Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1208, SLA/AW GENERAL COMMANDER REQUESTS REBEL UNIFICATION IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KHARTOUM1208.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1208 2009-10-26 11:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9947
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1208/01 2991140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261140Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4635
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001208 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SU
SUBJECT: SLA/AW GENERAL COMMANDER REQUESTS REBEL UNIFICATION IN 
DARFUR 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 487 B) KHARTOUM 649 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The General Commander of the rebel forces of 
Sudanese Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) Abdelgadir Abdelrahman 
(Gaddura) supports rebel unification efforts that occur within 
Darfur's "liberated areas," not in Libya.  Assembled commanders 
reaffirmed their support for the work of Special Envoy Gration, but 
asked for U.S. assistance in returning all SLA/AW commanders from 
various locations in Chad to the field.  Commanders reported that 
Gaddura asked Abdul Wahid to return to lead unification efforts in 
Jebel Marra, but that Abdul Wahid refused.  The commanders confirmed 
that they remain united, and expected to face a GOS assault in West 
Jebel Marra soon. Urging the GOS to de-escalate in West Jebel Marra 
would buy Gaddura time; and assisting in reuniting SLA leaders would 
give him the political space to maneuver past Abdul Wahid. 
Gaddura's goals remain rebel unification and a peace deal.  Given 
that they coincide so closely with U.S. interests in Sudan, support 
for Gaddura could further the effort for peace in Darfur. End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Gaddura: Unify Rebels In "Liberated Areas" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) SLA/AW General Commander Abdelgadir Abdelrahman (Gaddura) 
told poloff and UN representatives on October 22 that he supports 
rebel unification efforts, and extended an invitation to U.S. 
Special Envoy General Scott Gration to return to Jebel Marra.  In a 
tightly-choreographed meeting at their headquarters in Deribat in 
East Jebel Marra, Gaddura and acting SLA/AW Chief of Staff Abdalla 
Bakr rejected the legitimacy of any conference outside of Darfur, 
adding that the international community must be aware that the 
"liberated areas" of SLA/AW are the only appropriate location for a 
comprehensive unification conference.  They flatly declined to 
participate in a unification conference anywhere in Libya. "We will 
not unify with people who are not on the ground," Gaddura said. 
 
3. (SBU) Gaddura thanked the SE for his efforts following their 
first meeting on April 5, 2009, in pushing for rebel unification. 
He asked that in dealing with the Government of Sudan (GOS), SE 
Gration be as neutral as possible, and continue to support the 
humanitarian effort in Darfur.  Abdalla Bakr, clearly speaking at 
the behest of Gaddura, said that the movement was concerned that the 
United States intended to drop Sudan from the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list, and improve relations with the GOS without any 
change in the situation on the ground in Darfur.  "We are Sudanese, 
and for Gration to succeed, he needs to meet us, share ideas and 
plan together," Abdalla Bakr said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Return Stranded Commanders from Chad to Sudan 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Gaddura's most pressing concern remains the return of 
SLA/AW commanders from N'Djamena to the field.  Stranded in the 
Chadian capital since May, the commanders represent both field and 
organizational strength for the movement.  Gaddura stressed that no 
wider SLA unification could take place until he had reunited the men 
under his command.  (Note: Representatives from UNAMID noted that 
the UN could arrange transport for the commanders if the 
international community could persuade the GOS to permit the men to 
return.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
JEM Holding SLA/AW Chief of Staff 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) In addition to the return of the commanders from N'Djamena, 
Gaddura also asked that the international community intervene to 
arrange the release of SLA/AW Chief of Staff Yusuf Karjakola. 
SLA/AW commanders believe Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) is currently holding Karjakola hostage at their base 
in Umm Jaras, in eastern Chad.  (Note: Karjakola is a close ally of 
Gaddura, and he is frequently credited with maintaining the unity of 
SLA/AW in the field. End note.)  Although the assembled rebels were 
tight-lipped about how Karjakola and 34 other SLA fighters fell into 
JEM's hands, UN officials said they believe that SLA/AW probably 
contacted JEM to assist in transport across the Chad-Sudan border. 
Given that the rebels presumably are still in JEM custody, the deal 
must have collapsed.  (Note: Gaddura's statement of October 20 
acknowledges a degree of cooperation between JEM and SLA/AW, before 
rejecting it. End note.)  Three other rebel leaders told poloff that 
they had successfully traveled from N'Djamena to Jebel Marra earlier 
in October, but they dressed as civilians and carried no weapons 
with them. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001208  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Commanders Claim SLA/AW United 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) All of the commanders stressed that their movement remains 
united.  But in response to a pointed question over internal 
division in SLA/AW, one young man spoke through his camouflaged 
headdress to reiterate the structured ranks of the commanders below 
Abdul Wahid.  That remained, however, the only mention in the 90 
minute-long meeting of the movement's Paris-based leader.  Speaking 
privately with poloff following the meeting, Abdalla Bakr said that 
Gaddura had spoken with Abdul Wahid within the last week.  Gaddura 
reportedly asked Abdul Wahid to return to Jebel Marra to preside 
over SLA unification within the "liberated areas," but Abdul Wahid 
flatly refused his entreaties. 
 
------------------------------- 
SAF Ready to Strike Jebel Marra 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) SLA/AW commanders confirmed UN reports (Septel) that the 
GOS appears to be readying an offensive into West Jebel Marra. 
According to Abdalla Bakr, SLA/AW commanders in the area near 
Sartony noticed significant Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) mobilization 
and overhead flights on October 19.  In response, Gaddura sent "many 
men" in that direction, and although the situation was quiet on 
October 22, the commanders said they were prepared for the situation 
to escalate. 
 
------------------------------------- 
UNAMID Blamed for IDP Camp Insecurity 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The October 22 meeting represented the first high-level 
meeting since April between representatives from the United 
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and Gaddura.  The 
SLA/AW commanders heaped blame on the mission for overseeing a 
decline of security in the camps of Darfur's internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).  Abdalla Bakr openly criticized UN leadership, 
saying "It is not true that the Sudanese military operations in 
Darfur are finished, as Adada said.  Until now, we do not know the 
positive military role of the peacekeepers."  However, the 
commanders said they welcomed future visits by UNAMID and 
representatives of the diplomatic missions in Khartoum. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The General Commander has, from the beginning, 
consistently taken the position that SLA should reunite in the 
liberated areas, and then negotiate for a peace deal.  Still 
operational after five years of intermittent war, Gaddura has 
reached out to the international community in a show of Darfur 
realpolitik.  Still tethered to the absent Abdul Wahid, Gaddura is 
facing a GOS advance on his western flank with key SLA/AW commanders 
unable to return to their mountain stronghold.  Urging the GOS to 
de-escalate in West Jebel Marra would buy Gaddura time; and 
assisting in reuniting SLA leaders would give him the political 
space to maneuver past Abdul Wahid.  Gaddura's goals remain rebel 
unification and a peace deal.  Given that they coincide so closely 
with U.S. interests in Sudan, support for Gaddura could further the 
effort for peace in Darfur. 
 
WHITEHEAD