VZCZCXRO4402
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3168/01 2801410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071410Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1999
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003168 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID MOPS AF
SUBJECT: GOVERNANCE IN PANJSHIR - PEEKING UNDER THE HOOD 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The government and people of Panjshir have 
firm control of their own security, providing a safe 
environment for development and enabling the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) to undertake $65 million worth of 
projects.  However, human capacity remains weak.  Perceived 
neglect by the central government, coupled with Panjshir,s 
Mujahadeen culture, stifles the development of modern 
institutions and links to Kabul.  Bereft of resources and 
indigenous expertise, Panjshiris look first to the PRT to 
meet their development needs.  Governor Bahlol has done a 
great deal for the province and for the PRT, but his 
leadership style limits the space for competent bureaucrats 
to grow.  The Panjshir PRT is working closely with the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 
strategies to support and empower provincial officials so 
that they -- not the U.S. -- are setting development 
priorities for the province.  Panjshirs, unrivaled security 
situation makes it an excellent laboratory to try out new 
civilian-led approaches aimed at building Afghan governance 
and ownership.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
PANJSHIR:  A SECURITY SUCCESS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) It is sometimes easy to forget that Panjshir lies in a 
war zone.  There are no security barriers to travel within 
the valley.  Conex shops line the excellent main road, which 
has been widened and paved by the PRT.  Road construction is 
everywhere, and a few modern homes are starting to rise above 
the traditional mud dwellings.  Girls and boys are being 
educated, even in the most remote villages.  Afghan National 
Police (ANP) checkpoints are rare, and the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) has no presence at all, except for a small 
recruiting center and a few guards watching MOD weapons 
stockpiles.  Voters had no difficulty getting to the polls on 
August 20, casting their votes in a calm and orderly process. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Credit for Panjshir,s excellent security situation 
goes to the Panjshiris themselves, a proud and insular people 
of overwhelmingly Tajik (97 percent) ethnicity.  Panjshiris 
are proud of their resistance against the Soviets and the 
Taliban, and their post-9/11 partnership with U.S. forces to 
run the Taliban out of Kabul.  This legacy of security 
cooperation led to the establishment in 2005 of the unique 
Panjshir PRT:  civilian-led, with no maneuver element, and 
protected by local Mujahadeen guards rather than by a U.S. 
security force.  Since 2005, security incidents have been 
rare, although the PRT did experience an IED/small arms 
attack in July.  There were no casualties, and four suspects 
remain in NDS custody (Note: the tragic deaths earlier this 
year of four PRT personnel, including LTC Mark Stratton, took 
place in Kapisa, not Panjshir). 
 
---------------------------- 
GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING LINK 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Panjshir,s unparalleled security situation has 
enabled the PRT to undertake some $65 million in projects 
since 2005, including roads, schools, clinics, micro-hydro 
power generators, and agriculture.  However, the ease of PRT 
building comes at a price:  Panjshiris expect more from the 
PRT than from their own institutions.  Locals perceive 
(correctly) that the central government has given them 
little.  Governor Bahlol,s poor relationship with Karzai -- 
the two have not had a meeting in nearly five years -- 
contributes to this sense of neglect.  Ministers seldom 
visit.  Meanwhile, the provincial Line Directors suffer from 
the usual ailments afflicting their colleagues elsewhere: 
weak capacity, few resources, and a lack of influence over 
ministry decisions.  Unmotivated and short of gas money, few 
Line Directors venture far from their offices in the 
provincial capital. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Governance in Panjshir is defined by the province's 
Mujahadeen culture.  In the run-up to the August 20 
elections, some questioned whether former Defense Minister 
Marshal Fahim could effectively activate his former 
sub-commanders to generate votes for President Karzai, widely 
despised in Panjshir, where he captured less than 1 percent 
of the vote in 2004.  Karzai,s take of nearly 28 percent 
this time around -- despite Governor Bahlol,s efforts to 
suppress those votes -- suggests Panjshir,s informal 
Mujahadeen structures remain largely intact.  Abdullah 
Abdullah has strong support in Panjshir,s lower districts, 
where (the overtly pro-Abdullah) Governor Bahlol served as 
top commander in his Mujahadeen days, and whose residents 
 
