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OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0485/01 3001414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271414Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7367
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
SECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
ABUJA FOR POL 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR SU NI CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN SAYS CHAD PUSHING TO NORMALIZE WITH SUDAN, 
USG SUDAN STRATEGY SOUND, DEBY TO MEET GRATION IN ABUJA 
 
REF: A. STATE 109669 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 483 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 479 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 466 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 462 
     ¶F. NDJAMENA 457 
     ¶G. NDJAMENA 446 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  FM Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador and DCM 
October 27 that Chad was "perfectly serious" about pursuing 
normalization with Sudan; still talking to Sudan about 
confidence-building measures and normalizing relations along 
lines agreed during Dr.Ghazi Salahuddin's visit last month; 
and awaiting the GOS's cantonment of Chadian rebels and 
promised invitation for Faki to visit Khartoum to move the 
process to conclusion.  Faki said that Deby's decision to 
move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the border was 
meant as a clear signal to the GOS that Chad was serious 
about normalization, and to the JEM that their welcome in 
Chad was wearing out.  Faki reiterated that he was hoping for 
an equally "strong signal" from Sudan.  Faki said that he 
would accompany President Deby to the AU Peace and Security 
Council meeting in Abuja.  The GOC was preparing for a 
Deby-Gration meeting there and would take the Abuja 
opportunity to consult with Sudanese counterparts, including 
Ghazi Salahuddin, in the hope of speeding up the bilateral 
process. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador briefed Faki on the USG's new Sudan 
Strategy, underlining the novel elements -- prioritized full 
CPA implementation, a shorter timeline, and new benchmarks, 
incentives and disincentives.  Ambassador briefed Faki on his 
own visit to Eastern Chad last week, emphasizing the very 
good collaboration between GOC local officials, MINURCAT, 
Humanitarian IOs and NGOs.  Faki approved Ambassador's goal 
of talking soon to rebel and opponent returnees like Soubiane 
and Goukouni, but noted that Soubiane was busy re-integrating 
his fighters into Chadian life and that Goukouni was not in 
Chad at the moment. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The GOC has proved as good as its (very carefully 
chosen) word regarding the current bilateral Chad-Sudan 
normalization process and its outreach to former rebels and 
regime opponents, as reftels make clear.  Deby's engagement 
on courses of action recommended to him by senior USG 
officials since February of 2008, and now with SE Gration, 
has resulted in progress toward restoring regional stability, 
both in terms of Chad-Sudan detente and JEM as a Chadian 
proxy.  We're not there yet, and we prefer to make 
predictions after the fact, but Chad-Sudan normalization, and 
a JEM-less Chad, are more possible now than a few months ago. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMICS 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Faki reviewed the results of the October 10 
meetings in N'Djamena between President Deby and Sudanese 
Presidential Envoy Ghazi (Ref B), describing the 
confidence-building measures agreed by the two sides (the 
"scenario" having been hand-written by Ghazi as he and Faki 
spoke): Khartoum to canton and restrain remaining Chadian 
rebels well inside the Sudan border; N'Djamena to "open its 
eyes" to JEM doings on its territories and "encourage" JEM to 
return to Darfur, after which Chad was to open its territory, 
including "former JEM areas of operation" in Eastern Chad to 
inspection by the Sudanese; and a visit by Faki himself to 
Khartoum to discuss further mutual steps, which might include 
mixed patrols on the border and the opening of consulates in 
Abeche and El Geneina, as envisaged in the bilateral 2006 
Protocol.  Faki reiterated that Ghazi had said Sudan sought 
peace, and recalled that the two sides needed proof of 
 
NDJAMENA 00000485  002 OF 003 
 
 
sincerity -- "just as your Sudan Strategy calls for 'verify, 
then trust'." 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Faki indicated that he had spoken with Ghazi by 
phone October 25 for an update on the status of Sudan's 
efforts with regard to the initial confidence-building 
measure, cantonment of Chadian rebels still in Sudan.  Ghazi 
had told him that all elements of the GOS were supportive in 
principle of the measure.  Chad was "now awaiting a concrete 
plan, and hoping for progress."  Faki said that Deby's 
decision to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the 
border was meant as a clear signal to the GOS that Chad was 
serious about normalization, and to the JEM that their 
welcome in Chad was wearing out.  Faki said that Chad hoped 
for an equally "strong signal" from Sudan.  Ambassador noted 
that he had spoken with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim the 
previous week and found him more on the defensive than 
formerly.  Faki rejoined that the GOC had this impression as 
well. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Faki confirmed that he would accompany President 
Deby to the AU's Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja 
October 29, and that President Deby was looking forward to a 
meeting there with S/E Gration.  Faki said that he himself 
intended to meet with Ghazi and others from the Sudan side in 
Abuja in the hope of spurring progress on the 
confidence-building measures laid out October 10 in N'Djamena. 
 
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CHADIAN REBELS 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Faki said that the Ambassador should feel free to 
meet with returning Chadian rebel leaders Soubiane and 
Goukouni but noted that Soubiane was busy re-integrating his 
fighters into Chadian life and that Goukouni was not in Chad 
at the moment.  Faki said he had been in routine contact with 
Soubiane October 25, as they worked together on national 
reconciliation issues.  Faki indicated that he was not able 
to shed light on the supposed "congress" of Chadian rebels 
organized by Khartoum, which National Mediator Abderahman had 
previously discussed with us. 
 
----------------------- 
SUDAN STRATEGY ROLL-OUT 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Ambassador briefed Faki on the elements of the 
USG's new Sudan Strategy (Ref A), stressing that we felt a 
sense of urgency to resolve the Darfur conflict and 
simultaneously to move forward with the CPA process.  Faki 
indicated that that the GoC appreciated the "strong ideas" in 
the document, supported the notion of simultaneous steps on 
the Darfur and CPA fronts, and was pleased that Sudanese 
Presidential Envoy Ghazi had had favorable things to say 
about the U.S. strategy.  Faki noted that Chad believed the 
U.S. had correctly identified the root causes of the Darfur 
conflict, which included injustice and marginalization of the 
population, coupled by "usurpation of power" by those not 
popularly selected.  He thanked the U.S. for stating clearly 
that the time had come for Sudan to "take care of its 
internal problems" and "find means of getting along with its 
neighbors," including Chad. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Following the release of the new U.S. Sudan 
Strategy, "the world was waiting" for Sudan to respond, 
continued Faki.  The U.S. had made its views known.  If other 
UNSC members -- "including Sudan's friends" -- did the same, 
Sudan might produce concrete proof of its bona fides. 
President Bashir remained concerned about his indictment by 
the International War Crimes Tribunal, Faki pointed out, and 
was perhaps looking for international support for the notion 
of placing some judges at the Tribunal who were from Sudan. 
The question of whether justice would have to precede 
reconciliation or vice versa was an open one, but "Bashir 
needs to be judged based on the allegations against him," 
Faki offered. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000485  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The GOC has proved as good as its (very carefully 
chosen) word regarding the current bilateral Chad-Sudan 
normalization process and its outreach to former rebels and 
regime opponents.  Deby's engagement on courses of action 
recommended to him by senior USG officials since February of 
2008, and now with SE Gration, has resulted in progress 
toward restoring regional stability, both in terms of 
Chad-Sudan detente and JEM as a Chadian proxy. We're not 
there yet, and we prefer to make predictions after the fact, 
but Chad-Sudan normalization, and a JEM-less Chad, are more 
possible now than a few months ago. 
NIGRO