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O 260906Z OCT 09 ZDK MULTIPLE
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7355
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000479 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
DOD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SU FR LY UN AU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: MINURCAT SRSG GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON 
CHAD-SUDAN NORMALIZATION AND CHAD ELECTION PROCESS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1193 
     ¶B. PARIS 1415 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 466 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 462 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 458 
     ¶F. NDJAMENA 457 
     ¶G. NDJAMENA 447 
     ¶H. NDJAMENA 446 
     ¶I. NDJAMENA 444 
     ¶J. NDJAMENA 441 
     ¶K. NDJAMENA 428 
 
NDJAMENA 00000479  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador 
October 22 that he was "guardedly optimistic" regarding the 
current trend in Chad-Sudan relations, where momentum toward 
normalization and ending support for military proxies was 
building, and on Chad's election process, making "credible if 
not perfect" legislative and municipal elections more and 
more likely in 2010.  Angelo thanked the Ambassador for his 
participation in a two-day tour of Eastern Chad by Perm-5 
ambassadors the previous week, which exposed the group to 
progress by MINURCAT and DIS, the current state of 
humanitarian assistance, and the views of local GOC 
officials, refugees, IDPs, and local Chadian stressed 
populations.  Angelo also touched on his own planned travel 
to Congo-Brazzaville and CAR next week; the complex political 
dynamic between Chad and CAR, including the presence of the 
LRA and possibly Joseph Kony himself in CAR; the current 
INTERPOL arrest warrant out on JEM Chief Khalil Ibrahim; and 
MINURCAT's desire for more U.S. military staff and liaison 
officers. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Angelo has extremely sensitive political antennae 
and is extremely well-informed, including through his 
contacts within the GOC, where he is trusted and esteemed. 
Like the French (Ref C), he appears increasingly "bullish" on 
developments here, both diplomatic and domestic.  We agree 
with Angelo that there are reasons for optimism regarding 
Chad-Sudan normalization:  the tone and substance of Chadian 
rhetoric vis-a-vis Sudan had changed since the Ghazi visit 
here, including at the highest levels, both publicly and 
privately; President Deby's decision to move the Oure Cassoni 
refugee camp ought to reassure Khartoum as much as it 
dismayed JEM; and continued engagement by the USG, France, 
Libya and the UN/AU sponsors Dakar Accord Contact Group 
should be useful in encouraging the bilateral movement toward 
detente.  (See Refs A-D, F, and H.)  We also agree that the 
trend-line is favorable regarding the long-drawn-out 
electoral reform process, with a positive "election climate" 
in the air, and the real possibility of elections before 
mid-year 2010. (See Refs A, C, E, I and K.) 
 
--------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN: TRENDING 
TOWARD NORMALIZATION? 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Angelo indicated that the UN was cautiously 
optimistic about the prospects for improved relations between 
Chad and Sudan, now that the two sides seemed to be moving 
from deep mistrust to efforts at mutual confidence-building. 
Angelo said that the sudden but welcome August decision by 
President Deby to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, long a 
refuge, R and R point, and recruiting station for JEM 
fighters, had sent a powerful message to the Sudanese 
Government and to JEM, positive to the former, negative to 
the latter.  The proposed move was clearly designed as a 
"confidence-building measure" for the GOS, and could not be 
taken by JEM as anything other than a shot across the bow. 
Angelo said that bilateral talks between N'Djamena and 
Khartoum over the past several months, and especially the 
recent visit of Dr. Ghazi to N'Djamena, was a very positive 
sign.  A bilateral dynamic, with the two countries taking the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000479  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
lead in resolving their differences, and others -- the Dakar 
Contact Group, the UN, the USG, the AU, etc. -- "blessing" a 
normalization process arrived by Chad and Sudan on terms of 
their own choosing, was perhaps the most workable way 
forward.  Angelo said that there was interest in Brazzaville 
and perhaps Libya in reviving the Dakar Accord Contact Group 
to encourage Chad-Sudan normalization:  He added that he 
would be traveling to both capitals soon. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Ambassador asked whether Angelo was aware of a 
possible "congress" or "conference" of Chadian rebels in the 
coming days on the Sudan side of the border. Angelo indicated 
that the UN was watching to see what might develop as a 
result of this apparent Khartoum-backed initiative, which 
could be linked with steps proposed for Sudan in the series 
of confidence-building measures laid out in the course of the 
October 10 Ghazi visit to N'Djamena. 
 
