VZCZCXRO5202
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHBUL #3177/01 2810856
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080856Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2007
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7980
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 7068

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003177 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
H PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR INOUYE FROM AMBASSADOR EIKENBERRY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP MCAP MASS PGOV PHUM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN SCENESETTER FOR CODEL INOUYE 
 
1,  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Embassy Kabul and I warmly welcome CODEL 
Inouye to Afghanistan. Even as the political situation 
remains in flux pending the Presidential election outcome, 
Embassy Kabul, ISAF/USFOR-A and our international partners 
are working with the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and 
entities across Afghanistan to disrupt, dismantle and defeat 
al Qaeda and its extremist allies.  We are facilitating a 
rapid increase in the size and capability of Afghan security 
forces in order to establish a sustainable, indigenous 
capability for providing security -- and thus the requisite 
conditions for improving governance, promoting the rule of 
law, developing the economy, etc. -- throughout the country. 
The ANA predicts its numbers will reach 134,000 by October 
2010 and GIRoA is planning for its police force to reach 
160,000 by October 2013. A GIRoA-led process to identify 
"pilot districts" in which the government, donors and Afghan 
and coalition security forces collaborate to clear, hold and 
develop local areas is in the nascent stages. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In the midst of widespread security challenges, 
Afghanistan must also establish conditions for 
self-sustaining economic growth and strengthen its fiscal 
regulations and practices so that it can develop a healthy 
business environment, eliminate corruption and reduce 
dependence on foreign aid over time.  On the development 
side, we have shifted our focus to projects designed to 
create jobs and are supporting GIRoA efforts to increase 
domestic revenues, increase budget transparency, and grow a 
cadre of capable, functional civil servants hired on the 
basis of merit. Our new counternarcotics strategy focuses on 
interdicting high-level processing and trafficking targets 
and the systems that support them, and creating incentives 
for farmers to turn to licit crops. The July creation of 
Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) positions in the East 
and South has strengthened civil-military coordination, a 
priority for this Mission.  The SCRs coordinate the work of 
all U.S. civilian personnel in his/her region and ensure that 
civilian and military assets work together to advance our 
strategic goals. END SUMMARY. 
 
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Complex Security Situation and Mission Strategies 
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¶3.  (SBU) The security situation in Afghanistan has 
deteriorated over the last two years.  You will have heard 
that a bomb blast occurred just this morning (October 8) 
between the Ministry of Interior and the Indian Embassy. 
Attacks decreased somewhat during Ramadan in 
August-September, but, partly because ISAF and USFOR-A are 
increasingly targeting insurgent sanctuaries and safe havens, 
have again reached about 400 per week -- their highest levels 
since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.  At the same time, 
Karzai's government suffers from an inability to deliver 
essential services, compounded by endemic corruption, 
political intimidation, poverty, criminality, the continuing 
insurgency and ethno-tribal politics -- all exacerbated by 
three decades of war and misrule since the Russian invasion 
of 1979.  Nevertheless, there are numerous Afghans, including 
those who have returned from abroad, who are dedicated to 
rebuilding their country. The energy and ambition of Afghan 
youth are particularly striking at the burgeoning university 
campuses.  Nevertheless, the Afghan government and people 
await President Obama,s decision on a strategy for further 
U.S. engagement here. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Against this background, ISAF continues to pursue a 
counterinsurgency strategy, centered on protecting the 
population and reducing civilian casualties -- objectives key 
to Afghan popular and government support for all we do.  At 
the same time, ISAF is working to provide the security 
necessary to enable the complementary and growing civilian 
programs designed to help strengthen Afghanistan's society 
and government.  Our Mission is coordinating with GIRoA, ISAF 
and other international partners to rapidly increase the 
quality and size of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF).  The Afghan Army is growing by more than 2,500 per 
month, according to ISAF,s Combined Security Transition 
Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), who project troop strength of 
134,000 by October 2010.  The Ministry of the Interior is 
planning for a 160,000-strong police force by 2013, although 
Interior Minister Hanif Atmar cautions that this remains a 
planning figure.  Vigorous reform programs are also underway 
to reduce help corruption, especially within the Afghan 
National Police (ANP). 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Outside Kabul, coordinated U.S. civilian-military 
efforts focus on strengthening local government and 
measurably improving the delivery of basic government 
 
KABUL 00003177  002 OF 004 
 
 
services.  Our goal is to help support more visible, 
effective and honest governance at the sub-national level, 
with well-functioning links to the center.  Particular 
programs include integrated civilian-military Brigade Task 
Forces, PRTs and District Support Teams.  We are supporting a 
new GIRoA-led process to identify a limited number of "pilot 
districts" in which GIRoA, donors and Afghan and coalition 
security forces would collaborate to clear and hold areas 
where the Afghan government is unable to provide basic 
services and ensure population security.  We will then 
implement development projects based on self-identified 
community needs.  We work with traditional leadership 
structures and with those who have proven themselves ready to 
cooperate with the constitutional government and abide by the 
rule of law.  Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak 
connections between the capital and provinces, distrust and 
long-standing personal, ethnic and tribal rivalries, as well 
as the presence of insurgents or criminals, complicate our 
task. 
 
¶6. (U) New Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) positions, 
created in July for Regional Commands (RCs) East and South, 
have brought increased management, direction and oversight to 
civilian officers working in the field, and have strengthened 
civil-military cooperation.  Planning is underway to create 
additional SCR positions in RC-West and RC-North.  The SCR is 
the U.S. civilian counterpart to the RC military commander; 
s/he coordinates the work of all U.S. civilian personnel in 
his or her region, ensuring that civilian and military 
capabilities are working together to advance our strategic 
and counterinsurgency goals.  We plan to establish similar 
positions in the North and West. 
 
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Elections Still Unresolved 
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¶7.  (SBU) Afghans are still awaiting the results of the 
August 20 Presidential elections.  On September 16 the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced preliminary 
presidential election results with incumbent President Hamid 
Karzai in the lead at 54.52 percent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah at 
27.75 percent and Ramazan Bashardost at 9.2 percent. 
Continuing challenges include resolving issues related to 
charges of widespread fraud, conducting a limited recount, 
and completing a separate independent process to adjudicate 
numerous election-related complaints.  Slim odds still favor 
a first-round victory for Karzai but the outcome is far from 
certain; some random sampling of the 3,498 polling stations, 
ballots will be audited by the ICC/EEC (Electoral Complaints 
Commission) because of questionable results. We had publicly 
cautioned that these would not be perfect elections, but 
stressed that we expect they will represent the will of the 
majority of the people.  What ultimately matters is whether 
the Afghan people accept the electoral outcome and whether 
the new president forms a capable and honest cabinet that 
will help the new administration deliver services to the 
people.  We expect that during your visit the IEC will 
determine, and might also announce, whether there will be a 
second round in the presidential election process. 
 
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Little Momentum on Taliban Reconciliation 
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¶8.  (SBU) Many Afghans welcomed President Obama,s March 27 
and Secretary Clinton,s July 15 commitments to work with 
local leaders to promote reconciliation with Taliban who 
renounce al-Qaeda, lay down their arms and show they are 
willing "to participate in the free and open society 
enshrined in the Afghan Constitution."  Nonetheless, 
reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent leaders 
remains controversial and difficult.  Many Afghans welcome 
the possibility of reduced violence and greater stability, 
while others (non-Pashtuns, women, and some civil society 
groups) fear an intra-Pashtun deal that could come at the 
expense of their interests.  Some fighters who might 
otherwise be inclined to reintegrate are concerned that the 
U.S. may withdraw from Afghanistan leaving them vulnerable to 
reprisals from radical Taliban.  We expect the new Afghan 
administration, regardless of leadership, will make 
developing a comprehensive reintegration program a priority. 
 
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Strengthening the Economy 
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¶9.  (SBU) Due in part to the long years of conflict, 
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the 
 
KABUL 00003177  003 OF 004 
 
 
world, and is facing spending increases that are outpacing 
revenue year-over-year.  Heavy spring rains boosted 
agricultural production in 2009, however, yielding bumper 
wheat, vegetable and fruit crops.  This, along with growth in 
the services sector, has spurred projected economic growth 
for 2009-2010 to about ten percent.  Inflation is under two 
percent, and the Afghan currency is stable.  Relatively 
young, dynamic and reformist Ministers of Finance, Commerce 
and Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the 
business climate, and we are encouraging the government to 
implement major economic reforms to support private sector 
development.  Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to 
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and 
strengthen fiscal policies and practices so that it can 
develop a healthy business environment, eliminate corruption 
and reduce dependence on foreign aid over time. 
 
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Fast-Tracking our Assistance and the Longer Term 
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¶10.  (U) Within this economic climate, our approach to 
foreign assistance is focused on increasing our effectiveness 
and establishing a genuine partnership with GIRoA to benefit 
the Afghan people.  We are supporting GIRoA efforts to 
increase domestic revenues, increase budget disbursement and 
transparency and grow a cadre of functional civil servants 
hired on the basis of merit.  We are shifting our focus to 
projects designed to create jobs, including by promoting 
agricultural productivity, alternative livelihoods, 
infrastructure development, education and vocational 
training, capacity building, good governance and the rule of 
law.  At the national level, more U.S. assistance is being 
channeled through the Afghan government's core budget.  The 
increased numbers of civilian and military in the field will 
allow us to partner with sub-national officials and extend 
the reach of the GIRoA to district levels.  We are shifting 
our assistance to smaller, flexible and faster contract and 
grant mechanisms to increase decision-making at the more 
local levels.  A coordinated civilian-military coalition and 
an effective U.S. regional counterinsurgency strategy will 
provide the necessary secure space within which assistance 
efforts can operate. We are also encouraging local 
procurement initiatives so monies spent will more directly 
benefit the Afghan economy and people, and allocating 
resources by region and sector to support stability and build 
Afghan government capacity.  For example, USAID 
infrastructure activities in the south and east currently 
employ 26,000 Afghans in the power, water and transportation 
sectors. 
 
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Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
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¶11.  (SBU) The September 2 UN Office for Drug and Crime 
(UNODC) Opium Survey indicated that poppy cultivation 
decreased by 22 percent this year (following a 19 percent 
decrease in 2008), while production decreased by 10 percent 
(the difference accounted for by higher yields).  The number 
of poppy-free provinces has risen from 18 to 20; all of the 
provinces in the Northern region are poppy free for the first 
time in almost a decade.  Nevertheless, Afghanistan still 
accounts for 90 percent of the world's opium, and poppy 
cultivation remains a serious problem in the troubled south 
and west, where six provinces account for 97 percent of the 
country,s poppy crop.  The fight in Afghanistan is not 
merely about narcotics, but stemming the narcotics trade will 
be key to breaking the narcotics-financing chain to the 
insurgency and combating endemic corruption. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Our new counternarcotics strategy moves away from 
costly eradication efforts that have yielded limited results 
and alienated large segments of the population.  We are now 
going after high-level processing and trafficking targets and 
the systems that support them, and creating incentives for 
farmers to turn to licit crops.  Our agriculture programs 
give farmers easier access to permanent alternatives to poppy 
cultivation; our development programs provide incentives for 
local communities not to grow poppy.  DEA will expand its 
presence from 9 to 70 agents, and INL will increasingly shift 
its focus to supporting greater interdiction efforts.  We are 
also increasing our public information efforts to educate 
communities about the risks of growing poppy, the 
possibilities of alternate livelihoods and the dangers of 
addiction.  Similarly, we promote the rule of law by helping 
build Afghan law enforcement institutions, prosecutorial 
services, courts and corrections systems. 
 
 
KABUL 00003177  004 OF 004 
 
 
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Gaining Traction on Gender and Human Rights 
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¶13.  (SBU) A thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society 
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive 
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlook 
of a young but determined demographic in this 
conservative society.  There have been recent improvements in 
legislation protecting women, and in the period running up to 
the Presidential elections there was unprecedented coverage 
of candidate debates, fora and interviews, widening the 
content and quality of information available to the public. 
Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human rights 
record remain poor, including violence and discrimination 
against women, lack of due process and weak rule of law, and 
intimidation restricting the exercise of free speech.  In the 
face of powerful conservative religious and tribal 
patriarchal traditions, 
the Afghan government has shown a lack of sustained will to 
press forward a systematic campaign to promote and protect 
human rights, particularly women's rights. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Civil society campaigners for gender equity, 
however, have an impact far beyond their low numbers and 
offer hope and inspiration for the future.  Most of our 
Afghan civil society interlocutors say the process which led 
to reform in the published version of the Shia Personal 
Status Law (SPSL) is a step forward in advancing women's 
rights, but several articles in the SPSL still contradict 
Afghan women's constitutional right to equality.  Most 
believe the law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
is a strong law that will protect women's rights.  The 
Women,s Commission in Parliament is currently working with 
international and Afghan legal experts as well as civil 
society to further strengthen the law. 
 
- - - - - 
Management 
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¶15.  (SBU) To properly implement our strategies to improve 
responsiveness in Afghan institutions and local capacity, we 
require an increased U.S. civilian presence alongside the 
increases in U.S. military personnel.  In August 2009, the 
Mission had 470 U.S. civilians in Afghanistan, including 159 
in the field; we anticipate reaching 944 civilian positions 
by the end of the year, of which 380 will be in the field. 
The new civilians will join various State Department and 
USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and 
the FBI (Legal Attach), the Departments of Agriculture, 
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT) and 
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC), as well as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).  In Kabul, we are helping Afghans 
create a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and building 
its capacity to deliver services to the public.  Strong 
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, 
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, 
Counternarcotics, the Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance and the Afghan Central Bank.  The Interior, 
Agriculture and Finance Ministries enjoy strong leadership, 
while the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice, 
confronted with a complex legal system that combines 
sometimes inconsistent elements of Sharia, tribal, and 
Western law, suffer from the acute lack of qualified 
professionals. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Our efforts to double the U.S. civilian staffing 
complement and acquire the requisite expertise have resulted 
in immense administrative and management challenges, 
including recruitment, hiring, clearing, training, funding 
and orienting personnel, as well as providing workspace and 
life-support requirements.  We also face growing difficulties 
in recruiting local staff in certain specialties, as there is 
great competition for the small pool of well-qualified 
candidates.  We have acquired a 7.5-acre parcel of land 
adjacent to the East side of the Mission compound and are 
continuing to press for more property, both in Kabul, and in 
Mazar-e Sharif and Herat, where we plan to open consulates. 
While the Afghan government is cooperative, political 
uncertainty has delayed finalizing and implementing 
agreements, including leases for Mazar and Herat. 
 
EIKENBERRY