VZCZCXRO5041
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #2133/01 2810459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080459Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1262
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002133 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N /A 
TAGS: PINS EAID EIND PHUM SENV KCRM KE
 
SUBJECT: ISIOLO SECURITY UPDATE 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 1770 
¶B. NAIROBI 1259 
¶C. NAIROBI 1242 
¶D. NAIROBI 1238 
¶E. NAIROBI 551 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kenya's ongoing drought has exacerbated tribal and 
political tensions between pastoralists in Kenya's Isiolo District. 
The situation recently presented problems for the tourism industry 
in Kenya's northern corridor when armed livestock herders moved into 
wildlife conservation lands with their animals.  While some 
interpreted the move as an attempt to grab what little water and 
pasture was left, others saw a political agenda by one group to 
threaten the revenue stream of another group.  Regardless of the 
motive, some safari camps and hotels were forced to stop accepting 
bookings.  The Ambassador and mission staff engaged with local 
politicians, the leadership of a USAID-funded conservation program, 
and others to assist, and the immediate problem has been resolved. 
Problems will remain, however, as long as there is poor security, 
ethnic based winner-take-all politics, excessive reliance on the 
livestock sector as a source of income, and ineffective mechanisms 
to govern land use.  If this situation continues, Kenya's arid north 
will be just as vulnerable to political violence as the areas 
affected by the 2007-8 post-election crisis.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Pastoralists Invade National Reserves 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) An ongoing drought has exacerbated tensions between 
pastoral groups in Isiolo and Samburu Districts, located in Kenya's 
geographic center.  Competition for scarce pasture and water is 
intense, and the region's different tribes have aligned against one 
another to secure control over valuable land and constituency votes 
for the next round of general elections.  Relations between the 
Samburu and Borana tribes have been particularly strained, but other 
groups have become involved as well, including Rendille, Turkana, 
and Somalis. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In August, approximately 300 armed moran (unmarried male 
warriors) from the Samburu, Rendille and Turkana tribes led 
approximately 10,000 head of cattle and goats into Shaba and Buffalo 
Springs National Reserves located in the Borana area of Isiolo 
District.  In addition to grazing their herds, which is generally 
permitted in many reserves managed by country councils, the moran 
also killed protected wildlife and shot and wounded a game guard 
while he was accompanying Spanish tourists on a game drive.  The 
tourists were unharmed but departed Kenya the next day. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Kenya Tourism Federation (KTF), alarmed at the 
potential damage to Kenya's tourism industry, made their concerns 
known to a number of government officials after it became clear that 
safari camps and hotels in the affected area quietly stopped taking 
bookings.  KTF Chief Executive Officer Agatha Juma told Emboffs that 
if anything happened to a tourist on safari anywhere in Kenya, it 
had the potential of shutting down the entire country's tourism 
industry.  Further setbacks to tourism, she said, was something the 
struggling industry, struck by the global financial crisis just as 
it was recovering from the 2007/8 post-election violence, could ill 
afford.  KTF made it clear that they were very close to advising 
their partners that Kenya's northern corridor be closed to tourists 
until the security situation improved. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response to complaints by Isiolo Member of Parliament 
(and Minister of Livestock) Mohammed Kuti, Minister of Tourism Najib 
Balala, and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), Minister of Internal 
Security George Saitoti sent a contingent of 400 security officers 
and eight trucks to the area to little effect.  However, we heard 
from multiple sources that the police did not try to force - and did 
not even ask - anyone to leave the park.  We were told they merely 
drove on routine patrols and made no arrests. 
 
-------------------------------- 
U.S. Encourages Dialogue, Action 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The ongoing drought and polarized political environment 
have created a situation ripe for conflict.  Borana viewed the 
mostly Samburu invasion of their conservation lands as a deliberate 
attack against their tourist revenue stream, asserting that the 
Samburu conservation lands had not been similarly overrun.  The 
Borana also saw the ineffectiveness of the police deployment as a 
deliberate slight by the (ethnic Maasai) Minister of Internal 
Security in favor of his fellow Maa-speaking (and Nilotic) Samburu. 
The Samburu, on the other hand, were still feeling bitter and 
victimized by the police security operation earlier this year (ref 
E), and claimed that all areas were overgrazed, including Samburu 
 
