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RR RUEHGI
DE RUEHFR #1387/01 2871159
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R 141159Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7325
INFO RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 1522
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0388
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RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0127

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 29 PARIS 001387 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OMA 
TREASURY FOR DO/IDD AND OUSED/IMF 
SECDEF FOR USDP/DSCA 
PASS EXIM FOR CLAIMS - MPAREDES 
PASS USDA FOR CCC -- ALEUNG/WWILLER/JDOSTER 
PASS USAID FOR CLAIMS -- WFULLER 
PASS DOD FOR DSCS -- PBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID XM XA XH XB XF FR
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 2009 PARIS CLUB MEETING; NEGOTIATION WITH CAR 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On September 15, the Paris Club and the Central 
African Republic (CAR) negotiated a new debt relief agreement 
recognizing that country's completion of the enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  Creditors agreed 
voluntarily to go beyond HIPC terms to forgive all but $3.7 million 
of their claims on the CAR.  After disagreeing about the Paris 
Club's proper role in the debt restructuring negotiations between 
Kazakh banks and foreign export credit agencies, the Club agreed on 
a new letter to the Finance Minister.  The letter emphasized the 
need for a fair process and "insisted" that creditors be given 
adequate time to consider options.  Creditors discussed Argentina's 
stated new willingness to address arrears, recognizing that previous 
similar Argentine overtures were not implemented.  Regarding the 
Brazilian loan to Argentina, creditors accepted U.S. suggestions to 
strengthen a draft letter to the Brazilian finance minister; the 
letter makes clear the Club's disappointment that Brazil made the 
loan, as well as that it had not notified the club. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the IMF was 
still awaiting China's signature of the revised loan agreement for a 
Chinese-financed project.  The French-led Secretariat hailed the 
significant progress the revised loan agreement represented.  Other 
creditors were very skeptical, insisting on adequate time to review 
and discuss the IMF's forthcoming debt sustainability analysis 
before the Club meets in October or November to provide financing 
assurances for the DRC's IMF program.   Brazil confirmed that it had 
 
PARIS 00001387  002 OF 029 
 
 
signed an agreement with Suriname for clearing arrears, granting a 
38% nominal discount on a total of $118 million, in exchange for 
immediate payment of the balance.  The Secretariat was bluntly 
critical, saying that creditor "solidarity had been breached."  The 
Club would send a letter urging Suriname to clear its arrears to the 
U.S. in full.  The UK Government has held consultations but not yet 
decided whether to move forward with legislation on "vulture" funds' 
efforts to secure full repayment from poor debtors.  Further work 
had uncovered some difficult legal issues. 
 
¶3. (U) Other countries discussed included:  Algeria, Angola, 
Bahrain, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Guinea, Jamaica, Seychelles, Ukraine, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe.  Methodological issues discussed included the working 
group on treatment of guarantees, the Club's global data call, the 
reform of IMF programs and the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), 
and the Club's debt service reduction methodology.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------- 
Algeria 
------- 
 
¶4. (U) France reported that state-owned Credit Populaire d'Algerie 
had requested to prepay at face value EUR 55 million of official 
development assistance (ODA) loans that had not been previously 
treated in a Paris Club agreement.   The Algerian Ministry of 
 
PARIS 00001387  003 OF 029 
 
 
Finance had also asked about ODA debts, though no formal proposal 
was made.  France observed that it seemed odd, from a financial 
perspective, for Algeria to pre-pay low interest rate ODA loans. 
Some of the debts had contractual provisions allowing prepayment at 
any time. 
 
¶5. (U) Italy argued that Algeria should make its offer to all Club 
creditors, particularly in view of Algeria's ample resources.  The 
Secretariat agreed that it could look into coordinating a response 
if other creditors were interested.  The Fund confirmed that Algeria 
was in a strong position, with few debts and large reserves.  It had 
been little affected by the crisis, due to a lack of financial 
integration, and non-oil GDP growth was expected to reach 6% in 
¶2009. 
 
