VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0877/01 3011914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281914Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0780
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4747

UNCLAS RABAT 000877 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM MO
SUBJECT: PALACE PARTY SEEKS TO DOMINATE THE 
MOROCCAN POLITICAL SCENE 
 
REF: A. RABAT 0517 
     ¶B. RABAT 0607 
     ¶C. RABAT 0858 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION:  In the short 
span of two years the Party of Authenticity and 
Modernity (PAM) has gone from being a loosely 
defined political association to a political 
powerhouse that dominated the June 2009 municipal 
elections.  The PAM now controls the upper house of 
Parliament, and appears the favorite to win control 
of the government in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections.  Founded and directed by Fouad Ali El 
Himma, one of the king's closest friends, the PAM is 
widely perceived to be the palace's party.  Its 
critics argue that PAM is a step backwards for 
Moroccan democracy and is little more than an 
instrument (like many of its predecessors) created 
by the King to exert stricter control over the 
political process.  Most vocal among these critics 
is the Islamist Party of Justice and Development 
(PJD), which the PAM and the Palace have clearly 
sought to undermine.  PAM militants, however, argue 
that their party represents a new and transformative 
force in Moroccan politics that rewards competence 
and initiative, and that will foster reform by 
forcing the entrenched political parties to compete 
for voters based on its ability to govern 
competently and democratically.  This is a joint 
Casablanca-Rabat reporting cable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF THE HOUSE OF PAM 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Little more than two years ago Fouad Ali 
El Himma, a childhood friend of King Mohammed VI and 
a former palace official charged with overseeing the 
Ministry of Interior, founded a political 
association called the Movement for All Democrats 
(MAD).  The MAD's stated goals were to invigorate 
discussion and bring new ideas to the political 
arena from outside Morocco's established political 
party structure.  The association attracted a wide 
range of personalities from various backgrounds and 
included former political prisoners from the Hassan 
II era, prominent leftist activists, government 
technocrats, and a significant number of civil 
society leaders who had not previously been directly 
involved in party politics.  The association 
marketed itself as an inclusive organization open to 
anyone who supported transparency and good 
governance -- with the notable exception of 
Islamists, whom MAD leaders made clear were not 
welcome. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The MAD launched its effort to 
reinvigorate Morocco's political discussion "from 
the outside" via a series of forums around the 
country.  For MAD activists, a central talking point 
argued that Morocco's established political parties 
had become stale, complacent and self-serving.  They 
openly accused prominent politicians of completely 
ignoring their duties to govern.  Another central 
theme was the need to strengthen the Moroccan 
democratic process and overall good governance by 
drumming out of the established parties those 
politicians for whom the getting re-elected had 
become a self-serving and full-time vocation.  Both 
arguments appealed to local officials, civil society 
activists and the leaders of small political 
parties, many of quickly sought to associate 
themselves with the MAD. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE MOVEMENT BECOMES A PARTY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In August 2008, El Himma took the step 
that many established politicians feared he would 
take:  he converted his movement into an official 
political party.  Dubbing it the Party of 
Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), El Himma bolstered 
MAD's ranks by incorporating five minor parties 
(which collectively held 26 parliamentary seats) 
into the PAM and by actively courting popular and/or 
influential members of larger parties.  In February 
2009, the party held its first national congress and 
elected officers.  Early detractors quickly accused 
many of the party's new adherents of being 
 
opportunists hoping to capitalize on the PAM's early 
popularity and on El Himma's royal connections. 
However, PAM supporter argued that the party 
welcomed all but only rewarded talent and 
initiative, citing the fact that some of the small 
party leaders who joined PAM early on were not 
elected to senior leadership positions.  (NOTE: 
Most notably, Abdullah Qadiri, the leader of the 
National Democratic Party (PND), quit the PAM in a 
public row while most PND members stayed with PAM. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In the lead-up to the June 2009 municipal 
elections, the PAM continued to attract defectors 
from other parties, including sitting Members of 
Parliament who changed parties and, in some cases, 
unaffiliated technocrats.  The party garnered the 
support of people from across the political 
spectrum, including prominent members of the 
government such as Minister of Finance Salaheddine 
Mezouar of the Rally of National Independents (RNI); 
Talbi Al Alawi, the former Mayor of Tetouan who was 
also from the RNI; and Mohammed El Gaz, a former 
Minister of Youth from the Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces (USFP).  The PAM made a parliamentary 
alliance with the RNI that gave it the 70 votes it 
needed to form a caucus and hence access and 
influence in the parliamentary committees.  Despite 
never having participated in a parliamentary 
election, the PAM quickly came to control two of the 
seven vice-presidential positions in the Parliament 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and it now 
counts among its adherents two sitting Ministers. 
 
---------------------- 
PAM FLEXES ITS MUSCLES 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The PAM also took aggressive steps to 
recruit supporters in the June communal elections, 
which were widely viewed as a bellwether for its 
appeal among voters.  Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi 
of the ruling Istiqlal (Independence) Party (PI) 
derided the PAM during the campaign as a "party of 
kids" who had no right to dictate or criticize the 
country's leaders.  Despite such bluster, the PI, 
ruling coalition-member USFP, and other established 
parties clearly feared the PAM's potential and took 
steps to check it.  For example, they sought -- and 
failed -- to outlaw party-switching as their 
candidates and members continued to flock to the 
PAM.  In the end, the PAM won over 20 percent of the 
seats in municipal councils nationwide, making it 
the obvious winner (Ref A).  Through coalitions, its 
candidates also became the mayors of major cities, 
including Marrakesh, Tangier and Meknes (Ref B). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The PAM continued its successes in the 
many rounds of indirect elections that, by law, 
follow Morocco's communal elections.  It established 
itself as the dominant player in the upper house of 
parliament, captured the presidency of that chamber, 
and entrenched itself at the top or near the top of 
regional councils throughout the country.  PAM 
militants like to claim that 80 percent of party 
activists come from a civil society and have little 
actual experience with party politics.  However, the 
sophisticated alliance building and ruthless horse- 
trading that characterized and underpinned the PAM's 
strategy in these contests belied that "grassroots" 
veneer and attested to the party leadership's 
tremendous ability to manipulate successfully -- and 
legally -- Morocco's byzantine electoral rules (Ref 
C). 
 