NAIROBI 00002133  002 OF 003 
 
 
conservancies.  In addition, the Samburu interpreted Borana 
counter-raids as the onset of a sustained attack by the Borana, who 
were importing fighters from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to 
wipe out the Samburu completely. (Note: The OLF is a guerilla and 
political organization that has been fighting against the Government 
of Ethiopia since 1973.  The Oromo and Borana are closely related. 
End Note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Mission's USAID and Political staff convened or 
participated in a number of meetings with local politicians, USAID 
grantees, and the KTF to generate options for immediate action.  The 
motive for the sparring groups to come together was clear: no matter 
the political dimensions, any closure of Kenya's northern corridor 
to tourism would affect both Samburu and Borana conservancies (and 
their respective streams of revenue) equally. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The first option was to open a dialogue between the Isiolo 
County Council and KWS to negotiate a temporary KWS takeover to 
secure the Reserves.  (Note:  KWS does not currently administer or 
provide security for Shaba or Buffalo Springs National Reserves; the 
Isiolo County Council administers them and collects the 
corresponding revenues from tourist visits.  End Note)  While this 
was the option KTF favored, securing such an agreement would take 
time. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In support of defusing the conflict, the Northern 
Rangelands Trust (NRT), a USAID-supported umbrella organization of 
community conservancies (see Refs B-D), agreed on August 28 to form 
and deploy an inter-ethnic team of local elders to the reserves to 
encourage the moran to move out.  This is part of a larger 
USAID-supported and NRT-implemented peace and reconciliation 
initiative that aims for a durable solution to the conflict. For 
example, the team would pave the way for the local politicians to 
appear together in front of their respective constituents to promote 
peace. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The first step of the NRT initiative was remarkably 
successful.  By September 19, the inter-ethnic team briefed the 
Ambassador that half of the moran had agreed to depart the reserves. 
 Since then, the team has completed a second round of discussion 
with the moran.  We have heard from both the KTF and Minister 
Saitoti that the reserves are now secure and a KWS takeover is no 
longer necessary. 
 
----------------------- 
Raids/Violence Continue 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Unfortunately, the victory in Isiolo's Reserves appears to 
be an isolated one.  Raids and violence have continued and are 
expected to worsen once the short rains begin and livestock become 
more mobile.  (Note: The rains are expected imminently.  End Note) 
The political divisions have not gone away, nor have the other 
underlying conditions that drive raiding behavior and land grabbing. 
 On the contrary, the continued raiding is deepening political 
divisions. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Local Members of Parliament from Samburu East and Isiolo 
North have appealed to the government to provide livestock to both 
sides to avert another round of raids.  In response to a letter of 
concern from the Ambassador, Minister of Internal Security Saitoti 
replied that the Government is instead focusing on long-term 
interventions to cushion pastoralists during drought and working 
with neighboring countries on a "comprehensive disarmament 
exercise."  There are also media reports that the Government is 
considering disarming the Kenya Police Reserves, or home guards, 
because arms handed out to such citizens are reportedly being used 
for cattle raiding.  (Note: Disarmament exercises in Kenya do not 
have a strong track record of success, but the European Union has 
nevertheless reportedly pledged funding to support the next 
exercise.  End Note) 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: The long term way forward will depend not only on 
improving security, but also on evolving local perspectives on 
ethnic based politics and the livestock monoculture.  Residents of 
the region will also have to find a way to deal peacefully and 
creatively with the continued influx into Isiolo of populations from 
arid regions searching for a way to make a living.  We are exploring 
ways to help.  Senior officials at the Northern Rangelands Trust 
assert that the way ahead lies in helping local populations find 
more reliable and sustainable sources of income that will help them 
move away from the livestock monoculture.  We agree, but also see 
that NRT's way of dealing with Kenya's dysfunctional, byzantine, and 
corrupt land administration system (by admitting groups for 
membership that engage in conservation activities but who in some 
cases have no authority to control access to conservancy lands) 
causes its own problems.  USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives 
 
NAIROBI 00002133  003 OF 003 
 
 
appears to have found some success in grappling with a similar 
series of problems in nearby Samburu North.  In doing so, they have 
found that the government's administrative subdivision of districts 
appears to drive local conflict as much as longer-term 
environmental, overpopulation, and migration issues. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment, cont: Given the overwhelming political dimension 
to the current conflict, it appears that the landscape in Kenya's 
arid north is just as vulnerable to future political violence as 
other areas in Kenya affected by the 2007/8 post-election crisis. 
We will continue to work toward finding sustainable solutions for 
the people of this troubled region. 
HOZA