VZCZCXRO4645
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #2614/01 2931333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201333Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5154
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0008
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 4115

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002614 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC RU
SUBJECT:  SEPTEMBER 2009 FRAUD SUMMARY - MOSCOW 
 
MOSCOW 00002614  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  This report covers the timeframe of March 1, 2009 
to 31 August 2009.  Consular officers referred 389 cases of 
suspected fraud to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) at Embassy 
Moscow.  Fraud was confirmed in approximately 12 percent of the 
referred cases, mostly for fraudulent employment or financial 
documents.  FPU assisted the American Citizen Services (ASC) Unit on 
welfare and whereabouts cases, a passport fraud case and a suspect 
application for a Certificate of Birth Abroad.  In addition, the ACS 
Unit noted they encountered two additional Certificate of Birth 
Abroad applications that were not referred to FPU.  Based on these 
findings, Moscow is currently considered a low to medium-fraud post. 
 The FPU enjoys an open and collaborative relationship with the 
Assistant Regional Security Officer - Investigator (ARSO-I) as well 
as law enforcement agencies at post.  The Fraud Prevention Manager 
(FPM) participates in monthly meetings of the Moscow Anti-Fraud 
Group, which is a group composed of migration and consular officials 
from the various diplomatic missions based in Moscow.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Since the financial crisis hit in September 
2008, uncertainty about the banking sector, the value of the ruble, 
and the price of oil have prompted investors to withdraw significant 
amounts of capital from the Russian economy.  The higher cost of 
credit that ensued, in conjunction with the global downturn in 
demand for a broad range of products, forced Russian firms to cut 
production, reduce the workweek, decrease salaries, and trim staff. 
As a result, since November 2008 incomes have declined, reversing 
nearly a decade of real double-digit income growth.  Unemployment 
and underemployment in Russia increased.  Estimates for actual 
unemployment range from ten to twelve million with significantly 
higher risk for workers in Russia's single company towns and 
distressed sectors (e.g., automotives, steel).  In addition to 
currently unemployed workers, more than 1 million workers are on 
idle time, reduced work schedules, or administrative leave. Russian 
workers also suffer from falling real incomes and delayed salaries, 
although the government has stepped up activities to reduce the 
amount of wage arrears to workers.  Despite these efforts, wage 
arrears remain at around 8 billion rubles, primarily due to the 
absence of sufficient funds on the part of employers.  The Ministry 
of Economic Development predicted real incomes would fall 8.3 
percent in 2009, although these estimates are being revised, as 
inflation is also slowing due to the overall decline in economic 
activity in the country. 
 
As the first half of 2009 draws to a close, the economy appears to 
have achieved some stability, thanks to a modest, but steady rise in 
the price of oil.  The ruble has stabilized, the federal budget was 
in surplus (through February), and the stock market has been growing 
again.  However, the economic outlook for the year has never been 
more uncertain, as production continues to contract and banks are 
still grappling with large amounts of non-performing loans.  The 
Russian Government forecasts an economic contraction of 6-8 percent 
for the year.   Economists from academia and the think tank 
community estimate a sharp economic contraction of 5-10 percent, 
whereas investment bankers anticipate a recovery by the end of the 
year with potential growth reaching three percent in 2010. 
 
According to the last official census in 2002, the population in 
Moscow is 10.4 million; however this figure only takes into account 
legal residents. Current estimates place Moscow's population at over 
13 million.  The government recently announced that the next 
official census, scheduled for October 2010, may be delayed due to 
budget constraints. 
 
¶B. (SBU)  NIV FRAUD Q MOSCOW: During this reporting period (1 March 
to 31 August 2009), consular officers referred 325 cases to the 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) for investigation of suspected fraud. 
FPU confirmed fraud in approximately 12 percent of the cases.  Most 
of the referrals to FPU during the report timeframe were for 
employment or bank statement verification.  Based on these findings, 
Moscow is currently considered a low to medium-fraud post. 
 
