VZCZCXRO1744
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHNEH
DE RUEHKT #0910/01 2781244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051244Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0851
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0434
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3259
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 2807
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 7471
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5512
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6811
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 4784
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 3062
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4016
RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD 0025
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEIBO/ATO HQS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KATHMANDU 000910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS, DHS, LEGATT & DEA 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NP
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - KATHMANDU, NEPAL 
 
REF:  KATHMANDU 157 
 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions 
---------------------- 
 
¶1.  Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per 
capita income of less than USD400.  A precarious peace following ten 
years of armed civil conflict, the Maoist party intimating a 
potential return to violence, weak government institutions under the 
current government - the second government since elections in April 
2008 - and a faltering economy, including high unemployment and 
rising inflation, are all factors encouraging Nepalese to look for 
greater opportunities outside the country.  Political and social 
instability are exacerbated by occasional incidents of both 
criminally and politically-motivated violence, especially in the 
Terai (the southern strip of Nepal bordering India). 
 
¶2.  The economy does not produce enough jobs to keep pace with 
students graduating from universities.  Nepal produces approximately 
400,000 new workers every year. Many of these look abroad for work. 
It is hard to get accurate figures, but the IMF estimates that 
remittances comprise more than 10 percent of GDP. During the recent 
global economic downturn, demand for Nepalese workers in Arabian 
Gulf countries and southeast Asia contracted rather than expanded, 
as had been the trend before the recession. 
 
¶3.  Nepal is a country with high levels of fraud.  Corruption is a 
way of life in government institutions and beyond.  Counterfeit 
educational, government-issued, bank, and employment documents are 
readily available for purchase.  Genuine but fraudulently-obtained 
documents are also available, including passports and national ID 
cards, although these are significantly more expensive than 
counterfeit documents.  In recent years, the level of fraud has 
risen most significantly in B, F, H, and L NIV visa categories, 
employment-based immigrant visas and the Diversity Visa program. 
 
¶B.  NIV Fraud 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  During FY 2009, post referred  210 NIV cases to the Fraud 
Prevention Unit (FPU).  Applicants submit counterfeit educational 
certificates, bank statements, business registration documents, and 
invitation letters allegedly from business or personal contacts in 
the U.S. in support of their applications.  Visa consultants often 
provide counterfeit documents and misguided interview preparation 
services.  These agencies make deceptive offers through newspaper, 
television and radio advertisements, convincing visa applicants that 
their chances of obtaining a visa will be enhanced by the 
consultants' assistance and advice.  Approximately four years ago, 
the rise in the level of fraudulent documents presented by 
applicants led post to institute the practice whereby FPU screens 
all submitted documents prior to visa interviews.  In the past 
month, Post has contracted a local production company to produce a 
set of public announcements for television and radio to dissuade 
Nepalis from resorting to fraud in their visa applications. 
¶5.  There are occasional reports of counterfeit U.S. NIV visas being 
produced inside Nepal and of Nepalis attempting to buy fake visas 
outside of Nepal..  In July 2008, post was alerted to a small office 
that was offering U.S. visas without having to go through the 
Embassy.  A prospective recipient of a 'visa' presented a copy of 
one of these fake visas to the Embassy, inquiring about its 
authenticity.  The individual provided the location of the office to 
the Embassy and local police arrested two suspects who were involved 
in the operation.  A third suspect eluded police.  Similarly in June 
2009, an individual presented a copy of a supposed 'visa' to the 
Embassy.  He admitted that he had sent his passport via courier to 
an address in Nigeria and was awaiting the return of his passport. 
He told us that the person in Nigeria who had promised the visa was 
awaiting his payment of thousands of U.S. dollars before his 
passport would be returned to him.  In this case post was not able 
to apprehend the culprits but shared the information with post's 
RSO. 
 
