VZCZCXRO2886
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0446/01 2881727
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151727Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7308
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000446 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS QA SU LY CD
SUBJECT: FM FAKI BRIEFS ON GHAZI VISIT RESULTS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1146 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 438 
     ¶C. STATE 106594 
 
NDJAMENA 00000446  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  FM Moussa Faki Mahamat called in DCM October 15 
(Ambassador is traveling in Eastern Chad with MINURCAT) to 
provide a read-out of the October 10 discussions in N'Djamena 
among President Idriss Deby Itno, Sudanese Presidential 
Adviser Ghazi Salahhuddin, UN/AU Negotiator Djibrill Bassole, 
Faki himself and others (Refs A and B).  Faki echoed Ghazi's 
own positive description (Ref A) of the potential that the 
past weekend's meetings offered for improved Chad-Sudan 
bilateral relations, but his description of steps to be taken 
in the coming weeks differed somewhat from Ghazi's. 
According to Faki, Chad and Sudan had agreed that as the 
first in a series of confidence-building measures, the GoS 
would find a location well inside the Sudan border to canton 
Chadian rebels who refused to return home.  Once Chadian 
rebels had been rounded up, removed from areas bordering 
Chad, and "placed in a camp," the Chadian side would invite a 
Sudanese delegation to visit "the former JEM military base" 
at Am Jarras in Eastern Chad and/or other locations that the 
Sudanese wished to see, to prove that such sites were no 
longer militarized.  When the Sudanese were satisfied that 
the JEM lacked bases from which to attack into Darfur, Faki 
would himself travel to Khartoum for meetings that would 
focus on additional confidence-building measures such as 
border monitoring, as envisioned in the 2006 Joint Protocol, 
etc.  Faki said he could not predict how long the process 
might take, given that the most complex step from a technical 
standpoint was the first, to be carried out by Sudan.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  SBU  FM Faki, who will be traveling internationally 
beginning this evening until October 24, told DCM that both 
the visiting Ghazi delegation and their Chadian hosts had 
approached the October 10 bilateral meetings with the goal of 
improving relations and finding ways to reestablish lasting 
peace.  President Deby had been "frank and direct" with Ghazi 
and those who accompanied him, including governors of North 
and West Darfur and military and security experts.  Deby had 
recalled for the Sudanese "the context of current relations" 
between Chad and Sudan, which in his description included 
Sudanese "disinformation" in the course of the summer about 
alleged Chadian attacks on Sudan, as well as continuing 
support for Chadian rebels who had made military moves on 
Chad as recently as five months previously, and who continued 
to threaten the Chadian border.  Chadian rebels supported by 
Sudan retained as their aim the overthrow of the Chadian 
government, Deby had pointed out.  Chad, by contrast, had no 
aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Sudan, with which it had 
maintained good relations until the Darfur crisis. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  According to Faki, Deby had conceded to Ghazi that 
"I have been closing my eyes to JEM comings and goings," out 
of frustration that the Sudanese regime was trying to divert 
attention from the problems it had caused in Darfur by 
provoking Chad.  Deby had also told Ghazi that "if you can 
guarantee that the Chadian rebels are not in a position to 
threat Chad, we will let you verify that the JEM is well and 
truly gone from Chad."  Deby had in mind "a strong initial 
signal from Sudan," consisting of a Sudanese effort to canton 
all remaining Chadian rebels well inside the Sudanese border. 
 The location would "have to have wells and other things" so 
that the rebels would not continually stray in the direction 
of Chad.  (NOTE:  Faki did not specifically rule out the Ain 
Sirro site where some Chad rebels have been located during 
this summer's rainy season, but neither did he suggest that 
Chad thought an appropriate cantonment had been found as of 
yet.  END NOTE.)  Once Chadian rebels were no longer in a 
position to threaten Chad -- Faki said that it might take 
several weeks or longer -- Chad would invite a Sudanese 
delegation into Chad to look at Am Jarras and/or other former 
JEM military sites, to prove that Chad was not giving succor 
 
NDJAMENA 00000446  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to the JEM.  Faki stressed that Deby was prepared to give up 
the JEM in exchange for improved bilateral ties with Sudan, 
and that Deby had tried to make this clear to Ghazi.  Once 
the Sudanese were satisfied that Chad was not aiding the JEM, 
Faki continued, he himself would travel to Khartoum for 
meetings at which discussion would continue on 
confidence-building measures such as those envisioned in the 
2006 Sudan-Chad Joint Protocol, including border monitoring. 
The Chadian side hoped to interest the international 
community (including potentially MINURCAT and UNAMID) in 
assisting with or advising on how to conduct such monitoring. 
 
------------------ 
JEM OF THE FUTURE? 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  DCM pointed out that JEM leaders had recently 
been, and perhaps still were, in N'Djamena, a situation that 
made our authorities in Washington -- and the Sudanese -- 
intensely nervous.  Faki said that he believed Djibril 
Ibrahim might still be in N'Djamena in connection with an 
inheritance from an older brother, but Khalil appeared to 
have "gone back East."  "We don't want these guys here," Faki 
continued.  But keeping them away was difficult, as they did 
have family and property in N'Djamena.  DCM noted that rumors 
of JEM weapons purchases, perhaps with the knowledge of 
Chadian officials, continued to circulate, and to provoke 
considerable anxiety among U.S. policymakers.  Faki replied 
that "we can't resolve everything at once," but stressed that 
Chadian government interlocutors with the JEM had been making 
clear for many months that Chad expected the JEM "to 
participate in negotiations, lay down arms, and assume the 
posture of a political movement -- inside Darfur, not from 
Chad." 
 
------------------------------ 
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE EAST 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  DCM asked whether the GoC had any reason to 
believe that Chadian rebels were currently still near the 
border, as they had been the previous week, apparently in the 
company of Minni Minawi units.  "We continue to get reports 
of armed groups making forays toward Chad," said Faki, who 
asked the U.S. to put pressure on Sudan in the aim of 
preventing such developments.  Faki then allowed as how 
"there are some on both sides who don't want peace," 
including within respective governments.  Faki said he 
attributed persistent -- but consistently false -- reports of 
ANT military build-up in the East to "some within the 
Sudanese command who are used to selling information and are 
not ready to give this practice up."  Faki made clear that he 
had very much appreciated his October 7 conversations with 
A/S Carson (Ref C), during which he hoped he had disabused 
Carson of the notion that a recent spate of reports was true. 
 
-------------- 
FAKI'S TRAVELS 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Faki termed the current situation, both on the 
ground and diplomatically, "fragile but promising."  He 
advised DCM that he was headed to Saudi Arabia to try to 
convince Riyadh to resend an Ambassador to Chad and reopen 
its Embassy here (closed since the then-Saudi Ambassador's 
wife was killed in the 2008 rebel attacks.)  From Riyadh, he 
would travel to Kampala for meetings on refugee management 
and global issues.  He made clear that he would be available 
to the USG throughout his trip, should officials wish to 
confer with him on any aspects of follow-up to the Ghazi 
visit or other matters.  He reiterated that current lack of 
trust between Chad and Sudan compelled each side to take 
steps that the other could verify, ideally with multilateral 
observation an eventual part of the process. 
NIGRO