FPM conducted routine LexisNexis checks and conferred with U.S. law 
enforcement entities at post, including the ARSO-I, the FBI and DEA 
during fraud investigations.  In addition, FPU local fraud 
investigators conducted host country law enforcement record checks 
on individuals with suspected links to organized crime or with prior 
criminal records. Local investigators also researched host country 
tax and business registries; national and local media websites; and 
reviewed a variety of Russian newspapers for fraud-related 
information during the course of their investigations. 
 
The most common type of FPU referral at U.S. Embassy Moscow involves 
B1/B2 applicants with suspect employment claims.  Of the 325 cases 
referred to FPU during the timeframe covered by this report, 
twenty-one cases involved confirmed fraudulent employment 
statements; an additional 53 resulted in inconclusive findings 
(either because of discrepancies between the applicant's interview 
and the employer's description of job duties).  We noticed a sharp 
rise in Uzbek applicants applying at U.S. Embassy Moscow with 
 
MOSCOW 00002614  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
entirely fabricated employment documents, including fraudulent 
Russian work permits, provided by a known local document vendor, 
"Mayak."  Line officers noted that frequently these applicants were 
non-residents flying in specifically for the purposes of their visa 
interview in Moscow.  Members of the Anti-Fraud Working Group 
(comprised of consular officers from foreign missions in Moscow) 
noted similar trends with Uzbek applicants as well. 
 
During this reporting period, the FPM confirmed that five B1/B2 
applicants attempted to cover up their prior illegal stay in the 
United States.  In one case, an applicant went so far as to tear out 
the page in his passport to remove his re-entry stamp into Russia. 
Another case was detected after a positive IAFIS arrest for shop 
lifting revealed that the applicant was present nearly four years 
after his claimed departure from the United States.  The applicant 
refused to admit that he was illegally present and went so far as to 
provide a fraudulent employment letter from a Russian employer to 
cover the years he was in the United States.  All five cases 
involved individuals with significant overstays in the United States 
of four or more years.  Given this new trend in applicants covering 
up illegal overstays, officers are consistently referring cases to 
FPU for verification of an applicant's prior travel via ADIS.  ADIS 
is an essential tool used by the FPM on a regular basis.  Post 
appreciates the additional ADIS account which was added recently to 
U.S. Embassy Moscow and would welcome additional accounts for all 
line officers. 
 
During this reporting period, FPU investigations revealed that two 
separate applicants applied under false names in an attempt to 
obtain visas Q both cases were caught as facial recognition hits. 
The applicants later admitted that they changed their name 
specifically to cover up an ineligibility in order to obtain a visa 
to travel to the U.S.  Our FPU investigations revealed that it is 
quite easy to officially change one's name in Russia and often 
little reason needs to be provided to local officials for the 
change.  One key anti-fraud tool used by line officers when 
encountering Russian applicants is their Vnutrenniy (internal) 
passport (similar to a national ID card).  The internal passport 
lists all minor children, marital status, address of current and 
prior registrations, military service and current and previous 
external passports.  Unfortunately, the internal passport does not 
list name changes unless the change is as a result of change in 
marital status. 
 
The use of Suspicious Documents Function in NIV remains 
inconsistent.  In addition to FPU referrals, NIV officers designated 
only 75 cases associated with suspicious documents.   FPU is working 
with NIV officers to use the suspicious document function more 
consistently. 
 
Post decided to initiate a rolling B1/B2 validation study on a 
quarterly basis in order to provide real time feedback to line 
officers.  During the timeframe covered by this report, Post took a 
random sample of B1/B2 visas issued from March 2008 to May 2008. 
The sample size used allowed for a margin of error of +/- three 
percent.  Post, with assistance from CA/FPP and DHS, verified the 
applicant's ADIS status and followed up with phone calls to 
applicants that either had not used their visas or had no reported 
departure from the U.S. 
 
The results from the first tranche of our rolling validation study 
revealed that: 
- 90.1% of the applicants traveled in status and returned; 
- 8.5% of the applicants did not travel to the U.S.; 
- 0.4% of the applicants had an adjustment of status pending; 
- 1 % of the applicants were determined to be illegally in the U.S. 
 
The results reveal that Russians during timeframe had good travel 
patterns.  We were surprised by the number of applicants that 
applied for a visa stating specific travel plans but that did not 
use their visas.  This is something we will continue to monitor in 
the next tranches of our validation studies. 
 