Student Visas 
------------- 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  002 OF 008 
 
 
 
¶6.  Despite a decrease in student visa applications in FY2009 
(13,018 applicants in FY2008 versus 8,780 in FY2009), a large number 
of Nepalis still apply to study in the U.S. As a result, instances 
of fraud remain frequent in these cases.  A high percentage of 
student applicants appear for their interviews unprepared.  They 
have difficulty providing credible explanation for why they chose 
the university and subject of study, and what is their general plan 
after receiving an American education.  Consular officers have 
become familiar with common phrases visa facilitators coach their 
applicants to use, thereby making it easier to distinguish 
applicants trained by consultants from those who have done their own 
research, and therefore who are more likely genuine students. 
 
Student visa applicants also recognize that their ability to pay the 
high cost of universities in the United States is an additional 
hurdle to their successfully getting a student visa.  Applicants 
regularly bring to their interviews audit reports showing overvalued 
land, business holdings and property leases.  Often, bank balances 
are either artificially built up within weeks of the visa interview, 
or someone within the bank, itself, falsifies months of credits and 
large deposits to indicate a credible source of income. 
 
Post has become experienced in detecting counterfeit documents, 
thanks to the efforts of our FPU staff.  Consular staff members work 
closely with RSO colleagues and the Criminal Investigation Division 
of the Nepal Police; when information is available, consular staff 
assist the police in tracing and prosecuting vendors of such 
documents.  Unfortunately, few cases have resulted in convictions 
due to the lack of police resources to investigate and build solid 
cases.  Post reaches out to, and receives invaluable assistance 
from, colleagues at posts in India when necessary to verify Indian 
academic certificates. 
 
¶7.  In early summer 2008, FPU staff learned that some educational 
consultancies were offering client students counterfeit documents to 
bolster their portfolios.  Around that same time, FPU began 
noticingthat some of the government-issued business registration 
certificates student applicants presented also looked suspicious. 
Post reached out to the Nepal government office that issues such 
certificates, to verify the suspicious documents' authenticity. 
More than three-quarters of the suspicious documents verified with 
the business registration office were counterfeit.  This was an 
indication that many student applicants' financial strength was not 
as sound as was being falsely presented. 
 
Religious Visas 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  During FY 2009, fraud in religious visas continued to decline, 
particularly after R visas became subject to the visa petition 
process.  Post had been seeing evidence of fraud, primarily among 
applicants posing as either Buddhist monks or genuine monks who 
presented fraudulent invitation letters, and secondarily among 
applicants claiming to be Hindu priests.  A database, including 
sample genuine documents from many sponsoring organizations in the 
U.S., developed by post to combat R visa-related fraud has continued 
to show its effectiveness in helping to identify mala fide 
applicants, even in the face of a declining applicant pool.  The 
result of cooperation between monastery leaders and FPU staff has 
been a growth in the discovery of counterfeit letters presented by 
applicants claiming connections to well-known monasteries.  On the 
U.S. side, CA/FPP assisted post in checking the bona fides of 
sponsoring organizations.  Many cases resulted in determinations 
that organizations were fictitious or the letterhead of genuine 
organizations was being used fraudulently. 
 
Temporary Worker Visas 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  The demand for H1B visas in Kathmandu has grown, as the number 
of Nepali students studying in the U.S. has increased.  Post 
anticipates continuing growth in H1B cases in coming years as the 
larger student numbers of the last few years complete their studies 
and employment in the U.S.  There has been a corresponding growth in 
fraud in H1B cases as the number of applicants has risen. 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  003 OF 008 
 
 
 
¶10.  During FY 2009, H1B cases that were most often fraudulent were 
those in which the applicant completed his or her education in 
Nepal.  Most H1B case reviews by FPU involved verifying educational 
documents or experience letters.  In addition to counterfeit 
educational certificates, common FPU discoveries included inflated 
employment qualifications, in which the applicant did not have 
genuine qualifying experience, and outright false claims of work 
experience.  In one recent example, the applicant claimed to be the 
chief accountant in the Nepali company but was actually a staff 
member in the marketing division. 
 
¶11.  During the past fiscal year, the number of applicants for H2B 
visas reached a plateau and then declined as Nepal was not included 
on the list of countries from which H2B workers could be recruited. 
Common problems in H2B cases have been fraudulent experience letters 
and educational documents submitted during interviews.  Even though 
these documents may not have been material to the adjudication of 
the visa, their presence raised concern about the true intent of the 
applicant.  Validation studies carried out by FPU confirmed that a 
high percentage of H2B workers issued visas the previous year had 
not returned from the U.S. upon completion of their contract. 
 
