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Viewing cable 09MONTEVIDEO595, Uruguayan Elections: Counting Down to October 25

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MONTEVIDEO595 2009-10-21 18:13 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Montevideo
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0595/01 2941813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211813Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9415
INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2653
RUCNMER/MESUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000595 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/BSC MARY DASCHBACH 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UY
SUBJECT:  Uruguayan Elections: Counting Down to October 25 
 
REF:  A. MONTEVIDEO 560, B. MONTEVIDEO 409 AND PREVIOUS, C. 
MONTEVIDEO 298 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) With Uruguayans voting October 25, local polling 
indicates that the two leading presidential candidates are 
running in place or even losing ground.  A second round seems 
likely, as neither ruling Frente Amplio coalition candidate 
Jose Mujica nor National Party candidate Luis Lacalle appears 
likely to receive the fifty percent plus one required to win 
Uruguay's presidency in a first round.  This election is 
significant even if a second round is necessary, however, as 
each partyQs respective share of the vote will determine the 
balance of power in parliament for the duration for the next 
administration.  END SUMMARY. 
 
HOW THE NUMBERS LOOK 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) As the October 25 election looms, the majority of 
polling on the respective fortunes of the leading parties 
appears to have settled on a ruling Frente Amplio coalition 
(FA) vote of around 43-45 percent, with the main opposition 
National Party total of around 29-31 percent.  The National 
Party figures are down from a height of 38 percent in June. 
Curiously, the number of persons claiming to be undecided or 
willing to cast blank votes is rising as the campaigns close, 
and is now around 10-12 percent.  Both the third-place 
Colorado party and fourth-place Independent Party are 
performing better than many analysts had predicted earlier in 
the campaign, with totals of 13-15 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively.  Although a spokesman for the polling company 
Cifra opined that it is still possible for Mujica to win in 
the first round, most analysts believe the FA is unlikely to 
secure over 50 percent, the minimum necessary to avoid a run- 
off scenario.  While some second round predictions have been 
carried out (with Mujica ahead in some and Lacalle in others), 
polling for such a scenario has not yet been systematic enough 
to identify a definite trend.  Most observers feel that, in a 
run-off, National Party candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle will be 
the beneficiary of a large percentage of votes that go to the 
Colorado or Independent parties in the first round. 
 
SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS AND POTSHOTS 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) This race for the presidency has focused more on 
character and personality and less on issues then many 
Uruguayans had hoped.  It has also been defined by a number of 
self-inflicted injuries.  The media and public alike have 
focused on the variety of slip-ups, fumbles and gaffes on 
display over the duration of the campaign.  This has been 
particularly surprising in the case of Lacalle, an ex- 
president and highly experienced politician who appeared to 
squander a strong start with some highly divisive statements 
that were gleefully seized upon by the opposition.  Whether 
declaring he was going to take a chainsaw to public spending, 
recommending the poor shower more regularly, or labeling the 
impoverished beneficiaries of the government social support 
scheme Qscroungers,Q he has seemed at best careless. 
 
4. (U) MujicaQs less-refined reputation has, to an extent, 
prevented his gaffes from generating much fall-out.  Still, 
his mishaps have not been without cost.  Musings on the 
justice of his own guerilla past and suggestions that the land 
belongs to the state have both caused consternation, but 
MuijcaQs most dramatic faux pas was the recent publication of 
interviews (Reftel A)in which he appeared to blast both his 
own party and the Argentine government.  The resulting 
embarrassment did nothing to help the already fractious 
relationship between Mujica and current president Vazquez, who 
during a visit to the U.S. characterized Mujica's comments as 
"stupidities."  Mujica subsequently absented himself from from 
several high profile government events, most noticeably the 
recent opening of MontevideoQs new airport and, on another 
occasion, a new port terminal. 
 
THE OUTLOOK IN PARLIAMENT 
------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Although most of the local media attention is focused 
on the fight for the presidency, the October 25 vote is much 
more than just the first round of a race for the top job.  The 
votes obtained decide the make-up of the next parliament 
regardless of which partyQs candidate heads the executive 
office.  Presently, the FA enjoys an overall majority in the 
general assembly of 53 percent, but if the recent polling 
figures were to become a parliamentary reality, no one party 
would have an absolute majority in parliament.  In such a 
situation, smaller parties such as the Colorados and the 
Independent party would gain importance. 
 
6. (U) A less likely alternative could see the FA failing to 
gain the over fifty percent majority required to avoid a run- 
off but still clinch an absolute parliamentary majority.  This 
seemingly contradictory outcome rests on the fact that while 
the presidential vote is calculated according to the number of 
recorded voters (i.e. it includes blank and annulled ballots), 
the parliamentary vote is calculated according to the number 
of legitimate votes actually returned (i.e. blank or annulled 
ballots donQt count).  Given the current closeness of the 
race, a couple of percentage pointsQ worth of blank or 
annulled ballots could make a real difference.  One political 
analyst, assuming a blank/annulled vote of around 2.5 percent, 
calculates that FA could actually score a parliamentary 
majority if they reach 48.8 percent in the first round.  While 
such a scenario would make life easier for a Muijca 
administration, it also leaves open the possibility of a 
Lacalle presidency attempting to operate with a FA 
parliamentary majority. 
 
7. (SBU) October 25 not only decides the division of power 
between the parties but also between the factions within them. 
With polling generally focused on the big picture, the 
internal political landscape is harder to predict.  For the 
FA, much depends on whether MujicaQs MPP (Popular Movement 
Party) faction maintains or increases its one-third share of 
FA seats.  With the FA coalition already under strain, a shift 
in the power balance might further expose cracks that could 
widen after the election, irrespective as to who holds the 
presidency.  In the case of the National Party, ex-rivals 
Lacalle and Larranaga have put on a good show of solidarity 
during the campaign (Reftel B), and while Lacalle will head 
the party no matter who wins, LarrangaQs more moderate profile 
may enable him to attract more votes.  His Alianza National 
(National Alliance) faction already holds over twice the 
number of seats as LacalleQs Unidad National (National Unity) 
faction and, if the National Party candidates were to lose in 
their presidential bid, Larranaga, who is younger than Lacalle 
and still has presidential ambitions, may not expend too much 
energy on preserving a good relationship. 
 
THE REFERENDA 
------------- 
 
8. (U) Also of interest on October 25 is the outcome of two 
public referenda.  One will decide whether to repeal Uruguay's 
amnesty law (Ley de Caducidad Q reftel C) that protects police 
and military personal from prosecution for acts committed 
under the auspices of the dictatorship, and the other on 
whether to allow an absentee vote (by mail) for Uruguayan 
expatriates. The FA, whose ranks contain many ex-Tupamaro 
guerilla fighters and which also stands to gain more from 
absentee voting, is broadly pro both referenda, while the 
traditional parties are broadly against them.  Despite support 
for these issues dividing more-or-less on party lines however, 
neither issue has played a significant role in the campaigns 
and, unlike the election proper, citizens are not legally 
obliged to participate.  Polling on both the referenda has 
been close, indicating an uncertain outcome for both 
referenda. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (U) When the FA won its first-ever presidential election in 
2004, polling showed FA candidate (now president) Tabare 
Vazquez making a late surge that allowed him to close just 
over fifty percent.  We have not seen a similar surge from 
Mujica, so the temptation is to predict a second round. 
However, this is the first election with the FA in the 
incumbent's role after generations of traditional party 
dominance, and no one can confidently predict how much of 
Vazquez's considerable popularity and proven achievements will 
benefit Mujica.  END COMMENT.