------------------ 
JEM NOT MOBILIZING 
IN EAST CHAD 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Ambassador shared our estimation of the situation, 
asking whether MINURCAT had heard reports of JEM "build-up" 
in Eastern Chad in recent days.  Angelo replied that "we keep 
seeing JEM figures in the East," but denied that anything 
that could be described as build-up was going on.  The JEM 
had recently been "moving around Farchana, visiting people in 
camps."  But the UN had observed no unusual concentration of 
JEM fighters. 
 
----------------- 
KHALIL IBRAHIM 
ON INTERPOL LIST? 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Angelo asked whether the U.S. had reason to believe 
Khalil Ibrahim had been placed on an INTERPOL list of those 
wanted for terrorism.  Ambassador said he would try to 
determine what the reality was in this and what implications 
it might have for the USG and the GOC. (Septel.)  Ambassador 
said that we had found Khalil to be in quite a defensive mood 
when we saw him earlier in the week.  Angelo offered that 
Khalil seemed bitter toward both UN/AU Negotiator Djibril 
Bassole and S/USSES General Scott Gration, which Ambassador 
confirmed, saying it was further indication of JEM loss of 
confidence, despite the organization's continued rhetorical 
bravura. 
 
--------------------------- 
ELECTORAL PROCESS: CREDIBLE 
ELECTIONS POSSIBLE IN 2010 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Angelo said that he was encouraged by what he 
called "electoral climate change" in Chad, as long-awaited 
legislative and municipal elections seemed more likely to be 
held in 2010.  Angelo cited the appointment of a new Chief of 
Joint Military Staff, a veteran and prestigious Southerner, 
as a move by Deby to attract Southern Chadian voters.  He 
termed ongoing civic improvement projects in N'Djamena as 
essentially good electoral politics, for which Deby was 
picking up some popular support.  Ambassador added that an 
increased sense of safety among populations who had for too 
long been victimized by rebel activity would also likely 
increase Deby's electoral chances, citing a 
soon-to-be-published USAID risk-assessment. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Angelo stressed that the UN believed Deby was 
serious in his determination to hold elections in 2010 and 
2011, and that some cabinet changes should be expected in the 
near term, not only to make room for homeward-bound rebels 
but also to "put more Southerners in charge" so as to 
cultivate votes among the group least likely to be 
enthusiastic about another Deby term.  The opposition had had 
a strategy session the previous day to try to select from 
 
NDJAMENA 00000479  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
many self-appointed leaders, among whom was Saleh Kebzabo, 
who claimed to have been invited to Am Jarras for a Ramadan 
audience with the President and offered the Prime 
Ministership, which he had declined.  Current Prime Minister 
Abbas was "hanging on," offered Angelo, because he was doing 
a good job and the IC liked him.  In general terms, said 
Angelo, the UN was supportive of elections and wanted to 
encourage the GoC to move ahead, without placing "so many 
demands on the project that IC involvement becomes a source 
of tension." 
 
----------------- 
SRSG TRAVEL TO 
CONGO/B AND LIBYA 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Angelo said that he had been invited by 
Congo-Brazzaville President Sassou-Nguesso to visit that 
nation October 23, ostensibly to discuss his desire to revive 
the Dakar Accord Contact Group Process, but also, Angelo 
surmised, to cultivate him as part of an effort to assert 
himself as "first among equals" of Central African leaders, 
replacing deceased Gabon "Big Man" Omar Bongo and preempting 
or marginalizing Biya of Cameroon, who (Angelo added) was 
seen by many as an obstacle to regional integration.  Angelo 
noted that he would travel to Libya (the other co-chair of 
the Dakar Process) the week of November 2 to continue 
pursuing how the international community might formally 
"bless" an improvement in relations between Chad and Sudan. 
 
---------------- 
CAR ISSUES: SRSG 
GOING TO BANGUI 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Angelo indicated that he planned to travel from 
Brazzaville to Bangui October 24, in order to try to gain a 
better understanding of the complex situation there, 
particularly with respect to the possibility of elections in 
April 2010.  In Angelo's view, a constitutional requirement 
to hold a vote as scheduled might exist, even though 
statements had been made about postponing elections.  Angelo 
said he had been discussing the UN's role in CAR national 
elections, which seemed to involve increasing security in 
advance of a vote, with his counterpart, SRSG Sahle-Work 
Zewde of BONUCA, who had been in Chad earlier in the week. 
He made clear that he looked forward to seeing Ambassador 
Cook in Bangui. 
 
