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Viewing cable 09NDJAMENA498, CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE: THE NEXT STEP IS DEFINITELY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NDJAMENA498 2009-10-30 12:20 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO4640
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0498/01 3031220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301220Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7379
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
SECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM MARR SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE:  THE NEXT STEP IS DEFINITELY 
UP TO KHARTOUM, FRANCOPHONIE AMBASSADOR ASSERTS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 485 
     B. NDJAMENA 446 
     C. NDJAMENA 438 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU)  "The ball is definitely in Sudan's court" in the 
current Chad-Sudan bilateral process aimed at detente between 
the two countries, Francophonie "Ambassador" Hassan Lebatt 
told Ambassador and DCM October 30.  Lebatt, who is a keen 
analyst of the Chad-Sudan situation and very well-informed, 
said that Chad was waiting for Sudan to advise that it had 
relocated Chad rebels sufficiently far away from the border 
for Chad's comfort and that rebel chiefs were gathered in 
Khartoum.  Lebatt confirmed our understanding of the sequence 
of actions agreed by Chad and Sudan during Dr. Ghazi's visit 
to N'Djamena:  first, the Sudanese act with respect to Chad 
rebels; second, the Sudanese come to Chad to verify that 
there are no JEM bases in Eastern Chad; third, a Chadian 
delegation goes to Khartoum to discuss further steps.  Lebatt 
called for international pressure on Sudan to put into force 
early, good-faith cantonment measures, joining UN/AU 
Negotiator Djibrill Bassole and Chadian officials, who have 
been making the same point to us since the Ghazi visit.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
BILATERAL DYNAMIC ENCOURAGING 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Representative of the Organisation Internationale 
de la Francophonie (OIF) Hasan Lebatt, a former Mauritanian 
Foreign Minister, UN official, and academic specializing in 
international mediation, offered his views on Chad-Sudan 
relations in the course of a conversation with Ambassador on 
Chad's electoral process, in which the OIF has played an 
important and positive role.  Lebatt stressed that the most 
encouraging aspect of the October 10 visit by Sudanese 
Presidential Envoy Ghazi to Chad was that the Chadians and 
Sudanese seemed interested in speaking directly to each 
other, without a facilitator.  Lebatt noted that the 
international community had a virtual "facilitators market" 
in operation at present, with many individuals, organizations 
and representatives of third countries trying to encourage 
Chad-Sudan rapprochement.  Mediators who were biased or 
motivated by self-interest -- even if the interest consisted 
solely of putting the mediators themselves on the world stage 
-- generally did not make headway unless parties to conflict 
genuinely wanted to work out their differences. 
 
------------------- 
REALISM ENCOURAGING 
------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  The GoC and GoS had not only been willing to sit 
down bilaterally, but they had also agreed on mutual 
confidence-building measures that were achievable and 
realistic, said Lebatt.  President Deby had not asked Ghazi 
to disarm the Chadian rebels, to take away their sources of 
financing, or to chase them from Sudan, he had simply asked 
that they be cantoned in a location where they could not 
continue to threaten Chad.  Ghazi had not asked Deby to force 
the JEM to leave Chad or to prevent them from visiting 
relatives here, he had merely asked that they not have 
military bases in Chad.  Thus both sides appeared to have set 
aside their litanies of demands and maximalist positions. 
This in itself was a big step. 
 
----------------- 
NOW WALK THE WALK 
----------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  According to Lebatt, President Deby had told OIF 
Secretary General Abdou Diouf in Paris, during his visit 
there immediately following meetings with Ghazi, that Ghazi 
had agreed explicitly to the notion of Sudan's taking the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000498  002 OF 002 
 
 
first step in the new bilateral process.  If Sudan did not do 
so, said Lebatt, the result might well be a return to proxy 
war.  The GoC remain extremely nervous about the Chadian 
rebels.  Lebatt added that his most recent information 
suggested that some Chadian rebel groups were still arming. 
If Sudan failed to accomplish cantonment, or if it cantoned 
the Chadian rebels in such a way that they could remain 
strong or continue to receive Sudanese arms, there would 
likely be trouble.  The international community needed to put 
pressure on Sudan so that it would fulfill its commitment in 
a manner that reassured the GoC that the Chadian rebels would 
not be in a position to threaten or attack. 
NIGRO