------ 
Angola 
------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) The IMF reported that Angola's heavily oil-dependent 
economy had taken a turn for the worse, with a sharp contraction in 
GDP.  Angola had expressed interest in an IMF lending program, and a 
mission had been there in early August to discuss one.  Debt 
sustainability had worsened, with the country now rated at "moderate 
risk" of debt distress.  The Fund still expected the risk to fall in 
the long run, however.  The World Bank mentioned that it planned to 
 
PARIS 00001387  004 OF 029 
 
 
loan about $80 million to Angola in Fiscal Year 2010. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In July, no creditors had expressed interest in 
participating in the debt swap initiative proposed by the Angolan 
Parliament.  The Paris Club approved a reply from the Club 
Co-Chairperson rejecting the proposal and asserting that creditors 
expected to be paid as agreed.  (Several days after the meeting, the 
finance minister sent another letter reiterating the request, but 
the substance of the Club's reply will remain unaffected.) 
 
--------- 
Argentina 
--------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The discussion of Argentina focused on renewed hints that 
the country wanted to normalize relations with creditors, and on the 
Brazilian aircraft loan.  The IMF reported that markets had calmed, 
although H1N1 influenza had had a major effect.  Reserves remained 
stable at $45 billion gross and an estimated $35 billion net. 
Economy Minister Boudou had hinted at a desire to improve relations 
with the Fund, including by agreeing in principle to an Article IV 
review, though no date has been set. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Bank reported that the government was engaged in an 
effort to regain access to capital markets, and 76% of eligible debt 
had been tendered in the recent inflation-linked bond exchange.  The 
 
PARIS 00001387  005 OF 029 
 
 
Bank's new strategy foresaw $3.3 billion in new investment lending. 
The Secretariat reported some informal contacts with the new 
minister's team, and that Club Chairman Fernandez was available to 
meet with Boudou.   In their informal contacts, the Argentines had 
emphasized their desire to normalize relations.  The U.S. delegation 
reported on AmEmbassy Buenos Aires DCM Tom Kelly's recent meeting 
with Minister Boudou and on Treasury DAS for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs Nancy Lee's previous meeting with Argentine Ambassador to 
the U.S. Timerman. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Discussion then turned to the proposed letter to Brazil. 
The Secretariat had circulated a draft, which had criticized Brazil 
for not communicating with the Club about the loan and had asked a 
number of questions - the answers to many of which were already 
known.  The U.S. had argued in advance that the letter should object 
to the fact of the loan, not just to Brazil's failure to inform the 
Club.  The Secretariat and almost all other creditors argued that 
the U.S. position was too harsh, particularly since Brazil was not a 
Club member.  The Club eventually agreed to a UK-proposed 
compromise, supported by Germany, that criticized both the fact of 
the loan and the lack of prior communication. 
 
------- 
Bahrain 
------- 
 
 
PARIS 00001387  006 OF 029 
 
 
¶11. (U) In July, the Netherlands had complained about nagging 
arrears issues with two Bahraini ministries.  The Ministry of 
Housing had since made a payment of EUR 300,000, but another due 
date had passed so arrears had actually risen, to EUR 8.3 million. 
The Netherlands had heard nothing from the other debtor, the 
Ministry of Works.  The Paris Club agreed to send a letter to the 
authorities. 
 
------------------------ 
Central African Republic 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Paris Club's September 15 HIPC "Completion Point" debt 
negotiations with the Central African Republic (CAR) went smoothly. 
In his opening statement, CAR Minister of Finance Abdalla-Kadre 
Assane touted reforms in the diamond and telecom sectors as well as 
in financial and business regulations.  Assane also emphasized the 
CAR's commitment to seek comparable debt relief from its non-Paris 
Club creditors so that the CAR does not remain heavily indebted even 
after HIPC.  The IMF reported that the CAR had made steady progress 
in implementing its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
program, while noting the fragility of fiscal reforms and very low 
level of revenue collection.  The World Bank highlighted the CAR's 
new forestry code and the country's first report under the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  Nevertheless, 
the CAR remains vulnerable to debt distress and its per capita 
 
PARIS 00001387  007 OF 029 
 
 
income is among the lowest in the world. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Paris Club accounted for only a small portion of the 
country's debts, just $46.1 million of $854.3 million outstanding as 
of September 2007 when CAR entered the HIPC Initiative ("Decision 
Point") process.  Following its normal seniority rules, the 
remaining debts after the agreed treatment were $5.7 million owed to 
France, $2.5 million to Japan, $360,000 to the U.S. and small 
amounts to Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Russia and the U.K. 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Under creditors' various bilateral policies providing for 
voluntary debt cancellation beyond the HIPC initiative, creditors 
planned to forgive all of these debts except for $5.5 million of the 
French claim, which represented previously-rescheduled, short-term 
debts.  Perhaps because of the awkward optics, France later in the 
day indicated that it would go beyond its own policies to forgive 
the portion of that debt contracted before the Paris Club's 1983 
cut-off date, leaving $3.7 million outstanding. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The U.S. delegation emphasized the importance of obtaining 
comparable treatment from other creditors, especially Taiwan, the 
largest bilateral official creditor.  In response, Finance Minister 
Assane said that the CAR can only engage Taiwan through third 
parties and would continue its efforts to seek Paris Club-comparable 
debt relief from Taiwan. 
 
