VZCZCXRO3959
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3018/01 2922229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 192229Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8666
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQS USNORTHCOM
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003018 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX
SUBJECT: MATAMOROS OFFICIALS: INTEL, COORDINATION, AND CONVICTIONS 
ELUSIVE IN DRUG FIGHT

¶1. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Ambassador 
DCM John Feeley 
Consul General Michael Barkin (Matamoros) 
RSO Michael Flynn (Matamoros) 
Mexico 
Matamoros Mayor Erick Silva Santos 
Tamaulipas State Attorney General Jaime Rodriguez Inurrigarro 
SEMAR Vice Admiral Daniel Bozada Sanchez 
SEDENA General Brig. D.E.M. J.A. Sanchez 
City Council Secretary Raul Cesar Gonzalez Garcia 
Public Safety Director Ruben Hiram Gonzalez 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Matamoros Mayor Erick Silva, local security 
commanders, and Tamaulipas Attorney General Jaime Rodriguez 
Inurrigarro described a strained security environment and weakened 
economy in a 24 September luncheon with the Ambassador. 
Conversation focused on deficits in intelligence generation, 
coordination among agencies and between levels of government, and 
drug offense prosecutions, as well as the limited role of 
civil/police forces.  The Mayor and Attorney General called for 
government reform and consistent delivery of resources.  Apart from 
SEDENA and SEMAR, whose temporary deployment they praised, civilian 
officials portrayed a low-bandwidth relationship with the federal 
government.  Based on visits to Tijuana and Juarez, the lack of 
cooperation between police and military in Matamoros may reflect the 
worst of the worst.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FIGHTING BLIND AND DISJOINTED 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked first about intelligence production 
and dissemination.  General Sanchez listed his primary intelligence 
gathering activities: overflights searching for trafficker routes, 
street patrols, intel analysts, and a citizen hotline.  His 
regimental command is located in Reynosa, along with most of the 
analytical operation (apart a small Matamoros-based cell).  He 
allowed he did not believe he was receiving sufficient, actionable 
leads to drive operations.  The General qualified the situation in 
Matamoros as "not a front of war."  The enemy is organized gangsters 
who at least in Matamoros look to lay low out of reach of the state. 
 But they are well armed, he granted.  SEDENA's Matamoros street 
strength is 100 men; reinforcements from neighboring garrisons of 
300 can respond within an hour.  Air assets are based in Reynosa; 
the General wished he had that capacity locally.  The local 
Seguridad Publica force is 615 people, but its mission is 
maintaining order rather than combating drug traffickers.  When 
asked whether the varied government forces conducted joint patrols, 
the General said that while SEDENA, SEMAR, and PFP were all present 
in Matamoros, each operated independently.  They request 
cross-service assistance in emergencies, but there is little 
day-to-day coordination. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador turned to a much-publicized September 4 
gunfight.  The General said the action began when an army patrol 
encountered suspect vehicles (a convoy of SUVs with tinted windows). 
 The engagement was not a raid and not intel-driven.  Spotted on the 
street, the suspects tried to flee.  The General said they were 
transporting a senior drug trafficking organization (DTO) leader; 
they fought ferociously, knowing their chain of command would kill 
them were the chief in their care apprehended.  Local police did not 
respond to the firefight.  Stray bullets landed on the U.S. side of 
the border, compelling the University of Texas-Brownsville to close 
early. 
 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LEAD 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador noted the security forces rarely assembled a 
crime scene and that the overwhelming majority of those detained in 
operations do not go to court.  The army is limited in what it can 
do at a crime scene.  Local and state police do not enter the crime 
scene because drug offenses are jurisdictionally outside their 
scope.  Either a narco dies in a firefight, he confesses under 
military interrogation, or in time he goes free.  Without criminal 
convictions and jail time, the fight is ultimately not sustainable. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized that the Mexican military needed 
an exit strategy.  Mexico must build up its civil police and 
prosecutorial forces to fill much of the space currently occupied by 
the military.  The DCM asked how the Merida Initiative could best 
push aid to the state and local level.  The Mayor said Mexico needed 
trustworthy people in security jobs ("gente que sea confiable"), 
more arms and equipment to mount more patrols, more investment in 
the army and navy, and better salaries.  He underlined the need for 
follow-through.  Who would fund initiatives after USG funding runs 
its course?  It's great to stand up a new unit, but how would he pay 
for its fuel and maintenance? 
 
REFORM AND COORDINATION 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Mayor, formerly a representative in the federal Chamber 
of Deputies, listed three reforms he considered necessary to win: 
 
*Wholesale reform by the state to clarify the roles of the various 
federal forces.  For example, the local Seguridad Publica force has 
more elements than SEDENA in Matamoros, but does not have the 
statutory authority to hunt drug traffickers. 
 
*Social reform to provide the jobs, education, and opportunity 
necessary to prevent young Mexicans from joining the cartels. 
 
*A new approach to public communications that reins in irresponsible 
journalism, better conveys the government's message and shapes a 
less hostile operating environment. 
 
The Attorney General concurred that constitutional reform was 
needed, driven by President Calderon.  He added that SEDENA, PGR, 
and SSP are all short resources.  Salaries are too low.  The major 
mechanism in the area for interagency coordination is a state-level 
committee that meets in Ciudad Victoria, the state capital, every 15 
days.  Its readouts go to CISEN but are not in real time and do not 
drive operational activity.  Noting the value the state government 
placed on cooperation with the USG, he mentioned Tamaulipas 
officials had met with ICE Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Pena on 
20 September and were optimistic of concluding an information 
sharing agreement. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked how local and state level government 
communicated with the federal level.  The Mayor said that at the 
local level, he lived with and reacted to the drug-driven troubles 
daily.  The federal government, at a strategic remove, acts via 
programs and plans.  Local-federal channels of communication are 
poor.  In Ciudad Victoria, the Governor of Tamaulipas has more clout 
and a more direct link to Mexico City. 
 
RECESSION, VIOLENCE, AND INVESTMENT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Stepping back from security, the Mayor detailed five chief 
concerns: crossing time at the border, illegal crossings, the effect 
of the U.S. economic downturn on Matamoros, distribution of wealth 
and social problems, and security.  The weakened local economy was 
of particular worry.  Declines in tourism, remittances, and oil 
receipts and the H1N1 influenza have combined to push up 
unemployment (a potential boon to DTO recruiting efforts).  The 
economy will improve, but fear in the business community of the DTOs 
and kidnappings may still drag on investment.  An indicator to watch 
is the number of Tamaulipans living in McAllen and San Antonio. 
Perceptions are worse than reality, but the Mayor admitted he faced 
a challenge convincing residents, tourists, and businesspeople to 
return to Matamoros. 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: While violence is not at the level seen in border 
cities to the west, security forces in Matamoros are 
underperforming.  They are not generating actionable intelligence, 
coordinating among security agencies, patrolling jointly or 
effectively, or getting prosecutions.  Measures to protect the 
population and disaggregate citizens and drug traffickers are 
underdeveloped.  Local citizens seem to support the military 
deployment but steer clear of patrols for fear of cross-fire. 
Government hotlines receive few tips, a sign would-be informants 
doubt the government can protect them from retribution.  In the 
search for better results, Matamoros may benefit by applying lessons 
learned in positive trending areas of operation such as Tijuana. 
 
PASCUAL