VZCZCXRO9652
RR RUEHAST RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHRN RUEHSL RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSA #2170/01 2990737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260737Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9979
INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 7269
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 1348
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9630
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 2022

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002170 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S, OES/EGC, OES/PCI, SECC 
USDA/FAS FOR MARK MANIS 
E.O.   12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV ENRG SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS ON CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: (A) STATE 107536 
  (B) PRETORIA 1762 
      (C) PRETORIA 2166 
 
PRETORIA 00002170  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
This cable is not for Internet distribution. 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  Per action request in Ref A, 
post requested a meeting with South African climate negotiators, but 
was told they are not available until November.  In the meanwhile, 
this cable lays out context for South Africa's negotiating positions 
to date, based on September meetings with the negotiators and other 
local reports and statements.  Post is convinced the SAG could be a 
key to successful talks in Copenhagen and stands ready to engage SAG 
and other interlocutors in any way Department advises to give those 
talks their best chance of success.  Post would appreciate further 
guidance from the Department on the border tax issue on an if-raised 
basis and whether/how to engage the SAG on its proposal for the 
"lifecycle" of nationally appropriate mitigation actions. 
 
---------------------------------- 
SOUTH AFRICA'S POSITION ON CLIMATE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Economic Minister Counselor and Environment, Science and 
Technology Officer last met with South Africa's lead climate 
negotiators, Joanne Yawitch and Alf Wills, on September 11.  Wills 
and Yawitch are Deputy Directors-General in the newly reconfigured 
Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DWEA).  Yawitch is 
responsible for national climate policy implementation, while Wills 
is the lead climate negotiator in international fora, including the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Major 
Economies Forum (MEF).  (NOTE: In August, Wills had publicly summed 
up South Africa's position on climate as "no money, no deal." END 
NOTE.)   As U.S. negotiators know, South Africa plays an active role 
in the negotiating sessions as one of the lead countries of the 
G77/China developing nations group.  In the run up to the September 
25 UN Climate Summit in New York and the Bangkok meetings, South 
African government officials, including Environment Minister Buyelwa 
Sonjica, were on record stating that South Africa is not willing to 
agree to quantified emissions targets that would undermine the 
country's economic growth.  Nonetheless, post views the South 
African proposal for a registry of self-financed, nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions as a strong indication that the SAG 
is thinking creatively about how to bring developed and developing 
countries closer. 
 
¶3.  (U) South Africa's climate and energy policy is guided by the 
Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS), a research project 
coordinated by the Department of Environmental Affairs, which calls 
for the country's CO2 emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025, 
stabilize for ten years, then begin to decline in absolute terms by 
mid-century.  , However, this scenario is contingent upon South 
Africa receiving adequate finance and technology support under a new 
climate agreement.   South Africa is prepared to take nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions that reduce emissions below a 
business-as-usual trajectory, consistent with actions proposed for 
advanced developing countries under the Bali Action Plan.. 
 
---------------------------- 
FUTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) According to news reports, Wills and a number of developing 
country negotiators staged a walkout from an informal working group 
Qcountry negotiators staged a walkout from an informal working group 
meeting on the Kyoto Protocol, accusing developed nations of trying 
to "kill Kyoto."  (Note:  According to one observer, only a handful 
of delegates walked out and discussions continued.  End Note). 
South Africa, along with other developing countries, does not want 
the Kyoto Protocol folded into a new Copenhagen legal framework, and 
that targets for Kyoto's second commitment period from 2013 should 
be on a parallel but separate track from any new agreement.  They 
oppose efforts by developed nations to "cherry pick" or merge parts 
of the Kyoto Protocol into a new Copenhagen agreement on the grounds 
that it would allow Annex I developed countries to water down their 
emissions reduction commitments and it muddies the distinction 
between developed and developing countries' binding mitigation 
actions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW PROPOSAL ON NAMA "LIFECYCLE" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (U) The South African proposal mentioned in Para 9 of Ref A, 
 
PRETORIA 00002170  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
which appears to deviate from the standard G77 position on 
nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA) registries, is 
consistent with Wills and Yawitch's expressed commitment that South 
Africa will "engage constructively" on climate change. 
 
------- 
FINANCE 
------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Besides mitigation, the other major sticking point at the 
Bangkok talks was finance.  South Africa stands firm with other 
developing countries in their view that developed countries will 
need to commit to massive public financing to seal a deal in 
Copenhagen.  Wills and Yawitch expressed the belief that private 
investment is not sufficient and that, at least initially, large 
infusions of multilateral funding will be required to make 
interventions where markets are failing, to enable countries 
(including South Africa) to "get off first base."  Once momentum is 
established, the market will be ripe for the private investment 
flows that will ultimately provide the majority of funding for 
mitigation efforts and the transformation to a low-carbon economy. 
At a press briefing in September, Yawitch stated that South Africa 
wanted to ensure "massively scaled-up, predictable and sustainable 
financial flows" from developed countries to the developing world of 
between 200 billion and 400 billion dollars per year until 2020. 
 
------------------------- 
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Wills and Yawitch explained that a major problem for South 
Africa is its categorization as a "developing country with greater 
capability," along with China, India, Brazil and others, under the 
tiered climate framework proposed by the U.S.  In their view, this 
would make South Africa ineligible for public multilateral finance 
and technology support.  While acknowledging that the U.S. proposal 
explicitly reflects "common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities," Wills and Yawitch opined that the U.S. has 
an "un-nuanced view" of South Africa's special circumstances.  They 
argued that South Africa should not be lumped together with 
countries such as China and India that have much larger populations, 
bigger economies, and a different set of challenges and 
capabilities.  In their view, a tiered approach is designed to help 
the U.S. solve its domestic political challenges with regard to 
China (i.e., getting Congress to accept emissions cuts in return for 
concrete mitigation actions by the other major emitters).  South 
Africa views itself as a developing country with special historical 
circumstances that make it different from other major emitters, a 
country that will be seriously disadvantaged if it does not have 
access to public financing and technology support. 
 
------------------------------------ 
SOUTH AFRICA'S SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) South Africa sees itself as a "middle income developing 
country," with an advanced manufacturing and services sector but 
also with special challenges in common with the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).  While a small segment of its population is 
wealthy, large numbers of South Africans live in poverty and the 
government is still grappling with the lingering economic and social 
effects of apartheid.  After the transformation to democratic 
majority rule in 1994, high expectations were placed on the 
Qmajority rule in 1994, high expectations were placed on the 
government to improve living standards for the poor.  While progress 
has been made in some areas, South Africa now has the world's 
highest level of income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient index.  Service delivery by the government in all 
sectors - housing, water, sanitation, power - is currently a hot 
topic and occasionally sparks violent protests, most recently in 
Sakhile township near Johannesburg.  For South Africa, the 
development imperative and poverty alleviation have a more immediate 
and higher priority than emissions reductions. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
ENERGY CHALLENGES DICTATING CLIMATE POLICY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (U) South Africa relies on coal for 90 percent of its 
electricity generation and intends to continue building coal-fired 
power plants in the short and medium term to respond to an ongoing 
power crisis and to accommodate future economic growth.  (REF C on 
the electricity situation provides further context.)  The global 
recession has provided South Africa with a temporary respite in 
energy demand, but reserve margins are razor thin (less than 10 
 
PRETORIA 00002170  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
percent) and the threat of rolling blackouts and power rationing, as 
occurred in 2008, remains high. Wills and Yawitch acknowledged that 
South Africa has enormous potential for renewable energy (solar, 
wind, biomass), but that the technologies have not scaled up 
sufficiently to meet mitigation targets.  As reported in Ref B, 
serious institutional and market barriers remain, including state 
power utility Eskom's virtual monopoly of the electricity market, 
which has hindered the uptake of clean technologies.  Eskom recently 
announced proposed electricity rate hikes of 45 percent annually 
over the next three years to cover current operating costs and 
partially fund their 385 billion Rand (USD $52 billion) capital 
expansion program.  While rate hikes may encourage the development 
of renewable energy sources, they will be a heavy burden on a 
fragile economy and a difficult adjustment for residential and 
industrial consumers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
SOUTH AFRICA AS CHAMPION OF LESS DEVELOPED AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶10.  (U) In addition to its role as a major economy and greenhouse 
gas emitter, South Africa wears another hat as champion for less 
developed African countries, which share with South Africa many of 
the same problems of poverty, access to clean water and sanitation, 
HIV/AIDS and other development issues.  Wills and Yawitch expressed 
concern that the differentiation between different categories of 
developing countries in the climate talks is counterproductive.  In 
their view, LDCs fear that because the more advanced developing 
countries have greater capacity to leverage financial and 
technological support under a climate deal, the economic and 
technology gaps between advanced developing countries and LDCs will 
be further exaggerated.  Wills stated that the LDCs need to be fully 
included in support mechanisms of the Copenhagen deal to enable them 
to "leapfrog" into clean energy technologies. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Post is convinced the SAG could be a key to successful 
talks in Copenhagen if properly consulted and lobbied as a partner 
and a unique player by the USG.  SAG negotiators are engaged 
thoroughly in preparations for the Copenhagen talks and clearly 
prepared to work with the USG and other governments to get to an 
agreement there.  Post stands ready to engage SAG and other 
interlocutors in any way Department advises to give those talks 
their best chance of success.  In preparation for further 
discussions, post would appreciate further guidance from the 
Department on the border tax issue (Para 14 of Ref A) and 
whether/how to engage the SAG on its proposal for a "lifecycle" of 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions. 
GIPS