PARIS 00001387  008 OF 029 
 
 
 
------- 
Comoros 
------- 
 
¶16. (U) The Fund said the situation in Comoros was difficult, 
particularly because of political instability.  However, GDP was 
expected to grow 1% in 2009, and the budget situation was improving. 
 Comoros' track record of reform during its Emergency Post-Conflict 
Assistance (EPCA) IMF program had been "solid."  This performance 
would allow the IMF Executive Board to consider a new PRGF program 
as soon as a payment issue with the World Bank had been resolved. 
(Comoros was over 45 days late on an $824,000 payment, which had 
caused disbursements to be suspended.  Comoros made the payment and 
the IMF approved the PRGF the following week.)  The IMF reported 
that Comoros' debt was "clearly unsustainable," equivalent to more 
than 260% of exports.  80% of the debt was owed to multilaterals, 
just 4.5% to the Club.  If the forthcoming debt sustainability 
analysis (DSA) confirms that Comoros is eligible for the HIPC 
initiative, the country could reach HIPC "Decision Point" in the 
first half of 2010. 
 
¶17. (U) The new PRGF program paves the way for a Paris Club debt 
treatment.  Even though there are just three Club creditors -- 
France, Italy and the U.K. (The USG is not a creditor.) -- a formal 
negotiation will be required.  The Secretariat suggested inviting 
 
PARIS 00001387  009 OF 029 
 
 
Kuwait and the UAE to participate in the negotiations (only Italy 
responded, expressing support, although the probability of 
acceptance seems slight).  Negotiations are expected to take place 
in October or November. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The IMF had hoped to request financing assurances from the 
Paris Club at the September meeting to support a new PRGF lending 
program.  The Fund was unable to do so, however, since the joint 
IMF/World Bank debt sustainability analysis (DSA) and other 
documents were not yet released.  The delay was due to the fact that 
the Fund was still awaiting confirmation that China had signed the 
amendment to the mining/infrastructure loan package.  (The physical 
document had to be sent to Beijing after the DRC authorities had 
signed.)  The amendment reportedly cancels the second $3 billion 
infrastructure loan, removes the DRC sovereign guarantee on the 
mining portion of the deal, and specifies that the sovereign 
guarantee on the remaining $3 billion infrastructure loan can only 
be triggered after 25 years.  The Secretariat characterized these 
developments as a great step forward.  Once Fund staff see and 
review the signed amendment, the final DSA will be circulated, along 
with a technical note on the loan package's concessionality.  The 
Fund now hoped that it could seek financing assurances at the 
 
PARIS 00001387  010 OF 029 
 
 
October meeting, with negotiations possible in November or December. 
 World Bank staff added that because of the loan's large potential 
macroeconomic impact, the Bank's Committee on Non-Concessional 
Borrowing would also need to assess the loan. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Netherlands asked whether the Secretariat foresaw a 
new Paris Club agreement, or a reactivation and extension of the 
previous one.  They also asked whether forgiveness of arrears in a 
new agreement would reward the DRC's years of bad behavior, and 
whether relief could therefore be back-loaded.   The Secretariat 
replied that a new agreement would be needed to cover payments 
coming due during the PRGF, that there would be no way to backload 
the treatment, and that attempting to do so would raise questions 
about equality of treatment relative to other HIPCs under similar 
circumstances, such as the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). 
 
¶20. (SBU) Japan asked about the long-delayed mining project 
feasibility study, indicating that Japan would not provide financing 
assurances until there was a clearer picture of how the project fit 
into the DRC's macroeconomic framework.  The IMF opined that since 
there would no longer be a sovereign guarantee on the mining portion 
of the loan, the study was no longer relevant to the program. 
Belgium, Japan, and Germany disagreed, arguing that it was relevant 
in that revenues from the mining portion would be dedicated to 
paying for the infrastructure-related loan.  Creditors were 
generally very skeptical toward the DRC, and were adamant that they 
 
PARIS 00001387  011 OF 029 
 
 
expected to receive ample time to review the DSA and conditionality 
documents before providing financing assurances for the PRGF 
program. 
 