(SBU) IV FRAUD - MOSCOW:  Only seven cases of suspect IV fraud were 
referred to FPU and most of these were for reviews of hits in the 
system and coordination with local law enforcement. 
¶D. (U) DV FRAUD:  During the timeframe of this report, Russian 
nationals were not eligible to participate in the Diversity visa 
(DV) program.  Russians will be eligible to participate in the DV 
2010 program.  Post expects a sharp rise in DV FPU referrals once 
Russian DV cases are current. 
 
There was a single DV case dealing with an Azeri national referred 
to FPU for verification of his educational qualifications.  FPU 
confirmed that the educational documents were fraudulent and the 
officer refused the applicant under Section 212(a)(6)(c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. 
 
¶E. (U) ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD:  During the timeframe of this 
 
MOSCOW 00002614  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
report, FPU assisted ACS on three cases.  One case dealt with an 
American Citizen that was issued passports in different names and 
places of birth.  Two other cases involved American Citizens filing 
questionable Certificates of Birth Abroad (CRBA) applications.  The 
FPM questioned both women (separate cases) with the ACS Chief and 
explained the consequences of filing fraudulent CRBA applications. 
Both women refused to admit that the baby was not their own and the 
ACS Chief recommended DNA testing as an option.  To date, neither 
has proceeded with DNA testing. 
 
In addition, ACS also encountered two additional suspect CRBA cases 
that were not referred to FPU.  One case involved a woman that 
admitted to the ACS officer at the time the oath was administered, 
that the baby was not her own.  The ACS officer entered a lookout 
for this mother in PLOTS.  Another ACS officer issued a CRBA only 
after subsequent proof of birth (hospital records, ultrasound 
photos, etc) was provided by the birth parents.  It is too earlier 
to determine if this is a new trend in Moscow, however, it is 
something we are monitoring. 
 
¶F. (U) ADOPTION FRAUD:  There have been no fraudulent cases on the 
part of Americans families adopting Russian children. The press has 
reported prosecutions of Russians accepting bribes to represent 
children as orphans who are not in fact orphans at all. This is 
predominantly found in the provinces and rarely seen in Moscow. 
 
¶G. (U) USE OF DNA TESTING:  IV Unit used DNA testing on a single IR2 
case.  ACS Unit used DNA testing in two cases. 
 
¶H. (U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD:  DHS USCIS, Moscow 
interviews applicants for refugee status from 15 countries of the 
former Soviet Union.  During this reporting period, 895 applicants 
interviewed were citizens of Russia.  Of the 895 applicants 
interviewed, 141 were denied refugee status at least in part because 
of credibility. 
 
The criteria for denying an applicant based on credibility is as 
follows: 
 
QThe USCIS officer informed you of discrepancies concerning material 
facts within your testimony during your interview and you were 
provided with an opportunity to reconcile those discrepancies. 
Because you were unable to reconcile the discrepancies to the 
officerQs satisfaction, it has been determined that your testimony 
lacked credibility on those material facts.  As a result, you are 
not eligible for refugee status. 
 
¶I. (U) ALIEN-SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST 
TRAVEL:  For the sixth consecutive year, Russia has been included as 
a "Tier 2 Watch List" in the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) annual 
report.  Russia is considered to be a source, transit, and 
destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for 
various forms of exploitation.   Article 127 of the criminal code 
prohibits both trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation and 
forced labor.  The Government of the Russian Federation does not 
fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination  of 
trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. 
Despite these significant efforts, the government over the last 
year: decreased the number of reported trafficking investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions; did not vigorously prosecute, 
convict, and punish government officials; made no significant 
efforts to improve identification of and assistance to victims of 
trafficking; and did not make adequate efforts to address labor 
trafficking.  Organized crime is also considered to be widespread, 
but with a loose structure and intertwined with corruption. 
 
