VZCZCXRO6725
RR RUEHPD
DE RUEHLI #0534/01 2821154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091154Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7910
RUEHPD/AMCONSUL PONTA DELGADA 0630

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LISBON 000534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT KFRD ASEC CVIS CPAS PO
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - PORTUGAL 
 
REF: (A) LISBON 000400 (B) LISBON 000239 
a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Portugal has been a member of the European 
Union since 1986 and a member of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) 
since 1999.  The country has a relatively homogeneous population of 
10.7 million and one of the lowest crime rates in Western Europe. 
Although Portugal had for centuries been a country of net 
emigration, during the past twenty years emigration has slowed to a 
trickle and the country instead has become a destination for 
increasing numbers of immigrants from outside the European Union. 
Traditionally boasting one of the lowest crime rates in Western 
Europe, 2008 statistics show an increase in every significant 
category across the criminal index.  This trend has held steady 
through both quarters of 2009.  General crime increased by more than 
seven percent while violent crime increased 10 percent with crime in 
Lisbon alone accounting for 40 percent of the increase.  Some 
members of law enforcement attribute this to increased unemployment, 
specifically among immigrants.  Others cite the economic crisis in 
general, and some believe that youth gangs in the larger cities are 
simply becoming more brazen. 
Approximately 100,000 foreign nationals are estimated to be residing 
in Portugal illegally, in addition to the approximate 500,000 legal 
residents.  Immigration and visa- related fraud detected in Portugal 
usually takes the form of attempts by foreign nationals--most 
notably, persons from Brazil, Eastern European countries and former 
Portuguese colonies in Africa--to enter Portugal surreptitiously or 
to move from Portugal to more prosperous countries, both inside and 
outside of the European Union.  Recent statistics from the 
Portuguese Immigration Service (Servico de Estrangeiros e 
Frontieras) [SEF]) show that Brazilians, who do not need a visa to 
enter Portugal, represent 71.5 percent of illegal residents in the 
country.  In terms of fraudulent documents, SEF's detection rates 
were highest for nationals of Colombia, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and 
Venezuela, in that order. 
b. NIV FRAUD:  Portuguese nationals with machine readable passports 
do not require visas for tourist or business travel to the U.S., as 
they may travel under the VWP. Embassy Lisbon's average refusal rate 
across all nationalities was 14.67 percent in FY 2009 and 13.20 
percent since the last fraud cable. Consulate Ponta Delgada's 
average refusal rate across all nationalities was 12.54 percent for 
FY 2009 and 14.29 percent since the last reporting period. 
Lisbon receives from DHS approximately 15 I-275's per month and 
Ponta Delgada receives about three.  Lisbon encounters approximately 
three applicants per week who have been denied VWP entry by CBP 
while Ponta Delgada sees about three per month.  It is not lost on 
either Post that these numbers strongly correlate with the number of 
'turn arounds' at the borders.  Of these applicants, we refuse about 
two-thirds 214(b) after having confirmed suspicions of living and/or 
working in the U.S. courtesy of the VWP.  Lisbon and Ponta Delgada 
see another 20 or so applicants a month who were not denied entry, 
but who were advised upon departure to seek a visa for future travel 
due to suspect travel patterns.  Of these applicants, both Posts 
estimate that 50 percent are refused 214 (b) with elderly Portuguese 
nationals veritably living with children in the US making up the 
bulk of the intending immigrants. 
Post has detected no crew-related fraud since the implementation of 
a fraud prevention process by which we confirm the employment of all 
crew members directly with their employers. The process includes a 
pre-screening of all shipping or transportation companies requesting 
visas on behalf of their employees.  Post maintains exemplars of all 
letterhead and company-approved signatures against which the 
confirmations are compared. 
c. IV FRAUD:  IV fraud is generally low in Portugal and demand for 
immigrant visas is not great.  Post sees quite a few third country 
nationals, however, primarily applicants from the former Portuguese 
colonies but increasingly also from Eastern Europe and from other 
countries requiring clearance procedures.  These cases require extra 
vigilance in terms of the validity of documents with which we have 
little or no familiarity.  When in doubt, we often use CCD resources 
or reach out to colleagues in relevant Posts.  In some of the 
family-based immigration claims, parents left behind small children 
to be raised by relatives.  This makes for scant evidence in terms 
of photos, letters, or even memories to assist in determining the 
bona fides of the relationship. 
d. DV FRAUD:  Post has not uncovered any fraud attempts related to 
DV applications during this reporting period. 
e. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  Counterfeit U.S. passports are detected 
in Portugal on occasion.  No new incidents of ACS or passport fraud 
were detected in the first half of 2009. 
f. ADOPTION FRAUD:  Post processes very few adoption cases and no 
adoption-related fraud has been detected this reporting period. 
g. USE OF DNA: In this quarter, Post has had three cases such as 
those described under section c, in which the suggestion of DNA 
testing seemed the best vehicle via which to draw a conclusion. 
However the applicants did not decide how to proceed before the 
release of STATE 097431. The new measures juxtaposed with the 
relative infrequency of this issue here have raised a cost/benefit 
question not yet fully addressed. 
h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD:  Post processes only one or 
two asylum cases per year, reflecting the small number of persons 
 
LISBON 00000534  002 OF 003 
 
 
who attempt to claim asylum in Portugal (fewer than 100 per year.) 
No new asylum cases were received during this period. 
i. ALIEN SMUGGLING: Post is the official NIV application point for 
Guinea Bissau and also often sees diplomatic visa requests from 
other nations where document integrity is not reliable.  Although 
these cases occasionally take more time and attention, no 6E cases 
have been confirmed this quarter. 
SEF has recently increased efforts to uncover human smuggling rings 
and punish perpetrators via increasingly-stiff penalties.  The GOP 
cooperates with other European Union countries in these pursuits. 
REFTEL A details how local authorities recently dismantled a 
Ukrainian fraud ring called "A Central." The group's main activity 
was the smuggling of people from Eastern European countries, mainly 
Ukraine, into Portugal, Spain and Italy. The ring produced 
counterfeit documentation, provided false U.S. and international 
driver's licenses and issued false labor contracts in the course of 
their illicit activities.  REFTEL A generated interest from the 
Department of Justice, which requested more information in hopes of 
catching up with facilitators in the U.S. 
 