------------------------------- 
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 
------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) The IMF reported that Congo's performance on its PRGF 
program had been broadly satisfactory and that a Fund staff mission 
was in country to conduct the first stage of a HIPC "Completion 
Point" assessment.  In particular, IMF staff planned to verify legal 
texts and action plans for fulfilling performance "triggers" and to 
reconcile external debt data.  In the fall, they would begin 
verifying implementation for those triggers that included 
implementation requirements. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Fund had examined Congo's recent $800 million payment 
to so-called "vulture funds," including whether the settlement 
implied a need to revise debt data (since the debt stock was much 
larger than previously reported). The Secretariat said it still 
could not assess the comparability of the settlement until further 
clarifications were received from the authorities, and that the 
finance minister had said in a September 15 letter that there had 
been errors in the Congo's June 12 report on comparable treatment. 
As a result, the vulture fund settlement payment was likely even 
 
PARIS 00001387  012 OF 029 
 
 
less comparable to Paris Club terms than previously thought.  The 
IMF warned of possible problems in securing participation from 80% 
of Congo's creditors, a requirement of HIPC "Completion Point." 
 
------------- 
Cote d'Ivoire 
------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) The IMF reported that a mission was in country to review 
the PRGF program.  Preliminary indications were that end-June 
targets seemed to be on track, although progress on structural 
reforms was slow.  The Bank reported the authorities were pursuing a 
London Club rescheduling of commercial debt.  Talks with the London 
Club had been difficult, since that club was asserting that it had 
already provided HIPC-comparable treatment in its earlier agreement 
with the Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The Secretariat said that the London Club's proposed terms 
were "rather comparable" to the Paris Club's treatment.  London Club 
creditors were willing to apply a low 2.4% interest rate and accept 
a very long payment period - a six year grace period without 
principal payments followed by 23 years of repayment.  The final 
deal, formally announced on September 28, results in a 90% reduction 
in debt service due while the PRGF is in effect and an overall 20% 
reduction (in present value terms) of the total debt.  Non-London 
Club commercial creditors presented a more complex picture, with 
 
PARIS 00001387  013 OF 029 
 
 
some debts being recent (related to multilateral arrears clearance), 
some securitized, and some denominated in CFA francs.  Claims 
totaled some $264 million, due by the end of 2011.  Cote d'Ivoire 
had made an offer to these creditors similar to that made to the 
London Club, but the response had been very negative. 
 
------------------ 
Dominican Republic 
------------------ 
 
¶25. (U) The IMF reported that the Dominican Republic's strong 
economic growth had stagnated and would amount to an annualized rate 
of just 1% for the first half of 2009.  An IMF mission was in the 
country to discuss a three-year lending program; however, the Fund 
did not expect that the Dominican Republic would seek a Paris Club 
treatment.  The World Bank reported that $150 million in new lending 
was under discussion. 
 
------ 
Guinea 
------ 
 
¶26. (SBU) Guinea had been on the verge of receiving HIPC "Completion 
Point" debt forgiveness at the time of December's coup.  The Fund 
reported that short-term prospects had deteriorated, due to the 
global financial crisis and a fall in mining revenues.  While the 
 
PARIS 00001387  014 OF 029 
 
 
official exchange rate had not changed, the parallel market premium 
had risen significantly, to 16% in early September.  The junta had 
made some attempts at maintaining fiscal discipline, and the primary 
fiscal balance remained positive.  This discipline was slipping, 
however, giving way to increased central bank financing. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Several creditors, including France and the U.S., reported 
that Guinea had made some debt payments during 2009.  The 
Secretariat reminded creditors to hold such payments in reserve, in 
accordance with the Club's policy on providing interim HIPC debt 
relief, until a decision is made at a later date about whether to 
retain or refund the payments.  Guinea had remained current on debt 
payments to the Fund through September, but had been late making 
debt payments to the multilateral development banks, including to 
the African Development Bank (AfDB).  (The World Bank added that 
Guinea had earlier been late on some payments to its International 
Development Association, but was now current, and that the AfDB had 
been paid the previous week.)  Guinea had also made some progress in 
efforts to obtain comparable debt relief from non-Paris Club 
creditors. 
 
