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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1199, DARFUR UPDATE: UNAMID FEARS ATTACKS COMING IN JEBEL MARRA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1199 2009-10-25 15:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9237
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1199/01 2981554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251554Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4623
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001199 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PINR PREF KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR UPDATE: UNAMID FEARS ATTACKS COMING IN JEBEL MARRA 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1095 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) officials are deeply concerned that the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) plans to fortify recent gains against Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) forces by attacking the rebel stronghold 
of West Jebel Marra in the coming weeks. These officials cited as 
evidence the resupply of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) base in 
Kabkabiya, the mobilization of Arab militia in the area, and the 
digging of trenches along the road leading to Jebel Marra.  In North 
Darfur, UNAMID confirmed the continued presence of Chadian armed 
opposition groups, noting that 400 well-armed Chadian rebels in 100 
vehicles are active west of El Fasher. Near Shangil Tobaya, clashes, 
which injured seven, broke out between Zaghawa and Birgit tribesmen 
on October 20 over access to water.  A UNAMID peacekeeping force 
intervened to stop the fighting, and has pledged to supply water to 
the two communities while reconciliation efforts continue. In El 
Fasher, former rebel leader Minni Minnawi hosted the third 
"Liberation Council" of his Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/MM) on 
October 20, bemoaning lack of support for the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) and criticizing the international community for "running after 
the mirage of the non-signatories."  Minnawi further urged that his 
party be viewed as the inclusive party for all Darfuris. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
IS THE GOS PREPARING TO ATTACK JEBEL MARRA? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) UNAMID expressed strong concern on October 21 that the GOS 
plans to consolidate recent gains against SLA/AW forces by advancing 
from Kebkabiya into West Jebel Marra.  Those stationed at UN 
teamsites in Kebkabiya and Sartony indicate the SAF has resupplied 
its base in Kebkabiya; activated local janjaweed in preparation for 
a ground assault; and dug trenches on the road that leads to Jebel 
Marra.  Attacks in Korma and Tawila earlier this month (reftel) 
pushed SLA/AW from their lowland bases and separated SLA Northern 
Command from its main commander. Well-informed UN officials in El 
Fasher suspect that an empowered SAF, aided by Arab militia based 
near Kebkabiya, could attempt to carry out the first advance of its 
long-rumored "five-point" plan for taking Jebel Marra.  Such an 
advance could come as soon as the coming week.  The UN will attempt 
to conduct an assessment on October 25 (septel). 
 
3. (SBU) Although Jebel Marra comprises the forbidding terrain from 
which SLA launched its 2003 attacks on the SAF, various unpaved 
roads do afford access in and out of the region.  UN authorities see 
one particular single-lane unpaved "goat path" near Kebkabiya as 
susceptible to SAF use for a strike into SLA/AW-held West Jebel 
Marra.  The SAF only secured the El Fasher-Kebkabiya road this year, 
and observers believe that it is making preparations within the next 
7-10 days to commence a coordinated air-ground attack on the road 
leading south from Ed al Nagib, located 25 km east of Kebkabiya, to 
Sartony.  (Note: The village of Sartony is an SLA/AW-held town 
located at the approximate coordinates of 240 15' 00" N and 130 30' 
00" E, 25 km south of Nagib. End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) Experienced observers in El Fasher speculate that any 
attack on Jebel Marra positions would follow the classic GOS 
strategy of aerial bombardment followed by a ground attack. Unlike 
Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), SLA/AW 
commanders rarely conduct attacks and remain vulnerable to a SAF 
siege, as evidenced by their immediate withdrawal from Tawila in the 
wake of the SAF advance of October 2.  However, the uneven terrain 
that SLA/AW has occupied since its inception may provide it with a 
natural advantage to avoid SAF bombardment and push back a janjaweed 
ground assault.  Additionally, SLA/AW commanders have reported that 
fighters managed to capture two SAF trucks carrying ammunition in 
August.  Despite this, UN observers warn that a high-level of 
civilian casualties is possible.  They point out that the SAF and 
janjaweed have targeted civilians in the past when finding rebels 
has proven difficult. 
 
------------------------------ 
CHADIAN REBELS IN NORTH DARFUR 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The GOS has managed to hold its recent advances in North 
Darfur, and appears to be successfully balancing the various forces 
under its control to stymie JEM aspirations there. Chadian armed 
opposition groups (CAOGs) remain active in North Darfur, and UN 
observers believe they comprise part of the GOS's strategy to block 
the transit routes used by Darfuri rebels to launch attacks and 
connect their separate commands.  Accurate UN estimates gleaned from 
regular observations of convoys indicate that up to 400 well-armed 
Chadian rebels in 100 vehicles are active in North Darfur, west of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001199  002 OF 002 
 
 
El Fasher.   UN field reports have noted that Chadian rebels have 
looted markets and houses for food and clothing following advances 
in recent months in Darfur.  In addition to relying on janjaweed 
militias, which were used in attacks in Mau and Tawila earlier this 
month, the SAF currently has two Hind "Ababeel" helicopters 
stationed at Kutum.  Observers have noted that the SAF now conducts 
regular patrols in the areas between El Fasher and Kutum, most 
likely as a way to announce their presence and discourage rebel 
advances. 
 
---------------------------------- 
TRIBAL CLASHES NEAR SHANGIL TOBAYA 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) UNAMID sources also reported that on October 20, clashes 
occurred between Zaghawa and Birgit tribesmen between Jabel Moskul 
and Jabelti (about 20 km SE of Shangil Tobaya). A UNAMID 
peacekeeping force in Shangal Tobaya intervened by interposing their 
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) between the two groups to stop the 
fighting. Both tribes, however, suffered casualties, and seven 
tribesmen were taken for treatment to the UN level 1 Hospital in 
Shangil Tobaya. . The cause of the clash was attributed to the 
struggle over access to limited water sources. As a temporary 
solution, the UNAMID peacekeeping force in Shangil Tobaya has 
pledged to supply water to the communities while reconciliation 
efforts continue. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MINNAWI HOSTS "LIBERATION COUNCIL" 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Minni Minnawi hosted the third "Liberation Council" of his 
party (SLM/MM) in El Fasher on October 20, hosting local politicians 
and members of his Zaghawa-based coalition from across Darfur in a 
show of political strength.  Complaining that the ruling National 
Congress Party (NCP) had not provided funding to the DPA, Minnawi 
also criticized the international community for not fully funding 
UNAMID, and "running after the mirage of the non-signatories." 
Joined by several Darfuri allies praising SLM/MM's activities in 
uniting Darfur, Minnawi pushed for his party to be seen as the 
"inclusive and complete" political movement for Darfuris.  Speaking 
with poloff following the speech, several SLM/MM confidantes 
admitted that their party has yet to enunciate a strategy for next 
year's elections, adding that it was "too soon" for SLM/MM to commit 
to any option. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: The potential for the GOS to initiative further 
attacks on SLA/AW in North Darfur is of concern.   With the rebel 
movements weak and scattered, such an offensive could derail the 
fragile efforts at rebel unification necessary for the commencement 
of peace talks.  Meanwhile, UNAMID's successful intervention to halt 
tribal clashes near Shangil Tobaya is a promising sign, offering 
hope that   UNAMID's new military leadership may result in more 
active implementation of its peacekeeping mandate. 
 
WHITEHEAD