KABUL 00003168  002 OF 002 
 
 
still follow his lead. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Panjshir,s Mujahadeen culture, a sort of "benign 
warlordism," benefits security but stifles the acceptance of 
national institutions.  Across the province, former fighters, 
mullahs, and ordinary villagers serve as the eyes and ears of 
the ANP and NDS, an informal "neighborhood watch" that makes 
Panjshir hostile terrain for would-be troublemakers.  ANP 
shakedowns do not occur, probably because bad behavior of 
this kind would be swiftly corrected by ex-Mujahadeen elders. 
 The system works and is unlikely to change quickly.  For all 
of the recent infrastructure improvements, Panjshir remains a 
rural subsistence economy.  Civil society barely exists, and 
young people seeking modern opportunities are quick to leave 
for the capital.  When Governor Bahlol departs office, he 
will likely be replaced by another ex-Mujahadeen -- this time 
loyal to Fahim.  Moreover, the next Provincial Council may 
include several representatives elected solely on the basis 
of their Mujahadeen credentials. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Governor Bahlol has been a strong and effective 
leader, but also a domineering presence.  An enthusiastic 
supporter of the PRT, he has intervened numerous times to 
solve problems impeding PRT projects and regularly chastises 
Line Directors when they are not doing their jobs.  Bahlol,s 
priorities for Panjshir -- infrastructure, agriculture and 
education -- generally track with our own, and he has shown a 
fierce commitment to keeping Panjshir safe and poppy-free. 
He is relatively uncorrupt and appears genuinely committed to 
the people of the province.  Yet he remains a Mujahadeen to 
his core, displaying imperfect skills as a manager and 
administrator, sucking up most of the political oxygen, and 
leaving little room for other officials to grow.  To some 
extent, his domineering approach to governance absolves the 
provincial Line Directors from taking charge of their own 
portfolios. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PRT PANJSHIR:  SHIFTING THE FOCUS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Panjshir,s Provincial Development Council (PDC), 
chaired by Governor Bahlol, meets regularly and is 
well-attended by Line Directors and the small number of NGOs 
that operate in the province.  However, as an Afghan-led 
process, it is yet to reach its full potential.  Discussions 
are often bloated and unfocused.  Participants identify needs 
but fail to identify their own roles and responsibilities. 
Instead of prioritizing projects, participants approve 
whatever comes before them, particularly if the Governor is 
interested, and defer serious funding decisions to the PRT. 
There is no need for trade-offs, and little if any strategic 
planning.  Panjshir,s Provincial Development Plan (PDP), 
completed in 2007, is out of date and somewhat irrelevant. 
Worse, Line Directors fail to coordinate their activities 
with one another, through the required sector meetings, 
before the PDC meets. 
 
¶9. (U) PRT Director has been working with UNAMA on strategies 
to address these problems and to encourage greater Afghan 
ownership in provincial development.  At the PRT,s behest, 
UNAMA has rolled out a proposal for updating the Provincial 
Development Plan this fall, putting local officials squarely 
in the lead.  Governor Bahlol agrees and the first meeting 
occurred on September 28.  UNAMA has emphasized the 
importance of effective sector meetings, with participation 
by all Line Directors, in order to prepare decisions by the 
PDC.  As a result, PRT personnel now attend every sector 
meeting, to encourage coordination and Afghan ownership.  PRT 
leadership is also engaging intensively with individual Line 
Directors, and integrating them into all PRT projects, in 
order to support and empower them. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  After years of successful infrastructure 
projects, the time is ripe in Panjshir to focus on human 
capacity-building, looking beyond the Governor's office to 
build a cadre of bureaucrats who can link the province to 
Kabul.  "Model" may not be the best word to describe 
Panjshir, given that not all of its advantages -- its unique 
history, mono-ethnic population, and defensible geography -- 
can be replicated elsewhere.  Panjshir might be thought of 
instead as a platform for the projection of stability 
outward, and as a natural laboratory to try out new 
civilian-led approaches aimed at building good governance and 
Afghan ownership.  End Comment. 
EIKENBERRY