--------------------- 
PAM AND THE ISLAMISTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Since its inception, the PAM has adopted a 
hostile stance towards the Islamist Party of Justice 
and Development (PJD); has refused to participate in 
any coalition that includes the PJD; and has 
condemned those parties, such as the USFP, that 
have.  Ali Belhaj, Second Vice President of PAM, 
told PolCouns and PolOff in a recent meeting that 
PAM seeks to undermine the popularity of the PJD 
which he characterized as a threat to Morocco's 
secular government and society.  Belhaj insisted 
that despite its conciliatory rhetoric, the PJD 
 
harbors dangerous Islamist elements who are intent 
on imposing their Islamic vision on Morocco. 
 
------------------------ 
THE NEED FOR A NEW PARTY 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) PAM supporters argue that the King has a 
genuine vision for reforming Morocco and that he has 
taken significant steps to implement social, 
political and economic reforms during his ten-year 
reign.  However, they continue, Morocco's 
established political parties have failed to rise to 
the king's challenge and expectations and have 
proven unable to lead the reforms he has sought. 
Indeed, the argument goes, the King has been left 
without a partner to implement his reform vision, 
given that the parties remain fossilized, antiquated 
and internally non-democratic institutions, with 
leaders who are simply intent on preserving the 
current system in which they benefit from the 
patronage of controlling most of the ministries. 
The prevailing perception that the current 
government of Abbas El Fassi has been somewhat 
ineffective in implementing reforms or efficiently 
governing has only reinforced the PAM's arguments. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Hence the need for the PAM.  The PAM, its 
members say, is indeed a palace-inspired party, but 
it was born from the king's vision to reform the 
system, not dominate it.  The PAM will offer a 
strong, transparent partner for the King as he seeks 
to create a more effective government.  In addition, 
by introducing competition into the system and by 
forcing other political parties to recruit and 
retain young and competent members, the PAM will 
also inspire other parties, i.e., those that survive 
its rise to power, to implement internal democratic 
reforms and to join the PAM as coherent and 
hardworking parties to whom the King can truly 
devolve power.  "Change in Morocco comes from the 
King.  This is not a judgment but rather a statement 
of fact," Belhaj told PolOffs. 
 
------------- 
A DARKER VIEW 
------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In stark counterpoint to the PAM's own 
enthusiasm, critics contend that throughout Moroccan 
history, the Palace has created parties whose 
principal aim was to support and lend legitimacy to 
the monarchy and that PAM is no different.  Parties 
such as the RNI, the Constitutional Union (UC), and 
even the PJD, began as palace ploys to balance, 
control, and manipulate the political system to 
ensure its uncontested central role.  El Himma's 
proximity to the King and the PAM's rapid spread of 
influence to all levels of legislative power have 
thwarted any competition or political reform, rather 
than stimulated it, critics say.  When the PAM takes 
control of the government -- an increasingly 
foregone conclusion among analysts -- it will lead 
to even greater alienation as many avenues for 
political opposition become restricted. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Likewise, there are some who fear that 
the PAM's overt hostility toward the PJD could 
produce dire repercussions.  Professor Mohammed 
Darif, a leading academic and researcher on Islamist 
movements in Morocco, predicted that the rapid 
emergence of PAM and the widespread perception of it 
as the palace's party would only strengthen the PJD 
and make it a more attractive alternative to those 
who oppose the policies of PAM or the Palace.  He 
derided the PAM theory that the PJD harbors 
radicalized jihadists intent on turning Morocco into 
an Islamist caliphate, but warned that the PAM was 
targeting exactly the wrong type of Islamists, i.e., 
those who have openly agreed to participate in the 
Moroccan democratic process and to express their 
view legally from within the system.  The real 
threat comes from "Salafist-Wahhabist" elements who 
reject any participation in what they consider to be 
an illegitimate political system and consider those 
who participate, including the PJD, apostates, Darif 
said.  However, by weakening the PJD, the PAM (and 
by extension the Palace) risk strengthening the hand 
of these extremists who are committed to working 
outside the system. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) It is difficult to separate form from 
substance in Moroccan politics since there is little 
difference in the political platforms or ideologies 
of the many political parties.  Proponents of the 
PAM correctly point out that Morocco's party system 
is ineffective.  And their argument that the King 
cannot implement reforms without strong, capable 
political parties is convincing.  However, the PAM's 
self-portrayal as the best instrument for such 
democratic reform is clearly self-serving and has 
yet to be tested.  That test starts now, with the 
PAM having positioned itself as the force to be 
reckoned with in Parliament and at the head of 
numerous regional and local governments.  If it 
lives up to its promises to delivers good governance 
and renewed energy to the political process, the PAM 
could truly emerge after the 2012 national elections 
as a viable option through which the king's 
decentralization efforts can be implemented. 
However, if it perseveres with the back-room deals 
that have contained the PJD over the last six months 
and/or becomes too much a victim of its own success, 
it could emerge as a de facto single party amidst a 
sea of weakened and alienated small parties -- not 
necessarily a positive scenario for Morocco's 
democratic evolution.  END COMMENT. 
 
KAPLAN