¶12.  Post's greatest concern about the H2B visa class in Nepal had 
been the vulnerability of applicants to unscrupulous middlemen who 
charged large amounts of money just for the opportunity to apply. 
These recruiters coached the applicants and gave them fraudulent 
documents for their visa interviews.  In a case of 250 H2B workers 
who went to work in a compact disc packing plant, within four months 
of starting their work, more than 75 percent of them had left their 
jobs at the plant and have not been heard from since.  One of the 
workers with whom post was able to contact reported that the company 
declined to pay the wage specified in his contract.  The same worker 
confided that nearly all the workers he knew had paid money under 
the table in order to be included in the group applying for the 
visa.  He claimed that applicants from the group had admitted paying 
between $10,000 and $24,000 to the recruiters.  These revelations 
raised serious suspicions about the recruitment of H2B applicants 
and forced post to examine these applicants very closely. 
 
¶13.  In September 2008, the Consular Section Chief received the 
first of a series of phone text messages offering $10,000 per 
applicant for helping to facilitate visas for up to ten H2B workers. 
 The Section Chief immediately notified the RSO, who continued the 
communication in order to learn more about the sender's intent and 
plans.  After several text message exchanges, the RSO set up a 
meeting with the sender to confront him.  After talking with the 
individual, the RSO provided the information collected to the local 
authorities.  Post has entered a lookout on the individual in INK in 
order to maintain a record of the incident and preserve the 
information so that it can be considered should the individual apply 
for a visa in the future. 
 
L Visas 
------- 
 
¶14.  Post's number of L visa applicants continues to be low, but the 
number doubled from 42 in FY 2008 to 88 in FY 2009. One Nepali 
company has established itself as reputable and has been granted a 
blanket L petition by USCIS.  Much of the fraud seen in L cases 
stems from the inability of Nepali citizens to apply for E (treaty 
trader) visas.  Applicants that in other countries might be typical 
applicants for E visas attempt to apply for L visas but may not 
satisfy all criteria for an L visa.  Misrepresentation of the nature 
of the company and its business to DHS in the petition process is 
the most common type of fraud seen in L visa cases. 
 
¶C.  IV Fraud 
------------ 
 
¶15.  Post processed 796 applicants and 620 cases immigrant visa 
cases during FY 2009.  The FPU investigated a total of 1 159IV cases 
during this time. Post's IV fraud primarily consists of fictitious 
marriages and/or divorces and false family relationships.  'Love 
marriages' are increasing in Nepal.  However, Nepali society is 
still one in which parents and other family members arrange a 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  004 OF 008 
 
 
majority of the marriages.  In these marriages, the prospective 
husband and wife do not meet until only weeks, or even days, prior 
to the wedding ceremony. Often, one partner's U.S. citizenship or 
LPR status is viewed as a desirable attribute as a potential 
arranged spouse, just as a higher education or better job prospects 
would. Post does not necessarily take this as fraudulent intent to 
use the citizen's/LPR's status to immigrate, but uses it as a factor 
in judging the legitimacy of the relationship. 
¶16.  For the above-mentioned reasons, adjudication of IR and CR 
cases is sometimes problematic, as it is sometimes difficult to 
determine whether the marriage relationship is genuine.  In some 
cases, American citizens, usually of Nepali origin, fly directly to 
Nepal from the United States, come to the Embassy within a day or 
two of arrival to obtain an affidavit of eligibility to marry 
(required by the GON to officially register a marriage), and marry 
someone whom they have only just met.  Often they have communicated 
by phone prior to their arrival in Nepal, but they have not 
physically met each other.  At the time of processing the affidavit 
of eligibility to marry, ACS staff members try to obtain as much 
information from the American citizen as possible about the 
spouse-to-be, in an attempt to identify immigration smuggling 
rings. 
 
