VZCZCXRO8974
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0438/01 2831840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101840Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7294
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
MOSCOW FOR SE GRATION 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM QA SU LY CD
SUBJECT: GHAZI VISIT TO CHAD; DEBY-BASSOLE MEETING; DOHA 
PLANS 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 429 
 
NDJAMENA 00000438  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) UN/AU Darfur Mediator Djibrill Bassole briefed USG 
officials October 10 on his meetings earlier in the week with 
Chadian President Idris Deby Itno, FONMIN Moussa Faki 
Mahamat, and Sudan rebel leaders from the JEM and various SLA 
factions.  Bassole indicated that Sudanese Presidential 
Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin was expected in town imminently, and 
that later on October 10 he (Bassole) would attend a meeting 
involving Deby, Faki, and Ghazi.  In the evening of October 
10, S/USSES Adviser Kemi Yai had a conversation with Ghazi, 
who expressed satisfaction with his meetings with the 
Chadians, and said that he planned to stay through the 
following day to continue talks here.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
BASSOLE'S PERCEPTIONS OF CHAD 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Bassole, who arrived in N,Djamena late October 8, 
told Charge, Pol/Econ Chief, and S/USSES Adviser Kemi Yai 
that an October 9 audience with President Deby had gone very 
well.  The President, whom Bassole described as cordial and 
relaxed, expressed skepticism at the likelihood of 
significantly improved relations with Khartoum in the near 
term.  But Deby also made clear that he was prepared to do 
his part to try to "warm" the bilateral relationship. 
Bassole offered that in his own view, the current poor state 
of relations between Chad and Sudan was poisoning the 
atmosphere for international Darfur mediations and making 
dealings with all rebel factions difficult.  Bassole stressed 
that he saw Khartoum's support for Chadian rebel groups as 
one of the most damaging aspects of current GoS policy.  In 
answer to our comment about Chadian rebel returns having 
picked up, Bassole said that the GoS would do well to emulate 
the GoC in encouraging its own rebels to return to Sudan, 
including by offering compensation.  Bassole noted that 
former Chadian rebel Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane was expected 
back in N'Djamena later in the day for discussions with GOC 
officials.  (NOTE:  FM Faki told us earlier this week that 
Soubiane was due here, but at this writing he has not yet 
appeared.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Charge pointed out that reports of Minni Minawi 
troops and Chadian rebels gathering on the Sudanese side of 
the border had provoked the Chadian National Army (ANT) to 
issue an alert in eastern Chad October 7.  Bassole recalled 
that Minni and the JEM regarded each other as arch-enemies, 
and suggested that Minni might have had his sights trained on 
the JEM, not the ANT.  Bassole described the ANT as well 
organized and well equipped, and said that the Chadian rebels 
would be unwise to attempt military action against N,Djamena 
anytime soon.  He added that the high level of ANT confidence 
had improved Deby,s negotiating position and even 
presentational aspects of his negotiating style. 
 
----------- 
GHAZI VISIT 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Bassole told us that he had been invited by the 
Chadian side to attend a meeting among President Deby, FORMIN 
Faki, and Sudanese Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin, who 
was expected in N,Djamena late in the morning of October 10. 
 Bassole recalled that this would be the third meeting 
between the Chadian side and Ghazi, the first having occurred 
in Tripoli and the second on the margins of the UNGA in New 
York last month.  He said that he believed all the sessions 
had been cordial.  He advised us that Deby had delayed a 
personal visit to Paris to remain in town for the meeting 
with Ghazi.  (NOTE:  We understand that Deby will now leave 
for Paris October 13.  He had originally planned to travel 
today.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Late on October 10, Presidential Envoy Ghazi 
 
NDJAMENA 00000438  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
briefed Kemi Yai to his meetings with President Deby, FONMIN 
Faki and others.  Ghazi said he was basically encouraged by 
the tone of the meetings, and indicated that he would stay an 
additional day in Chad for follow-on sessions.  Ghazi 
acknowledged that "there was lots of mistrust" between Chad 
and Sudan, but he expressed willingness to try to build 
better relations.  He characterized Sudan as "the big 
brother" in the relationship, which meant that Sudan should 
"make the first move" in improving the situation, by sending 
an envoy to Chad. Ghazi told Yai that he did not intend to 
meet with the either the SLA reps currently in N'Djamena or 
with the JEM, because doing so would be "confusing" to his 
bilateral mission, and he felt that discussions with the 
rebels should occur in Doha. 
 
------------ 
JEM, AS EVER 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Bassole indicated that he had spent considerable 
portions of October 9 with the JEM; in fact, he told us that 
he would leave our October 10 morning meeting to reconvene 
with JEM interlocutors.  Bassole described the JEM as having 
had little of a concrete nature to offer thus far, although 
he did mention that the JEM had said they had a "proposal" 
for him that they would share before he left.  According to 
Bassole, in his meetings with JEM to date, Khalil and Djibril 
Ibrahim continued to stick to long-standing positions and to 
display noteworthy lack of flexibility or negotiating acumen. 
 JEM leaders remained reticent about whether they would go to 
Doha, said Bassole, or whether they would be willing to deal 
with other rebel movements as peers at the negotiating table. 
 Charge asked Bassole what the JEM appeared to be doing in 
N,Djamena besides plowing familiar ground with him, and what 
had brought them here.  Bassole offered that Khalil had a 
house in N,Djamena and relatives in town:  "He is just here; 
he likes it here, he has family business."  Bassole continued 
that Khalil had approached him early in October to say that 
he would be in N,Djamena, and to invite him (Bassole) to 
Chad.  After some jockeying, the two had settled on October 
8-9 for the timeframe of a meeting.  We asked Bassole what 
sort of dealings he thought the JEM had had with the GoC 
during the present visit; Bassole said he did not know. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Bassole characterized the relationship between JEM 
and the GOC as sinusoidal, adding that he was not sure 
whether things were up or down at the moment.  He described 
the GOC's attachment to the JEM as a marriage of convenience. 
 The GoC invested more attention in the JEM when it felt 
threatened by Sudan, he added.  If the GoC,s relations with 
Sudan were to improve as a result of Ghazi,s visit or other 
developments, N,Djamena would lose interest in the JEM, 
Bassole predicted. 
 
-------------------- 
SLA, COMING TOGETHER 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Bassole expressed appreciation for S/USSES Adviser 
Kemi Yai's efforts to convince various SLA factions -- 
SLA/Shafi, SLA/Unity, SLA/URF -- to coalesce and prepare for 
a potential SLA unification conference to be held later this 
month.  (NOTE: We understand that the conference had 
originally been envisioned for Darfur, but now may be held in 
Libya, following interventions by SE Gration in Tripoli.  END 
NOTE.)   According to Bassole, the SLA players had told him 
(and also the GoC, with whom they met at Yai,s urging) that 
they were willing to work with each other, that they wanted 
expanded contacts with UNAMID, and that they sought financial 
support from the Gabonese, Saudis, Swiss, Kuwaitis and 
Qataris.  Bassole offered that the SLA players had seemed 
sincere in their desire to maintain the current discussion 
process. 
 
---------------------- 
BASSOLE,S FUTURE PLANS 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Bassole emphasized that as he prepared for an 
October 28 "Civil Society" conference in Doha, he was making 
 
NDJAMENA 00000438  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
an effort to treat the various SLA and other Sudan rebel 
movements as political groups, not ethnic ones, so as to 
avoid provoking additional fractures along ethnic lines and 
to encourage coalition formation.  He said that he hoped to 
use the civil society event to set the stage for efforts in 
November to get the main belligerents -- the GoS; JEM; and 
SLA factions (under one banner) -- to sit down together in 
the aim of signing a peace deal.  Diplomatic partners 
including Chad, Libya, Egypt, and the P-5 would be invited to 
the session he hoped to hold in November, said Bassole. 
 
--------------------- 
WAYS THE USG CAN HELP 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In reply to a question on how the USG could do 
more to facilitate his efforts, Bassole replied that he hoped 
the U.S. would put more pressure on the GoS to sever links 
with Chad rebels, to reduce actions that could be interpreted 
as support for janjaweed militias, and to take opportunities 
for bilateral contacts with Chad.  He added that the U.S. 
could also urge Khartoum not to wait for a formal peace 
accord with its rebels, but to reach out now, in a positive, 
proactive manner, to rebel groups.  Bassole reiterated his 
appreciation for the U.S.'s taking the initiative to 
encourage SLA factions to come together.  Charge noted that 
Embassy N'Djamena would continue to do its part to press the 
GoC to remain open to Khartoum, maintain the moral high 
ground with respect to military action, and prioritize 
relations with Sudan over support for the JEM. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Bassole seemed pleased with his meetings with the 
Chadians, and hopeful that Ghazi's visit would bring further 
bilateral progress.  Ghazi himself also struck us as 
cautiously upbeat.  We will check in with GoC officials next 
week to seek their perceptions of the Ghazi visit, of the 
Doha process more generally, and of course to see if they 
have anything to say about the JEM (or SLA).  Embassy stands 
ready to facilitate S/USSES,s efforts to spur greater SLA 
cohesion and willingness of all players to take part in the 
upcoming unification conference, Doha events and other 
relevant activities. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) As for the JEM, its goals (and representatives) 
remain elusive to us.  JEM leaders spoke at length with 
Bassole, but whether they offered anything new remains to be 
seen.  They have had cursory consultations with Embassy staff 
and with Yai, but have not engaged substantively.  We are 
presently not in a position to confirm any meetings they may 
have had with the GoC.  SLA factions told Yai that they were 
prepared to meet with JEM reps, but the capture overnight of 
some SLA/AW fighters by the JEM prompted the SLA to withdraw 
the offer.  The JEM advised Yai that if the SLA were to 
unite, JEM would have no problem having SLA reps at the table 
in Doha, but if the SLA remained divided, as they were at 
present, the "movement's" position vis-a-vis the GoS would 
remain weak.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
BREMNER