¶28. (SBU) The Fund was assessing relations with the country. 
President Moussa Camara's statement that he planned to run in the 
January 2010 elections, despite earlier commitments not to, make 
international recognition more difficult.  The Fund was polling 
members in order to determine whether to seat a Guinean delegation 
 
PARIS 00001387  015 OF 029 
 
 
at Annual Meetings.  (This poll later determined that there is no 
Guinean government that the IMF should recognize or engage with.) 
 
------- 
Jamaica 
------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) In July, the Fund had reported on discussions with Jamaica 
regarding an IMF lending program.  Since then, imbalances had 
intensified, with GDP expected to fall 3.8% in the current fiscal 
year, impacted by declines in tourism, remittances and bauxite 
prices.  Further fiscal consolidation, a significant reduction in 
the interest bill, and a major improvement in medium-term fiscal 
policy were needed.  The IMF and Jamaica continue to discuss a 
lending program; however, timing was uncertain.  The IMF believed 
that the debt load had become unsustainable and that a restructuring 
is needed.  Whether to approach the Club as part of the program 
remained an open question, but in the Fund's view, it would be 
"strange" not to include Paris Club creditors in a comprehensive 
debt restructuring.  The World Bank reported having approved a $100 
million loan in January 2009 and ongoing discussions about 
additional loans.  (Note: while it is not yet clear what form of 
debt treatment would be sought, the USG does not have funding or 
authorization in place to provide debt reduction to Jamaica.) 
 
¶30. (SBU) The U.S. delegation reported on Treasury DAS for Western 
 
PARIS 00001387  016 OF 029 
 
 
Hemisphere Affairs Nancy Lee's conversation with the Jamaican 
Ambassador to the U.S., prompting the IMF representative to observe 
that the authorities did not yet seem reconciled to the need for 
debt restructuring or deep reforms.  The Secretariat reported that 
the debt stock was about $6 billion, of which about $500 million was 
owed to the Club.  Canada reported that the Jamaican prime minister 
had called his Canadian counterpart to discuss IMF reforms, and had 
said (erroneously) that the Fund was conditioning an IMF program on 
Jamaica's willingness to seek a Paris Club debt restructuring. 
 
---------- 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) The IMF did not have any updates to the briefing provided 
in July.  The World Bank described a "complicated" bank 
restructuring underway, noting that an estimated 20% of the total 
loan portfolio was non-performing and that President Nazarbaev was 
"strongly reluctant" to use oil resources to recapitalize these 
banks.  Just days before the September 16 meeting, the Club had 
received a response in Russian, dated September 3, to its letter 
from the Kazakh finance minister.  The letter essentially reiterated 
the steps in the banking and financial sector restructuring taken to 
that point.  The Secretariat reported the results of the recent data 
call, which was unusual in that it included data on loans to private 
banks.  Paris Club creditors reported $3.5 billion of exposure to 
 
PARIS 00001387  017 OF 029 
 
 
Kazakhstan, of which Kazakh banks and financial institutions 
accounted for $1.5 billion, including $779 million owed by BTA Bank, 
$95 million by Astana Finance, and $60 million by Alliance.  Fifteen 
Club members had reported exposure, as had non-member Korea. 
 
¶32. (SBU) There was general agreement that the fact that the 
minister had replied, and at length, was a positive sign.  Following 
the same lines as before, Italy argued strongly for a Club response, 
asserting that the debt to private banks was "close to" being Club 
debt.  Italy pushed for another Club letter to endorse the export 
credit agencies' (ECA) position, including support for the 
Government of Kazakhstan to extend a sovereign guarantee, and for 
giving the ECAs more time to reach agreement (the deadline on BTA's 
offer was just two days later).  Noting similarities between the 
situations in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Italy also argued that the 
Club should at some point have a general discussion of debts owed by 
private banks that are directly or indirectly under sovereign 
control. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Germany was at the other extreme, arguing first that it 
needed time to review the Kazakh letter and to consult with its ECA, 
then that the Club should not "interfere."  Italy's position 
regarding a GOK guarantee received little support.  There was 
widespread support for another letter, however, and given the 
deadline two days hence, a sense of urgency.   It was eventually 
agreed that a letter should be sent, and the final text -- signed on 
 
PARIS 00001387  018 OF 029 
 
 
the same day -- reiterated that the Club was following negotiations 
carefully, emphasized the need for a fair process, and "insisted" 
that creditors be given enough time to consider options. 
 