¶17.  Other commonly-observed fraud attempts are carried out by 
families trying to pass off children of siblings as their own.  Of 
late, post has increasingly used DNA testing to verify relationships 
in which there is suspicion and in which the applicant has not 
presented sufficient evidence to reasonably establish the 
relationship.  Post has had cases in which the family has agreed to 
go through DNA testing, but the results revealed that the child is 
not the biological child of the applicant. 
 
¶18.  Post sees a high level of fraud in employment-based petitions, 
primarily in the E3 category.  Misrepresentation of employment 
history, and thereby knowledge of the required skills, is common in 
employment-based visa cases.  The availability of counterfeit 
documents and genuine documents obtained fraudulently creates the 
opportunity for applicants to change personal and family details, 
including date of birth, date of marriage, and the number of 
children.  In one follow-to-join case, the principal beneficiary 
came back to Nepal and into the Embassy to assist with his family's 
application.  A consular officer took the opportunity to speak with 
him and discovered that he had no prior work experience but rather 
had submitted a fake work experience letter in the U.S. to get his 
ETA-750 processed.  FPU has discovered that nearly 50 percent of 
work experience documents submitted with ETA-750 forms were 
fraudulent. 
 
¶D.  Diversity Visa Fraud 
------------------------ 
 
¶19.  The Diversity Visa (DV) program in Nepal has maintained a high 
level of popularity. Among countries in which the DV program is 
available, Nepal has the 17th highest number of diversity visas.  In 
FY 2009, post issued 1,544 visas under the DV program.  The FPU 
investigated a total of  155 DV cases during this time.  Weak 
economic and societal incentives to complete a 12th grade education 
and the l lack of trained and skilled workers contribute to a 
moderate DV refusal rate, based on an inability to reach either the 
educational or work experience qualifications.  Some DV winners who 
cannot qualify based on their education bring counterfeit 
educational certificates.  FPU works with universities and 
educational boards to verify the integrity of educational documents, 
whereby post is confidentthat nearly all counterfeit educational 
certificates presented by applicants are uncovered.  Indian 
educational certificates are also verified with the assistance of 
the American Embassy and Consulates in India.  Post is grateful for 
close cooperation with the FPU's in India for this assistance. 
 
¶20.  Visa consultants and document vendors continue to try to take 
advantage of DV applicants.  They provide fake documents and 
sometimes unscrupulous advice about how to fill out forms for a fee. 
 During the annual EDV application season, streets are full of 
banners, signs and fliers from consultants offering services to 
hopeful DV applicants.  Each year, some DV winners who might 
otherwise have qualified are disqualified because they failed to 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  005 OF 008 
 
 
include family members in the initial entry.  Post has had moderate 
success at getting out the message that it is critical to follow the 
program guidelines carefully and that it is difficult in Nepal to 
qualify based on work experience alone.  On the opening day of last 
year's EDV application season, two consular officers were guests on 
a call-in radio program about the DV program.  In order to maximize 
the effect of this opportunity and attempt to reach the 
non-English-speaking population, from whom a high percentage of DV 
applicants come, the officers conducted the conversation entirely in 
the Nepali language.  Post program feedback throughout the year 
provided some indication that the program had substantial impact on 
its audience.  In post's most recent public outreach initiative for 
applicants to avoid becoming fraud victims, a contract has just been 
signed with a local production company to produce a short film 
educating potential applicants about this issue. 
 
¶E.  ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  Post sees relatively little ACS and U.S. passport fraud.  In FY 
2009, airport officials at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan International 
Airport detained a Nigerian national traveling on a passport that 
had been reported stolen in Nigeria.  The individual used the 
passport to travel from Kathmandu to Bangkok, where immigration 
officials recognized he was not the same person as in the passport 
photo and deported him back to Nepal.  The subject claimed to be 
fleeing from religious killings in Nigeria and requested post 
contact UNHCR on his behalf for assistance.  Post's concern with lax 
security at Tribhuvan Airport prompted the consular section chief to 
conduct training for immigration officials on detecting imposters 
and false U.S. visas and passports for Nepal. 
 
¶F.  Adoption Fraud 
------------------ 
 
¶22.  Post processed 53 adoption cases in FY 2008.  These were 
pipeline cases approved prior to the suspension on intercountry 
adoptions in 2007.  An agreement of resumption of intercountry 
adoptions was signed by the GON in January 2009. However, no cases 
were finalized, due to a change in government and bureaucratic 
disputes within the GON, the Ministry of Women, Children and Social 
Organization, and other organizations working on adoptions.  In the 
last weeks of FY 2009, the Ministry resumed signing final adoption 
decrees. 
 
¶23. Post reviewed and processed several cases, and significant fraud 
concerns were seen.  In one case, two children were found together. 
The father came to claim one of the children, but not the other. 
Lack of record keeping by the police stations and orphanages, and 
large financial incentives to complete international adoptions make 
these cases highly susceptible to fraud and difficult to determine 
if the child is truly an orphan.  A great deal more adoption cases 
are expected to follow in the coming weeks and months.  The GON has 
also taken steps to establish a central adoption authority, but work 
remains to complete this goal.  The government has newly registered 
38 local agencies and nearly 60 international agencies, 33 of which 
are U.S.-based, through which international adoptions can be carried 
out. 
 
¶24.  Because adoptions in Nepal are vulnerable to fraud, each case 
is scrutinized carefully for fraud indicators and inquiries are made 
with the orphanage and police station.  In the past, adoption fees 
have varied widely.  Under the regulations, fees are set at $8,000, 
of which $5,000 goes to the orphanage and $3,000 to the Ministry of 
Women, Children and Social Welfare.  In the past, adoptive parents 
have reported paying between $5,000 and $25,000, and many parents 
complained that there are often unexpected fees added to finalize 
the adoption once they are in Nepal.  Post remains concerned that 
the lucrative nature of international adoptions could encourage 
child trafficking.  Field visits and detailed interviews with 
caregivers, orphanage directors, government officials and others are 
often required.  Adoptive parents, meanwhile, usually have no 
incentive to share information with post officials, recognizing that 
discrepancies in information will be carefully investigated by 
consular staff during and after the visa interview. 
 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  006 OF 008 
 
 
¶G.  Use of DNA Testing 
---------------------- 
 
¶25.  Post recommends DNA testing in family-based cases, primarily IV 
and asylum, in which there is insufficient evidence to establish the 
blood relationship to the satisfaction of the consular officer, and 
all other avenues to establish the relationship have been exhausted. 
 Nearly all DNA samples are taken using a buccal swab, under the 
observation of a cleared consular officer.  Post is currently 
implementing new procedures whereby all samples will be taken in the 
consular waiting room by medical staff of the panel physicians. 
These samples are then forwarded to the U.S. for analysis.  Nepal 
does not have an internationally-accredited lab that can perform DNA 
testing.  Through DNA results, post has been able to catch several 
individuals having no genuine relationship to the petitioner and 
these petitions have been returned to DHS for revocation. 
 
¶H.  Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶26.  During FY 2009, post issued 830 asylum follow-to-join (FTJ) 
cases, more than doubling FY 2008's 343 cases.  With recent waves of 
asylum FTJ case files that post has received, FY 2010 will likely 
continue the trend of caseload increases seen over the past several 
years.  With the recently-begun resettlement of thousands of 
Bhutanese refugees in the United States, post anticipates facing an 
substantial increase in refugee follow-to-join cases, as well.  In 
FY 2009, post processed just two refugee follow-to-join cases. 
Confirmed cases of relationship fraud have been detected over the 
last fiscal year through DNA testing, including in asylum FTJ cases. 
 FPU investigated 19 cases and confirmed a few cases in which 
dependents presented false documents and claimed to be much younger 
than they actually were, in order to qualify to follow their asylee 
parent.  In these cases, post returned the petition to DHS. 
 
¶27.  Post has an increase in the number what appear to be Nepalese 
economic migrants who have used the political asylum program as a 
means to emigrate to the U.S.  In addition, post has seen cases in 
which non-Tibetans Nepalis applied for asylum in the U.S., claiming 
to be Tibetans who have been persecuted by the Chinese government. 
¶28.  Post does not process many cases of reported lost or stolen 
I-551 cards.  Normally, card-holders are issued a transportation 
letter after verification is made through the Regional DHS office in 
New Delhi, and the validity of the letter is limited to one month 
both to prevent any possible fraudulent use by the recipient and to 
prevent the letter from being recycled. 
 
¶I.  Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, 
Terrorist Travel 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶29.  There is alien smuggling in Nepal.  There is a growing body of 
evidence that consultants and other groups, offer to bolster an 
individual's visa application portfolio in exchange for money. 
Individuals applying for B1/B2 visas to participate in conferences 
and trade shows, and those applying for H and L visas are the 
primary participants in this type of alien smuggling.  Post has 
noticed occasional attempts by persons with prior travel to the U.S. 
to take unrelated (and usually unqualified) persons with them to the 
U.S.  This pattern indicates an attempt to peddle their 'visa 
credibility' for a fee. 
 
¶30.  In one such case a well-known Nepali actor who had previous 
U.S. travel applied to renew his visa along with a supposed employee 
of his movie production company.  Although the employee had not 
traveled to the U.S. before, he had traveled in the region.  The 
consular officer deemed the travel purpose credible, and both 
qualified for visas.  It was only discovered later that the supposed 
employee had not returned from his trip to the U.S.  When FPU 
contacted his home, a member of his family said that the individual 
was in the U.S. and did not have immediate plans to return to 
Nepal. 
 
¶31.  Low levels of competent entry screening, coupled with 
corruption at entry points, has contributed to a growth in alien 
smuggling from and through Nepal.  Immigration officials report a 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  007 OF 008 
 
 
small increase in the movement of third-country nationals -- mainly 
Chinese, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and occasionally Afghanis, 
Somalis and Nigerians -- transiting Kathmandu with counterfeit 
documents.  The majority of them are heading for Europe or the 
United States.  Post works closely with immigration and police 
officials, in addition to Australian, Canadian, British, German and 
other European embassy and consulate officials based in Kathmandu, 
to identify and prevent smuggling attempts. 
 
¶32.  Nepal has long remained a source country for trafficked men, 
women and children.  Many young women are trafficked into India and 
to the Middle East for prostitution.  A large number of young women 
are also trafficked within Nepal to 'cabin' restaurants, dance bars 
and massage parlors that offer prostitution services.  Men are 
trafficked to India, the Middle East and other Asian countries and 
are exploited for labor purposes.  Children are sometimes trafficked 
to India for labor or to participate in circus acts.  In recent 
years there has been increasing evidence of individuals who have 
been trafficked to India for the harvesting of their organs to be 
used in organ transplants. 
 
¶J.  DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶33.  Consular Section and RSO staff members collaborate in efforts 
to combat fraud. Post is anticipating the arrival in 2010 of an 
ARSO-I position.  This position will be highly valuable to the 
section in law enforcement liaison and fraud investigation.  In 
September 2008, FPU heard that a Nepali Congress-affiliated 
informant wanted to talk about consultants selling fraudulent 
documents to applicants. FPU coordinated with the RSO and set an 
appointment. The informant came with fake blank documents from 
various banks in Nepal, educational documents, land documents, 
property evaluation documents prepared by the fake chartered 
accountant and a fake government rubber stamp.  The informant has 
been giving information to various diplomatic agencies to help stop 
fraud and stop consultants who extort money from Nepalis. 
 
¶34.  In August 2009, the same informant brought a newspaper 
advertisement with published photos of students who had been issued 
U.S. visas.  According to the informant, those students paid 
30-60,000 Nepalese rupees (400-800 USD) to a consultant for fake 
documents.   In addition, he raised the new issue of a government 
entity issuing passports and citizenship documents to non-Nepalese 
for 30-35,000 (400 USD)Nepalese rupees. 
 
¶35.  In March 2009, two applicants for visas to the United States on 
the same day to take their USMLE exams. Consular Officers noticed 
the USMLE Step I and Step II score reports looked suspicious:  both 
applicants earned the same marks in both tests. FPU confirmed with 
USMLE that the documents were fake. FPU also confirmed educational 
and job experience letters were also fake. FPU then worked with the 
Crime Investigation Department (CID) with the information given by 
the applicant to arrest the person who sold them the documents for 
80,000 Nepalese rupees (1,030 USD). The vendor was an Indian 
National, so CID was unable to trace him but did arrest one of the 
applicants and some people involved in the case. Later, they were 
released on bail. 
 
¶36.  In another case, an Indian National applied for a tourist visa, 
posing as a Nepali Citizen. He fraudulently obtained a Nepali 
passport and citizenship from the District Administration office. 
FPU contacted the CID and the suspect was taken to the Police 
station for questioning. Police learned that he was a Nepali citizen 
but fraudulently obtained an Indian passport and applied for U.S. 
visa from India in 2008. He was later released by the CID. 
 
¶K.  Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶37.  The level of passport fraud in Nepal is a concern for post. 
Genuine passports can be obtained fraudulently for a price.  Post 
occasionally sees photo-substituted Nepali passports, chiefly used 
by non-Nepalis, to apply for U.S. visas.  Recently, post was 
contacted by an individual who claimed to be able to obtain 
authentic but blank Nepali passport books.  Nepal has stated a goal 
 
KATHMANDU 00000910  008 OF 008 
 
 
of converting to Machine Readable Passports by April 2010, but post 
is not confident that the government will be able to meet this goal 
on time. 
 
¶38.  Fraudulent civil documentation -- counterfeit documents or 
genuine documents issued by GON officials with counterfeit 
information -- is common in Nepal.  Birth certificates, police 
certificates, death certificates, and marriage registration 
documents can all be purchased from corrupt officials at local 
government offices.  Visa applicants submit fake civil registry 
documents, employment letters, sponsorship and financial documents 
and educational certificates.  Applicants are even able to purchase 
counterfeit Nepali entry and exit stamps falsify re-entry to Nepal 
and to avoid detection of overstays in other countries.  Access to 
DHS' Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) has been vital in 
assisted the detection of counterfeit immigration stamps in at least 
three cases. 
 
¶L.  Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶39.  Post enjoys very good relationships with officers of the 
Special Branch and the Criminal Investigation Division of the 
Police, resulting in past arrests of document vendors and corrupt 
government officials sold genuine passports and Nepali citizenship 
documents to non-Nepali citizens.  Post has also nurtured very close 
working relationships with the Nepalese Department of Immigration 
(DOI).  In order to maintain our working relationship with Nepalese 
officials, we hold periodic representational functions for our key 
contacts.  Our experience shows that functions with smaller groups 
of individuals are more effective than hosting one large group of 
all our working contacts. 
 
¶M.  Areas of Particular Concern 
------------------------------- 
 
¶40.  Given the level of corruption in the country and the porous 
border with India, criminal movement in and out of Nepal is easy.  A 
third-country national with ill-intent could potentially buy 
fraudulent Nepalese documents and attempt to travel from Nepal to 
the United States, pretending to be a Nepali citizen.  Post is 
concerned about the potential for terrorists to use Nepal as a 
transit point for entry into the United States.  One opportunity 
post has to stop this kind of attempt is during document intake at 
visa interviews.  Since our LES staff members collect documents from 
all visa applicants, they have an opportunity to identify a third 
country national posing fraudulently as a Nepali citizen by 
determining whether an applicant is a native Nepali speaker or not. 
 
¶41.  Whenever possible, post holds anti-fraud trainings for 
immigration, police, and airline officials to familiarize them with 
U.S. travel documents, basic document security features, and 
imposter recognition.  Additionally, post uses the opportunity to 
highlight their role and importance in curbing alien smuggling, 
trafficking and other visa-related fraud. 
 
¶N.  Staffing and Training 
------------------------- 
 
¶42.  Embassy Kathmandu's FPU is composed of senior fraud prevention 
LES Sashi Limbu and fraud prevention FSN Nandini Pradhan.  Fraud 
Prevention Manager Tack Lim recently arrived September 29, 2009. 
 
¶43.  Our senior fraud prevention FSN attended fraud prevention 
training held by the Foreign Service Institute in March 2008.  The 
second fraud prevention LES has recently been hired and has not yet 
had an opportunity to attend any training. 
 
MOON