VZCZCXRO5453
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHSK #0357/01 2940801
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210801Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0524
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0001
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0532

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000357 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB (JOE WANG) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: IN BELARUS THE JUDICIARY IS JUST ONE MORE TOOL OF CONTROL 
FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
MINSK 00000357  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  Two of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee's 
(BHC) most prominent human rights leaders, Harry Pogonyailo and 
Oleg Gulak, told Post that the Belarusian judicial system 
remains under the control of the Presidential Administration 
(PA) and the Justice Ministry (MOJ).  According to them, judges 
trade their professional independence for lucrative governmental 
benefits and follow precise instructions set by the PA, while 
defense lawyers are pressured through the Belarusian Bar 
Association.  Additionally, the PA imposes certain indicators on 
the judiciary by which it further restrains the independence of 
the courts.  Although the PA faces some internal opposition over 
its control of the judiciary from agencies like the MFA, the 
latter's dissenting voices are rather insignificant. 
Subsequently, the lack of a real independent judiciary allows 
the PA to continue influencing judges, persecuting the 
opposition, and deepening the PA's concentration of power.  End 
summary. 
 
Judiciary: Lack of Sovereignty and Resuscitated Soviet Practices 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) According to Gulak and Pogonyailo, the Belarusian 
court system continues to be heavily dependent on the regime's 
executive branch.  In particular, the courts rely on the MOJ for 
budgetary allocations, while the PA controls the recruitment and 
appointment of judges.  Additionally, the PA consistently 
adheres to the Soviet-style practice of nominating judges.  The 
experts explained that this process requires extensive 
background checks by the Belarusian State Security Committee 
(BKGB) and approval from local executive committees in order to 
guarantee the ideology pedigree of the nominees.  Senior level 
judicial candidates are also subject to yet another layer of 
scrutiny and are personally interviewed by the PA's Deputy Head. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Moreover, the lucrative governmental benefits, 
including free housing that the judges enjoy for towing the line 
and the MOJ's loyalty-based promotion system for "trustworthy" 
judges who deliver desirable trial outcomes, add to their 
reluctance to depart from the "traditional" approaches in 
handling political and other cases and to pursue non-sponsored 
judgments.  Also, the judges are not authorized to take foreign 
business travel and participation in seminars and conferences 
without special permission from their courts' chairs. 
Nevertheless, it was noted that loyalty to the regime does not 
secure immunity from repressions and persecution, and even the 
most "loyal" judges may be brought up on far-fetched charges 
that the courts once applied against the regime's opponents. 
 
Quantitative Targets Predetermine the Work of the Courts 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The pundits elaborated that the PA further controls 
the courts by requiring the judiciary to implement a range of 
the indicators that the PA uses to evaluate the efficiency of 
the system.  Ostensibly, a high number of "indictments" and a 
low "rate" of acquittals (less than 1%, which was common for the 
Soviet judicial system) demonstrate the "success" of the 
judicial system's performance in the eyes of the PA bureaucrats. 
 According to Pogonyailo and Gulak, the PA apparatchiks regard 
laws as their exclusive domain and continue to be the ultimate 
source of "legislative initiatives." 
 
Bar Association: No Support to Lawyers 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) According to the interlocutors, the Belarus National 
Bar Association is controlled to a great extent by the MOJ.  As 
in the case with the judges, lawyers must also receive approvals 
to participate in conferences or seminars in and outside of 
Belarus.  Moreover, the Bar can repeal a lawyer's license for 
minor misconduct, and the MOJ is required to endorse the 
appointment of the Bar's chief.  As a result, independent 
lawyers regretfully acknowledge that "being a lawyer" is no 
longer "prestigious" in a judicial system that is "in the 
pocket" of the regime.  The ongoing criminal cases against 
Volkovysk political activists Nikolay Avtukhovich and Yuriy 
Leonov, charged with arson and terrorism, vividly demonstrate 
how even the "most progressive" and open-minded lawyers can be 
constrained by the law-enforcement.  The lawyers in this case 
have been unable to effectively defend their clients because 
they are prohibited from disclosing any details about the 
investigation.  Consequently, these lawyers have no right to 
publicly express their concerns about any violations that may 
occur during the investigation that infringe upon the activists 
legal rights or even any inappropriate treatment in the pretrial 
holding facilities.  In the end, the judicial system ultimately 
puts the lawyers at risk of persecution and the regime's 
 
MINSK 00000357  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
arbitrary rule if they confront the prosecution's case or even 
approach to the case. 
 
PA and MFA Send Mixed Messages 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Gulak stressed that despite the PA's immense authority 
over all GOB agencies, the MFA officials have attempted to push 
for a different approach, especially with regard to politically 
motivated trials.  In their informal conversations with the BHC, 
the MFA EUR officers explained that the cases involving 
internationally recognized political prisoners were a sour point 
in the Belarus' relations with the West.  In case of Artyom 
Dubskiy (sentenced on July 7, 2009, to a year in jail for 
violating his previous sentence to a two-year partial house 
arrest), the MFA officers lobbied for Dubskiy's early release. 
Despite these efforts, the PA international affairs aides 
legitimized Dubskiy's sentence and expressed confidence prior to 
his trial that Amnesty International would not recognize Dubskiy 
as "a prisoner of conscience." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As with all other aspects of governance, and in the 
case of Belarus that includes 80% of the economy that lies in 
state hands, the PA maintains authority over the judicial system 
to ensure that it serves as yet one more of its instruments of 
control over society.  This applies not only to political 
dissidents or opposition figures but to intransigent business 
managers and state officials as well.  The courts' dependence on 
the regime and the subsequent lack of independent and consistent 
judicial processes, including the possibility of impartial 
appeal procedures, have led to a vicious circle, which fully 
cements the PA's concentration of power over the courts.  End 
comment. 
SCANLAN