---------- 
Seychelles 
---------- 
 
¶34. (SBU) The Secretariat reported that the Seychelles had made 
progress in obtaining Paris Club-comparable debt relief:  Seychelles 
had reached agreement with Malaysia on the same terms as the Club's 
April 2009 agreement (Malaysia had shown interest in participating 
in the negotiations but had not been ready to do so), and 
discussions with Kuwait had begun, though Libya would be "harder." 
The government's offer to bondholders, comprising three options, was 
moving forward, although there was not much likelihood of addressing 
the $40-60 million in debt that was tied up in the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy. 
 
¶35.  (SBU) The Fund reported that the macroeconomic situation had 
stabilized and that reforms were proceeding.  Negotiations with 
private creditors were transparent and credible, and the formal 
offer was expected to be made in late September or early October. 
The government was awaiting agreement on a partial guarantee from 
the African Development Bank, which Seychelles' advisors had 
indicated was essential for the exchange to succeed.  The Fitch 
 
PARIS 00001387  019 OF 029 
 
 
credit rating agency had been hired to rate the new bonds. 
 
-------- 
Suriname 
-------- 
 
¶36. (SBU) The IMF reported that GDP had grown 6% in 2008, but was 
expected to rise only 1.5% in 2009, reflecting weak bauxite and 
alumina prices on the one hand and strength in gold and construction 
on the other.  Gross reserves were expected to rise to $670 million 
(equivalent to six months of imports), from just $160 million at 
end-2005.  Suriname had made progress in settling arrears with 
official creditors, and public debt had fallen from 37% of GDP at 
end-2005 to 19% at end-2008, with external debt down from 21% of GDP 
to just 11% over the same period. 
 
¶37. (SBU) The U.S. had asked that Suriname be placed on the agenda 
to discuss arrears and a reported debt agreement with Brazil. 
Prior to the plenary discussion, the Brazilian representative had 
mentioned the deal with Suriname to the U.S. delegation, 
inexplicably adding that the Surinamese had said that they needed 
contacts in the USG.  (Discussions between USDA and Suriname's 
financial advisor are ongoing.)  During the plenary, the U.S. noted 
reports of the deal, pointed out that it seemed to violate Paris 
Club principles, and asked Brazil for details.  (Note:  Creditors 
are supposed to keep the Club informed and attempt to coordinate 
 
PARIS 00001387  020 OF 029 
 
 
efforts to obtain payment from countries even when the country is 
not pursuing an IMF lending program and/or Paris Club debt relief. 
End note) 
 
¶38. (SBU) Brazil acknowledged that a deal had been reached involving 
$118 million in non-concessional debt.  In June, Brazil had offered 
Suriname two options: 
 
-- Option 1:  a rescheduling creating eleven semi-annual payments, 
the first after six months, with forgiveness of $35 million of late 
interest after all payments were received; or 
 
-- Option 2:  full payment upfront, with forgiveness of $45 million 
(a 38% nominal discount). 
 
¶39. (SBU) The Surinamese had selected the second option the previous 
week and paid the $72.8 million into escrow (since the deal needed 
approval from the Brazilian parliament).  The Secretariat recalled 
the Club's discussions of Suriname over the past three years, during 
which several creditors, including Germany and Italy, had confessed 
to having settled arrears outside the Club.  The Club Co-Chairperson 
was bluntly critical of Brazil, stating flatly that creditor 
"solidarity has been breached here."  Norway attempted to defend 
Brazil, noting that solidarity did not prevent individual creditors 
from being more generous than the Club, but the Secretariat pointed 
out that this did not apply when a payment was received.  The 
 
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Secretariat offered to send a letter to Suriname, which the U.S. 
accepted. 
 
------- 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
¶40. (SBU) Italy had asked that Ukraine be placed on the agenda, 
noting similarities to the situation in Kazakhstan.  The IMF 
reported that the recession seemed to be bottoming out, with GDP 
expected to contract 14% in 2009, followed by a 2.75% increase in 
¶2010.  Bank restructuring was progressing, with issues at three of 
the five systemically-important problem banks having been resolved. 
There was an agreement on the fourth, leaving only Nadra Bank. 
About $1 billion in liabilities needed to be restructured, though 
there was agreement on $120 million owed to export credit agencies 
(ECAs).  An IMF mission planned to travel to Ukraine in October to 
prepare the third review of the IMF stand-by arrangement. 
 
