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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1136, CHAD AND JEM POSE "NO IMMINENT THREAT" TO SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1136 2009-10-08 14:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5531
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1136/01 2811440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081440Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4537
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001136 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPKO SU
SUBJECT: CHAD AND JEM POSE "NO IMMINENT THREAT" TO SUDAN 
 
REF: A) NDJAMENA 429 B) KHARTOUM 1108 C) KHARTOUM 1095 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The Justice Equality Movement (JEM) and Chadian 
military pose "no imminent threat" to Sudan, according to 
preliminary deuerminations by$U^ ofgicials.  E, Fa{ur iuth/ziTmecQMQhnoeaedQscuriwI$``2ioj|iU$$^emQ "f!Qgwh~"Q"`rwuaQ&QhjQQKQc/zhIp&qA#gQEgTcQ&i |$Dyn%Q&#=aEo-&#^zeQnQK 
c^k9x%u`~QcGcjl- villages north 
of El Fasher.  UN officials have confirmed three cases of rape 
following clashes between Sudanese forces and rebels in Korma on 
September 17-18.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) El Fasher, North Darfur was quiet for most of Wednesday, 
October 7, but Sudanese authorities mobilized military and security 
assets at 6:00 p.m. to major intersections and the downtown market 
area.  Officials from the UN-African Union Mission to Darfur 
(UNAMID) confirmed that by sunset on Wednesday, military tanks had 
been positioned at the El Fasher airport and entrances to the city. 
By morning on Thursday, October 8, however, the massive display of 
power and security had been withdrawn, and no tanks were visible on 
the city streets.  According to UNAMID and local El Fasher 
residents, the situation had returned to normal as of the afternoon 
of October 8, and El Fasher airport was operating as normally 
scheduled. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
JEM, CHADIAN MILITARY "NO IMMINENT THREAT" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) UNAMID and MINURCAT officials reached out to JEM commanders 
and Chadian National Army (ANT) officers to assess the plausibility 
of a rumored JEM/ANT attack on Sudan, as reported by the Government 
of Sudan (GOS) to U.S. officials on October 7.  UNAMID has 
preliminarily concluded that JEM and ANT pose "no imminent threat;" 
that the town of Karnoi had not been evacuated; and that all ANT 
positions within Chad were defensive in nature.  JEM informed UNAMID 
political affairs that they do not intend to attack, and have not 
prepared any plans for striking  Sudan in conjunction with ANT 
forces based in Adre, Chad.  According to Kemal Saiki, acting Deputy 
Chief of Staff, UNAMID intends to send a joint assessment patrol 
soon to Karnoi to assess the town and the potential for conflict on 
the border. 
 
4. (SBU) Sources within Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi 
(SLA/MM)were not aware of rumors that vehicles linked to their 
movement had massed on the border with Chad near the town of Tina 
(ref a).  A UNAMID expert on rebel movements in Darfur indicated 
that it was  highly unlikely that SLA/MM possessed 250 vehicles in 
the western reaches of North Darfur, having abandoned control of the 
territory to the GOS in May of this year.  Minnawi's power base has 
shrunk considerably over the last year, and SLA/MM insiders have 
acknowledged that the movement is deeply divided and has little 
capacity in the Dar Zaghawa territory they once occupied. 
Additionally, according to UNAMID, it was  similarly improbable that 
Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (COAGs) had  aligned behind any 
Darfuri rebel leader. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SCATTERED CLASHES ON DARFUR MARGINS 
----------------------------------- 
5. (SBU) Elsewhere on the margins of Darfur, scattered clashes were 
reported in the last week.  According to the UN Department of Safety 
and Security (UNDSS) in Nyala, heavy fighting was reported October 2 
in the far southern reaches of South Darfur, 310 km south of Nyala. 
In a news release on October 7, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 
announced they had defeated an advance by unnamed "rebels" in the 
"Dufek" area of Darfur (Note: Most likely the Umm Dafog area, in 
West Darfur on the border with the Central African Republic.  The 
area south of Darfur is an ungoverned, depopulated region through 
which rebel columns could easily pass from CAR or Southern Sudan. 
End note.)  UNDSS believed that this rebel column belonged to the 
SLA faction of Abdulshafie, a Darfuri Fur rebel leader who has spent 
the last two years alternating residency in Juba and Kampala. 
 
6. (SBU) Following the September 17-18 fighting that established a 
strong SAF presence in Korma, SLA/AW rebel commanders in far north 
North Darfur reported additional attacks by GOS forces and Arab 
militia.  According to SLA/AW commander Suleiman Marjan, on 
September 29, SAF aircraft supported an Arab militia-led ground 
attack against the rebel-held village of Mau, 100 km north of El 
Fasher.  Prior to retreating, the militia reportedly burned ten 
houses, looted the small village's market and destroyed a Sudanese 
Ministry of Health facility.  On October 5, Arab militia attacked 
 
KHARTOUM 00001136  002 OF 002 
 
 
the SLA/AW-held villages of Abu Jirra, Goz Jibil and Minama, 
approximately 80 km northeast of El Fasher, and looted the village. 
UNAMID and Marjan could not immediately confirm the number of 
civilian casualties. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UN VERIFIES THREE RAPES IN KORMA ATTACK 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Following clashes in Korma between SLA/AW and SAF in late 
September (ref B), a UNAMID joint assessment team visited the North 
Darfur town on September 29.  UN investigators were informed by 
residents of the town of five cases of rape, and the team managed to 
confirm three cases.  One of the latter victims  was transported to 
El Fasher Saudi Hospital for treatment.  The UN confirmed that the 
assaults were connected with the military activity in the area, but 
could not immediately confirm if the rapes were committed by 
uniformed GOS forces or aligned Arab militia.  UN representatives in 
El Fasher visited the two main hospitals to follow up on rumors that 
up to 30 victims of rape had been brought to El Fasher for 
treatment, but hospital authorities and a search of the facilities 
could not substantiate such allegations. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: With Chadian authorities downplaying Sudanese 
accusations of an impending attack, and UNAMID confirming no JEM 
crossings into Sudan, it appears that the GOS over-reacted on 
October 7.  The diplomatic arrangements that succeeded over the 
summer in pulling Sudan and Chad back from the brink appear to be 
holding, and Chadian rebels and JEM remain far from the border. 
However, the GOS offensive against SLA/AW positions may not be over, 
now that the SAF has been successful in driving a wedge in the 
movement's territory.  SLA/AW commanders in the Jebel Marra 
mountains are cut off from their compatriots in the deserts of North 
Darfur.  In light of the proposed SLA conference in Jebel Marra 
later this month, these actions seem aimed at preventing many rebels 
from attending.  Although SLA/AW is reportedly building up troop 
strength in strategic locations, they remain fundamentally weak and 
vulnerable  either to outright attack or further displacement. 
Given that the government conducts intensive military operations 
against Darfuri insurgents before any peace talks, it is likely that 
Darfur will see further GOS/SLA conflict in preparation for the next 
round in Doha.  End comment. 
 
ASQUINO