 
 
 
------------------------- 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING 
------------------------- 
 
¶49.  (U) Post's FPU is staffed by: a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM), 
a Senior LES Investigator, four LES Investigators, one LES 
Investigative Assistant, and one LES Clerk.  An ELO serves as 
back-up FPM and works five or more hours per week in the FPU.  The 
FPU works in close cooperation with an ARSO-I and a local police 
officer assigned to the ARSO-I. 
 
¶50.  (U) FPU staff actively engages in FSI distance training and 
completed 2 online courses during the reporting period.  A listing 
of all training received, with the number of FPU LES who have 
completed the course in parenthesis, follows: PC102 Immigration Law 
and Visa Operations (7), PC103 Nationality Law and Consular 
Procedures (2), PC110 Passport Examiners (1), PC120 Consular Task 
 
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Force Basics (7), PC128 Detecting Imposters (4), PC545 Examining 
U.S. Passports (2), COMM0013 Business Writing (1), PY210 FSN Online 
Writing Lab (1), PY212 FSN online Writing Adv (1), PC143 Customer 
Service (1), PC542 FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (4), OT501 FSN 
Investigator Course (3), PC104 Overseas Citizen Services. 
 
¶51.  (U) FPU continues to provide anti-fraud training for all newly 
arrived officers.  In addition FPU encourages IV officers to 
participate in field investigations and NIV officers are offered 
windshield fraud tours of Santo Domingo.  Consular personnel who 
volunteer for work at the ferry terminal receive further FPU 
training.  Additional training, advising and coaching occurs 
regularly in staff meetings, during monthly Consular Development 
Days, and in consultation with individual consular personnel. 
During the reporting period, approximately 60 GODR officials, mostly 
from immigration or the passport office, attended FPU organized 
document detection training. 
 
LAMBERT