------- 
Vietnam 
------- 
 
¶41. (SBU) The Paris Club discussed Vietnam because of arrears. 
Denmark reported that Vietnam had missed a July 15 payment but had 
paid during the week of the meeting.  Norway reported "on and off" 
 
PARIS 00001387  022 OF 029 
 
 
payment trouble on a loan guaranteed by Norway's export credit 
agency.  The IMF reported that the country was weathering the global 
crisis well, despite pressures on the country's balance of payments 
position.  The IMF expected GDP to rise 4.5% in 2009 and the outlook 
for 2010 to improve.  The World Bank reported that there were 
shortages of foreign currency, and that there appeared to be foreign 
exchange hoarding in expectation of a currency devaluation. 
 
-------- 
Zimbabwe 
-------- 
 
¶42. (SBU) The Secretariat had placed Zimbabwe on the agenda because 
a number of creditors had received requests from authorities to 
reconcile debts.  (The U.S. has not.)  The IMF indicated that a 
recovery had begun, with 4% growth expected in 2009.  The government 
had implemented dollarization, was broadly adhering to cash 
budgeting, and had liberalized prices and exchange markets.  Many 
issues needed to be addressed, however, including aid and capital 
inflows, the business climate, public sector wages, and central bank 
governance.  Cooperation with missions and advisors had been good, 
and the government had agreed to make token payments of 
$100,000/quarter against its Fund arrears; the first such payment 
had been made.  However, the IMF Executive Board had decided to 
leave its relations with Zimbabwe unchanged, which means that 
Zimbabwe would remain ineligible for new IMF lending under a PRGF 
 
PARIS 00001387  023 OF 029 
 
 
program until arrears were cleared.  End-2008 public- and 
publicly-guaranteed external debt was estimated at $5.7 billion, 
313% of goods and services exports, and 182% of GDP.   Most was in 
arrears. 
 
¶43. (SBU) The Fund also summarized its contacts with the Government 
of Zimbabwe concerning use of the special SDR allocation.  While 
there was no conditionality associated with the use of the 
allocation, Fund staff had advised the authorities to retain the 
SDRs in reserves so they could remain available for an eventual 
arrears clearance, rather than being spent to finance investment. 
The IMF also had no new information on a reported $950 million 
Chinese loan mentioned by Germany.  The Bank reported that its staff 
was setting up the multi-donor trust fund as well as a country 
office.  A joint UN Development Program and African Development Bank 
needs assessment had been put on hold, though small grants were 
being made through NGOs. 
 
¶44. (SBU) Creditors that reported requests to reconcile debt data 
mostly said that Zimbabwe's figures were well below theirs.  There 
was a general feeling that the reconciliation exercise should be 
coordinated, though the U.S. warned that it was important not to 
raise unrealistic expectations in Harare about Paris Club debt 
treatment.  It was agreed that the Secretariat would contact the 
Zimbabwean authorities informally, reminding them of the full list 
of Club creditors, and that the Club would launch a data call for 
 
PARIS 00001387  024 OF 029 
 
 
its own use. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Methodological Issue: 
Draft UK Vulture Fund Legislation 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶45. (SBU) The UK discussed its public consultation concerning draft 
legislation on legal efforts by so-called "vulture funds" to secure 
full repayment from poor debtors on loans the funds had bought at 
steep discount on secondary markets.  The presentation mostly 
followed that of the public document, which can be accessed at the 
following links: 
 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_69_09.htm 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ 
consult_effectivedebtrelief_200709.pdf 
 
¶46. (SBU) Based on public comments received thus far, British NGOs 
believed that the proposal did not go far enough in restricting 
vulture funds' recovery rights, arguing that it should cover more 
countries and future lending.  In contrast, financial firms asserted 
that the draft law would interfere with property rights, pervert 
incentives, threaten London's role as a financial center, and that 
it was disproportionate to the extent of the problem.  The UK added 
that it was unclear whether the government would proceed with the 
 
PARIS 00001387  025 OF 029 
 
 
legislation, which would require a ministerial decision. 
 
