VZCZCXRO5888
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0465 2941214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211214Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7336
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000465 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM RU SU FR CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: RUSSIAN SPECIAL SUDAN ENVOY BRIEFS PERM-3 
AMBS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 462 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 457 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 446 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 438 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Russian Special Envoy for Sudan Mikhail Margelov 
briefed U.S., French, and Chinese Ambassadors to Chad October 
20 on his Chad visit, at Russian Embassy over breakfast. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Margelov said that a recent seminar in Moscow on the 
CPA was a Russian attempt to interest Sudanese parties in an 
alternative to either continued union or South Sudan 
independence.  There were other possibilities, such as a 
looser federation or confederation, that fell between the two 
more extreme alternatives, that might work for Sudan.  The 
Russian Federation itself, with some experience in holding 
fractious peripheral parts of a federal system together, 
might offer some models. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Margelov said that he was sensing some hesitation 
on the part of senior SPLM leaders about the prospects of 
independence, for which they would completely responsible. 
Recent events in the South had divided and weakened the 
Southern side, increasing the SPLM's feeling of being on the 
defensive. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Margelov described his visit to eastern Chad, 
meetings with SRSG Angelo, GOC officials, and parliamentary 
leaders and said he was scheduled to see President Deby later 
today.  Margelov said he would be in Paris tomorrow for talks 
with the French and UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole.  Margelov 
said that he was studying the new USG Sudan Strategy, and 
that he looked forward to discussing it with his colleague, 
General Gration.  Margelov added that he was still puzzled by 
the concept of "civili society" in Darfur.  French Ambassador 
Foucher agreed with Margelov that this notion was a bit 
opaque. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Margelov said he was currently slightly more 
optimistic about prospects for resolution of Darfur than for 
the complete implementation of the CPA, although the two 
situations were of course inter-related.  He said that 
President Bashir needed a positive outcome in Darfur to 
consolidate his own position and to give him leverage for 
upcoming elections as well as for his approach to CPA 
implementation.  A negotiated resolution in Darfur would 
increase Bashir's position vis-a-vis Salva Kiir and the SPLM. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In response to Margelov's request, Ambassador Nigro 
and French Ambassador Foucher briefed on recent developments 
in Chad-Sudan relations and USG and French views on JEM (See 
reftels for substance of Ambassador's briefs.). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Margelov said he was sorry that he had not been 
able to arrange to meet JEM while in N'Djamena, despite 
trying to make contact with the leadership since his arrival. 
 Ambassador Nigro and French Ambassador offered to help, got 
their staffs on the phone to JEM here, and arranged for 
Margelov to see Khalil Ibrahim later in the morning. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO