VZCZCXRO4599
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHKV #1822/01 2931254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201254Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8620
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR UMB - JOE WANG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT:  MINSK:  OPEN TO ROAD MAP DISCUSSION WITH THE USG, 
IF ONLY TO REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary, Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  The President's Chief of Staff, Vladimir 
Makey, reaffirmed to Charge on October 14 the desire of 
Belarus to craft a Road Map with the USG on improving 
US-Belarus bilateral relations.  He said they welcomed a 
fluid discussion with the PA in the lead on the Belarusian 
side.  Makey underscored that Belarus needs to decrease its 
economic dependence on Russia; he has seen no change in GOR's 
preference for dictating to its "partners." He personally 
believes that recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 
GOB will not change Russia,s heavy handiness towards Belarus 
although some in the GOB, he said, have a different view.  He 
believes the President is committed to economic reform, 
including privatization.  He said GOB will be seeking USG 
support to expand IFI lending to Belarus in 2010, and 
understands there will be economic conditionality.  He 
appeared to imply that they saw it as the lesser evil of 
having to turn to Russia for help, yet again.  Political 
liberalization, on the other hand, is something more 
difficult for Presidential Administration to stomach, but he 
said they are open to discussing our different perspective on 
this issue within the context of the Road Map.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) On October 14, Charge met with President's Chief of 
Staff, Vladimir Makey, at his request.  In an hour and twenty 
minute meeting, Makey apologized for the lack of progress on 
flushing out a Road Map (RM) agreed upon with A/S Gordon on 
August 14.  He said that between the summer break, other 
pressing matters, including a number of high level meetings 
involving Russia, the issue had fallen by the wayside.  He 
said he asked for the meeting with the Charge to reaffirm 
Belarus, interest in moving the process forward, and indeed, 
called it a historic opportunity to improve relations between 
the two countries. 
 
¶3. (C) Having sought clarification on how the RM should 
proceed, Makey said that unlike Foreign Minister Martynov's 
comments to DAS Russell on the margins of UNGA, the 
Presidential Administration (PA) would take the lead on the 
discussion and include the MFA and other Ministries as 
necessary.  He also agreed that the process should not be 
wedded to a document but instead be a fluid back and forth 
discussion.  He instructed Valentin Rybakov, his Foreign 
Affairs Advisor, to begin the discussions with Charge ASAP. 
Rybakov volunteered that perhaps it would be best to launch 
the process with a senior level meeting for Makey in 
Washington.  Charge responded he would forward the proposal 
but believed Washington would be inclined to elevate the 
discussions once real progress had been made on the RM. 
Makey and Gordon had set out the goal, laid out the 
parameters, and blessed the process, but to date no progress 
had been made.  Makey agreed and said he would be happy to 
meet with Charge once a month or as need be if problems 
arose. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to Charge's comment that he heard from the 
IFI Resident Representatives that despite progress with their 
counterparts in the Central Bank, MinFin and even MinEcon, 
everything had to go through the PA for final approval and 
the PA economic decision makers would override or distort the 
agreements that had been reached.  Makey argued that it was 
actually the opposite and that PA was the driving force for 
economic change in Belarus.  (Note:  Both IMF and WB Res Reps 
found his response baffling.  End Note.)  PA fully supports 
economic liberalization and the privatization and often has 
to push the government, Makey said, to move more quickly.  PA 
favors large scale foreign direct investment from the West. 
He said they were talking to Poland about the refineries and 
would welcome and strongly support US companies interested in 
purchasing refineries, banks or factories in Belarus, 
although they would not to be sold at fire sale prices.  It 
was critical (a theme he repeated often) that Belarus 
diversify its economic relations.  Its dependence on 
Russia,s market and capital served only to undermine the 
independence and sovereignty of Belarus.  He said they were 
well aware that they would have financial shortfalls in 2010 
and he asked that the USG support funding through the IMF and 
WB to Belarus so they would not have to rely on Russia. 
 
¶5. (C) He reported that at the Chisinau CIS summit, when 
other members tried to engage in a serious discussion on how 
to improve economic coordination between the countries, 
"Medvedev just sat there and smiled" knowing full well the 
other countries were dependent on Russia.  Unlike in western 
organizations were there are genuine friendships and 
partnerships Russia preferred to dictate.  Saying this was 
his opinion and thus only the three of us would hear it (he 
 
KYIV 00001822  002 OF 003 
 
 
used this phrase a number of times) that even if Belarus 
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia would continue 
to press Belarus; it would never be its real partner.  All 
the same, he did warn that there were elements in the PA and 
government who were predisposed towards recognition.  He said 
this was not a negotiating tactic on his part, but just a 
fact he wanted to share with us. 
 
