VZCZCXRO3108
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1215/01 3020725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290725Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4647
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001215 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SMIG UN SU
SUBJECT:  USAID Acting Administrator Meeting with UN DSRSG to Sudan 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: On October 24, USAID Acting Administrator Alonzo 
Fulgham and Acting Assistant Administrator for USAID's Bureau for 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) Susan 
Reichle met with Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary 
General (DSRSG) and Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator for Sudan 
Ameerah Haq as part of the delegation's October 24 to 27 visit to 
Sudan.  In a "tour d'horizon" that encompassed the political scene 
and humanitarian challenges, Ms. Haq and her chief of political 
affairs described the worrying state of election and referendum 
preparations, as well as the difficulties of managing an 
increasingly complex humanitarian response.  End summary. 
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LACK OF PREPARATION, CONSENSUS ON ELECTION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) DSRSG Haq's political advisor began the briefing by 
stressing that the lack of trust between the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) 
regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) remains a significant risk to the peace process as elections 
and the referendum approach.  At this late date in the process, the 
parties should be reaching consensus; however, the opposite appears 
to be the case.  The National Election Commission is weak, perhaps 
even by design, impeding implementation of the various stages of 
election preparation.  If federal-level preparation is weak, state 
level organization is even weaker.  While the mechanics of the 
election may be moving forward, the NCP and SPLM have not agreed 
upon critical issues that will impact the conduct of elections, such 
as the border demarcation and the census. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Regarding the referendum scheduled for January 2011 on 
potential Southern Sudan independence, Haq and her advisor expressed 
hope that the meeting between Riek Machar and Ali Osman Taha, the 
vice presidents of Government of Southern Sudan and Sudan's 
Government of National Unity,  respectively, had resolved the voting 
formula.  However, she noted that recent information indicates that 
the deal may not be 'sealed.'  The parties agree that southerners in 
the north, as well as the diaspora, will be permitted to vote. 
However, outstanding issues remain regarding the number of votes 
required for the referendum to be considered valid.  Currently, the 
parties are discussing a formula that will require that 66 percent 
of registered voters participate, of which a simple majority would 
be sufficient to determine separation.  The parties view the 
election and referendum as a package deal, and both are needed to 
move the CPA process forward. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DARFUR SECURITY, RETURNS COMPLEX 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Turning to the humanitarian situation, Ms. Haq informed the 
delegation that gap-filling by UN agencies and NGOs averted a 
humanitarian crisis following the early March NGO expulsions.  In 
addition, the U.S. Special Envoy (SE) to Sudan General Scott Gration 
has opened humanitarian space through his initiatives. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In Darfur at present, most assistance is flowing to 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps, as areas outside camps 
are increasingly unsafe for humanitarians.  In addition, due to the 
prevailing insecurity outside of camps, IDPs are not returning to 
pre-crisis homes.  At the same time, Haq stated that the 
humanitarian community must avoid creating a situation of dependency 
through protracted relief to camps, particularly while camps become 
increasingly political entities where IDPs who might want to return 
home are held back by their leaders.  The international community 
has clearly expressed to the GOS that returns must be voluntary and 
verifiable.  DCHA Acting USAID/DCHA Assistant Administrator Reichle 
asked Haq about returns-related land issues.  The UN DSRSG replied 
that Darfuri civil society must be involved in any land reform 
discussions and in resolving land disputes.  Through the Doha 
process, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan (USSES) and others have 
encouraged civil society representatives to conduct the proper 
surveys to analyze the land issue.  The UN DSRSG said land will be 
critical in the upcoming negotiations between the government and 
rebel groups. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Security remains a primary concern for humanitarian 
operations.  Haq noted the October 22 kidnapping of an International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff member near El Geneina, West 
Darfur, and underscored her intention to persuade the High Level 
Committee (HLC) to make the planned HLC trip to El Geneina, despite 
the incident, as a show of solidarity with ICRC and the humanitarian 
community more generally.  The DSRSG opined that abduction of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001215  002 OF 002 
 
 
international staff was increasing in frequency due to the culture 
of impunity that prevails in Darfur and the feeling of 
marginalization by Arab groups who are receiving little humanitarian 
assistance.  The U.S. delegation promised to raise this as a matter 
of urgency at the meeting with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs 
scheduled for later in the day. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Haq noted that the multiple entry visa initiative of SE 
Gration was a success, but that implementation has encountered 
obstacles, since the visas are attached to other agreements and 
bureaucratic procedures in place between the NGOs and the 
government. On the "Sudanization" of humanitarian assistance, as 
announced by Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in March, Haq 
observed that this was a Presidential directive and would be 
implemented.  Humanitarian agencies do not disagree with the 
principle of partnership, but a line needed to be drawn if the GOS 
arbitrarily assigned inappropriate national NGOs to the 
international agencies, compromising the latter's neutrality. 
 
------------------------------------- 
WORRYING HUMANITARIAN TRENDS IN SUDAN 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UN representatives noted that the situation in Southern 
Sudan has become equally worrying. Haq stated that the international 
community had hoped by this time to be shifting from humanitarian 
work to development, but instead "we are moving backward" with 
insecurity in Jonglei State and other areas, as well as a food 
security crisis necessitating airdrops in multiple Southern Sudan 
locations.  The UN is addressing this through a 'stabilization' plan 
that involves capacity building in governors' offices throughout the 
South, but focusing first on Jonglei.  The UN plans to mobilize 150 
UN Volunteers (UNVs) with expertise in information technology, 
planning, surveying, engineering, and medicine.  To date, the UN has 
recruited 55 UNVs.  These efforts are in preparation for a 'soft 
landing' the day after the 2011 referendum. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In a quick review of other geographical problem areas, Haq 
highlighted Abyei as a "tinderbox," with the decision on the border 
still contested by some parties, as well as early Misseriya 
migration, which more immediately could lead to an outbreak of 
violence in the area.  In the East, despite the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement (ESPA), little assistance has been provided to reverse the 
chronic situation of poverty and malnutrition.  (Note: While the 
ESPA provided for the establishment of an Eastern Sudan 
Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF), with an initial GOS 
deposit of USD100 million and annual allocations of at least USD125 
million for four years, the ESRDF remains underfunded, with only 
USD53 million allocated as of July 2009.  End note).  Haq stated 
that indicators in the East and South are far worse than Darfur. 
 
¶10. (U) The delegation cleared this cable prior to departure. 
 
WHITEHEAD