¶47. (SBU) France, in particular, seemed interested in the prospects 
of legislation, and asked whether there was anything the U.S., as 
one of the main jurisdictions for litigation by vulture funds, could 
or would do.  The U.S. reported on H.R. 2932, the bill that 
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) had reintroduced in June 2009, 
noting that the Administration was not supporting it and that the 
bill raised significant policy and legal issues.  Privately, the UK 
delegation indicated that further technical work had uncovered 
significant legal obstacles, including how the legislation would 
treat requests to enforce in the UK awards made by foreign courts, 
and how foreign courts would be expected to consider the legislation 
when adjudicating debts covered by UK law. 
 
------------------------------ 
Methodological Issue: 
Data Call on Paris Club Claims 
------------------------------ 
 
¶48. (U) The Secretariat proposed making the global data call, first 
conducted in September 2008, an annual exercise.  The Secretariat 
suggested using year-end data, and that the request for (2009) data 
will therefore take place early in 2010. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
PARIS 00001387  026 OF 029 
 
 
Methodological Issue: 
Review of Debt Sustainability Framework 
and Debt Limits in IMF Programs 
Paris Club Implications 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶49. (U) The IMF provided a detailed briefing on recent reforms of 
Fund lending programs.  The Secretariat also circulated a working 
paper analyzing which of the new IMF program types could provide a 
basis for Paris Club debt relief.  In the Secretariat's view, the 
key requirements justifying Paris Club treatment remained:  1) a 
demonstrated financing gap, and 2) an appropriate IMF economic 
reform program.  The new Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Standby 
Credit Facility (SCF) could provide adequate bases for debt relief. 
The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), however, would not.  Countries 
using the new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) program seemed unlikely 
candidates for Paris Club debt relief, and the FCL's structure did 
not fit well with standard Paris Club debt relief agreements. 
 
¶50. (U) The Fund also presented its new Debt Sustainability 
Framework (DSF) methodology.  Creditors discussed how the Club would 
consider debts owed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that the Fund 
had decided to exclude from the debt sustainability analysis (DSA). 
The Secretariat reiterated its view that the Paris Club reserves the 
right to analyze independently the autonomy of the SOE and the risk 
of default during the period of the debt relief.  A more general 
 
PARIS 00001387  027 OF 029 
 
 
discussion of this methodology topic was deferred to a later 
meeting. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Methodological Issue: 
Debt Service Reduction (DSR) Methodology 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶51. (U) The Secretariat presented a working paper, which revealed 
that the current methodology for calculating repayment schedules 
contains an error.  As a result, some creditor countries provide 
less reduction than others do in the case of successive debt 
treatments for the same debtor country.  The U.S. is not directly 
affected by this correction, since U.S. bilateral debt reduction 
agreements provide relief through actual reduction of principal (the 
so-called "debt reduction option"), rather than payment deferral 
only.  However, the U.S. still has an interest in the relief 
provided by others. 
 
----------------------- 
Methodological Issue: 
Working Group Regarding 
Treatment of Guarantees 
----------------------- 
 
¶52. (SBU) At the July meeting, the Club had discussed inconclusively 
 
PARIS 00001387  028 OF 029 
 
 
how it should address guarantees of loans that were not in default, 
both in data calls and debt treatments.  A survey had shown that 
creditor practices varied widely, and that the issue raised a number 
of policy and legal questions (the latter for some creditors, 
including the U.S.).  The Secretariat had decided to set up a 
working group, including ECA representatives, to consider the issue 
and establish a clearer Club policy.  A brief organizational meeting 
was held after the Tour. 
 
¶53. (SBU) The Secretariat invited creditor input ahead of the 
working group's first full meeting, probably in October and expected 
to focus on the scope of the issue and the economic and financial 
implications of including or excluding contingent liabilities.   A 
second meeting would focus on legal problems, and a third would 
examine technical aspects of the issue using a concrete country 
example, such as Pakistan.  Germany, one of countries that said it 
included all public and publicly-guaranteed loans -- whether in 
default or not -- in Paris Club data calls and treatments, asked for 
a clear explanation of the legal problems that other creditors 
claimed to face. 
 
¶54. (U) For additional information on any of the countries or issues 
mentioned above, please contact EEB/IFD/OMA David Freudenwald at 
freudenwalddj@state.gov or Nicholle Manz at manznm@state.gov. 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
PARIS 00001387  029 OF 029 
 
 
 
RIVKIN