---------------- 
CAR ISSUES: LRA, 
KONY IN CAR? 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Referring to reports that the LRA and possibly 
Jospeh Kony had taken up residence in ungoverned spaces in 
Northeastern CAR, Angelo stressed that the Chadians were 
increasingly concerned about CAR in general.  They did not 
necessarily believe that Kony would attempt to enter Chad, 
but they were nervous that their operational capabilities in 
Salamat Province were insufficient to deter major trouble 
from the south.  The LRA was highly mobile and used to living 
simply for long periods in the brush, so their staying power 
was relatively great, said Angelo. 
 
-------------------- 
CAR ISSUES: CHAD-CAR 
RELATIONS/TENSIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The Chadians were also worried about military 
tensions in the vicinity of Chad's southwestern border with 
CAR, Angelo noted.  The Chadian rebel group Rally of Positive 
Forces, hailing originally from Eastern Chad, had settled in 
the vicinity of the Northwestern CAR town of Kaga Bandoro. 
Although the leader, Baba Lade, had been arrested in CAR, a 
new leader seemed to have emerged, was heavily armed, and 
 
NDJAMENA 00000479  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
apparently had plans for preying on populations on both sides 
of the border.  To compound the situation, a rogue ANT 
general, Djibrine Dassert, had been raiding CAR villages from 
the Chadian side of the border.  We noted that the Chadian 
Defense Minister had traveled to CAR recently, and that a CAR 
delegation had been in N'Djamena the previous day for 
meetings with PM Youssef Saleh Abbas, but said we did not 
have details.  (NOTE:  The CAR media report that a General 
Ramadane has replaced Baba Lade, but state that they cannot 
verify the permanence of this posting.  END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
OURE CASSONI: MOVING THE CAMP NO 
EASY MATTER FOR PKO AND HUMANITARIANS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Angelo said that there was no doubt about the 
positive political implications of President Deby's personal 
decision to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the 
border, which sent clear signals to Khartoum (positive) and 
to JEM (negative), although it presented practical logistical 
challenges for MINURCAT and the humanitarian effort.  Angelo 
noted that the location in Bir Douan proposed by the GoC as 
an alternate to the present refugee camp site at Oure Cassoni 
was presenting significant practical challenges, including 
that there might not be enough water to sustain the camp's 
population.  MINURCAT was supportive of moving the camp in 
order to disrupt JEM operations -- so long as a suitable 
alternate site could be found.  Bir Douan did not look to be 
such a site.  Angelo asked for U.S. support in trying to 
convince the Chadian side to accept the realities of the 
situation; Ambassador agreed to help.  (NOTE:  Refcoords met 
separately October 20 with UNHCR Deputy ResRep Michele Manca 
di Nissa, who stated that the hydrological studies described 
in Ref G were not showing adequate water for sustained supply 
to 28,000 people.  Manca added that UNHCR was still 
formulating its report, hoping to make clear that the 
relocation of Oure Cassoni within the same general area would 
be unsustainable, and suggesting areas with greater 
potential, including Fada or the area around Iriba.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------- 
NEW HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP 
STRONG AND ACTIVE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Angelo said he was encouraged by the arrival of 
an experienced new WFP Program head, Jean-Luc Siblot, given 
that the food security situation in Chad would likely become 
quite challenging in the coming months due to an expected bad 
harvest.  Angelo also termed incoming UNHCR ResRep Stefano 
Severe and UNDP ResRep Michele Falavigna "proactive and 
enterprising."  The UN's new IV/AIDS Coordinator was also 
impressive, with th result that had the strongest team in 
quite som time in Chad. 
 
-------------------------- 
HUMNITARIANS AND SECURITY 
IN EASTERN CHAD 
------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  According to Angeo, coordination between UN 
agencies and the GO community had improved over time, but 
humanitarians were still far too prone to taking unnecessary 
risks in an extremely dangerous environment, and then 
complaining that the UN had been remiss in not protecting 
them.  He asked for USG support in alerting U.S. citizens 
among the humanitarian community to the need to coordinate 
closely with MINURCAT, and to avoid launching forth 
unescorted into regions (e.g., the vicinity of Guereda) where 
trouble was likely. 
 
------------------------------ 
ANGELO SEEKS MORE U.S. MILOFFS 
------------------------------ 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000479  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Angelo also recalled his request that the U.S. 
provide more military staff and liaison officers to MINURCAT, 
adding that he had left the UNGA with the impression that 
these would be forthcoming in the December-January timeframe. 
 We told him that we believed the USG was ready to send six 
more such officers, and that we hoped that they would arrive 
in the first quarter of 2010. 
 
¶17.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO