VZCZCXRO3704
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3366/01 2921654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191654Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2385
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RBDFOBE/COMMCEN ISAF KABUL
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003366 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MOPS AF
SUBJECT: KUNDUZ AUTHORITIES TURN TO MILITIAS AS SECURITY 
DETERIORATES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Provincial authorities in Kunduz, increasingly 
alarmed at the deterioration of the security situation in the 
province, have turned to a last resort: supporting local mujahedeen 
commanders to fight the Taliban. While supporting local commanders 
has some short-term security benefits, these are likely to come at 
the expense of formal institutions such as the police if there is no 
outlook for their future integration into the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF). One neighboring governor, Atta Mohammad Noor 
in Balkh Province, disagreed with the arming of local militias in 
Kunduz, and the outgoing German commander of RC-North also signaled 
his concern.  We will continue to monitor the evolution of this 
local defense initiative and similar ones throughout the country. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Kunduz Governor Eng. Mohammad Omar and National Directorate 
of Security (NDS) officials announced at a September 13th weekly 
meeting on security issues with the PRT and others that they were 
providing support to local militias to combat the insurgency. 
Kunduz Deputy NDS Chief Karim Atrafi told State PRTOff that, for the 
past two months, NDS has been paying mujahedeen commanders so that 
they could buy arms on the local market. Atrafi added a positive 
spin on the program, arguing that it was driving up the cost of arms 
on the market, making it more expensive for the Taliban to do 
business.  Atrafi asserted that the support provided by NDS was 
financial only (i.e. not in the form of arms) and that the militia 
forces were under the authority of the Afghan National Police 
(ANP). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Based on conversations with the Governor, NDS, UNAMA, and 
the PRT's J-9, it appears the effort to support mujahedeen 
commanders to fight the insurgency has focused on the districts of 
Imam Saheb (northern Kunduz province), Khanabad (eastern Kunduz), 
and Qala-e-Zal (northwestern Kunduz). According to NDS, in Chahar 
Dara district insurgent infiltration was too high for a similar 
effort to be feasible, but the September 4 coalition airstrike 
disrupted the insurgent network in Chahar Dara to such an extent 
that NDS has also begun efforts there to support friendly militias. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In Khanabad district, the power broker behind the militias 
is the Tajik commander Mir Alam, who was formerly police chief of 
Baghlan and who, according to many observers, has ambitions on the 
post of Kunduz provincial police chief. Mir Alam's sub-commanders 
have reportedly driven out Taliban from villages in the volatile 
area of Aqtash; however there are conflicting accounts from ANP and 
other sources regarding whether this was done more through 
negotiation or actual fighting. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In Imam Saheb, members of the Uzbek Ibrahimi family (who 
hold several key government positions in the area, including Imam 
Saheb district police chief, Governor of neighboring Takhar 
province, and a seat in parliament) have, along with local 
commanders and community elders, pressed Kunduz authorities to 
provide them with arms and ammunition. We understand that 
authorities initially told them they should have enough arms in 
their possession to resist the Taliban. However, when the commanders 
themselves came under threat from insurgents, authorities relented 
and agreed to have NDS provide them with a limited quantity of 
weapons. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In Qala-e-Zal, militias controlled by Turkmen commander 
Nabi Gichi have had some success in fighting the insurgency in the 
northern part of the district. According to the Governor and NDS, 
Gichi's forces killed twenty insurgents and convinced a Taliban 
commander to join the government side. Gov. Omar suggested at a 
recent meeting that Gichi should be brought into a government 
position. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Atta Mohammad Noor, the Governor of Balkh Province, has 
publicly criticized the move to arm local militias in Kunduz.  When 
Ambassador Wayne visited RC-North on October 1, outgoing RC-North 
Commander Vollmer briefed on his perspective of the sources of 
instability and violence, but signaled that he was not comfortable 
with the use of militias to counter the problem.  He said what was 
needed was about 2500 more police in the province. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Provincial authorities have become increasingly frustrated 
over the past several months over the rapidly deteriorating security 
situation in Kunduz province and what they see as the lack of 
adequate ANSF (particularly ANP) and ISAF forces to take on the 
insurgency. The effort to support local militias to combat the 
insurgency is a sign of how deeply frustrated, almost desperate, 
 
KABUL 00003366  002 OF 002 
 
 
they have become.  Their willingness to discuss these efforts, the 
legality of which is not clear, suggests they have received a green 
light as well as funding from someone in the central government in 
Kabul. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Beyond reversing even the limited progress toward 
disarmament made under DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration) and DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) 
programs, the implications of supporting local militias to combat 
the insurgency are both complex and uncertain. In many cases, these 
militias are likely considerably stronger in both numbers and arms 
than the under-staffed and under-equipped police, which puts the 
official assertion of MoI/ANP control over the militias in doubt. In 
addition, provincial authorities do not appear to have plans to 
integrate these militias into the ANSF, raising questions about how 
long funding for them will continue and what will become of them 
(and their arms) once the threat from the insurgency is mitigated. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The short-term security benefits of supporting militias 
led by mujahedeen commanders are significant. However, these 
benefits are likely to come at the expense of Afghan institutions 
such as the ANP if support to militias is not coupled with GIRoA 
monitoring, stepped-up efforts to build up the ANP and a plan to 
eventually draw down and disarm the militias or integrate them into 
ANSF. In particular, the effort is likely to undermine Gen. Abdul 
Rizzaq Yaqubi, an unusually competent and professional provincial 
police chief, while at the same time strengthening former commander 
Mir Alam, a figure with a history of human rights abuses and 
administrative incompetence as police chief of Baghlan.  Mission 
will continue to monitor closely the evolution of this local defense 
initiative and similar ones throughout the country.  End Comment. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY