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DE RUEHFR #1465/01 3031721
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P 301721Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7449
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001465 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR KDEM GV FR
SUBJECT: GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN 
PARIS (OCTOBER 29-30) 

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). 

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials generally agreed with U.S. 
Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller on the need for the 
international community to develop a visible process or 
framework on Guinea that could lead to a transition to a 
democratic government, with Burkina Faso President Campaore's 
intervention a possible vehicle for forming such a process. 
Presidential Africa Advisor Andre Parant plans to travel to 
Ouagadougou for meetings with Campaore on November 2, where 
Parant will offer France's support. While agreeing that 
junta leader Dadis Camara had to be removed from power, they 
believed that Dadis could be part of the solution to the 
problem if handled properly through the right combination of 
"carrots and sticks." The French were encouraged by the 
African Union's October 29 decision to take a firm stance on 
Guinea, and they believed that the AU, following ECOWAS's 
lead, could play a useful role in resolving the crisis in 
Guinea. Once the transition process gains traction, France 
is prepared to commit resources and expertise, especially for 
reforming Guinea's military. END SUMMARY. 

¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller, met, 
separately, with MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz and 
Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on October 30, 
following her meeting on October 29 with MOD Africa Analyst 
Jerome Spinoza. AF-watcher attended the meeting with 
Marechaux; AF-assistant attended the meetings with Gompertz 
and Spinoza. MFA Guinea desk officer Ann'laure Hare attended 
the meeting with Gompertz. 

Meeting with Gompertz (MFA) 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Gompertz began by asking what Ambassador Moller 
planned to do concerning her credentials. She replied that 
she would not present her credentials to the Dadis government 
and, if pressed, would say that she would do so only when a 
democratically-elected government was in place in Conakry. 
Gompertz explained that France's recently arrived Ambassador 
(Jean Graebling) had similarly refused to present his 
credentials. The CNDD Foreign Minister informed Graebling 
that, as a result, Graelbing would have no access to regime 
officials. Gompertz observed that Ambassadors Graebling and 
Moller would be in similar situations. He and Ambassador 
Moller looked forward to close working relations between the 
Ambassadors Graebling and Moller in Conakry. 

¶4. (C) Gompertz noted the AU's October 29 communique on 
Guinea, which he deemed very helpful. He commented on EU 
efforts to develop travel bans and asset freezes. Ambassador 
Moller said the USG was taking similar steps. 

¶5. (C) On the broader issue of next steps, Ambassador Moller 
stressed ultimate priority of avoiding a melt-down in Guinea, 
with which Gompertz agreed. To accomplish that, Ambassador 
Moller said that it was imperative for the international 
community to establish a process or framework -- the more 
visible the better -- to show that there was a serious 
commitment on moving Guinea away from the abyss and towards 
an acceptable democratic transition, which could be centered 
on African institutions such as the AU or ECOWAS, with the 
support and participation of other members of the 
international community. 

¶6. (C) Gompertz agreed, and he said that Burkina Faso 
President Campaore, who had already taken up a mediator's 
role, could be the focus of such an effort. Gompertz said 
that Presidential AF-advisor Andre Parant was going to 
Burkina Faso and would meet with Campaore on November 2, to 
discuss Guinea as a first priority, and also Niger. Gompertz 
indicated that Parant would try to encourage movement on 
Campaore's part, although Gompertz noted Campaore's 
preference to move deliberately. He also mentioned that 
Campaore had personal economic interests in Guinea (as he had 
in many other African countries) that would be a factor in 
his decision-making. Gompertz encouraged the U.S. to talk to 
Campaore. 

¶7. (C) Gompertz, while harboring no illusions about Dadis 
(describing his as "dangerous" and "insane") nonetheless 
believed that Dadis should be part of the solution and not 
simply isolated and scorned. He needed to be offered an exit 
or a way out. Gompertz mused on the possibility that Morocco 
(where the junta has cached much of its wealth) or Libya 
could serve as points of exile, although Ambassador Moller 
indicated that Morocco had signaled that it was not 
interested in hosting an exiled Dadis. Gompertz said that 
other factors to be considered were the danger of civil war 
(the Forestiers had to be reassured that Dadis's departure 

did not signal a return to Peul or Malinke dominance over the 
Forestiers) and the need to accommodate Guinea's military. 
Gompertz observed that a transition to a democratic 
government was essential, in order to avoid a "melt down" or 
else a drift into a Zimbabwe-like state, which would be 
hardly any better. 

¶8. (C) Asked about the departure of French citizens from 
Guinea, Gompertz said that about 500 of 1,800 had left 
following the GOF's public suggestion that citizens leave 
voluntarily rather than wait for a possible evacuation under 
emergency conditions. He noted that of the remainder, many 
were dual nationals or long-term residents not inclined to 
leave in any case. Gompertz said that the suggestion to 
leave was more anticipatory in nature and to prepare for the 
worst, not an indication that conditions were at an extreme. 
(Marechaux claimed that about 800 French, out of 2,300, had 
departed, and that there were an estimated 600 known dual 
nationals who would likely never leave. He also verified 
that the GOF-supported school in Conakry would remain closed 
until an acceptable transition government was in place.) 

Meeting with Marechaux (Presidency) 
----------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Presidential Africa Advisor, Remi Marechaux, who will 
travel with Parant to Ouagadougou, echoed many of the points 
made by Gompertz. In particular, he noted that it was 
important to support Campaore and allow him to lead, even 
though there would be frustrations that Campaore wanted to 
"maintain leeway" and that the mediation would happen "on 
African time." Part of the problem was that Campaore relies 
on only 5-6 advisors to assist with all his mediations, 
including for Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, and that even FM Yoda 
could not speak authoritatively on Campaore's thinking. 

¶10. (C) In Marechaux's opinion, Campaore was "scared by the 
strength of the international community's strength of 
reaction" to the September 28 violence. Therefore, Marechaux 
said that in Ouagadougou, Parant would make clear that France 
would support Campaore, if requested, on delivering 
demarches, providing ideas on the way forward, and even 
helping with travel or other logistic requirements. 
Marechaux agreed with Ambassador Moller that it is important 
to get some visibility on a specific transition plan soon, 
but described the situation as still in the "threat stage," 
and that "we still have 2-3 weeks before we need to be 
greatly concerned about a lack of progress." 

¶11. (C) Marechaux described the sanctions and UN Commission 
of Inquiry as "tools" that should not be confused with the 
international community's "goals." In creating the sanctions 
list, there was a vibrant debate within the GOF, with some 
wanting the sanctions to be more targeted to "destabilize" 
the junta. Now that the list is, in the end, quite 
inclusive, it needs to remain dynamic so that those listed 
understanding there is the option of being removed from the 
list if they depart the junta and help the transition process 
-- a process that leads to the removal of Dadis. 

¶12. (C) Parant will also discuss with Campaore the question 
of what to do with Dadis, reminding Campaore that he needs to 
reach out to countries who might accept the junta leader 
should he step down. France also wants Campaore to consider 
how to avoid the possibility of an International Criminal 
Court (ICC) case against Dadis, which, Marechaux added, would 
be a disincentive for the junta to agree to give up power. 
Marachaux speculated that perhaps some kind of in-country 
court could be established which, in the end, would allow 
Dadis and others a way to be relocated. 

¶13. (C) Another critical step raised by Marechaux is to plan 
for some kind of international observer force, noting the 
effectiveness of 50 or so ECOWAS troops who helped during 
Togo's 2007 elections by assuring that military forces stayed 
in their barracks and by conducting joint patrols with Togo's 
police and gendarmes. In Marechaux's opinion, it would be 
difficult for Guinean authorities to refuse a similar ECOWAS 
plan. However, a large intervention force was not realistic. 

¶14. (C) Marechaux stated that reforming the military needed 
to be included in the transition plan, and that the U.S. and 
France needed to work together on this. He asserted that the 
majority of Guinea's military was not implicated in the 
September 28 attacks, and that Guinea's gendarme force had 
performed well. Dadis may have recruited up to 2,500 
fighters from Liberia, but the Guinean forces loyal to the 
junta numbered only about 2,000. This left a significant 
military to work with. Marechaux raised the idea of possibly 
training Guinean troops for UN peacekeeping duty, effectively 

reducing the influence of the military in Guinea. Ambassador 
Moller remarked that peacekeeping training and deployment had 
been a successful strategy in Burundi. 

Meeting with Spinoza (MOD) 
-------------------------- 
¶15. (C) Jerome Spinoza at the MOD's Strategic Affairs 
Delegation, befitting his position as an analyst, offered a 
broader, less operational view of Guinea during his October 
29 meeting with Ambassador Moller. Of the three 
interlocutors, he was the one who most directly counseled 
against demonizing and isolating Dadis. He too shared no 
illusions about Dadis but he thought that Dadis was more 
reasonable and susceptible to persuasion than others might 
think, even if only at the level of self-interest. He 
believed that Dadis should be part of any process to end the 
junta's control of Guinea and to move to a more acceptable 
government. Spinoza agreed with Ambassador Moller's views on 
the need to establish a process for channeling Guinea in the 
right direction and the need to avoid a complete collapse in 
Guinea, which would be bad for Guinea and disastrous for the 
region, which was grappling with recoveries in in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire. Spinoza acknowledged that 
some of his colleagues considered him "pro-junta," but he 
said that this was only because he believed one had to work 
with the junta rather than isolate it or back it into a 
corner where its only choice might be aggression. 

COMMENT 
------- 
¶16. (C) The French clearly welcomed the opportunity to 
consult with Ambassador Moller and we expect she will a close 
and collaborative relationship with the French in Conakry. 
More importantly, in each of her discussions, French 
agreement on the need for a visible international process 
strengthened, with a focus on Campaore's initiative. END 
COMMENT. 

¶17. (U) Ambassador Moller has cleared this message. 

¶18. (U) Conakry minimize considered. 
RIVKIN