Just a few weeks later, GOP uncovered and prosecuted a Moldovan 
fraud ring comprised of 13 Moldovans and one Portuguese citizen. 
The resultant prison sentences ranged from five to 23 years. 
j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: There are no current fraud 
investigations. 
k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Portugal has made great strides in upgrading the security of its 
identity documents over the past ten years.  Portuguese passports 
have had digital photos and machine-readable passports since January 
1, 2001, leaving only another year of current passports susceptible 
to photo-subbing. On August 26, 2006, the GOP began issuing 
electronic chip passports. 
Per REFTEL B, the GOP and the Australians have reported imposters 
boarding flights with valid Portuguese passports.  There have also 
been reports of issues with altered Portuguese passports. 
Additionally, mala fide travelers have presented altered Portuguese 
residency cards although the GOP's upgrade in 2005 to plastic cards 
with flush photos rather than paper cards with pasted photos has 
greatly increased integrity of that document. 
 
l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  Cooperation with 
host government authorities remains excellent. The Government of 
Portugal shares U.S. concerns about document fraud and is mindful of 
the need to remain vigilant in this area, both to protect its 
citizens and to preserve Portugal's highly-valued participation in 
the Visa Waiver Program. 
In June 2009 Secretary of State Clinton and the Portuguese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs exchanged the instruments of ratification 
concerning the U.S-Portugal Agreements on Extradition and Mutual 
Legal Assistance.  The bilateral instruments aim at implementing the 
2003 U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. 
 
The Agreement on Extradition modernizes the 1908 Extradition treaty 
between the U.S. and Portugal.  Among the most important features is 
a provision replacing outdated lists of extraditable offenses with 
the dual criminality approach.  It also allows extradition for a 
broader range of offenses and for newer ones.  The Agreement 
contains a series of significant improvements to expedite the 
extradition process. 
 
Prior to these advances, no bilateral law enforcement treaty existed 
between the United States and Portugal in the area of mutual legal 
assistance.  The current mutual legal assistance instrument reflects 
the high level of bilateral cooperation here and exemplifies 
on-going efforts to meet the obligations arising from the U.S.-EU 
Agreement. 
In June 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano visited Lisbon to meet 
with the Portuguese Foreign, Interior and Justice Ministers.  After 
the roundtable meeting, Sec. Naplitano and the Interior and Justice 
ministers signed a bilateral agreement on Preventing and Combating 
Crime (PCC) that will allow the exchange of information on 
biometrics, criminal history records, and terrorism.  The USG 
initially proposed this agreement (under the name "Preventing and 
Combating Serious Crime") to the GOP in 2008 as part of enhanced 
security arrangements mandated by the 9/11 Act for VWP countries. 
m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN:  As noted in REFTEL B, post 
occasionally sees employment-based IVs seemingly being used in lieu 
of a family-based immigration option. Typically, a cousin in the 
United States will over-inflate the size and solvency of the 
US-based business.  Additionally, the applicants in these cases do 
not tend to possess training or schooling logical to the intended 
"position."  While not prevalent enough to be legitimately called a 
trend, Post did return to DHS during this reporting period one such 
petition with a recommendation for revocation.  Post is grateful to 
KCC for pro-actively researching and highlighting inconsistencies in 
the Petitioner's claims.  Post has noticed a particular immigration 
attorney's name attached to cases of this ilk and is employing Watch 
Phrase and other Department and CCD resources in search of common 
threads.  We will report back if something solidifies. 
Something that is not strictly fraud perpetrated against Post but 
 
LISBON 00000534  003 OF 003 
 
 
which merits mention due to frequency is the number of scams against 
ESTA registrants.  Internet sites pop up bearing striking 
resemblances to the legitimate USG site.  The sites collect the 
unwitting applicant's personal and financial information.  In the 
best case scenario, the entrepreneurial owners of the site properly 
register applicants with ESTA, and extract a one-time fee.  On the 
other end of the scale is full-fledged identity theft.  Post tries 
to report and shut down such sites, but it is akin to playing 
whack-a-mole.  Post is proud to note that 100 percent of email 
inquiries receive a personal response within two working days.  We 
can, therefore, sometimes stop this problem before it starts. 
Additionally, since the official ESTA launch, Post has placed ads, 
done outreach, and posted warnings on our web site in hopes of 
reinforcing to the public that such sites are neither legitimate nor 
necessary. 
n. STAFFING AND TRAINING PATTERN:  Laura Chamberlin is Embassy 
Lisbon's Visa Unit Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager and will soon 
be Visas Viper Program liaison.  She completed the Advanced 
Consular, Advanced Namechecking, and Fraud Prevention Manager 
courses in Spring 2009.  Margarida Gomes is Embassy Lisbon's Legal 
Advisor and has completed various anti-fraud training courses, 
including the PC-542 "FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop" in November of 
¶2004.  Jeanette Rebert is Consulate Ponta Delgada's Consular Section 
Chief (both Visa and ACS units), FPM and Visa Viper Program liaison. 
She completed the Advanced Consular and Advanced Namechecking 
courses in March 2006 
BALLARD