VZCZCXRO2902
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0457/01 2931118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201118Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7323
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000457 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM MARR SU LY CD
SUBJECT: GOC "INTRA-CHADIAN DIPLOMACY" SCORING CONTINUED 
SUCCESS IN OUTREACH TO CHAD REBELS AND OPPONENTS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 438 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 429 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 406 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 401 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 355 
     ¶F. NDJAMENA 214 
     ¶G. NDJAMENA 102 
     ¶H. 08 NDJAMENA 571 
     ¶I. 08 NDJAMENA 494 
     ¶J. 08 NDJAMENA 396 
     ¶K. 08 NDJAMENA 149 
 
NDJAMENA 00000457  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and former 
regime opponents, which we have long characterized as 
"intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic, 
"Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role 
in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and 
weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current 
government by force of arms.  A tour d'horizon given by 
Chad's National Mediator to the Ambassador October 19 
highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's long and patient 
effort to woo rebels and other opponents, resulting in their 
return to Chad to participate in the broader process of 
national reconciliation in which the Deby regime is engaged. 
 
¶2.  "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and 
protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political 
culture, whose dynamics are different from classic 
Western-style diplomacy.  It is highly personal, exploits 
family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the 
form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for 
the rank and file.  "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and 
persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent 
return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former 
President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant 
numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in 
the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort:  Recall that the 
current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that 
the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led 
by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The notion that "intra-Chadian diplomacy" as 
practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby 
regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and 
opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture 
and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the 
virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months.  A 
review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and 
consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy" 
since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby 
regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented 
by the Chadian rebellion. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------- 
THE NATIONAL MEDIATOR 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ambassador met October 19 with Chad's National 
Mediator, Abderamane Moussa, who gave him a tour d'horizon of 
his activities that underlined the consistent success of the 
GOC's ongoing efforts toward national reconciliation through 
outreach to Chad rebel groups and leaders and former regime 
opponents, as well as prospects for an improved Chad-Sudan 
relationship. 
 
---------------------- 
TWO RECENT KEY PRIZES: 
SOUBIANE AND GOUKOUNI 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Moussa claimed that President Deby's "extended 
hand" policy continued to successfully attract rebel groups 
and leaders, as well as former non-violent regime opponents, 
back to Chad. 
 
-- The legal basis for rebel return to Chad was the 2007 
Sirte Accord, which continued to function well and was clear 
 
NDJAMENA 00000457  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
and fair to all sides. 
 
-- The two biggest recent prizes, Moussa said, were Ahmat 
Hassaballah Soubiane and Goukouni Oueddei. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Former rebel leader Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, who 
had just returned "definitively" from Sudan and Libya on 
October 17, was intent on helping Deby improve the general 
political environment, including the GOC's relationship with 
Chadian rebels and the Khartoum Government. 
 
-- Moussa said that Soubiane's troops were already at the 
GOC's reception center and that Soubiane and his staff were 
seeking accommodations in town.  (NOTE: The semi-official 
daily Le Progres headlined October 19 that "Soubiane Returns 
Definitively," and that 1600 of his troops were in Moussoro. 
END NOTE.) 
 
-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would 
arrange for him to meet with Soubiane shortly. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Former President Goukouni Oueddei planned to settle 
in Chad permanently, as soon as the GOC could provide him 
with an official residence appropriate to a former chief of 
state, which the GOC was happy to do. 
 
-- Moussa said that Goukouni's commitment to national 
reconciliation would be a powerful tool to accomplish that 
end, especially in his home region of the far-north Tibesti, 
where his Toubou fellow-tribesmen, who suffered from 
perceived neglect by the GOC and had problems, like 
landmines, resulting from the Chad-Libyan wars of the 1980s, 
were liable to be attracted to dissident movements. 
 
-- Moussa asked for USG development assistance to focus on 
the Tibesti, claiming that the region was falling victim to 
illegal trafficking, including a Nigeria-to-Egypt drug 
trafficking route, that the GOC was still powerless to stop. 
 
-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would 
arrange for him to meet with Goukouni as soon as possible 
after his return to Chad. 
 
------------------- 
NOURI AND ERDIMI: 
PERSONAE NON GRATAE 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Moussa underscored that rebel leaders Timan Erdimi 
and Mahamat Nouri remained personae non gratae in Chad. 
 
-- He said the two leaders were "traitors to President Deby 
and to Chad" and that the two would have to find another 
country in which to live, because they could never be sure of 
their security in a country they had betrayed. 
 
------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE? 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Moussa, who was twice Chadian Ambassador to Sudan, 
said that he was encouraged by Sudanese Presidential 
counselor Ghazi Sallah Eddin's recent visit to Chad and the 
talks the latter had with the GOC and with UN/AU Special 
Mediator Bassole here. 
 
-- Moussa said that he understood that Ghazi had talked about 
a "congress" that rebel leaders remaining in Sudan would be 
organizing soon, perhaps at the behest of the Khartoum 
Government. 
 
-- Moussa said that the GOC hoped that this "rebel congress" 
would result in the remaining rebels deciding either to make 
peace and return to Chad; or stay in Sudan as refugees; or to 
give up armed struggle and "retire" to third countries, such 
as Mahamat Nouri to Saudi Arabia and Timan Erdimi to join his 
brother Tom in Texas.  (NOTE:  We discouraged the latter 
course of action.  END NOTE.) 
 
-- Moussa said that the best way for the Chad-Sudan "proxy 
war" to end would be by putting a joint GOC-GOS force to 
 
NDJAMENA 00000457  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
control the border, after which Chad could permit 
international and Sudanese monitors the opportunity to verify 
that there were no "JEM military bases" in Chad. 
 
-- Moussa said that the GOC was continuing to press JEM to 
participate in efforts for a negotiated peace in Darfur and 
that President Deby was always ready to assist bringing the 
different Darfur sides together, in so far as he was able to 
do and in so far as the Khartoum Government permitted him to 
act. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and 
former regime opponents, which we have long characterized as 
"intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic, 
"Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role 
in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and 
weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current 
government by force of arms.  This tour d'horizon by the 
National Mediator highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's 
long and patient effort to woo rebels and other opponents, 
resulting in their return to Chad to participate in the 
broader process of national reconciliation in which the Deby 
regime is engaged. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and 
protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political 
culture, whose dynamics are different from classic 
Western-style diplomacy.  It is highly personal, exploits 
family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the 
form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for 
the rank and file.  "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and 
persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent 
return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former 
President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant 
numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in 
the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort: Recall that the 
current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that 
the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led 
by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  The notion that intra-Chadian diplomacy as 
practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby 
regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and 
opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture 
and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the 
virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months.  A 
review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and 
consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy" 
since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby 
regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented 
by the Chadian rebellion.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO