VZCZCXRO2929
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1174/01 2911603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181603Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4585
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001174 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PBTS PINS KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI DEMARCATION COMMITTEE DELAYED, SEEKS INTERVENTION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1135 C) KHARTOUM 1067 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 9 letter to Riek Machar (SPLM), Vice 
President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), three members 
of the Abyei Boundary Demarcation Committee state that the committee 
is seriously hampered by political interference, security concerns, 
and lack of equipment.  The three committee members, all members of 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), allege that the 
problems facing the committee are rooted in the fact that the 
National Congress Party (NCP) is not interested in demarcation of 
the Abyei boundary, and intends to use the committee as a scapegoat 
when demarcation fails.  Whether the problems faced by the 
demarcation team are intentional or unintentional, it is clear that 
the demarcation team is sitting in Abyei town unable to do its work. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
LETTER DECRIES OVERSITE OF COMMITTEE BY NCP 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In an October 9 letter to Machar in his capacity as Vice 
President of the GoSS, Kwol Biong, Valentino Malueth, and Ring Kuol 
Arop, the three SPLM members of the six person Abyei Boundary 
Demarcation Committee claim that demarcation is being intentional 
hampered by the Presidency of the Government of Sudan (GoS).  In 
particular the letter decries the lack of an oversight committee as 
called for by the Points of Agreement executed by the NCP and SPLM 
on August 19, and the imposition of Sami Bushara (NCP), as 
administrative secretary on the committee.  The letter states that, 
without the consent of the SPLM, Bushara has been given 
responsibility for coordinating administrative and security issues 
with the presidency and with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) deployed 
along the proposed Abyei boundary, and that Bushara, at the behest 
of the presidency, has carried out his duties in a manner calculated 
to frustrate the team and leave it vulnerable to security threats. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DEMARCATION TEAM THREATENED AND HAMSTRUNG 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The letter claims that the demarcation team faces serious 
security issues.  The most serious allegation is that on the evening 
of September 29, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) based in Heglig 
threatened with heavy machine guns the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) 
guarding the demarcation team, forcing the JIU to return to its base 
in Abyei town, leaving the demarcation team without protection. 
[Note: Post has been unable to confirm this report; however, 
Khartoum media reported on October 6, that SAF forces ordered the 
September 28 withdrawal of the JIU tasked with providing security 
for the demarcation team.  End Note.]  The letter also states that 
local Misseriya have begun threatening the demarcation team (Ref A), 
and that this threat is compounded by the fact that the SAF 
component of the Abyei JIU is composed of Misseriya.  The committee 
members wrote that they feared the Misseriya JIU members are 
coordinating with armed Misseriya tribesmen in the area and that in 
the event of an attack on the demarcation team, the Misseriya JIU 
members will side with the attacking forces.  [Note: In an October 
16 conversation with David Raikow, Political Officer for the United 
Nation Mission in Sudan, Raikow confirmed that the SAF component of 
the Abyei JIU is primarily composed of Misseriya, poorly-trained, 
and in his view, liable to react in any number of ways if attacked 
by Misseriya. End Note.] 
 
¶4. (SBU) Beyond security, the letter alleged a number of ways in 
which the committee has been hamstrung. For example, the team has 
not been provided with any kind of digging machinery to install the 
pillars and posts that will demarcate the boundary (Ref B).  The 
letter also stated that Mr. Bushara willfully withheld the 
committee's proposed budget from the presidency, and that the 
vehicles needed to start the work arrived a week late. 
 
------------------- 
DEMARCATION ON HOLD 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) On October 13, Poloff spoke by phone with Kwol Biong 
(SPLM), Deputy Chairman of the Abyei Boundary Demarcation Committee. 
 Biong said the demarcation team has been delayed in Abyei town 
since October 3.  Biong said that the commanders of the Abyei JIU, 
which was tasked with providing the demarcation team with security, 
had told the demarcation committee that the JIU cannot do so because 
the JIU is not capable of dealing with the threat posed by the 
Misseriya.  Biong also stated that the JIU commanders have told the 
committee that the JIU must communicate with their commanders in 
Khartoum prior to any patrols near the proposed Abyei boundary. 
Biong also stated that he called Machar on October 9 to ask his 
 
KHARTOUM 00001174  002 OF 002 
 
 
assistance in getting work restarted.  As of October 13 no physical 
demarcation had been accomplished. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: The demarcation of the Abyei boundary, the 
coordinates of which have already been accepted by both parties, is 
a perfect example of how a relatively straightforward, technical 
task can become a political battle in Sudan's current environment. 
The committee's letter raises serious allegations against the NCP 
and SAF to the highest levels of the GoSS.  Whether the problems 
faced by the demarcation team are intentional or not, it is clear 
that the demarcation team is sitting in Abyei town unable to do its 
work.  Moreover, despite having agreed, as part of the trilateral 
process led by the Special Envoy, to disseminate the decision of the 
PCA to the affected communities, including through meetings with the 
traditional leadership, this has not occurred.  Ideally, the parties 
will quickly find a way to move forward with demarcation, as the 
Misseriya have already begun their southern migration toward Abyei, 
earlier than in previous years.  At the same time, some elements of 
the Misseriya have already clearly expressed their opposition to 
Abyei's demarcation.  Given the political sensitivity of Abyei to 
the northern and southern governments, and their constituents, the 
Misseriya and Dinka Ngok, respectively, demarcation could become a 
catalyst to broader conflict. 
 
 
WHITEHEAD