¶J. (SBU) DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: The Consular Section 
enjoys an open, strong working relationship with its ARSO-I.  During 
the timeframe of this report, ARSO-I worked on a joint investigation 
with DHS and FBI regarding a Eurasian Organized Crime group 
operating in Colorado and Nevada that is suspected of using 28 
Summer Work and Travel (SWT) exchange program students including two 
female students from Russia to participate in financial fraud 
schemes to obtain money or goods. 
 
ARSO-I successfully documented visa fraud committed by a Russian 
government official accused of the theft of billions of dollars 
worth of land and money.  When the suspect fled to the United 
States, ARSO-I Moscow determined the suspect had made material false 
statements on the most recent visa application.  After DHS was 
notified, the suspect was detained on his next entry into the United 
States, and confessed to having made false statements.  Due to the 
extremely high value of money allegedly stolen, DS, DHS, DOJ, and 
the FBI are working closely with Russian officials on pursuing the 
case and proceeds from the theft and subsequent money laundering. 
 
ARSO-I and the DS New York Field office jointly investigated visa 
fraud committed by a fugitive from Kazakhstan who initially obtained 
a Russian passport and fled to Moscow, before going to the United 
 
MOSCOW 00002614  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
States.  Based upon the concealment of his prior arrest and criminal 
charges, the suspect was charged with fraud and arrested.  The U.S. 
Marshal Service initially brought the case to the attention of DS 
due to the Interpol warrant issued by Kazakhstan for the suspect's 
alleged murder of four people. 
 
¶K. (SBU) HOST-COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY:  ARSO-I Moscow is leading a joint criminal investigation 
into the sale of counterfeit and altered documents by a crime ring 
based in Moscow.  The overall investigation encompasses more than 34 
DS criminal cases, touching on 46 countries.  The vendors are 
suspected of having produced counterfeit supporting documents for 
visa applications, counterfeit and altered passports, and 
counterfeit visas from the United States, Russia, Schengen 
countries, Canada, and several other nations.  Over the past 11 
years, the group has sold an estimated 1000-3000 U.S. visas. 
Several key members of the organization have been identified and 
indicted in the United States; however the suspects remain at large 
in Moscow.   A recent success in the case was the arrest of suspects 
in Ghana and Belarus after at least eight of the counterfeit U.S. 
visas were sold through that portion of the distribution network. 
To date, approximately 21 members of the organization have been 
arrested, however Russian officials have to date refrained from 
pursuing the highest level suspects.  The vendor ring has also sold 
documents to criminal fugitives and Chechen fighters, raising 
concerns of terrorist travel. 
 
¶L. (SBU) COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES:  Official 
requests for verification of documents and information must be 
conducted using the format of Diplomatic Notes to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for dissemination to the respective federal or 
regional government office.  FPU relies on contacts in various 
ministries to provide verification and/or confirmation of requests 
on an unofficial basis.  In September 2008, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs disbanded the anti-organized crime unit following 
allegations of extortion of wealthy business men by members of the 
unit. 
 
ARSO-I has had limited cooperation and slow response from host 
country law enforcement units.  Despite the willingness of some host 
country officers to discuss criminal cases, the endless layers of 
bureaucracy, corruption, and apathy lead to limited success in 
responding to criminal acts.  Transparency International has rated 
the perceived level of corruption in Russia as having risen steadily 
over the past eight years, and have noted the judicial system as a 
particular concern. 
 
¶M. (U) AREAS OF CONCERN:  Summer Work & Travel and the impact of the 
economic crisis on the quality of visa applications and the growing 
number of illegal overstays are all areas of concerns. 
 
¶N. (U) STAFFING AND TRAINING:  The Fraud Prevention Unit consists of 
two Consular Officers, the Fraud Prevention Manager and a Rotating 
FSO; an Assistant Regional Security Officer; and four locally 
engaged Fraud Investigation Specialists.  All FSNI have taken the 
on-line FSI courses for Detecting Imposters and How to Detect Human 
Trafficking Victims.  A newly hired FSNI is scheduled to take the 
Fraud Prevention Course at FSI in November 2009.  The Deputy FPM is 
scheduled to take the Fraud Prevention course at FSI in October 
¶2009. 
 
¶O. (U) EVENTS:  None at this time. 
 
BEYRLE