¶6. (C) Charge mentioned that through USAID we were exploring 
efforts at initiating a program to promote the growth of 
small and medium size businesses in the private sector as 
well as work with the Latvians on establishing a English 
language Riga MBA program in Minsk.  He said PA welcomed and 
supported both.  The growth of the private sector was 
inevitable, and it was important that Belarus be prepared for 
it.  He said that PA was interested in engaging directly with 
the Charge on the MBA program.  The response was that despite 
the USG being the largest funder in this joint effort with 
the Latvians, the Latvians had the lead on this effort and we 
respected that and supported their role.  Makey responded 
with a chuckle and said, see the difference (a reference to 
the Chisinau CIS meeting). 
 
¶7. (C) Charge concluded by expressing his appreciation for 
the PA,s intervention when Charge called the evening of Oct 
7 to complain about a crew showing up on the Charge,s 
doorstep to film, including into the house, the arrival of 
political party representatives for a dinner Charge hosted 
for the visiting Coordinator of Assistance to Europe and 
Eurasia, Dan Rosenblum. Charge reminded Makey that in their 
first meeting Makey had assured the Charge the Embassy could 
meet with anyone in society but asked that it also meet with 
government figures.  Charge said he had held up his part of 
the bargain with his meetings, and indeed, Mr. Rosenblum had 
met with the Chairman of the Central Bank.  Makey apologized 
and said when he heard of it he had put a stop to it 
immediately. 
 
¶8. (C) Makey added that elections were not far off and people 
were getting nervous and that the special services in any 
country had to keep track of people who were a threat to the 
country.  He claimed that the opposition figures were playing 
into Russia,s hands by trying to isolate Belarus, which 
would only increase its dependence on Russia.  Charge said he 
was confident the services could keep tabs on people in a 
much more sophisticated way and what had transpired was just 
harassment.  Makey agreed.  Charge continued that isolation 
of Belarus was not the policy of the USG, but a by product of 
the decisions GOB made in terms of how it handled issue of 
human rights, freedom of the press, and elections.  The 
choice was not between east and west, as there were no longer 
two camps, but it was about the decisions Belarus made 
internally about what type of economic and political system 
it would have that would affirm the sovereignty and 
independence of Belarus, something the USG supported.  Makey 
concluded the meeting by saying our respective understanding 
of these issues would be clarified in the RM. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  The theme of the meeting mirrored the 
conversation with A/S Gordon, namely that Belarus had learned 
during the financial crisis the harsh consequences of being 
so dependent on Russia; much as in a boxing ring, Russia just 
pushed harder when Belarus appeared weak.  However, more so 
then before, Makey, and the PA and GOB writ large, realize 
that there is no going back to the economic model that 
allowed them to maintain the social compact with society -- 
full employment, economic predictability, and consistent be 
it gradual improvement in people's economic welfare; and thus 
the genuine popularity of Lukashenka.  The model, based on 
cheap oil and gas from Russia, and a Russian market that 
bought most of what Belarus produced, and that allowed 
Belarus to sell finished petroleum products to the West, was 
gone; and even if Belarus was offered the chance to return to 
it, total dependence on Russia was no longer in the interest 
of Belarus. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment Continued:  PA and GOB, the latter a subset 
of PA, has increasingly, be it reluctantly, accepted the 
economic reform criteria of accessing IFI funding as the 
lesser of two evils.  A potentially strong structural reform 
program in a follow on Stand By Agreement in April of 2010, 
as would be required under Article 4, may be the best way in 
the short run to foster change of the economic system in 
Belarus.  To date the maintenance of a state economy has been 
one of the major tools of control over the population by the 
Lukashenka regime.  A more relaxed approach to human rights, 
independent media, and political pluralism, is something, at 
least for now, the PA still looks upon with great fear. 
Therefore, the continued presence of sanctions in their 
 
KYIV 00001822  003 OF 003 
 
 
current form most likely are a necessary requirement to 
remind the PA of the value the West applies to these 
principles, and thus push for continued incremental progress 
in this sphere.  This combination of carrots and sticks may 
be the best approach to helping Belarus achieve what it 
profess it wants to be -- an independent and sovereign 
country. 
 
¶11. (U) Embassy Minsk Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michael Scanlan 
cleared this message. 
PETTIT