VZCZCXRO2906
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0462/01 2931643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201643Z OCT 09 ZDS ZDS ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7331
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000462 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CAPTIONS) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: JEM ON THE DEFENSIVE 
 
NDJAMENA 00000462  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Khalil Ibrahim and Secretary of Humanitarian 
Affairs Suleiman Jamous, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Djibril 
Ibrahim, Secretary for Administration Abubakar Hamid, 
Economic Advisor Bushara Suleiman Nour, and Secretary for 
Finance Azadein Yousif. asked to see Ambassador Nigro and 
others at Embassy N'Djamena October 20.  Key points of 
Khalil's presentation included: 
 
-- JEM "does not rule out the possibility" of traveling to 
Doha for the civil society conference being organized by 
UN/AU Negotiator Bassole. 
-- Still, JEM "must be consulted in advance of the 
conference," not simply invited as a take-it-or-leave-it 
gesture, as JEM remains "the most important group on the 
resistance side." 
-- JEM is concerned that too many international players, and 
too many individuals with disparate points of view, are being 
"cultivated" in advance of the civil society conference, and 
that international negotiators are "impatient" and insistent 
on "rushing" the process. 
-- JEM is supportive of the conclusions of the U.S.-Sudan 
policy review, and pleased at recent bilateral progress 
between Chad and Sudan. 
-- JEM believes that so long as the Chadian rebels continue 
to cause problems, there will be no regional peace. 
 
----------------------- 
To Play or Not to Play? 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Ambassador engaged Khalil using USG policy points 
provided by S/USSES:  the USG was encouraged by Chad's and 
Sudan's progress toward improving bilateral relations and 
would view negatively any activity to undermine the GOC-GOS 
effort; the USG hoped that JEM would participate in the next 
negotiating meeting in Doha so that its constituency would be 
represented; the Doha meeting would be an excellent 
opportunity for JEM to make its views heard.  Ambassador 
summarized key objectives of the new Sudan strategy to Khalil 
and emphasized that this was the USG's and especially Special 
Envoy Gration's "roadmap" for Sudan's future. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim sought a meeting with 
Ambassador Nigro October 20 to lay out his unhappiness with 
planning for the upcoming Doha civil society conference being 
organized by UN/AU Negotiator Djibrill Bassole.  Although 
Khalil claimed that he was "prepared" to go to Doha, he 
complained that the GoS "had offered nothing" in the way of 
concessions in advance of the event; that some ostensible 
observers from third countries were in fact pro-Sudanese 
agents; and that so long as "just anybody" was at the 
negotiating table, JEM might not see fit to participate. 
Khalil said he hoped to engage in consultations in advance of 
the Doha round on questions such as who would be invited, as 
"there is no freedom or civil society in Darfur."  According 
to Khalil, the GoS had been advised that it could bring civil 
society reps to the Doha event.  Why could JEM not bring its 
own civil society reps?  JEM was prepared to play the role of 
a political movement, as the international community wished, 
but was concerned that this would make it subordinate to 
other participants in the conference -- "and such an 
arrangement is not fair." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Khalil denied that the JEM was receiving 
significant military assistnce from the GoC at present, 
"although we want to work together with Chad toward peace." 
Nor did he threaten to withdraw definitively from the Doha 
process, conceding that to do so "would mean war."  Khalil 
claimed that in the wake of the U.S. Administration's release 
of its new Sudan policy, "you need our cooperation, just as 
we need yours."  For this reason, the U.S. should "stop 
trying to rush things" and stop issuing ultimatums.  The JEM 
did not appreciate being cast as "the bad guys," continued 
Khalil.  Djibril Ibrahim added that "we are not happy about 
being at the table with people who do not belong there; we 
will not sit down unless there are criteria developed as to 
who should be at the table."  Soulieman Jamous attempted to 
note that the JEM would agree to sit with other rebel groups 
"under some conditions," but he was interrupted by Djibril, 
 
NDJAMENA 00000462  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
who insisted that JEM would only appear at the table in Doha 
if there were prior agreement, to which JEM subscribed, on 
"who gets a seat."  The Doha process "was resulting in 
chaos," Khalil offered.  "No one listens." 
 
--------------------- 
Sudan-internal Issues 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  According to Khalil, the JEM sought "unity of our 
country," and was disturbed by the recent flawed census, 
which had "multiplied Bashir's supporters 457 times."  An 
election in such circumstances would weaken both the SPLM and 
movements in the North, harm fragile North-South linkages, 
and render impossible a free or fair vote.  Given that the 
timetable for the CPA process was already accelerated beyond 
a point where it would produce a desirable electoral result, 
the CPA clock should not be used to force developments in 
Darfur.  "Why can't we have peace prior to working on 
elections?" Khalil asked.  Djibril Ibrahim predicted that 
Darfur would not participate in Sudan elections in any case 
if these were held prematurely.  "Instead of unity, you will 
get separation" between either the North and South, or Darfur 
and the rest of Sudan, said Djibril. 
 
---------- 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Khalil reiterated that he "wanted to cooperate" 
with the U.S. and international community in advance of the 
Doha round.  He stressed that there had been "lost 
opportunities" in recent weeks, and that the U.S. should "be 
more patient."  Ambassador Nigro agreed to convey Khalil's 
views to Washington and advise of any response. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO