VZCZCXRO4499
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0815/01 3030909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300909Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1325
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CB
SUBJECT: HUN SEN MANEUVERS OVER POSSIBLE THAKSIN VISIT 
 
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 811 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 2746 
 
Classified By: DCM THEODORE ALLEGRA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Cambodian officials cite personal relations 
as justification for a possible visit by former Thai Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in November.  Some also cite the 
Preah Vihear situation, which has seen no diplomatic movement 
since April.  Prime Minister Hun Sen appears to be taking a 
longer view of Cambodian-Thai relations -- maneuvering to 
keep the current government attentive to Cambodia's needs 
while cozying up to a potential future (read Pheua Thai) 
government in Bangkok grateful for Cambodia's strong support. 
 Hun Sen's bottom line seems to be a deal on Preah Vihear 
that both countries can live with, even if one Thai party 
cannot.  In the meantime, Thai and Cambodian regional 
military commanders reinforced October 27 the message that 
armed confrontation should be avoided.  Although units on 
both sides remain on alert, peaceful intentions were 
reiterated by line commanders at Preah Vihear on October 29, 
who voiced support for the bilateral Joint Border Committee. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
No Official Confirmation? 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Noun Chivorn, Deputy Director-General of the MFA 
ASEAN Department confirmed October 29 that no official 
messages had been received regarding a visit by Thaksin. 
Noting the heavy media speculation, he said that the story 
was being driven by the newspapers since Hun Sen's remarks on 
October 21 inviting Thaksin to Cambodia and offering to 
appoint him as an economic advisor.  Phay Siphan, Secretary 
of State and Spokesperson in the Council of Ministers, echoed 
the view that a media frenzy had stirred up a hornet's nest 
but noted that so far, there had been only one personal 
message delivered to Hun Sen from Thaksin expressing 
gratitude for Hun Sen's personal support.  On October 30 MFA 
spokesperson Koy Kuong repeated there were no official 
indications of a visit but added that reports from the press 
of an impending Thaksin visit appeared to be "credible." 
 
Only a Personal Relationship? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Phay Siphan acknowledged that a visit may indeed be 
possible and that it would "present difficulties" for 
Cambodia.  He nevertheless emphasized that if Thaksin chose 
to visit it would be the personal visit of a long-term 
friend.  Sry Thamarong, close foreign affairs advisor to Hun 
Sen, said that the whole matter should be viewed as "only 
personal" with no connection to official relations between 
Cambodia and Thailand.  He nonetheless hinted that a short 
visit was in the works.  "Thaksin has no business here,"  he 
said.  "He has billions to look after elsewhere," he 
emphasized, "so even if Thaksin came for a visit to Cambodia, 
he would have no reason to stay."  When asked about the 
extradition of Thaksin from Cambodia to Thailand, Phay Siphan 
said that Cambodia reserved the right to interpret its treaty 
obligations consistent with international law.  (NOTE: On 
October 23, a hastily issued MFA press release stated that 
Cambodia would not extradite Thaksin to Thailand.  END NOTE.) 
 Phay Siphan emphasized that he was speaking only about a 
possible visit, "if" Thaksin chose to make it.  That said, a 
senior minister advisor to Hun Sen has confirmed that 
Thaksin's people have been on the ground in Cambodia for some 
time, and that Hun Sen already signed the order appointing 
Thaksin an economic advisor. 
 
Mind Boggling! 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) An ASEAN embassy official commented that it "boggles 
the mind" to think about what Hun Sen intended when he "stuck 
it to the Thai" at the ASEAN summit October 23 by his 
statements inviting the fugitive from Thai justice and to 
appoint him as an economic advisor.  It was embarrassing to 
the hosts and not in the interests of Cambodia, he noted.  He 
speculated that Hun Sen was mad about something the Thai had 
done behind the scenes but noted that it "was a case of Hun 
Sen saying what he says and everybody scrambling to explain 
it." 
 
A Diplomatic Feint and Maneuver? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) That Preah Vihear was uppermost on Hun Sen's mind 
before the ASEAN summit was obvious after the Cambodian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had seized on an article quoting 
the Thai foreign minister as favoring a neutral third party 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000815  002 OF 002 
 
 
to take up the border dispute.  The RGC slyly suggested that 
ASEAN might be considered, causing the Thai FM to quickly 
clarify the record and reassert that Preah Vihear should be 
solved bilaterally.  That Hun Sen deliberately repeated his 
"personal" support for Thaksin on the opening day of the 
ASEAN summit made it abundantly clear that he is not happy 
with the current Thai government and that he is not convinced 
the Thai government has the willingness or even the ability 
to resolve the Preah Vihear dispute anytime soon. 
 
Border Meetings Ease Tensions 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In the meantime, Cambodian and Thai military and 
border officials continue to meet.  Siem Reap governor Sou 
Phirin told embassy staff that an October 27 meeting focused 
on avoiding military confrontation and maintaining border 
security.  Cambodian Military Region 4 commander Gen. Chea 
Mon and newly installed Thai Military Region 2 commander LTG 
Wiwalit Chonsamrit were in attendance, as were the three 
Cambodian governors from Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, and Banteay 
Meanchey and four deputy governors from the adjacent Thai 
provinces.  "The meeting was unofficial" Sou Phirin said. 
"Both sides agreed to avoid armed confrontation and respect 
law and order to make the disputed border as peaceful as 
before that of last July.  The two sides agreed to facilitate 
the work of the Border Committees of the two countries to 
implement their duty." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On October 29, the line commanders at Preah Vihear 
met once again and Cambodian press reports indicate that 
although units on both sides of the border remain on high 
alert, their commanders repeated their joint desire for 
avoiding armed clashes.  Cambodian Commander Srey Deuk and 
his Thai counterpart (identified as Gen. Suvatchai) also 
pledged to leave the resolution of border issues to the 
bilateral Joint Border Committee (JBC) (Ref A). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Hun Sen wants to deal with a Thai counterpart who can 
deliver on Preah Vihear.  It seems clear to the RGC that the 
current Thai government has placed the border issue well down 
on the Parliamentary agenda and the lack of diplomatic 
movement (Ref A) reflects that low priority.  By establishing 
informal party-to-party relations between CPP and Pheua Thai 
(Hun Sen met former Thai PM Chavalit October 21 as vice 
chairman of the CPP) Hun Sen is betting on Pheua Thai's 
ascendancy and is taking first steps to cement what he may 
view as a more productive bilateral relationship.  This 
remains true notwithstanding the statements of other RGC 
officials, who have been out in force repeating the message 
that Thai-Cambodian relations on all fronts remain positive 
and friendly. 
 
¶9.  (C) But this reserved approach -- especially in view of 
protracted and incremental diplomatic activity on the border 
issue -- has clearly made Hun Sen impatient.  He is playing 
to a rambunctious domestic polity fed up with perceived Thai 
dissembling and unable to shoulder the cost of a huge army 
stationed at the border.  Some RGC officials have referred to 
the provocations of Thai yellow shirts regarding Preah 
Vihear, and to a general state of Thai "anarchy" as 
negatively affecting Cambodia (through lower numbers of 
tourist visits, for example).  In addition, recent shootings 
of Cambodian civilians by Thai militia (Tahan Prahn) along 
the Thai border have been a festering popular grievance that 
was reportedly aired in the October 27 civilian-military 
meeting in Siem Reap.  Hun Sen's flamboyant performance at 
Hua Hin may have had some subtle nuances after all, with a 
cathartic effect at home and a wake-up call for a little more 
respect -- and action -- from his neighbor. 
RODLEY